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ABSTRACT
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Selanik became one of 
most modernised and dynamic regions of the Ottoman Empire. With its tightly knit 
marketing networks and extensive railway systems, relatively well-developed financial 
markets, fluid land market, modem factories, burgeoning urban areas and port-cities, 
Selanik had clearly become one of the leading commercial regions of the entire eastern 
Mediterranean basin by the* turn of the twentieth century. Two primary forces underlay 
the process of economic modernisation in the region, namely the capitalist world 
economy and the reform efforts of the Ottoman government. Enhanced integration with 
the world economy brought new opportunities and helped bolster economic 
modernisation in the region. The reform efforts and infrastructure investments of the 
Ottoman state also contributed to the moment of commercialisation and modernisation.
Notwithstanding the impressive dynamism and apparent modernisation of the 
regional economy, serious processes of retardation and backwardness also surfaced 
rather strongly during the same period. Ironically, the very same forces that generated 
much dynamism in the regional economy also prepared the structural ground for 
retardation and backwardness. More specifically, the growing moment of 
commercialisation and enhanced integration with the world capitalist economy created 
serious dislocations in the agrarian economy and prepared ground for economic 
retardation. Likewise, the organisational, fiscal and diplomatic weakness of the Ottoman 
government undermined the existing potential for economic development and growth.
Thus, a dual economic structure emerged whereby facets of “modernity” and 
growth meshed with those of economic retardation and backwardness. The socio­
economic tensions and contradictions building up in this process prepared the structural 
background to the dissolution and eventual collapse of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. 
In other words, the sporadic fits of modernity and growth could not be sustained, given 
the overwhelming dominance of European economic interests and the apparent, 
weakness of the Ottoman state. The conflict ridden transformation process simply 
erupted in uprising, revolution and war.
The fear o f loneliness has been like a ball and 
chain restraining ambition, as much o f an obstacle 
to a fu ll life as persecution, discrimination or 
poverty. Until the chain is broken, freedom, for  
many, will remain a nightmare
T. Zeldin
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INTRODUCTION
1. The Problem:
Contemporary Near Eastern economies face serious economic problems. 
Endemic poverty, twisted income distribution, inadequate health and educational 
services, environmental problems, and resource depletion affect the region in varying 
degrees of urgency.1 These economic problems undermine the quality of life in the 
region and put the vast majority of its people under acute and constant economic 
distress. In retrospect, this poor state of economic affairs may appear to have been the. 
destiny of the region. The persistent failure of the modernisation efforts in the region is 
striking. Modernisation efforts have yielded important results, and underscored the 
irreversible transformation of these economies towards a more industrialised and urban- 
based structure since the e.arly decades of the nineteenth century. Egypt under Mehmet 
Ali during 1805-1845, the Hamidian and Unionist years of the Ottoman Empire, early 
decades of Republican Turkey, the first few decades of the post-war communist regimes 
in the Balkans, the import substituting industrialisation drive of the 1960s and the 
1970s, and the moment of economic liberalisation during the 1980s and the 1990s 
constitute some of the important landmarks in this long process.2 Still, the region
1 A. Richards, and J. Waterbury, A Political Economy o f the Middle East, State, Class, and 
Economic Development, (Boulder, San Fransisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990); R Owen, and §. 
Pamuk, Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); C. Issawi, The 
Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery, Selected Essays by Charles Issawi, (Princeton: Markus 
Wiener Publishers, 1995).
2 The literature is vast on this topic. However, primary contributions can be cited as follows: R. 
Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, 1. P. (1981), (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd. Publishers, 1993); D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert 
(eds.), An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-946; Z.Toprak, Turkiye’de Milli Iktisat, (1908- 
1918), [National Economy in Turkey (1908-1918)) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymlari, 1982); V.Eldem, Osmanli 
imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi §artlari Hakkinda bir Tetkik, [Research on the Economic Conditions of the 
Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kunimu Basimevi,(l.P. 1970), 1994a); V. Eldem, Harp ve 
Miitareke Ydlarinda Osmanli imparatorlugu’nun Ekonomisi, [Ottoman Economy in Years o f War and 
Armistice] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kunimu Basimevi,1994); Q. Keyder, Dunya Ekonomisi Iginde Turkiye, 
1923-1929, [Turkey in the World Economy, 1923-1929] (Ankara: Yurt Yaymlan,1982); Q. Keyder, State 
and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London: Verso, 1987); Y.S. Tezel, Cumhuriyet 
Doneminin iktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950), [Economic History of the Republican Era, 1923-1950] (Ankara: 
Yurt Yaymlari, 1986); G. Kazgan, Tanzimat’tan XXI. Yiizyila Turkiye Ekonomisi, Birinci Kureselle§meden 
Ikinci Kureselle$meye [Turkish Economy from the Tanzimat to the Twenty-First Century, From the First 
Wave of Globalisation to the Second] (istanbul: Altai Kitaplar Yaymevi, Ankara 1999); Richards and
1
appears to have failed to break through the predicament of poverty. The modernisation 
drive of especially the last thirty years, particularly in the Balkans and increasingly in 
Turkey, also came at a severe environmental cost, which puts a heavy burden not only 
on current generations but also on future ones. Overall, the project of “modernisation”, 
which initially promised prosperity as well as greater equality for all, appears betrayed. 
in the region.3
The poor state of Near Eastern economies has strongly shaped the way in which 
the economic history of the region has been written over the last four decades. 
Economic historians attempted to trace back certain structural factors, and processes 
that have underscored the persistence of underdevelopment in the region. This is an 
effort that is politically and academically justifiable. The effort is politically justifiable 
for it attempts to understand and explain the historical reasons underlining the 
persistence of human suffering and insecurity, notwithstanding the great technological 
achievements of our era and the economic potential of the region. An effort to explain 
‘what went wrong’ in the Near East may provide us with a better insight in dealing with 
problems of the region.
Earlier efforts to deal with problems of economic development in the Near East 
suffered from certain historiographical flaws. For one, nationalist worldviews and 
suppositions, which have had a strong influence on the historiography of the Near East, 
affect our perceptions and interpretations of historical events and processes in peculiar 
ways.4 That these perceptions and interpretations have become deeply entrenched in our
Waterbury, A Political Economy o f the Middle East', Pamuk and Owen, Middle East Economies in the 
Twentieth Century, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).
3 See R.B. Norgaard, Development Betrayed, The End o f  Progress and a Coevolutionary 
Revisioning o f the Future, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), for a strong environmentalist 
critique of modernisation drive of the last half century.
4 For critiques of nationalist historiography in Ottoman studies see H. islamoglu-inan and Q. 
Keyder, ‘Agenda for Ottoman History’, in H. islamoglu (ed.) The Ottoman Empire and the World 
Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 42-62; H. islamoglu-inan, “Osmanli Tarihi 
ve Dunya Sistemi; Bir Degerlendirme,” [Ottoman History and World System: An Assessment], Toplum 
ve Bilim 23, (1983): 9-39; H. islamoglu-inan, “Introduction: Oriental Despotism in World Perspective,” 
in H. islamoglu (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 1-26; E. D. Akarli and C. Fleicher, ‘Taking Stock of Ottoman History,” (Unpublished paper. 
presented at the Rockefeller Foundation Seminar on Ottoman History, St. Louis, April 12-15, 1990); T. 
Akfam, Turk Ulusal Kimligi ve Ermeni Sorunu, [Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question] 
(istanbul: ileti§im Yaymlari, 1992); H. Berktay, Cumhuriyet Ideolojisi ve Fuat Koprulu, [Republican 
Ideology and Fuat Koprulu] (istanbul Kaynak Yaymlari 1983); H. Berktay, “The Search for the Peasant 
in the Western and Turkish History/Historiography,” in S. Faroqhi and H. Berktay (eds.) New 
Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 109-185; S. Faroqhi, 
‘Introduction’ in S. Faroqhi and H. Berktay (eds.) New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman 
History, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 3-17; S. Faroqhi, “In Search of Ottoman History,” in S. and Faroqhi
minds through public education and other popular means, blinds many to alternative 
visions and approaches.5 For instance, until recently, there has been an apparent lack of 
serious interest in the Ottoman period of Balkan economic history. Many standard texts, 
including those of Lampe and Jackson and Berend and Ranki, offer categorical 
judgements without serious research or reflection.6 Typically, they could argue that 
Ottoman despotism was the primary factor that undermined the developmental potential 
of the Balkan economies. The implication of this position is that, in an ideal world, that 
is a world without the exacting oriental despotism of the Ottomans, the Balkan 
economies would have successfully gone through the necessary stages of social and 
economic development that eventually, and inevitably, led to industrial capitalism. They 
would have potentially broken through the predicament of underdevelopment long 
before the establishment of the communist regimes in the region. Thus, the mainstream 
scholarship in Balkan economic history has defined the Ottoman past as the “other” in 
its nationalist imagination,' identifying it as the source of persistent backwardness in the 
region.7
A similar problem in dealing with the Ottoman past also surfaces quite strongly 
in nationalist Turkish historiography. In works of this genre, the economic history of the 
Ottoman Empire is treated as a process of steady decline and retreat since its “classical
H. Berktay (eds.), New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, (London: Frank Cass, 
1992), 211-241.
 ^ H.Berktay, “The Search for the Peasant”; H. Berktay, “Diinyada ve Tiirkiye’de Tarihfiligin 
Durumu ve Dilin Evrenselle§mesi Uzerine Dti§iinceler,” [The State of Historiography in the World and 
Turkey and Thoughts on the Universalisation of Language] in S. Ozbaran (eds.,) Tarih ve Ders Kitaplari, 
Buca Sempozyumu, 29 EyliXl -  1 Ekim 1994 [History and Teaching Books, Buca Symposium, 29 
September -  1 October 1994] (istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlari, 1995), 69-86; H. Millas, Yunan 
Ulusunun Dogu§u [The Birth of the Greek Nation] (istanbul: ileti§im Yaymlari, 1994); H. Millas, 
“Tiirkiye’de Etnosantrik Tarihfiligin Pratik Sorunlan,” [Practical Problems of Ethnocentric 
Historiography in Turkey], in S. Ozbaran (eds.,) Tarih ve Ders Kitaplari, Buca Sempozyumu, 29 Eyliil -  1 
Ekim 1994 [History and Teaching Books, Buca Symposium, 29 September -  1 October 1994] (istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlari, 1995), 69-86.
6 I. T.Berend, and G. Ranki, Economic Development in East-central Europe in the 19th and 
20th Centuries, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974); J. R. Lampe, and M. R. 
Jackson Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950, From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).
 ^ For a comprehensive critique of nationalist Balkan historiography see F. Adamr, “The 
Macedonian Question: the Socio-economic Reality and Problems of its Historiographic Interpretation,” 
International Journal o f Turkish Studies, 3, N. 1, (1984-85): 43-64; F. Adamr, “Tradition and Rural 
Change in Southeastern Europe During Ottoman Rule,” in D. Chirot (ed.), The Origins o f Backwardness 
in Eastern Europe, Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century, 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1989 ), 131-176. Also see M. 
Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in L. C. Brown (ed.), Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman 
Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (1996), 45-77.; N. Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” 
in L. C. Brown (ed.) Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 30-44, for a thorough discussion of Balkan historiography and 
its problems.
3
age” in the sixteenth century. Post-classical Ottoman economic history ends in full­
blown financial and economic dependency and loss of national sovereignty. The 
degeneration of the “classical” Ottoman institutions leads to the weakening of the 
central authority.8 Unable to control the provinces and collect the taxes, the central 
government runs into serious fiscal problems. The' monetary regime becomes 
destabilised leading to inflation and gradual economic decline.9 Simultaneously, ever 
intensifying European competition in international and domestic markets, and the heavy 
burden of constant warfare on Ottoman state finances, further intensifies the problems 
of the Ottoman economy.10 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman 
economy enters the path of semi-colonisation. Only after the establishment of the 
sovereign republican regime in the 1920s does the economy recover sufficiently to 
make the desired breakthrough.11 Thus, once again, the Ottoman past emerges as the 
negation, or rather the anti-thesis of ‘modernity’, which is considered to be the 
exclusive attribute of the republican era.
The problems of the Ottoman economy had become certainly grave and far 
reaching by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Fiscal insolvency, monetary 
instability, and inflationary pressures were among the problems that affected the 
Ottoman economy and economic policy makers.12 However, seeing the roots of these 
problems in a steady and sustained economic decline that lasted for over three centuries
8 See H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600, 1. P. (1973), (London: 
Phoenix, 1994); H.inalcik, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600,” in H. inalcik and D. 
Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9-410.
9 O. L Barkan, “The Price Revolution of 16th Century,” International Journal o f Middle East 
Studies, 6, (1975): 3-28; O.L. Barkan, Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, [Land Issues in Turkey], Collected 
Works, V. 1, (istanbul: Gozlem Yaymlari, 1980.
10 B. McGowan, “The Age of Ayans, 1699-1812,” in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An 
Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637-758.
11 D. Avcioglu, Turkiye’nin Diizeni, [The Order of Turkey] V. 1, (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 
1966). Also see Z. Y. Hershlag, Introduction to the Modem Economic History o f the Middle East, 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964); Z. Y. Hershlag, “The Late Ottoman Finances: A Case Study in Guilt and 
Punishment,” in O. Okyar and H. inalcik (eds.) Social and Economic History o f Turkey (1071-1920): 
Papers Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History o f Turkey, 
(Ankara: Meteksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 297-310.,
12 §. Pamuk, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nda Paramn Tarihi [The History of Money in the 
Ottoman Empire] (istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlari, 1999); Y. Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim 
ve Degi$im Donemi (XVIII, yy. Dan Tanzimat’a Mali Tarih), [Era of Crises and Change in Ottoman Fiscal 
Policy (Fiscal History From XVIHth Century to the Tanzimat)] (istanbul: Alan Yaymcilik, 1986); 
M.Gen?, “Osmanli Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi”, [Malikane System in Ottoman Finances], in O. Okyar 
and U. Nalbantoglu (eds.), Turkiye Iktisat Tarihi Semineri [Turkish Economic History Seminar] (Ankara: 
Hacettepe Universitesi Yaymlari, 1975), 230-296; M.Gen?, “XVHI. Ytizyilda Osmanli Ekonomisi ve 
Sava§,” [Ottoman Economy and War in Eighteenth Century], Yapit, 49, N.4, (1984): 51-61.
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is not persuasive. First, the historical evidence presented in support of this view is far 
from conclusive, because it is based on selectively used sources and tentative 
interpretations. Secondly, recent research indicates that the Ottoman economy showed 
signs of significant dynamism and growth. For instance, we now realise that in the first 
half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman economy could well have been much more 
dynamic and robust than what the steady decline thesis would suggest. Likewise, 
research by distinguished scholars such as Eldem, Issawi, Kurmu§, Pamuk, Owen, 
Kasaba, Quataert, Go9ek, and Palairet indicate that certain sectors and regions of the 
Ottoman economy enjoyed considerable growth and dynamism during the nineteenth 
century. Clearly, the history of Ottoman economy was more complex and uneven than 
the notion of steady decline would imply.13 Indeed, our attention is now shifting 
increasingly towards sustainability of growth over time, and to its diffusion from the 
dynamic enclave economies over to other branches of the economy. In this context, we 
increasingly consider the dynamic interplay between political power struggles and 
institutional structures on the one hand and processes o f economic growth and 
retardation on the other. The current thesis addresses these issues of sustainability, 
diffusion, and interaction.
Equally serious conceptual and historiographical problems have emanated from 
the Eurocentric bias that has prevailed in Near Eastern studies. Eurocentrism has 
assumed two primary forms in the literature. One of these is conceptual Eurocentrism, 
which has been particularly prominent amongst scholars who have subscribed to liberal 
theories of post-war ecoiiomic development. Economic historians borrowed heavily 
from Rostow during the 1960s and the 1970s and viewed Ottoman economic history as 
a process o f failed transition from traditional society to a mature industrial one, via the
V Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nun Iktisadi §artlari; C. Issawi, (ed.) The Economic 
History o f  the Middle East, 1800-1914, (Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 1966); C. 
Issawi, The Economic History o f Turkey, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1980); 
O. Kurmu?, “Some Aspects of Handicrafts and Industrial Production in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1915,” 
Asian and African Studies, 15, (1981): 85-101; O. Kurmu?, Emperyalizmin Tiirkiye'ye Giri§i, [The 
Penetration o f Imperialism into Turkey], 1. P. (1974), (Ankara: Sava? Yaymlari 1982); §. Pamuk, The 
Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade, Investment and Production, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik ve Biiyume, 
[Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Economy], (istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yaymlari, 1994); R. Owen, 
The Middle East in the World Economy', R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, The 
Nineteenth Century, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987); D. Quataert, Ottoman 
Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Los Angeles: University of 
California Los Angeles, 1973); D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age o f the Industrial 
Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”; F. 
Go?ek, The Rise o f the Bourgeoisie and the Demise o f the Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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intermediary stages of “take-off’.14 The problem in this approach is that Rostow’s 
theory of the stages of economic growth offers a universal model of economic 
development that is based primarily on the European, and more specifically on the 
British, experience.15 Quataert persuasively argues that scholars who see “failure” in the 
Ottoman economy are in fact detecting divergence from the ‘unique’ British model and 
thus reaching the sterile conclusion that the Ottoman economy simply did not follow the 
British path to modernity, that is a rapid, factory-based industrialisation.16 Alternatively, 
Quataert maintains that comparisons with Japan, India and possibly China, where 
labour-intensive, small-scale and rural manufacturing industries assumed greater 
significance in the early stages of modem economic development, would be more 
meaningful in understanding the dynamics of economic change and modernisation in 
the Ottoman economy. Thus, Quataert points at the importance of putting the Ottoman 
experience into a more historical/comparative context, rather than developing 
straightforward narratives of failed industrialisation “according to a pattern prescribed 
from outside”.17
An equally robust criticism of the standard modernisation approaches came from 
the World System Analysis (WSA). The WSA conceives “underdevelopment” as a 
manifestation of an all-encompassing, long-term historical process that divided the 
world economy into core and peripheral zones, rather than being a peculiar anomaly 
marked by the lack or retardation of certain precepts of modernity.18 Thus, the WSA 
radically rejects the idea of an “ideal-type” pattern, or model, of economic development 
that can constitute the yardstick against which the condition of underdevelopment or
1996); M. Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c.1800-1914, Evolution without Development, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
l^ W. W. Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960). See Eldem, Osmanli imparatorlugu’nun iktisadi §artlari; O. Okyar, “The Role of the State 
in the Economic Life of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” Asian and African Studies, 14, (1980): 
143-164; O. Okyar, “A New Look at the Problem of Economic Growth in the Ottoman Empire (1800- 
1914),” The Journal o f European Economic History, 16, N. 1, (1987): 7-50; Issawi, The Economic 
History o f Turkey', Issawi, The Middle East Economy; Issawi, Economic History o f Turkey, Hershlag, 
Modern Economic History o f  the Middle East, for Rostowian approaches to Ottoman economic history.
For a critique of the euro-centric developmentalist paradigm see B. Hettne, Development 
Theory and the Three Worlds, l.P. (1990), (Longman Development Studies, Essex: Longman Scientific 
and Technical, 1994). For a critique of Rostow, see J. Larrain, Theories o f Development, Capitalism, 
Colonialism and Dependency, (Cambridge and Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 1994); I.Roxborough, 
Theories o f Underdevelopment, l.P. (1979), (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press, 1994).
16 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, 1-19.
17 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, 1.
18 For Wallerstein’s broad World System framework see I. Wallerstein, The Modem World- 
System I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f  the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth
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backwardness could be detected and tested. This constitutes a strong criticism of the 
modernist framework discussed above. Alternatively, the WSA emphasises the 
historical nature of underdevelopment and sees it as a dynamic process underlined by 
the aggressive expansion of European capitalism on a global scale. In this approach, the 
economic history of the Ottoman Empire appears as a process of incorporation into the 
expanding capitalist world economy and subsequent peripherisation.19 Within this 
context, the WSA pays attention not only to processes of crisis and retardation, but also 
to those of adaptation and growth. For instance, the WSA enables us to explain the 
dynamism of the sectors that articulated well with the moment of peripherisation, as in 
the case of the rapid growth of cash crops or the apparent success of export oriented 
manufacturing industries.20 Likewise, the rapid growth of the urban construction 
industry and the service sector, particularly in the booming port-cities of the 
Mediterranean basin, emerge as a central theme in nineteenth century Ottoman 
economic history.21 Simultaneously, however, the WSA provides us with an 
interpretative framework that helps explain the retarding effects of peripherisation on 
certain branches of the economy, most notably on consumer goods industries.22 The 
WSA also puts strong emphasis on the adverse and destabilising effects of financial and 
economic dependency.23
Century, (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1974); I. Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science, The 
Limits o f Nineteenth Century Paradigms, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
19 islamoglu and Keyder, “Agenda for Ottoman History”; I. Wallerstein, “The Ottoman Empire 
and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research,” in O. Okyar and H. inalcik (eds.) 
Social and Economic History o f Turkey (1071-1920): Papers Presented to the First International 
Congress on the Social and Economic History o f Turkey, (Ankara: Meteksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 117- 
122; I. Wallerstein, H. Decdeli and R. Kasaba “Osmanli Tarihi ve Dunya Sistemi” [Ottoman History and 
the World System], Toplum ve Bilim, 23, (1983): 9-39; I. Wallerstein, H. Decdeli and R. Kasaba, “The 
Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World Economy,” in H. islamoglu-inan (ed.) The Ottoman 
Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 88-100.
20 H. islamoglu, and S. Faroqhi “Crop Patterns and Agricultural Production Trends in Sixteenth 
Century Anatolia,” Review, N. 2, (1979): 401-436; H. islamoglu-inan , State and Peasant in the Ottoman 
Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the 
Sixteenth Century, (Leiden, New York and Koln: E. J. Brill, 1994); Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire', Pamuk, 
Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik, Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy', R. Kasaba, The 
Ottoman Empire-, Q. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle 
East, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991); D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing.
Q. Keyder, Y. E. Ozveren and D. Quataert (eds.) Dogu Akdeniz’de Liman Kentleri, 1800- 
1914, [Port Cities of the Mediterranean] (istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlari, 1994), 121-157.
22 §. Pamuk, “Osmanli Zanaatlerinin Yikilmasi,” [The Decline of Ottoman Manufactures] 
Toplum ve Bilim, 23, (1983): 75-99; §. Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire in the ‘Great Depression’ of 1873- 
1896,” Journal o f Economic History, 44, N. 1, (1984): 107-118; Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire', Pamuk, 
OsmanliEkonomisinde Bagimhlik.
22 Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire', Pamuk, OsmanliEkonomisinde Bagimhlik’, E. Kiray, 
Osmanli’da Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borqlar, [Economic Structure and Foreign Debt in the Ottoman 
Empire] (istanbul: ileti§im,1993).
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Despite the advantages of the WSA over the modernist perspective as a 
framework of interpretation, the WSA comes with its own shortcomings. First, it has 
been argued that, in WSA, relations of causality run down from the world system to the 
specific localities in question. Consequently, peripheral zones emerge as passive, or 
constrained/weak recipients of world economic influences. This methodological 
position not only leads to a strong Eurocentric overtone in WSA, but it also undermines 
its self-proclaimed historicism.24 Thus, rather ironically, WSA feeds into the 
trivialisation and “otherisation” of peripheral histories, not unlike the modernist cum 
nationalist approaches discussed above. Secondly, and in relation with the first, the 
WSA has been criticised for its omission of non-economic factors in its assessment of 
the emergence, expansion and consolidation of the modem world economy.25 This 
omission, it is argued, manifests itself particularly strongly in its failure to account for 
the diversity of experiences within the periphery.
These criticisms have been voiced in Ottoman studies in recent years. In her 
1983 contribution, Huricihan Islamoglu pointed to the Eurocentrism and economic 
determinism of the WSA and underlined the importance of bringing the political and 
cultural processes, as well as the ideological fabric of the Ottoman society, into the 
study of Ottoman social and economic history.26 This forceful criticism apparently 
found acclaim among the proponents of WSA. From the mid-1980s onwards, a number 
of scholars began to apply more refined versions of the WSA to Ottoman history. The 
works of Pamuk, Kasaba, Quataert, Keyder, Tabak and Owen are important in this 
respect. These contributions enhance our understanding of the ways in which local 
structures interacted with broad global processes to condition the peculiar pattern of 
peripherisation in Ottoman lands. For instance, Keyder, Pamuk and Owen draw our 
attention to the crucial role played by the modernising Ottoman state apparatus in
24 T. Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” 
in Social Revolutions in the Modem World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 55-71; A. 
G. Frank, and B. K. Gills, “The 5,000-Year World System, An Interdisciplinary Introduction,” in A G. 
Frank and K. Gills (eds.), The World System, Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand, (London: 
Routledge, 1996).
25 R. Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structures and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe,” Past and Present, 70, (1976): 30-35; R. Brenner, “The Origins o f Capitalist Development: A 
Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” New Left Review, 104, (1977): 25-93.
26 H. Islamoglu-inan, “Osmanli Tarihi ve Dunya Sistemi: Bir Degerlendirme,” [Ottoman 
History and the World System: An Assessment] Toplum ve Bilim, 23, (1983): 9-39; H. islamoglu-inan, 
“Introduction: ‘Oriental Despotism’".
determining the timing and degree of integration into the capitalist world economy.27 
Quataert attempts, quite successfully, to bring the more silent segments of the Ottoman 
population, namely peasants, workers, women and children, and examines, into the 
study of Ottoman economic history.28 Kasaba studies the transformation of the networks 
of exchange and commodity circulation and points to the dynamic participation of local 
merchants, prominent landlords and bankers, as well as of European capitalists as 
primary agents of peripheral transformation in Western Anatolia.29 Keyder, Tabak and 
others contribute to our understanding of the transformation of the relations of 
production and property in agriculture.30
To sum up the discussion so far, the direction in Near Eastern studies, in general, 
and Ottoman economic and social history, in particular, has turned towards writing 
more humanist and politically open-minded histories that are sensitive to flaws of 
nationalist rhetoric, ahistorical and teleological suppositions, and Eurocentricism. The 
emphasis put on rigorous' empirical research in developing analytical models or 
interpretative frameworks have also increased considerably. Thus, we already have a 
better and more balanced understanding of the Ottoman economy. Straightforward 
narratives of sustained economic ‘decline’ now appear inadequate and flawed, 
empirically and conceptually. We see and admit the presence of dynamic processes of 
growth and transformation, side by side with those of retardation and crisis. Our 
attention is shifting towards an analysis of the factors and structural processes that 
impeded the sustainability of these processes of dynamism through time and their 
‘diffusion’ between sectors. Likewise, we now have a better understanding of the local 
processes that have conditioned, in important ways, the pattern of economic 
transformation in Ottoman lands. Consequently, we realise the importance of studies 
that aim at grasping the complex, dynamic, and fluidly interactive relations among 
various local agents, including intermediary merchants, bankers, landlords, as well as 
peasants and workers. We also put greater emphasis on the role played by local
27 islamoglu-lnan, and Keyder , “Agenda for Ottoman History”; Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire; 
R. Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy.
28 D. Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881- 
1908, Reactions to European Economic Penetration, (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 1983); D. Quataert, Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, 
(Istanbul: ISIS Press 1993).
29 Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire-, R. Kasaba, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie in Mid- 
Nineteenth-Century Western Anatolia,” Review, 11, (1988): 215-288.
2® Keyder and Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture.
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institutional structures, notably by the Ottoman state, in the broader processes of 
incorporation into the capitalist order during the nineteenth century.
The current thesis subscribes to the emerging neo-revisionist agenda in Ottoman 
economic and social history and concentrates on the historical dynamics of economic 
change and transformation m the Ottoman, empire during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Drawing heavily on the emergent literature on new institutional 
economics, the thesis focuses on the dynamic interplay between local institutional 
structures, the actions of market agents and the world economic forces, and analyses the 
ways in which this process of interaction conditioned the pattern and timing of 
economic change in the Ottoman Empire during the period under consideration. Thus, it 
addresses the classical problem of structure vs agency in historical change through an 
institutionalist lens. This eclectic institutionalist approach constitutes precisely the main 
contribution of the current thesis to the emerging neo-revisionist agenda in Ottoman 
economic history.
The current thesis also puts forth certain methodological suggestions, which can 
help improve our understanding of Ottoman economy and the ways with which we 
study its history. More specifically, the thesis addresses the above mentioned questions 
in a regional context and concentrates on the Selanik region during the late Ottoman 
period from c.1875-1912. There are a number of conceptual and empirical reasons for 
choosing the “region” as the primary unit o f analysis in discussing the dynamics of 
economic change in the Ottoman empire. The “region” constitutes a robust unit of 
analysis that enables us to maintain a careful balance between theoretical analysis and 
empirical research. Sources on Ottoman economic history are plentiful, but they are 
difficult to use and master effectively. This situation renders empirical research 
problematical. Under the circumstances, scholars are forced to work within more 
feasible research agendas, and put emphasis either on in-depth empirical research or on 
broad structural analysis. It seems, more empirically oriented scholars choose to work 
on relatively narrow topics, and undertake research in various archives and libraries 
consulting a wide range of different resources. More conceptually motivated scholars 
tend to use resources that are readily available and relatively easy to use and concentrate 
more on theoretical issues and discussions. Both approaches have had their drawbacks. 
In the case of empirically oriented studies, the topics often remained too specific, and 
the scholars found it difficult to associate a singular aspect of the Ottoman economy
10
with the broad trends and dynamics underlining its transformation. In the case of more 
conceptually oriented approaches, contributions often suffer from the inadequacy of 
empirical research. Powerful theoretical statements often remain unsatisfactorily tested 
against historical evidence and vulnerable to powerful empirical criticisms. Early 
theoretical contributions of scholars subscribing to the standard WSA suffer from such 
empirical drawbacks.31 Similarly, broad macro-studies that use flimsy and uncritically 
compiled statistical evidence suffer from theoretical laxity.32
A closer regional focus should provide us with an excellent opportunity to 
address broad theoretical problems within a more feasible research agenda. European 
and Ottoman sources often present themselves on a regional basis, and provide us with 
rich qualitative and quantitative information on almost all aspects of economic life. In 
this respect, a regional approach can serve as a strategic guide in the actual process of 
research and ease the difficulty of locating and finding relevant documents among 
massive collections, particularly in the Ottoman archives situated in Istanbul. In 
addition, a regional focus enables the researcher to clearly demonstrate, and even 
correct, the existing biases and weaknesses in the evidence at hand. Finally, provincial 
sources, especially the relevant Ottoman sources, have not yet been properly utilised so 
far, despite the rich information they provide on economic life. Regional research can 
help make up for this negligence.
As a unit of analysis, the “region” is a more suitable unit o f analysis in view of 
the diversity of economic structures observed in the Ottoman empire. Vast differences 
in factor endowments, in geography, in climate, in the degree of centralisation, in the 
level of integration with overseas markets, and in local customs and conventions do not 
lend themselves to easy generalisations and clear-cut conclusions over the dynamics of 
economic change and transformation in the Ottoman empire. Therefore, a regional 
outlook may provide us with a more focused and robust framework that is capable of 
accounting for the richness of experiences and the variations in patterns of economic 
transformation throughout the empire. Only along with the accumulation of such 
detailed surveys on regional economies, will we be in a position to fully understand not
3 1 islamoglu-lnan, and Keyder, “Agenda for Ottoman History,”; Wallerstein, “The Ottoman. 
Empire and the World System”; Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba, “Osmanli Tarihi ve Dunya Sistemi”.
32 Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nun iktisadi §artlari. For a critique of Eldem’s use of 
Ottoman statistics see, A. O. Akarli, “Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880-1910,” in §.
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only the transformation of economic relations in the Ottoman empire and the interactive 
dynamics and consequence? of its integration with the capitalist world order during the 
nineteenth century. The accumulation of such research would also enable us to make 
much needed inter-regional comparisons that would reveal important clues about the 
broad dynamics and the structural patterns of economic change in Ottoman lands. 
Regional monographs constitute the first and indispensable step to undertaking such an 
academic endeavour. It is with this belief and hope that I have undertaken the present 
study, concentrating on one of the leading economic “regions” of the empire, namely 
the Selanik region.
A number of historical and methodological reasons justify the choice of Selanik 
as the subject matter of a case study. First, Selanik was one of the most commercialised 
regions of the Ottoman empire. The region was situated at an crossroads that linked the 
Balkan peninsula to the Mediterranean basin, and the Aegean Sea to the Adriatic.33 
Owing much to this locational advantage, the region had' for long been an integral part 
of the Levantine world of commerce, while also maintaining close relations with 
European economies.34 From the seventeenth century onwards, the region increasingly 
came under the orbit of the expanding “world” economy, becoming one of the primary 
“integrated” regions of the empire by the end of the nineteenth century. With a dynamic 
port-town in Salonica, a prolific hinterland economy, developed commercial 
connections with European economies, and an extensive railway network that linked the 
entire region to continental Europe, Selanik was indeed a leading zone of peripheral 
engagement in Ottoman lands during the late nineteenth century.35 In this respect,
Pamuk and J. G. Williamson (eds.,), The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 109-133.
33 F. W Carter, “Introduction to the Balkan Scene” in F. W. Carter (ed.) A Historical Geography 
o f the Balkans, (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 1-24.
34 C. Vacalopoulos, A History o f Thessaloniki, (Thessaloniki, 1963); N. Todorov, “The Genesis 
of Capitalism in the Balkan Provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in 
Economic History, 7, N. 3, (1970): 313-324; I. Tekeli, and S. ilkin, “Ittihat ve Terakki Hareketinin 
01u§umunda Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapismin Belirleyiciligi,” [The Determining Role of the Social 
Structure of Salonica in the Formation of the Committee of Union and Progress] in O. Okyar and H. 
Inalcik (eds.), Turkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, 1071-1920, [Turkey’s Social and Economic 
History, 1071-19209] (Ankara: Metaksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 351-382; T. Stoianovich, “The 
Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” Journal o f Economic History, 20, 1960), 234-313; F. Adanir, 
“Tradition and Rural Change”; B. McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and 
Struggle for Land, 1600-1800, (Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: 
Cambridge University press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de rHomme,1981); N.Svoronos, Le 
commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe siecle, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956).
35 B. C. Gounaris, “Emigration from Macedonia in the Early Twentieth Century,” Journal o f  
Modem Greek Studies, 7, (1989): 133-153; B. C. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio- 
Economic Change and the Railway Factor, (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed
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Selanik offers a site where we can observe the transformative effects of world economic 
forces.
Secondly, Selanik was one of the most important Ottoman provinces where the 
central government could assume a relatively strong presence and could implement its 
policies effectively, in comparison to, say, the distant Eastern Anatolian and Arab 
provinces of the Empire.36 In this respect, the Selanik region also emerges as an ideal 
site to assess the role played by the Ottoman state in processes of economic change and 
transformation.
Thirdly, Selanik’s regional economy had peculiar, if  contradictory, features that 
make it an attractive object of historical inquiry in its own right. On the one hand, we 
see manifestations of ‘modernity’, such as comprehensive marketing networks mediated 
by large trading houses and intermediary merchants, extensive railway systems, modem 
banks and other financial institutions, growing urban areas, burgeoning manufacturing 
industries, and dynamic urban construction and service sectors. On the other hand, we 
see facets of retardation and economic standstill, typically marked by the persistence of 
an undercapitalised and vulnerable agrarian economy at large, widespread absentee 
landlordism, distressing tenancy arrangements, and endemic rent-seeking activities, all 
of which undermined the economic potential of the region.37 Similar contrasts existed in 
other parts of the empire as well. However, the degree o f contrast appears particularly 
striking in the case of Selanik, because of the unusual strength of its “modem” sectors 
and features. In what follows, I will try to explain this “duality” of economic structures 
and processes in Selanik’s regional economy, a dualism which apparently deepened in 
time.
by Columbia University Press, 1993); B. C. Gounaris, “Selanik,” in Q Keyder, E. Ozveren and D. 
Quataert (eds.), Dogu Akdeniz’de Liman Kentleri, 1800-1914, [Port Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
1800-1914] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlan, 1994), 103-120; Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire.
36 For Ottoman provincial administration see S. J. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, History o f the 
Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, V II, Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise o f Modem Turkey, 
1808-1975, (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). For the dilemmas faced by provincial administrations see E. D. Akarli, “Abdiilhamid ITs Attempt 
to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System,” in D. Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, 
(Jerusalem and Leiden: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi and E. J. Brill, 1986), 74-89; E. D. Akarli, “Provincial Power 
Magnates in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840,” in Temimi (ed.), La vie sociale dans les 
provinces arabes a Vepoque ottomane, V. 3, (Zaghouan: Publications du Centre d’Etudes et de 
Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d’Information, 1988), 41-56.
37 Akarli, “Growth and Retardation”.
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Finally, by concentrating on the case of Selanik I hope to overcome the 
predicaments of “nationalist compartmentalisation” that has prevailed in studies on the 
history of the Ottoman Empire. An important consequence of the prominence of 
nationalist world-views in Near Eastern studies has been the dearth of communication 
and cooperation among scholars who specialise on different “nations”. These specialists 
tend to confine their work on a specific part of the empire and ignore “other” parts. 
Cooperation among the specialists of different “nations” remains limited, informal and 
unstructured. More importantly perhaps, until very recently, governments on each side, 
but especially Turkish authorities, have been jealously supervising the access to the 
historical archives under their control. This situation has not only frustrated sensible 
researchers but also has perpetuated controversies and nationalist monologues, leaving 
little room for constructive debate and criticism. Over the last decade and a half, 
however, scholars have begun to show much greater interest not only in the rich 
information available in Ottoman provincial archives that exist on former Ottoman 
lands, but also in comparing notes, sharing information and participating in open- 
minded debates and discussions. Still, there is a great need for further debate and 
research that go beyond the narrow confines of nationalist rhetoric and national 
boundaries. As a Turkish scholar, I feel obliged to address this need by moving beyond 
the political boundaries of contemporary Turkey and concentrating on the economic 
history of a region that supposedly falls into an “other” zone of specialisation. I hope 
my endeavour will contribute to the emerging debates and the creation of a new 
academic environment that goes beyond nationalist prejudice.
As for the time period on which this thesis focuses, the late nineteenth century 
appears as a crucial turning point in Near Eastern economic and social history. First, the 
late nineteenth century marks the full-blown integration of the Ottoman empire into the 
expanding capitalist world economy.38 The long process of the peripherisation of 
Ottoman lands reached its economic and institutional apex in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The transformations taking place during this period left a 
strong imprint on the economic and social history of the Near East, conditioning the 
pattern of socio-economic change in the region until the early 1930s.39 The advent of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s marked the beginnings of a new era of growing
38 Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlilik, 155-159; Keyder, State and Class, 25-48.
39 Keyder, Dunya Ekonomisi Iginde Tiirkiye, 11-22.
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protectionism, relative economic isolation and enhanced political independence.40 
Focusing on the late nineteenth century promises to shed light on the partly regressive 
and partly modernising but certainly complex effects of the integration of Ottoman 
lands into the modem world economy, as a background to the nationalist economies that 
later emerged in the region.
Secondly, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the culmination 
of the reform efforts of the Ottoman government. As before in the Tanzimat era (1839- 
1876), the central government took measures to enhance political centralisation, 
consolidate state finances and promote economic development during the period under 
consideration. In general, the mixed results of these efforts failed to bring about the 
desired effect in modernisation and economic development. However, the late 
nineteenth century reforms were consequential and played an important role in 
determining the unique, non-colonial, pattern of peripherisation that surfaced in much of 
the Ottoman lands.41 In this regard, the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
centuries emerge as a period when we can study the impact of Ottoman state policy on 
economic change and development in crystallised forms.
2. Sources and Structure:
2.1. Sources:
In my research, I have consulted a wide range of European and Ottoman 
sources. The majority of the European materials I relied on come from the British 
archives and libraries. I have used the relevant archival documents at the Public Record 
Office (PRO) quite exhaustively. The Foreign Office documents for the period of 
c. 1870-1912 proved especially useful. I have surveyed not only the correspondence 
between the consular office in Selanik and the embassy in Istanbul, but also the 
correspondence of consular representations within broader Macedonia, which included 
the neighbouring provinces of Kosova and Manastir in addition to Selanik.
I have also used a range of official publications issued by the British and French 
governments, which included the British Parliamentary Papers and the publications of
40 Owen and Pamuk, Middle East Economies, 3-8. Also see D. Rothermund, The Global Impact 
o f the Great Depression, 1929-1939, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 74-81.
41 Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlihk, 7-10, 157-162.
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the British Chamber of Commerce of Istanbul. The most important French publication I 
have used has been the official journal of the French Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul, 
Revue commerciale du levant, bulletin mansuel de la chambre de commerce frangaise 
de Constantinople. These official publications include commercial reports sent from 
consular representations in the provinces. Fortunately, the reports coming from Selanik 
and other Macedonian provinces appeared regularly in these publications.
The British archival materials and the above cited official publications provided 
me with valuable information. They were particularly useful for the statistical 
information they contain and for the rich historical detail they provide on foreign trade, 
banking, local marketing networks, railways, urban manufacturing and construction 
industries and, most notably, on export-oriented agriculture. However, they reveal 
relatively little information on ‘local* institutional processes, especially on government 
policy, taxation and the structuration of distributional processes.
Ottoman sources proved more prolific on these crucial issues. The Prime 
Ministry archives, Bagbakanhk Argivi (BA), in Istanbul served as the most significant 
resource of my research. I have consulted a number of key collections in the BA, 
beginning with the extensive papers of the Inspectorate of the Rumelian Provinces, 
Rumeli Mufettigligi Evraki. This collection includes the correspondence between the 
provincial governments and Istanbul, as well as reports, proposals and other official 
documents presented to various ministries. These documents yielded valuable 
information on almost all aspects of economic life, especially on land issues, taxation 
and agricultural reform. Unfortunately, this excellent collection covers a relatively 
limited time period, 1903-1908. I have consulted other collections for data on other 
years within the time period under consideration and for additional information.
My initial efforts concentrated on the registers of the Sublime Porte’s 
correspondence with the provinces, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi Vilayet Gelen-Giden 
Defterleri. However, my efforts yielded very little information, mainly because the files 
pertaining to the European provinces of the empire under this collection were not yet 
properly organised and available to researchers. In order to reach the same documents or 
to get an idea about them, I have consulted the Registers of the Summaries and 
Duplicates of the Sublime Porte’s correspondence, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi Ayniyat 
Defterleri. Unfortunately, this collection revealed little on economic affairs, because it
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contains detailed information on administrative matters that is of relatively little use for 
the immediate priorities of my research.
A collection that proved useful, both in terms of coverage and content, was the 
archives of the Council of State (§ura-i Devlet). The §ura-i Devlet collection is massive 
and includes hundreds of thousands of documents. This situation compelled me to cut 
my inquiries into this source down to a manageable size. Thus, I have consulted only 
the documents pertaining to the Province of Selanik and to the departments of 
Commerce (ticaret), Forests, Mines and Agriculture (orman meadin ve ziraat), Customs 
(riisumat), and Finance (maliye), and to contracts (mukavelat). These documents contain 
rich information on reform policies, taxation and land matters. A substantial drawback 
of the §ura-i Devlet documents in general is that they often reflect the immediate 
considerations and priorities of the council and yield limited information on the actual 
implementation of policy in the field. However, the documents also reveal abundant 
background information on the issues discussed. Thus, I was able to use the Council of 
State documents as a source of information on the policy priorities and orientation of 
the central government and as a source of some historical detail on the real economy.
I have consulted two more collections in the BA, namely the minutes of the 
Council of Ministers (Meclisi Viikela), which involve the major executive decisions of 
the central government. Both collections revealed rich historical detail on economic 
affairs. Similar to the documents of the Council of State, however, they remain silent 
about the actual implementation of the decisions taken at the top of Ottoman 
bureaucracy, unless they include summary references to the background of the issues 
discussed.
In order to check and complement the official sources mentioned above, I have 
consulted various local newspapers and journals as well as a wide range of official and 
semi-official publications. The local newspapers I have consulted includ two 
independent newspapers published by liberal intellectuals in Salonica, namely Asir and 
Journal de Salonique, and two newspapers published by the provincial government, 
namely Rumeli and Selanik. These newspapers, especially Asir and Journal de 
Salonique, constitute by far the richest source on economic affairs and provide detailed 
information on agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, as well as on reform policies 
and taxation. In addition, I have consulted the semi-official journal of the Istanbul
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Chamber of Commerce (Dersaadet Ticaret Odasi Gazetesi), which contain relevant 
information on general economic issues as well as on the Selanik region. Finally, two 
journals published by the'Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, namely Ticaret ve 
Ziraat Nezareti Mecmuasi and Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Mecmuasi, contain valuable 
information on agriculture and the implementation of agricultural reform schemes in the 
province.
Finally, a series of official publications issued by the Ottoman government 
proved particularly useful, especially for the rich statistics and detailed sectoral analysis 
they contain. The agricultural statistics published by the Ottoman government in 1907 
contain valuable data on output levels, yield ratios, prices and landholding. The general 
statistics published by the Ottoman government in 1897 contain equally valuable data 
on almost all sectors of the Ottoman economy on a provincial basis. Likewise, the 
provincial yearbooks (Salnames) contain useful information on regional economies and 
valuable output statistics, as well as detailed population figures and fiscal data. Lastly, 
the provincial budgets published by the Ottoman government provide valuable fiscal 
data. These statistics and publications proved particularly useful in estimating output 
levels and trends in agricultural production and thus contributed significantly to the 
quantitative rigour of the current thesis.
2.2. Structure:
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters discuss the 
agricultural sector, which was by far the most important sector of the regional economy.. 
Chapter One attempts to quantify the structural shifts taking place in the agricultural 
sector and to establish trends in sectoral performance. It taps the rich quantitative 
evidence available in European and Ottoman archives, provides an extensive discussion 
of the weaknesses and strength of the available statistics and suggests new methods of 
estimation that can be used to measure economic performance in agriculture. Chapter 
Two focuses on the economic conjuncture, discussing the transformation of the 
agricultural sector in tandem with the broader developments taking place in 
international markets. Within this framework, the chapter primarily focuses on demand- 
side factors as well as certain market-bound institutional processes as the primary 
facilitators of both growth and retardation in the agrarian economy. Chapter Three
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assesses the impact of state policy on agriculture, with an emphasis on supply-side 
dynamics, and on the impact of reforms instituted by the Ottoman government. In 
addition, the chapter examines the largely retarding impact of the prevailing fiscal 
processes and practices on agriculture.
Chapter Four discusses the transformation of rural socio-economic structures in 
response to the shifts taking place in the economic conjuncture, on the one hand, and the 
reform and modernisation efforts of the Ottoman government, on the other. The chapter 
concentrates primarily on redistributional processes and associated institutional 
structures, namely property rights, tenure systems and taxation. It discusses the political 
and economic dynamics underlying the transformation of these institutions, and 
considers the impact of this broad transformation process on the commercialisation of 
the agrarian sector, processes of rural displacement, and the persistence of speculative 
and “rent-seeking” economic activities. Chapter Five examines the transformation and 
growth of urban economies while focusing on the development of the urban service 
sector, construction industry and manufacturing. Finally, the thesis offers some 
concluding remarks on the peculiarities of Ottoman path to peripherisation in the light 
of the case of Selanik.
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CHAPTER I
THE PATTERN OF AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION, 
TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS
A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH
Introduction
Agriculture constituted the most important sector of the regional economy 
during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. About 70-80% of the 
regional population lived in the countryside and the sector probably accounted for about 
60% of the total income generated within the regional economy.1 Agricultural products 
accounted for the bulk of the exports and brought much income and prosperity into the 
region.2 Therefore, a thorough discussion of the changes and shifts taking place in the 
agricultural sector assumes great importance for the comprehensiveness of our analysis 
of economic change in Selanik during the period under consideration.
This chapter outlines the basic transformations taking place in agrarian economy 
of the Selanik region during the Hamidian years (1876-1908). In what follows, I 
develop a quantitative approach that should help us delineate the direction and timing of 
the shifts taking place in the agrarian economy of the region. In this context, I 
concentrate mainly on estimating changing levels and composition of agricultural output 
for selected benchmark years. Throughout the discussion, I use a wide range of British, 
French and Ottoman sources, most of which have never been used before. I discuss in 
detail the relative weaknesses and strengths of the these sources, and seek ways of 
improving their accuracy and reliability in light of qualitative evidence gathered from
1 V. Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi §artlari §artlari Hakkinda bir Tetkik, [Research 
on the Economic Conditions of the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994), 225. 
According to the estimates of Eldem, agriculture accounted for the 57% of the GDP generated with the 
European provinces of the Empire in 1907. For the composition of regional population see Table 1.15 
below.
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both European and Ottoman archives. I also employ, whenever possible, more than one 
estimation method to quantify the changes taking place in the level and composition of 
agricultural production. This quantitative effort largely sets the empirical background 
for the narrative of the following two chapters, which discuss the structural 
transformations taking place in Selanik’s agrarian economy during the period under 
consideration.
The current chapter also aims to till the statistical lacuna in Ottoman economic 
history, which continues to undermine the systematic discussion of some key issues and 
impedes the resolution of certain controversies. For instance, the absolute and relative 
performance of the nineteenth century Ottoman economy is an issue that is yet to be 
resolved.3 The pioneering works of Issawi, Eldem, Karpat, Lampe and Jackson, Pamuk, 
Owen, Quataert and more recently of Palairet contributed in important ways to our 
understanding of the performance of the nineteenth century Ottoman economy.4 We 
now have a better understanding of demographic trends, foreign trade, capital flows, 
prices, wages, and of ‘national income’ for selected benchmark years. Yet, there is still 
a great need for detailed quantitative research in order to understand better the issues of 
Ottoman economic development in historical perspective. With its comprehensive 
statistical base and detailed methodological discussion the current chapter is an
2 B.C. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the Railway 
Factor (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University Press,
1993), 92-95.
3 For comparative approaches to Ottoman economic performance see Eldem, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu’nun Iktisadi $artlari, 233-238; and, J.-G. Williamson, “Real Wages and Relative Factor 
Prices around the Mediterranean, 1500-1940,” in J. G. Williamson and §. Pamuk (eds.) The 
Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 45-75.
4 See C. Issawi, (ed.) The Economic History o f the Middle East, 1800-1914, (Chicago and 
London; Chicago University Press, 1966); C. Issawi, The Economic History o f Turkey, (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); C. Issawi, “De-industrialization and Re­
industrialization in the Middle East since 1800”, International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 12, (1980): 
469-479; Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi $artlari $artlari; V. Eldem, Harp ve Miitareke. 
Yillarinda Osmanli imparatorlugu’nun Ekonomisi [Ottoman Economy in Years of War and Armistice] 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994); K. Karpat Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, 
Demographic and Social Characteristics, (Madison-Wisconsin and London: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985); J. R Lampe, and M. R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950, From Imperial 
Borderlands to Developing Nations, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); §. Pamuk, The 
Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade, Investment and Production, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisiride Bagimhlik Biiyiime [Dependency 
and Growth in the Ottoman Economy] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlan, 1994); R. Owen, The Middle East 
in the World Economy, 1800-1914, 1. P. (1981), (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993); D. 
Quataert, Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Los 
Angeles: University of California Los Angeles, 1973); D. Quataert Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age o f 
the Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); D. Quataert, Workers, 
Peasant and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993); M. 
Palairet The Balkan Economies, c.1800-1914, Evolution without Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).
21
important empirical and technical contribution to the existing literature on the economic 
history of the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.
The current chapter also constitutes a strong critique of the existing estimates of 
Ottoman agricultural production for the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 
In 1970, Vedat Eldem produced quite comprehensive estimates of Ottoman agricultural 
output for the period 1890-1910. His figures suggest 27.5% growth in agricultural 
production, which maintains considerable dynamism and growth in the sector for this 
period.5 Eldem’s estimates have been widely used by scholars who have argued 
likewise that Ottoman agriculture grew considerably, if  modestly, during the same 
period. However, despite widespread circulation, Eldem’s data and his methods of 
estimation have not been seriously discussed. Scholars simply took for granted Eldem’s 
unique and pioneering research in the field and used his estimates to discuss trends in 
Ottoman agriculture.
Eldem mainly used a combination of fiscal data and agricultural statistics 
published by the Ottoman government to estimate both the production trends and levels 
of output for selected benchmark years. It seems Eldem did not control for the 
weaknesses and inconsistencies inherent in these sources. The following analysis shows 
quite clearly that Eldem overestimated agricultural performance.
The current chapter suggests certain methods and techniques of estimation that 
would improve the reliability and accuracy of Eldem’s estimates. As we shall see in this 
and the following chapters, agricultural performance remained sluggish in Selanik and 
strove to overcome such serious problems as adverse price trends, a heavy tax-burden, 
prohibitive transaction costs and serious institutional inadequacies during the period 
under consideration. The existing literature also suggests that similar factors retarded 
agricultural development in other parts and regions of the Empire. This observation 
instigates us to rethink our understanding of the performance of Ottoman agriculture in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.6 Undoubtedly, we need more research and
5 Eldem, Osmanli imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi $artlari, 35.
6 Quataert, Ottoman Reform. Also see T. Guran, “Tanzimat Doneminde Tanm Politikasi,” 
[Agricultural Policy in the Tanzimat Period] in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.) Social and Economic 
History o f Turkey (1071-1920): Papers Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and 
Economic History o f Turkey, (Ankara: Meteksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 271-277; T. Guran, Tanzimat 
Doneminde Osmanli Maliyesi: Butqeler ve Hazine Hesaplari, 1841-1861 [Ottoman Finances in the
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technical discussion before we can produce more reliable estimates and a more 
consistent historical narrative. The technical discussion included in this chapter 
constitutes a preliminary, but significant, step in this direction.
1. Measuring Performance in Sub-Sectors: Cereal Production, Cash Crop 
Production and Animal Husbandry
In this section, I will attempt to measure output performance in the primary sub­
sectors of the agrarian economy, namely cereal production, cash crop production and 
animal husbandry. This is a challenging task. The difficulty is not in the lack of 
statistical evidence. Raw data is available from a wide range of European and Ottoman 
sources. Agricultural output estimates, provincial tithe returns, foreign trade statistics, 
and agricultural prices were frequently cited in a variety of sources, such as the official 
agricultural statistics, provincial yearbooks (salnames), European consular reports, 
provincial newspapers, and the respective journals of the Ottoman, French and British 
Chambers of Commerce. The challenge is in extracting relatively accurate and 
consistent measurement of performance from these sources. The available data is often 
partial and sometimes weak and therefore one has to use them with caution and critical 
judgement. Yet, for all the difficulties of quantifying agricultural trends, a 
methodological analysis of the available data based on careful assumptions does yield 
reliable estimates.
1.1. Cereal Production
1.1.1. Official Output Estimates
An important source in delineating trends in cereal production is the official 
output estimates published by the Ottoman government. The Hamidian authorities 
showed an interest in compiling and publishing agricultural output statistics. Their 
primary motive in data collection was fiscal. Agricultural taxes, especially the tithe 
(a§ar), constituted the main source of revenue for the Ottoman government.7 It was
Tanzimat Period: Budgets and Financial Calculations, 1841-1861J (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basimevi, 1988).
7 S.J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue Systems,” 
International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 6, (1975): 421-459; E. D. Akarli, The Problems o f External
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crucial for the authorities to constantly monitor the collection of these revenues. Their 
main concern was to estimate the optimum tax base, or to determine how much revenue 
was ‘normal’ and what could define “under” or “over” taxation. At least in theory, the 
tithe was tuned to output levels at a fixed rate of 10%.8 Thus, estimating the tax base 
depended on estimating the total produce of the land. Based on this estimate, the 
authorities could expect to generate a certain amount of revenue. If a given year’s 
revenue fell below that expected level, then the tax would fall in arrears and anything 
above the ‘norm’ would simply be a bonus to the government coffers.
Direct estimation was out of question for the authorities. The existing land 
registers were incomplete and out of date, particularly in the early days of the Hamidian 
era. Although the attempts to improve land registers yielded some success towards the 
end of the century, the records did not allow for accurate estimates of agricultural 
production levels during a good part of the Hamidian period.9 Under the circumstances, 
the authorities had to find alternative ways of estimating the ‘tax base’ and levels of 
production.
In response to this need, officials relied on provincial tax records, especially the 
tithe returns from previous years. This method eradicated the fiscal purpose of output 
estimation. Estimating the output based on the existing tax-records would reveal little 
new information about the optimum tax base in a given year. As we will see in detail 
below, the tithe returns of the Ottoman government were only very loosely linked to 
actual output levels, mainly because the practice of tax-farming obscured the linkages 
between taxation and production.10 An optimum tax base could hardly be assessed on 
the basis of such fiscally rooted output estimates, which would, in the last instance, do 
little more than equating the optimum tax base with “what could be collected” rather 
than with “what is due for collection”.
Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamit II: Origins 
and Solutions, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton: University o f Princeton, 1976); E. D. Akarli, 
“Economic Policy Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909,” Middle Eastern Studies, 28, N. 3, (1992): 
443-476.
8 A. Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi [Rules of Taxation], V.2, (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Kanaat Matbaasi, 
1911), 262-263; A. §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli Vergi Sistemi [Ottoman Taxation System during the 
Tanzimat Era], (Istanbul: i§aret,‘ 1990), 119-139.
9 Akarli, “Economic Policy,” 443-476; §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli, 119-139; S. J. Shaw, 
“The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms,” 421-459; S. J. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, History o f the 
Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, V. II, Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise o f Modem Turkey, 
1808-1975, (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press,
1988); Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi, 262-263. Also see Chapter-4.
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Still, the Ottoman officials did all that was possible to make the most out of the 
tithe data. They had to cope with certain difficulties. The tithe revenue records, even on 
a sub-provincial (kaza) basis, were not itemised according to the crops cultivated. 
Therefore, even if the total value of production could be tentatively estimated, it would 
not be possible to determine the weights of various agricultural products in total output. 
In order to overcome this obstacle, the local authorities concentrated on more 
disaggregate tax data. According to the regulations governing the collection of the 
tithes, the tax-farmers (multezims) and the salaried tax-collectors of the Ottoman 
government (the mua$$irs) had to keep detailed tax records that indicated the quantity of 
each crop on which the tithe was levied.11 In practice, however, the tax-records often 
remained incomplete. Both the tax-farmers and the tax-collectors under-reported the 
volume and value of the product and pocketed the difference at the government’s 
expense. Sometimes, they did not even bother to keep proper accounts at all. 
Nevertheless, the appointed officers of the Ottoman government worked in cooperation 
with the local chambers of agriculture, the village headmen and the local revenue 
departments of provincial governments to make use of these books as a sample of sorts 
to determine the weights of different products.12 Thus, they eventually came up with 
weighed tithe returns for each district (kaza) in nominal terms. Then they deflated the 
nominal values by the average local price of each crop to determine a rough output 
estimate in terms of quantity. These output estimates were finally deflated by the 
average yield of agricultural land in any given district, in order to reach indicative 
estimates of the area under cultivation for each crop. All . estimated district values were 
aggregated to reach provincial (vilayet) figures.13
It is my impression that the Ottoman authorities used this ‘fiscal’ method to 
estimate levels of agricultural output and the area under cultivation during the period 
under consideration. The estimates published in the provincial yearbooks were certainly
See below for a discussion of the practice of tax-farming. Also see Chapter 4.
11 Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi, 262-263.
12 These observations are based on an 1898 report on the collection and compilation of 
agricultural statistics throughout the Empire, which was published in the journal of the Istanbul Chamber 
of Commerce. D.T.O.G., 7.Za.l316 (19.3.1899), No. 699: 169.
12 In provincial yearbooks (Salnames), it is actually possible to find output figures pertaining to 
each sub-province, which neatly sum up to vilayet figures. So the data was probably predominantly 
gathered on a sub-province basis.
based on this crude method.14 Even the estimates of the more comprehensive 1907 
agricultural statistics were, largely based on the tithe revenues.15 The main difference of 
these later statistics was that, the officials supplemented the fiscal data with auxiliary 
information in order to improve the reliability of their estimates.16 For this purpose, 
questionnaires were sent out to the provinces to be completed by the local chambers of 
commerce, administrative councils and the special survey committees established by the 
provincial governments. Most questionnaires were complete and returned to Istanbul. 
Even if they were not always accurate, the supplementary information they provided 
must have helped the Statistical Office in Istanbul to refine their estimates.17
Table 1.1.
Cereal Production in Selanik, Official Estimates 1890-1907 (tons)
Year 1890 % 1907 % % Change, 1890-1907
Wheat 81,474 16.6 79,740 26.6 -2.1
Barley 121,751 24.8 56,017 18.7 -54.0
Maize 167,489 34.1 113,085 37.7 -32.5
Oats 28,595 5.8 16,538 5.5 -42.2
Rye 91,280 18.6 34,749 11.6 -61.9
TOTAL 490,589 100.0 300,129 100.0 -38.8%
Source: 1890: 1307 S.V.S, 1890, 50; 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik idaresi, 1323
Ziraat Istatistigi, 1907, 11-33.
These official statistics must be used with caution because of the probable 
inconsistencies involved in data collection, especially before 1907. Comparing numbers 
compiled by different people, under different circumstances and at different times must 
have created certain irregularities in the available data. Even if all data sets were 
technically comparable, one still has to account for the influence of non-economic
In the yearbooks it is yery common to come across with crude calculations such as ‘so much 
tithe was collected and therefore this much was produced in the sub-province’.
15 Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik idaresi, 1323 Senesi Avrupa-yi Osmani Ziraat 
istatistigi [1323 Agricultural Statistics of the European Provinces of the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: 
Dersaadet Mahmud Bey Matbaasi, 1907), s-§. Also see, Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanli Donemi 
Tarim Istatistikleri, 1909, 1913 ve 1914 [Agricultural Statistics of Turkey during the Ottoman Period], 
Prepared by T. Guran, (Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Tarihi istatistikler Dizisi, V.3, Ankara: Devlet istatistik 
Enstitiisii Matbaasi, 1997), XXII. The only statistic available on the European provinces is the 1907 one. 
The others relate to Asiatic provinces of the Empire.
16 Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, s-§; Asir, 8.§.1324 
(27.08.1906), No. 1115:2.
17 For the statistical committees established in Macedonian provinces see, Asir, 12.B.1323 
(11.9.1905), No. 1008: 2; Asir, 22.B.1323 (21.9.1905), No. 1011: 2; and Asir, 7.C.1324 (30.7.1906), No. 
1098: 2.
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factors. For instance, the “fiscal” output estimates might in fact reflect improvements in 
taxation practices, rather than a net output growth. Similarly, changes in the definition 
of the tax base, such as increases in the rate of taxation, if not accounted for, could lead 
to misleading impressions about the performance of the sector. Clearly, caution is 
necessary in using the available statistics to delineate trends and to estimate output 
levels, especially for the earlier years of the period under consideration.
For all their shortcomings, however, the existing output statistics are still useful. 
The data are not entirely arbitrary and allow us to offer suggestions on both the changes 
in the level and composition of agricultural output by way of comparative static 
analysis, provided that the results are cross-checked by alternative sources and/or 
methods of estimation. Furthermore, the 1907 statistics are particularly comprehensive 
and reliable. They are relatively less fiscal and certainly more detailed in nature than 
anything else we have at hand.18 A comprehensive population census undertaken in 
1906 and the general improvement in land registers also contribute to the accuracy and 
reliability of the 1907 estimates.19 Thus, 1907 statistics can be considered as good as 
any benchmark can be in determining the levels of agricultural output. In the following 
analysis, I will also use the 1907 statistics as weights in the computation of various 
price indices.
Official statistics suggest considerable contraction in cereal output in the Selanik 
region between 1890 and 1907 (Table 1.1). Overall, cereal production seems to have 
declined by as much as 38.8% during the 1890s and early 1900s. Our knowledge of the 
broad trends in the regional economy corroborates this impression. As we shall see in 
Chapter-2, adverse price trends, severe crop failures, prohibitive transaction costs and
18 The later official statistics published in the Unionist period (1908-1918) seem to be less reliable 
than the 1907/09 statistics of the Hamidian period. The Unionist figures seem to have been somewhat 
inflated by the authorities in need of ideological and political legitimacy. For instance, based on these 
official estimates Eldem suggests that Ottoman agricultural output grew by 27%, or at about a rate of 5% 
per annum within the five years between 1909/10 and 1914/15 (Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nun 
Iktisadi §  art lari, 35). There is nothing in the literature that would justify such rapid rate of growth in 
Ottoman agricultural production. Especially considering the destabilising effects of the Italian (1911) and 
the two Balkan Wars (1912) it would be unrealistic to suggest such rapid growth in output figures. For the 
drawbacks of the Unionist statistics see Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanli Donemi Tarim Istatistikleri, 
XVII-XIX.
For Ottoman censuses see Karpat, Ottoman Population, 7-11; Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Tax Reforms”, 421-459; Eldem, Osmanli imparatorlugu’nun iktisadi §artlari, 10-24. Also for a 
recent compilation of all Ottoman population estimates see Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugunun ve Tiirkiye ’nin Niifusu [The Population of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey], Prepared 
by C. Behar, (Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii Tarihi istatistikler Dizisi, V.2, Ankara: Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii
27.
various “market-failures” put local cereal producers under distress and compelled them 
to switch to the production of more lucrative and less bulky cash crops during the same 
period. Under the circumstances, we would normally expect a significant contraction in 
cereal production.
The data presented in Table 1.1 also reveal important clues about the changing 
composition of cereal production in Selanik. The decline in the production of basic food 
staples, namely wheat and maize, was relatively moderate, whereas the contraction in 
the production of barley, oats and rye was significant. Consequently, the share of basic 
food staples in total cereal production increased from 1890-1907. More specifically, the 
share of wheat and maize in total cereal output rose from 50.7% in 1890 to 64.3% in 
1907. In contrast, the relative share of such non-staple cereals as rye, oats and barley 
declined proportionately during the same period.
In sum, the official statistics suggest a notable contraction in cereal production 
in the Selanik region during 1890-1907. The figures also suggest that the decline in the 
production of non-staple cereals was particularly swift. The contraction in the 
production of wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, remained relatively limited in the 
same period. Although these broad observations are in tune with the conjuncture of the 
regional economy, the rate of decline suggested by the official estimates must be 
crosschecked by alternative methods of estimation.
1.1.2. Fiscal Data and Trends in Output Growth
Using the Ottoman tithe data to delineate trends in output performance requires 
much critical assessment of fiscal data. In the following analysis, I will first discuss the 
nature and characteristics of the available tax data. I will then analyse certain features of 
the taxation process to clarify the assumptions underlining the method of estimation I 
employ. Finally, I will discuss the adjustments necessary to make better use of tithe 
revenues as indicators of trends in output performance.
Matbaasi, 1996). For a recent re-assessment of Ottoman census results for the European provinces of the
Sources
The Hamidian authorities published a multitude of provincial budgets from the 
mid-1880s onwards. It is possible to extract comprehensive tithe data from these 
provincial budgets. Our current understanding of the ways in which these provincial 
budgets were prepared is limited. It seems that the preparation of the budgets was a 
cumbersome process, and involved various steps of assessment and revaluation. At the 
end of each financial year, the tax commissions and the administrative councils of each 
sub-province (kaza) would jointly prepare a detailed fiscal report on the revenues and 
expenditures of each local government. The report was then forwarded to the central 
provincial (vilayet) administration. The provincial government would assess all such 
reports and prepare a final vilayet report that was sent to the central revenue 
departments in Istanbul. The central authorities would gather all the vilayet reports and 
use them to compile the revenue side of the final state budgets for the next fiscal year. 
The same vilayet reports constituted the basis of provincial budgets.20
Ottoman provincial budgets had a political significance as well as a fiscal 
meaning. It seems that, especially throughout the relatively ‘centralist’ Hamidian 
period, the authorities used budgets to impose tighter checks and controls over the 
provincial administrations.21 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the provincial 
authorities probably manipulated budgetary figures to make things look better or worse 
depending on the political and fiscal circumstances. The figures could be, and possibly 
were, inflated or deflated in accordance with the fiscal needs of the provincial 
governments.
This political distortion effect can be inferred from qualitative archival evidence, 
but it is very difficult to show exactly in which year the distortion had more impact on 
published tax figures compared to other years. Therefore, I will simply assume that the 
political distortion effect was even in each year. The anticipation is that the actual 
distortion effects would cancel each other out and leave long-term trend unaltered.
Empire see Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 3-33.
20 For the preparation of central state budgets see Y. Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunahm and 
Degi§im Donemi (XVIII, yy. dan Tanzimat’a Mali Tarih), [Era of Crises and Change in Ottoman Fiscal 
Policy (Fiscal History From XVIHth Century to the Tanzimat)] (Istanbul: Alan Yaymcilik, 1986); Guran, 
Tanzimat Doneminde Osmanli Maliyesi’, and, Akarli, The Problems o f  External Pressures', Akarli, 
“Economic Policy”.
21 Akarli, The problems o f External Pressures’, and, Akarli, “Economic Policy”.
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Furthermore, the effects of political concerns on tax data appear to be more plausible for 
relatively distant provinces of the Empire and it is reasonable to suggest that such 
effects would be relatively “insignificant” in the case of the province of Selanik, where 
the presence and control of the central government was more of a reality. Therefore, I 
will use budgetary tithe figures to delineate trends in output performance. However, we 
must first clarify the precise content of the tax base to reach more accurate and 
consistent estimates.
The Definition o f the Tax Base
Following the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA) 
in 1881, the Ottoman government agreed to grant the right to collect and manage certain 
revenues to the PDA. Amongst these revenues were the tithes accruing from the 
production of two important cash crops, namely tobacco and silk.22 From 1883 onwards, 
the PDA was in full control of tobacco and silk tithes and the Ottoman government had 
practically nothing to do with the collection and management of these revenues. 
Although the Ottoman budgets continued to include the silk and tobacco tithes, these 
items were kept under a distinct category separate from the standard tithe (a§ar). 
According to a draft budget I have at hand, both the tobacco (diihan) and the silk (harir) 
tithes were listed under ‘miscellaneous revenue’ (hasilat-i miiteferrika).23
This accounting practice has important implications for the following analysis. If 
the tax base covered by the standard tithe incorporates all agricultural products except 
tobacco and silk, then the tithe as such would mainly relate to cereal production. This is 
clearly the case for Selanik. According to the 1907 statistics, cereals accounted for 
about 66.4% and cash crops constituted around 26.5% of the total value of agricultural 
production in Selanik (See Table 1.2). The combined value of tobacco and silk cocoon 
production accounted for 24.1% of the same total. These numbers indicate that cereal
22 For details see D. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1929); Parvus Efendi, Tiirkiye’nin Mali Tutsakligi [Turkey’s Financial 
Dependency] (Istanbul: May Yayinlan, 1970); R. Suvla, “The Ottoman Debt, 1850-1939,” in C. Issawi 
(ed.), The Economic History o f  the Middle East, 1800-1914, A Book o f  Readings, (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 94-106; E. Kiray, Osmanli'da Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borqlar, 
[Economic Structure and Foreign Debt in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Ileti§im Yayinlan, 1993); and, 
§. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik. Also see Chapter 2 for a brief discussion of PDA and its 
impact on Ottoman agriculture.
22 Asir, 29.B. 1314 (29.12.1896), No: 139: 1-3.
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production dominated the tax base. According to the figures in Table 1.2, cereals 
constituted about 86.7% of the total value of the tax base. The tithe returns would 
therefore be the best proxy for determining trends in cereal production. This is exactly 
how I will interpret the tithe data in the following discussion.
Table 1.2.
Composition o f  Agricultural Production in Selanik, 1907 (ku ruses)
Products Total Value %
Cereals 248,136,697 65.7
Fruits 23,311,580 6.2
Other Cash Crops 8,848,589 2.3
Legiminious Products 5,917,157 1.6
TAX-BASE 286,214,023 75.8
Tabacco 65,877,449 17.4
Silk Caccoons 25,468,918 6.7
TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION 377,560,390 100.0
TAX-BASE AS A % OF THE TOTAL 75.8
CEREALS AS A % OF THE TAX BASE 86.7
Source: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, 1907, a’, b, h, z.
The Tithe and the Methods o f its Collection
The Ottoman tithe was in theory linked to production; that is to say, it should 
constitute 10% of the agricultural output. In practice however, the tithe was somewhat 
disconnected from the production process. The main reason for this disconnection lay in 
tax collection methods prevailing in the Empire.
During the Hamidian period there were two ways of collecting the taxes. The 
first was direct collection by salaried officials of the central government, and the second 
was tax-farming. Despite repeated attempts to introduce direct taxation in all provinces, 
tax-farming retained its importance and accounted for about 90-95% of the tithes 
collected until the end of the Hamidian era.24
In principle, tax-farming was a straightforward process. Each year, the local 
authorities would organise franchise auctions for the collection of the tithes from each
24 See Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures', and, Akarli, “Economic Policy”; §ener, 
Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli, 119-139; Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi, 262-263. Also see Chapter-4.
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village in the province. The authorities would set the minimum auction price for each 
village, usually based on the actual prices received in the preceding three years and 
announce their average as the current year’s initial auction price. The bidders would 
then deliver their offers to the local administrative council, which would publicly 
announce the highest bid and bidder for each village. From that point on, any bidder 
willing to offer a higher price could step in and take over the franchise agreement within 
a grace period. The local authorities would wait as long as possible to hear offers and 
finally would grant the franchise to the highest bidder. The final bidder, who received 
the right to collect the taxes in a particular village for a period of one year only, would 
pay the government the agreed-upon sum in cash, usually in five instalments.25
This method created complications in the actual taxation process. The level of 
government revenues accruing from tax farming would theoretically depend on several 
factors:
The tithe returns would depend on the number of tax-farming units to be 
auctioned. More settlements/population meant more auctions, and more auctions, ceteris 
paribus, meant higher revenues for the government. In other words, the tithe-retums had 
to be a function of rural population and the land under cultivation.
Second, the tithe returns depended on the rate of taxation. The auctioning 
authorities included a due rise in the legal rate of taxation in the minimum auction 
prices. It was the tax-farmers’ responsibility to increase their collections 
proportionately.
Third, tithe returns depended on the government’s capacity to enforce and 
effectively supervise the auctions and make them more competitive. This, in turn, 
depended on, above all, the government’s administrative capacity. Better 
communication and transportation facilities, accountability of local governments, and 
multi-layered bureaucratic controls over the auctions would help secure fair auctioning 
and tax-farm returns.
Market conditions and the economic conjuncture had an important role to play in 
determining the government’s capacity to tax. Tax-farmers had to convert the tithe
25 For the details of the practice of tax-farming see Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi, 290-299.
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collected in-kind into cash by selling it in the available markets at current prices. Thus, 
in years of price depression, it was very difficult for the authorities to attract bidders to 
auctions and to maintain, let alone, to increase the tax-revenue.26 Furthermore, the 
existing tax-farming regulations favoured risk-averse tax-farmers, and gave them the 
time to assess the potential profitability of the franchise agreement. Often, tax-farming 
auctions were held between mid-June arid early August.27 By that time in the year, 
potential bidders were in a position to make good guesses about the quantity as well as 
the quality of the summer crops.28 Simultaneously, potential tax-farmers could get a 
good sense of the trend of the going market prices and of the profitability of a tax-farm 
in a given region or even village. Adverse price trends and severe harvest failures would 
often drive risk-averse smaller players out of auctions. As the time to prepare the fields 
for winter crops approached, the government officials would be desperate to find a tax- 
farmer to collect the tithes. Under the circumstances, a few big, and often influential, 
tax-farmers could easily step in and purchase the tax-farms at exorbitantly low rates, 
hence, obliging the government to settle for low tax returns.29
Finally, the government’s taxation capacity would depend on the ‘marketability’ 
of the produce. Reductions in transaction costs, because of, for instance, the 
construction of new railway lines or lower railway tariffs, would increase the profit 
margin of tax-farmers and hence render tax-farming a more attractive investment 
option. Under such circumstances, we would expect the auctions to be more 
competitive, adding to the taxation capacity of the provincial governments.
These theoretical dynamics of tax farming suggest that there were many factors 
that could de-link the tax returns from actual output levels. To reiterate again, these 
factors of de-linkage included the rate of taxation, the government’s taxation capacity, 
the economic conjuncture and market conditions. If  we could successfully account for 
all the main factors of de-linkage, the tithe data would come quite close to the proxy 
output index. This index, however, would enable us to detect changes in productive 
capacity, rather than the actual output levels. In other words, any ‘real’ growth in tithe 
revenues, or for that matter the tax base, would only be indicative of extensive growth
26 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures, and Akarli, “Economic Policy”.
27 Asir, 2.R.1321, (29.6.1903), No. 795: 2.
28 Asir, 3.Ra.l320, (7.7.1902), No. 695: 2.
29 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures, and Akarli, “Economic Policy”. Also see Chapter 
4 for the extortion of tax-farmers in the Selanik region.
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and would reveal little about the intensive pattern, i.e. the productivity gains. This 
shortcoming does not detract us from the usefulness of the tithe data from our vantage 
point. As we shall see in the following chapters, under-investment in agriculture was an 
important factor, which kept cereal production from recovery during the period under 
consideration.30 Hence, it would not be entirely reasonable to assume, ceteris paribus, 
that land and labour would be the main determinants of output performance in cereal 
production.31 Consequently, we can still use the tithe data as a rough proxy to see trends 
in output performance in conjunction with the available population data. The problem is 
to account for the de-linkages and use the residual as a proxy to detect trends in output 
performance.
The Trends
Despite all the complications involved in its compilation, it is possible to use the 
tithe data to delineate trends in output performance. The anticipation here is that, if  we 
account for the impact of price changes on the government’s capacity to tax and on the 
changes in the rate of taxation, then it will be possible to use the residual tithe data to 
delineate trends in output performance.
A typical provincial budget contained detailed information on the tithe (<a§ar). 
Usually, the revenue side of the budget cited two important tithe values. The first would 
be the levied tax revenues (tahakkukat), or simply the tax base. It is not clear how the 
authorities established the tax base, but it seems that they relied mainly on the existing 
tax and population registers in combination with the revenues generated over the last 
few years, usually the preceding three years, to determine the tax base.32 The second 
value cited in the budget was the actual collections of the current financial year
30 See F. Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§ [An Overview of Turkish Agricultural 
History] (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1938); Quataert, Ottoman Reform, and, D. Quataert, “The Age of 
Reforms, 1812-1914”, in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f the 
Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 759-946; Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire', Pamuk, Osmanh Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik; T. Guran, 19. 
Yuzyil Osmanli Tarimi Uzerine Ara§tirmalar [Research on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Agriculture], 
(Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik, 1998); A. O. Akarli, “Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880- 
1910,” in Pamuk and Williamson (eds.,), The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 109-133.
31 See Chapters 3 and 4.
32 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures', Quataert, Ottoman Reform.
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(tahsilat). The difference between the levied value and the actual annual collections 
would be the tax in arrears.
Here, I will mainly use the levied tax revenues (tahakkukat), or rather the tax 
base, to measure performance in cereal production. The reason for this choice is that, 
the levied revenues would ideally be relatively more resilient to short term price and 
harvest affects and be a better proxy for estimating trends in output performance. 
Besides, given the fact that the authorities used the tax and the population registers as 
well as previous tax returns to estimate the tax base, the tahakkukat values better 
reflected output potential of the provinces. Actually, the tax base was, in principle, very 
close to a lagging three year moving average. That is, the authorities took mainly the 
average of the preceding three years’ actual tax revenues in order to estimate the tax 
base for any given budgetary year. For example, the tahakkukat value cited in the 1888 
budget, was based on the average revenues of 1885-1887, which indicated the level of 
“production” in 1886. Thus, output levels would lag two years behind the tahakkukat 
values.
Table 1.3.
Growth o f the Real Tax Base, 1886-1903 (1887=100)
I 11 III IV V
Year Revenue(Lagged) Revenue Tax Deflator Tax Deflator Real Tax Base
(Kuru^ es) (1887=100) (1907=100) (Ref. Year 1887) (II/IV)
1886 21,917,681 87.0 87.1 98.1 88.7
1887 25,186,456 100.0 88.8 100.0 100.0
1888 19,592,817 77.8 84.3 94.9 81.9
1889 21,561,813 85.6 84.7 95.4 89.8
1890 27,926,619 110.9 89.9 101.2 109.5
1891 24,773,471 98.4 99.5 112.0 87.8
1892 19,584,497 77.8 93.2 105.0 74.1
1893 21,176,812 84.1 78.7 88.6 94.9
1894 20,438,247 81.1 65.6 73.9 109.8
1895 20,187,636 80.2 64.7 72.9 110.0
1896 19,312,164 , ‘ 76.7 67.1 75.6 101.5
1897 21,810,000 86.6 77.1 86.8 99.7
1898 27,027,000 107.3 78.4 88.3 121.5
1899 22,098,869 87.7 79.0 89.0 98.6
1900 19,590,693 77.8 70.9 79.8 97.4
1901 23,851,969 94.7 72.2 81.3 116.5
1902 23,507,821 93.3 73.0 82.2 113.5
1903 22,439,400 89.1 75.7 85.2 104.5
Source: See Appendix 1 for the tax and price data used in computations.
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Based on the available provincial budgets and the tax data gathered from the 
Ottoman archives, I have constructed a series of estimated tithe returns in Selanik for 
the period of 1888-1905. The data were extracted mainly from the central state budgets, 
provincial yearbooks and archival sources. The data is quite comprehensive and allow 
for a structured analysis of long-term trends. I then lagged all the budgetary values by 
two years to reach comprehensive revenue series, which would roughly represent the 
production trends for 1886-1903. The data is presented in the first column of Table 1.3.
Table 1.4.
Composition o f Cereal Production in Selanik, 1907 (kurus es)
Crop Value %
Wheat 73,451,664 28.7
Barley 41,092,464 16.1
Oats 9,207,300 3.6
Rye 27,084,540 10.6
Maize 76,121,961 29.8
SUB-TOTAL 226,957,92 88.8
Spelt 638,580 0.2
Corn 3,710,288 1.5
Common Vetch 1,938,171 0.8
Rice 22,278,050 8.7
TOTAL 255,523,01 100
Source: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, z; 11-33.
The second step was to construct a price series to deflate the tax base. For this 
purpose, I used mainly the price series compiled by Gounaris.33 I completed the missing 
observations in his price data by relying on a wide range of sources, including the 
provincial newspaper Asir, the Journal o f the Istanbul Chamber o f Commerce, and the 
Bulletin Mensuel de la Chambre de Commerce Frangaise de Constantinople. I then 
constructed a standard three-year moving average Laspeyres cereal price index. I 
included five cereals, wheat, barley, oats, maize and rye, in the commodity basket. The 
commodity basket was comprehensive enough to represent changes taking place in 
regional cereal prices, for these cereals constituted 88.8% of the total value of regional 
cereal production in 1907 (see Table 1.4). I then used the 1907 statistics to determine
33 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 96-97.
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the weights associated with each crop that was included in the commodity basket.34 The 
ensuing computations comprise the data presented in the third column of Table 1.3. I 
then adjusted the index to set the reference year at 1886 in order to secure consistency 
with the tax data. Deflating the tithe-base series with this adjusted price index, I finally 
reached an indicative index of the ‘real tax base’ for 1886-1903. The resultant index is 
presented in the last column of Table 1.3.
According to the figures in Table 1.3, the real tax base kept growing until 1903. 
The only exception to the sustained growth of the tithe-base was the exogenous shock of 
the 1891-1892 Russian famine, which led to a swift rise in cereal prices in Selanik.35 
Otherwise, the upward trend continued uninterrupted.
As it stands, the “real” tax base does not represent the actual trends in output 
performance, because it does not account for the government’s changing taxation 
capacity and it does not reflect the changes in the rate of taxation. Therefore, the index 
must be adjusted further to better represent probable trends in cereal production. In this 
regard, measuring the provincial government’s changing taxation capacity offers the 
greatest difficulty. I will discuss the taxation practices in Selanik in Chapter 4. Here, it 
suffices to mention that the evidence at hand suggests that the terms of tax farming 
turned in favour of the provincial government, especially after the mid-1890s. First, the 
provincial government’s administrative capacity and its monitoring and enforcement 
powers seem to have improved. Secondly, the partial recovery in cereal prices, the 
construction of the Manastir and Istanbul railway lines and the gradual reductions in 
railway tariffs seem to have increased the attraction of tax farming in the region. I have 
the impression that the tax farming auctions became somewhat more competitive and 
better enforced in the latter half of the period covered.
There is one possible way of measuring the government’s changing capacity to 
tax. Ideally, the ratio of actual revenues to the tax base would give us a sense of the 
changes in government’s actual capacity to tax; the higher the ratio the better the 
enforcement would have been and vice versa. Of course, we would never know if the 
changes in the ratio are related to improved taxation or better and more realistic
34 I mainly used the data in Table 1.5. to calculate the weights. The total value of all products was 
226,957,929 kum§es. In that, wheat accounted for 32.4%, barley 18.1%, oats 4%, Rye 11.9% and maize 
33.5%.
35 See Chapter-2 for the impact of the Russian famine on local cereal prices.
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estimation and planning on behalf of the local authorities. However, the archival 
evidence, as I have briefly mentioned above, suggests that a convergence between 
actual values and the tax base would be associated more with increasing ‘taxability’ 
than realistic and accurate planning. Therefore, I assume that the ratio would be a rough 
proxy deflator of the “taxation effect”.
Table-1.5.
Estimated Output Trends in Cereal Production in Selanik, 1886-1903 (1887=100)
Year
I n III IV
Real Tax-Base Taxation Deflator
Real Tax-Base 
(Net of Taxation Effect)
(I/II)
Output Trends 
(Net of Tax-Rate Effect)
1886 88.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1887 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1888 81.9 95.1 86.1 86.1
1889 89.8 91.0 98.7 98.7
1890 109.5 100.4 109.0 109.0
1891 87.8 103.8 84.6 84.6
1892 74.1 86.1 86.0 86.0
1893 94.9 100.3 94.6 94.6
1894 109.8 91.7 119.7 95.8
1895 110.0 89.6 122.7 98.2
1896 101.5 110.4 92.0 73.6
1897 99.7 103.4 96.5 77.2
1898 121.5 99.2 122.5 98.0
1899 98.6 100.0 98.6 78.9
1900 97.4 99.4 97.9 72.7
1901 116.5 102.5 113.6 84.4
1902 113.5 100.1 113.3 84.2
1903 104.5 101.3 103.2 76.6
Source: Real Tax base is taken from Table 1.3, Column V. Taxation Deflator is based on the tithe figures 
compiled by S. J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue 
Systems”, International Journal o f Middle East Studies, V. 6, (1975): 421-459.
Data on the actual- tithe revenues (tahsilat) for the province of Selanik are 
missing for the post-1896 period. It was not therefore possible to construct a 
comprehensive deflator of the “taxation effect” for the entire period under 
consideration. In the lack of comprehensive evidence, I consulted Shaw’s tithe data, 
which included both the tahsilat and tahakkukat values cited in the budgets of the 
central government for the period 1887-1911.36 I mainly used these tahsilat and 
tahakkukat values as proxy indicators to calculate the “taxation deflator”. This index is 
presented in column two of Table 1.6. The data suggests a steady increase in the overall 
taxation capacity of the central government. This observation is in line with our
36 s  J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms,” 452-453.
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expectations, as it reflects the positive impact of increasing administrative powers and 
the construction of railways on taxation, as indicated above.
I deflated the “Real Tax base” with this “Taxation-Deflator” to reach an index of 
the “Real Tax base, Net of Taxation Effect”. The index is presented in the third column 
of Table 1.5. As a proxy variable, the “Real Tax base, Net of Taxation Effect” is a bit 
closer to an ‘ideal’ measure of the trends in output performance, but still we have not 
accounted for the changes in the rate of taxation. There were two increases in the rate of 
taxation during our period, one in 1894 and another in 1900 by 20.0% and 0.6%, 
respectively.37 This means that we must bring down the 1894-1899 figures by 20% and 
the 1900-1903 figures by about 20.7% in total in order to obtain relatively consistent 
series. These corrected final values are given in the last column of Table 1.5.
The long-term trend suggested by the final output index confirms our 
expectations of steady and swift decline from the late 1880s onwards. The estimated 
output index suggests a 24.3% decline in cereal production during 1887-1903. A simple 
regression analysis maintains that the output index would have declined further along 
the projected trend line and reached 73.1 in 1907. If so, we can suggest that the decline 
in cereal production could have been around 27.0% during the period under 
consideration.
Table 1.6.
Trends in Cereal Production, Summary Results, c.1890 - c.1905
Output Estimates (tons)
Official Estimates Fiscal Estimates Average
c.1890 490,589 411,136 450,863
c.1907 300,129 300,129 300,129
% Change
C.1890-C.1905 . -38.8 | -27.0 33.4
Source: See Text. 1907 output figures were taken from Table 1.1.
The rates of decline suggested by the official figures, i.e. 38.8%, and by the 
‘fiscal’ estimates, i.e. 27.0%, diverge from each other. Therefore, we need to consider 
both estimates jointly to reach a more accurate overall summary estimate. The two
39
estimates are brought together in Table 1.6. The first column of the table simply 
reiterates the official estimates presented in Table 1.1. The second column contains 
estimated output figures based on the trends suggested by fiscal data. More specifically, 
I took the levels of production c.1907 as benchmark and extrapolated the growth figure, 
that is 27%, backwards to reach an indicative output estimate for c.1890. Then I took 
the average of both estimates to reach the last column of Table 1.6. The summary 
figures suggest a notable contraction, by as much as a third, in cereal production during 
the 1890s and the early 1900s. Considering the trends suggested by the fiscal estimates, 
we could argue that the bulk of this contraction probably took place during the late 
1890s and the early 1900s.
1.2. Cash Crop Production
1.2.1. Tobacco and Silk Cocoon Production
Available output statistics on tobacco and silk production are relatively reliable.. 
The PDA’s close supervision and control of the production, marketing and taxation of 
these leading cash crops should enhance the accuracy of the official statistics.38 Besides, 
the production of the two crops concentrated in a number of leading districts, which 
renders the estimation of output levels easier in comparison to cereals that were almost 
universally cultivated throughout the region. Therefore, I will be using the official 
statistics on tobacco and silk cocoon production liberally to determine trends in output 
performance.
I will also use the available foreign trade statistics to outline trends in the 
production of tobacco and silk cocoons. However, there are certain risks associated with 
the use of foreign trade statistics. First, this crude method cannot account for the 
changes in the level of domestic consumption and cannot therefore fully represent 
trends in output. Secondly, foreign trade statistics used here contain exports originating. 
not only from the province of Selanik, but also from the neighbouring Macedonian 
provinces of Kosova and Manastir. Therefore, the export figures reflect only partially 
the trends in Selanik’s production. Yet, the exercise is helpful to crosscheck the
37 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures, 164.
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reliability of the trends suggested by the official figures. The export orientation of these 
products, especially of tobacco, was relatively high. Besides, the province of Selanik 
was by far the leading centre for tobacco and silk production in broader Macedonia. 
According to the 1907 statistics, Selanik accounted for 71.6% of tobacco production and 
92.7% of silk cocoon production in broader Macedonia.39 Therefore, we can reasonably 
assume that the export figures can be used as supplementary evidence to ensure the 
reliability of the production trends suggested by the official statistics.
Based on the available data, I compiled production and export figures pertaining 
to tobacco and silk cocoon production for a number of selected benchmark years 
between 1886 and 1912, for which data was available. The data was extracted from a 
number of sources, which, included British and French consular reports, the respective 
journals of the British and French chambers of commerce in Istanbul, the journal of the 
chamber of commerce of Istanbul, the local newspaper Asir, and the 1907 statistics 
published by the Ottoman government.
Table 1.7.
Production and Exports o f  Tobacco and Silk Cocoons in Selanik, 1886-1912 (tons)
Year Tobacco Year Silk Cocoons
Q X Q X
1886 3,378 5,139 1886 n.a.
oom
1890 4,376 5,031 1890 1,300 371
1897 7,500 8,556 1897 1,600 246
1907 11,570 9,479 1907 1,643 411
1912 19,700 18,889 1911 n.a. 461
Source: Production Figures: !8M i D. T.O.G., 15.N.1305 (26.5.1888), N. 178: 255-257; 1890: S.V.S.
1307, 1890, 58: 1897: D.T.O.G.. l.Ra.1315 (31.7.1897), N. 656: 249-250; R.C.L., 1899, N. 142- 
147: 1133; R.C.L., 1901, N.. 166-171: 126; 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik 
idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, b-z; 1912: Palairet, Balkan Economies, 343. Export Figures: 
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 94-95, 116-117.
Abbreviations: Q: Output; X: Exports.
Note: Export figures represent total exports from the port of Salonica and incorporate produce coming 
from neighbouring Macedonian provinces. Also see text.
The secular growth trend is quite notable for tobacco production. The production 
of the crop seems to have grown rapidly in the region between 1886-1912. In 1886,
See Chapter 2 for PDA’s tight control over tobacco production. Also see Quataert, Ottoman 
Reform-, Parvus, Turkiye’nin Mali Tarihv, Blaisdell, European Financial Control, E. G. Mears, (ed.) 
Modern Turkey, (New York, 1924).
39 Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat istatistik idaresi, 1323 Ziraat istatistigi, p-z.
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tobacco production was around 3,378 tons. By 1907, regional tobacco production 
yielded 11,570 tons and reached an all time high of 19,700 tons in 1912. Tobacco 
exports also grew over twofold between during 1886-1907 and grew rapidly afterwards 
to reach an all time high of 18,889 tons on the eve of the Balkan wars.
During the same period, the production and exports of silk cocoons seem to have 
also grown, albeit at a relatively modest rate. Output appears to have grown from 1,300 
tons in 1890 to 1,643 tons in 1907. Exports also grew from 300 tons in 1886 to 461 tons 
in 1912, albeit with considerable fluctuation. After a period of some moderate growth 
during 1886-1890, the export performance of the region remained sluggish throughout 
the 1890s and made some recovery after the turn of the century. By 1912, silk cocoon 
exports reached a high of 461 tons.
Overall, the production of both crops appears to have grown steadily during the 
period under consideration. The growth of tobacco production in particular is striking 
and in comparison the expansion of silk production appears to have been relatively 
limited.
1.2.2. Opium and Cotton Production
Empirical Problems and Alternative Methods o f  Estimation
The output statistics on opium and cotton production are less reliable than those 
on tobacco and silk cacoons. Similar to the official output estimates pertaining to cereal 
production, these statistics were probably based on fiscal data and are not entirely 
dependable for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, I will be introducing a more 
roundabout method of estimation to help confirm the reliability o f the trends suggested 
by available output figures. The following formula summarises the method of 
estimation I have adopted: ’
Total Output = (Domestic Consumption) + (Exports - Imports)
There are certain empirical difficulties in using this formula to determine the 
levels of opium and cotton production in the region. First, it is not easy to estimate
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domestic consumption of cotton because cotton was largely consumed within the region 
and the share of exports in total production remained relatively limited. In the following 
sub-section, I will try to estimate levels of domestic cotton consumption for selected 
benchmark years.
Second, the estimation of the foreign trade balance entails certain technical 
difficulties. The available export figures again comprise total shipments from the port of 
Salonica and therefore incorporate the exports originating from the entire Macedonian 
hinterland. This empirical drawback, however, does not appear to be entirely prohibitive 
for estimating the levels of cotton production. According to the 1907 statistics, Selanik 
accounted for 95.7% of all Macedonian cotton production.40 Therefore, we can 
confidently assume that the bulk of exported cotton came from Selanik during the 
period under consideration. The problem is slightly more complex for opium. The 
province of Kosova was the leading centre of poppy cultivation in broader Macedonia 
and the best quality opium for export came from the district o f I§tip in southern Kosova. 
The 1907 statistics suggest that about 52.6% of Macedonian opium production took 
place in Kosova, while Selanik accounted for about 46.8% of the total.41 Since the 
available export figures can only be representative of production trends in broader 
Macedonia, using the Macedonian output figures as a proxy to determine production 
trends in Selanik appears to be a reasonable approach. Surely, this approach is not 
entirely satisfactory, for it .does not allow for a robust analysis of the changes taking 
place in the level of opium production in the Selanik region. Yet, the compactness of 
opium produce, the relative insignificance of transportation costs associated with the 
marketing of opium, and the greater degree of integration in broader Macedonian opium 
markets allow us, albeit cautiously, to infer trends in regional opium production from 
those pertaining to broader Macedonia.
Cotton Production
Estimating levels of cotton production based on the consumptionist approach 
entails difficulties of a more specific nature. The ‘external’ balance can easily be
40 Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, p-z.
41 Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, p-z.
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calculated, because the trade figures are available and we know that the bulk of exports 
originated from the cotton producing districts of Selanik. As I have noted above, the 
main difficulty lies with the estimation of the levels of local consumption. Local cotton 
consumption had two components in the region, namely home/household and factory 
consumption. We know that rural household production of hand-spun yam survived 
well into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite the strong 
competition of European and local factories.42 However, it is very difficult to guess 
exactly how much cotton was produced and consumed for domestic purposes. A 
contemporary report on cotton production in Selanik prepared by the chief agricultural 
inspector, Vitalis Efendi, sheds some light on the issue. Vitalis estimated that about 
2,700 tons of cotton was consumed within the vilayet of Selanik in 1903. Of that sum, 
130 tons, or about 5%, were used for household consumption.43
Vitalis’ estimate of household consumption was probably impressionistic. 
Besides, his estimates pertain to 1903 and reveal nothing about the share of household 
consumption for earlier years. My impression is that, relative “de-industrialisation” and 
the retreat of cotton spinning deep into the countryside took place earlier, in the 1850s 
and 1860s, owing much to the rapid penetration of cheap European yams into domestic 
markets. Hand spinning was gradually pushed backed into the confines of rural self- 
sufficiency and had become a Chayanovian endeavour in the countryside by the 
1870s.44 The situation probably did not change much during the 1880s and the 1890s. 
As suggested by Vitalis’ report, women continued to support the household economy by 
spinning and weaving as they did in the past. I assume that the share of cotton 
consumption for household purposes remained relatively unimportant and more or less 
retained its relatively small share in total consumption. Rather than using Vitalis’ 
impressionistic estimates, I chose to remove household consumption altogether from the 
computations.
42 1307 S.V.S, 1890, 228.
43 Asir, 23 N. 1322 (1.12.1904), No. 935:2.
44 See D. Quataert, “The Ottoman Handicrafts and Industry in the Age of European Industrial 
Hegemony, 1800-1914,” Review, 11, (1988): 160-178; D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age o f 
the Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); S. D. Petmezas, “Patterns of 
Protoindustrialization in the Ottoman Empire. The Case of Eastern Thessaly, c. 1750-1860,” Journal o f 
European Economic History, 19, N. 3, (1990): 575-604; §. Pamuk, “Osmanh Zanaatlerinin Yikilmasi,” 
[The Decline of Ottoman Manufactures], Toplum ve Bilim, 23, (1983): 75-99.
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The ‘factory’ component of ‘domestic consumption’ is somewhat easier to 
estimate. Contemporary observers showed great interest in the proliferation of spinning 
mills throughout the region. These observers frequently cited estimates of cotton yam 
manufactured in local mills. Recently, Palairet compiled the available figures and 
produced a comprehensive output series pertaining to mechanised cotton yam 
production in Selanik.45 I relied mostly on Palairet’s yam output estimates as a proxy 
for factory consumption of cotton. The main difficulty was to determine how much 
cotton input was needed on average to produce a certain quantity of cotton yam of 
lower counts. As a rough estimate, I used the input/output figures given by the British 
consular assistant in Salonica, Mr. Du Vallon. Du Vallon argued that “[one of] the 
spinning [mills] in Salonica produced about 160,000 bales of 10 lbs. [of cotton yam], 
for which 2,000,000 lbs. of cotton were necessary”.46 Accordingly, I simply multiplied 
the yam output figures of Palairet by a coefficient of 1.25 to reach a rough estimate of 
factory consumption of raw cotton, which, in this case, also represents the total 
domestic consumption of cotton. I then estimated the levels of cotton production for 
selected benchmark years by adding the foreign trade balance to the consumption 
figures. The estimates are presented in Table 1.8. In the last column of the same table, I 
also give the available official estimates of cotton production.
Table 1.8.
Estimated Cotton Production in Selanik, 1885-1912 (tons)
Year I II III IV V
TDC X M Q=(i)+(ii-ni) Q (Official)
1885 800 550 - 1,350 n.a.
1890 2,171 578 - 2,749 n.a.
1895 2,500 483 - 2,983 n.a.
1900 n.a. 1,187 - n.a. n.a.
1907 3,656 - 1,500 2,156 1,999
1912 2,913 17 900 2,030 1,700
Source: Official Production Figures: 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik idaresi, 1323 
Ziraat Istatistigi, b-z; 1912: F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 5017: 10. Import Figures: 1907: F.O.A.S., 
1909, N. 4379: 11; 1912: F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 5017: 10. Export Figures: Gounaris, Steam over 
Macedonia, 94-95.
Abbreviations: TDC: Total Domestic Consumption; X: Exports; M: Imports; Q: Output.
Note: Export figures represent total exports from the port of Salonica and incorporate produce coming 
from neighbouring Macedonian provinces. Also see text.
45 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 351.
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The broad trend in regional cotton production seems to have been rapid 
expansion during the 1880s, followed by a period of relative slowdown during the early 
1890s and a swift decline, perhaps by as much as 28%, in the late 1890s and the early 
1900s. The contraction in regional cotton production seems to have slowed down during 
the late 1900s and the early 1910s. Yet, the sector failed to recovery, as indicated by the 
estimated level of regional cotton production on the eve of the Balkan wars, which 
remained below that of 1895 by as much as a third.
Opium Production
Table 1.9 presents the available output and export figures pertaining to 
Macedonian opium production for selected benchmark years. The output data was based 
on official figures extracted mainly from British consular reports, as well as on the 
official statistics published by the Ottoman government in 1890 and 1907. The export 
figures were extracted from Gounaris.47
Table 1.9.
Opium Production in and Exports from Macedonian Provinces, 1880-1912 (tons)
Year Q X
1880 6 1 .7 n.a.
1890 9 2 .8 85
1902 201 .1 2 0 0
1907 77 75
1912 103.1 132
Source: Production Figures: 1880: P.P.A.P.. 1883, Commercial Reports, N. 6: 97; 1890: S.V.S.
1307, 1890, 58; 1902: R.C.L., 1903, N. 190-195: 214; 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti 
istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, b-z; 1912: F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5234: 8. Export Figures: 
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 94-95.
Abbreviations: Q: Output; X: Exports.
Both estimates suggest steady growth in output during the 1880s, followed by a 
period of rapid growth during the 1890s and early 1900s. This expansionary period was 
followed by a brief interval of retardation and a partial recovery in the mid-late 1900s,
46 F.O.A.S., N. 3250, (1904: 5); PRO, F.O. 78/3343, 1881, General Report on the Province or the 
Sancak of Serres by Vice-Consul to Serres, Mr. Langdon.
4^ Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia.
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respectively. Yet, the recovery was only partial and still lagging behind the peak level 
reached in 1902 by the end of the period under consideration.
These figures represent the trends in opium production for Macedonia in general 
and not those in Selanik as such. However, due to the above mentioned peculiarities in 
opium production it is reasonable to assume that the broad direction of the regional and 
Macedonian opium production ran parallel. Therefore, I conclude that opium production 
expanded rapidly throughout the region during the 1880s and the 1890s and 
subsequently went into a period of relative retardation during the early 1900s.
1.3. Animal Husbandry
Two primary sources can be used to gauge the performance of the sector during 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The first, and indeed the primary, 
source is the official statistics on animal husbandry published by the Ottoman 
government. These statistics are readily available in various provincial almanacs 
(salnames) and the official 1907 agricultural statistics. Also fiscal data can be used quite 
productively to cross check and confirm the trends suggested by the official output 
estimates. The fiscal data pertaining to animal taxes, mainly the sheep tax (agnam 
vergisi) and the pig tax (canavar vergisi), can be extracted from the annual budgets of 
the provincial government. In what follows, I will first discuss the nature of my sources 
and point to their relative weaknesses and strengths. Having made the necessary 
technical reservations, I will use both data sets, particularly the official output statistics, 
to delineate broad trends in sectoral performance during the period under consideration.
The most important piece of evidence contained in the official statistics is the 
number of farm animals that existed within the boundaries of the province. It is not 
exactly clear how the authorities estimated this number. Most likely, they used a 
combination of local tax-registers and the records of local councils and the chambers of 
commerce and agriculture. The data published in the salnames appear to have been 
based on these sources. The numbers cited in the 1907 agricultural statistics probably 
were based on a combination of local tax registers, the reports of the appointed survey 
committees, and the records of the local chambers of commerce and agriculture. All of 
these estimates contain an indeterminate margin of error. The difficulty of keeping full
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account of the constantly changing number of farm animals in a large province with a 
total surface area of 36,000 square kilometres must have undermined the accuracy of the 
official estimates.
Despite their shortcomings, the data at hand can still be used to establish broad 
trends in sectoral performance. The fiscal origins of the available statistics do not appear 
to be as problematic as they are in the cases of cereals and some of the cash crops. 
Animal taxes were collected directly by the salaried officials of the government. These 
tax collectors cooperated with local village headmen, the estate owners, and members of 
the local councils, and other prominent individuals to set the number of animals that 
would be subject to taxation in each village or estate. The parties then determined 
jointly the average annual revenue to be generated from the keeping of these farm 
animals. The expected revenue thus determined simply set the tax base. The village 
commune, or the estate owner, was then obliged to pay, in cash, a certain percentage of 
the tax base as sheep, pig and farm animal tax to the appointed tax collectors.48
Available historical sources maintain that the authorities managed to collect the 
due animal taxes on time. The participation of local agents in the collection of these 
taxes, the simplicity of the method of taxation, and the clarity with which the specific 
fiscal obligations of the village commune were set were important factors that 
contributed to the prompt collection of animal taxes, without leaving much in arrears. 
According to the available budgetary figures, the government officers managed to 
collect over 95% of the expected animal tax revenues 49 This situation indicates that the 
official estimates of the number of animals kept within the boundaries of each province, 
and hence, the official figures published in the salnames were relatively accurate, 
particularly for the pre-1900 period. Besides, the reports of local chambers of commerce 
and agriculture probably increased the accuracy of the ‘fiscal’ estimates included in the 
provincial salname s. In the following analysis, I will be using the statistics published in 
the salnames for the years 1876 and 1890s. Data published in the salnames of other 
years were largely incomplete and partial, and the data pertaining to these two years 
constitute, by far, the best series available for the province.
48 s. J. Shaw “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms”.
49 For late 1890s, see Devleti Aliyeyi Osmaniyenin Varidat ve Masarifati Umumiyesinin 
Sal Muhasebesidir, 1312, Dersaadet, 1895.
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Table 1.10.
The Animal Taxes Levied in the Province of Selanik, 1888-1908 (kuru$es)
Year Sheep Tax (Agnam) Pig Tax (Canava r) Total Total (1888=100)
1888 16,355,930 269,460 16,625,390 100.0
1889 16,936,271 285,580 17,221,851 103.6
1890 16,435,004 319,180 16,754,184 100.8
1891 15,446,855 298,570 15,745,425 94.7
1892 15,925,245 384,505 16,309,750 98.1
1893 16,403,875 391,555 16,795,430 101.0
1894 15,679,150 476,205 16,155,355 97.2
1895 16,922,780 479,080 17,401,860 104.7
1896 17,899,302 435,555 18,334,857 110.3
1897 n.a. n.a n.a n.a
1898 n.a n.a n.a n.a
1899 17,279,621 236,531 17,516,152 105.4
1900 17,864,868 240,025 18,104,893 108.9
1901 14,763,723 181,528 14,945,251 89.9
1902 15,638,506 296,660 15,935,166 95.8
1903 14,570,647 1,710,153 16,280,800 97.9
1904 14,483,390 729,801 15,213,191 91.5
1905 11,047,300 534,100 11,581,400 69.7
1906 n.a n.a n.a n.a.
1907 n.a n.a n.a n.a.
1908 12,394,161 194,180 12,588,341 75.7
Source: Devleti Aliyeyi Osmaniyenin Varidat ve Masarifati Umumiyesinin Sal Muhasebesidir, 1305- 
1312, Dersaadet, 1888-1895; 1299-1324 S.V.S., 1882-1905.
Apparently, the data contained in the salnames are not equally reliable for the 
post-1900 period. My research in the Ottoman archives suggests that the local 
authorities encountered some difficulty in the collection of animal taxes after the turn of 
the century. Mounting political instability in the countryside and the intensification of 
the militant activities of the bands operating in the region, particularly in highland 
districts where animal husbandry was prominent, posed a serious threat for appointed 
tax collectors. Apprehensive of life-threatening attacks by bandits and the constant 
danger of being kidnapped by them, the appointed tax collectors often demanded 
protection from the local gendarmerie garrisons. In most instances, the local authorities 
failed to appoint guards to accompany the tax collectors, mainly because of the lack of 
funds to meet the extra costs of such protection. Under the circumstances, many officers 
refused to collect the tax dues in distant mountainous districts.50 Consequently, the 
animal tax revenues accruing to the provincial government contracted notably in the 
post-1900 period. The figures presented in Table 1.10 suggest a 30% contraction in the
50 For complaints see BA, TFR.l.SL, 9/851, 25.M.1321 (23.4.1903); BA, TFR.l.SL., 60/5995, 
8.L.1322 (15.12.1904); BA, TFR.l.SL., 115/11406, 4.C.1324 (26.7.1906)
49
animal taxes accruing to the provincial government during 1900-1908. Clearly, adverse 
political conditions underlined this notable contraction in government revenue. More 
importantly, these adverse circumstances, especially growing tax evasion, probably 
claimed much from the accuracy of the ‘fiscal’ estimates published in the salname s.
The 1907 statistics, as I have noted, were less fiscal in origin and were based on 
the detailed information provided by the specialist statistical survey committees, as well 
as by the local chambers of commerce and agriculture. Hence, the official agricultural 
statistics can be used with little reservation to determine the number of farm animals in 
the post-1900 period.
Table 1.11.
Growth o f ,the Number o f Farm Animals in Selanik, 1890-1907
Animals 1890 1907 Growth Rate (%)
Cows, Buffaloes and Beasts 199,846 419,513 109.9
Sheep 1,180,369 1,608,328 36.3
Goats 666,893 1,135,215 70.2
Horses 29,324 54,943 87.4
Donkeys and Mules 48,372 95,687 97.8
Pigs 72,445 45,097 -37.8
Source: 1293 S.V.S., 1876, 76; 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 69-74; Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik 
Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, 176-179.
The data presented in Table 1.11 suggest considerable growth in the number of 
farm animals during the period under consideration. The rise in the number of the most 
important farm animals such as cows, buffaloes, beasts of burden, sheep, donkeys and 
mules is quite striking. In this period, we observe a 109.9% increase in the number of 
cows, buffaloes and beasts, 70.2% in goats, 97.8% in donkeys and mules, 87.4% in 
horses and 36.3% in sheep. Only the number of pigs seems to have declined during this 
period. Looking at the fiscal data in Table 1.10, we can suggest, albeit cautiously, that 
this growth in animal numbers was relatively moderate during the 1890s. Animal tax 
revenues increased by about 8.0% during 1890-1900. Therefore, it is very likely that the 
bulk of growth took place in the post-1900 period. At any rate, we can confidently 
presume that animal husbandry assumed increasing importance in the regional economy 
during the period under consideration, with probable trend acceleration after c.1890.
50
2. Overall Trends in Agricultural Production
Our analysis so far has concentrated on the performance of the primary sub­
sectors of the agrarian economy. The discussion yielded a highly complex picture of the 
agricultural sector in the Selanik region during the period under consideration. Cereal 
production was seriously retarded and contracted by as much as a third, in contrast to 
the growing dynamic sub-sectors, namely tobacco, silk, opium and cotton production. 
The expansion of tobacco production in particular was quite spectacular and grew by 
over 400.0% during 1886-1912. Overall, therefore, we observe the emergence of a 
“dual” agriculture structure in the region, whereby dynamic and retarded sub-sectors 
coexisted in apparent contrast.
In this section, we turn our attention to the broader picture and discuss overall 
production trends in the agricultural sector. Again, I use a number of different sources. 
and employ various methods of estimation to assure reliability and accuracy in the 
estimates. First, I will use official data pertaining to the area under cultivation and the 
value of agricultural output in order to measure the changes taking place in the overall 
level of agricultural production. Secondly, I will use available demographic data to 
determine the changing importance of the agricultural sector in the broader regional 
economy during the period under consideration. Once this exercise is complete, then we 
shall be in a position to discuss the direction, pattern and timing of the shifts taking 
place in the agrarian sector as well as in the broader regional economy.
2.1. Changing Levels of Agricultural Production
Statistics on the area of agricultural land under cultivation can be extracted from 
the provincial yearbooks {salnames) and the 1907 statistics. In our case, the salname 
pertaining to 1890 and the 1907 statistics contain comprehensive data on the area of 
land under cultivation for most crops produced in the Selanik region. These crops 
include primary cereals, leading cash crops, grapes, as well as other less important, if 
significant, products, such as sesame, rice and leguminous products. Both sets of 
statistics also contain estimates of the total area of land under cultivation in the region 
(See Table 1.12).
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The aggregate data, namely the total area of land under cultivation, could not 
constitute a reliable basis for discussing overall trends in agricultural production, due to 
the apparent categorical inconsistencies that existed between the two data sets. More 
specifically, it is not exactly clear what the category of ‘others’ entailed in the 1890 
statistics. This drawback claims much from the comparability of the two estimates and 
undermines the reliability of comparative static analysis. I, therefore, decided to use 
categorical data in order to secure consistency. I simply added the available figures on 
cereals, cash crops, rice and leguminous products and vineyards to reach more coherent 
estimates of the area of land under cultivation for the two benchmark years. These 
leading products consistently accounted for at least 77.0% of the agricultural land under 
cultivation, and, therefore, the categorical aggregates could be representative of the 
broad trends taking place in agricultural production. The ensuing data is presented in the 
last row of Table 1.12.
Table 1.12.
Area o f Land under Crop Cultivation in Selanik, 1890-1917 (donums)
Cultivated Crop 1890 % 1907 % % Change (1890-1907)
Wheat 614,604 14.5 598,464 22.1 -2.6
Barley 729,965 17.2 511,611 18.9 -29.9
Maize 604,376 14.3 549,994 20.4 -9.0
Oats 239,653 5.7 167,412 6.2 -30.1
Rye 564,650 13.3 262,296 9.7 -53.5
TOTAL CEREALS 2,753,248 65.0 2,089,777 77.3 -24.1
Tobacco 58,490 1.4 115,713 4.3 97.8
Cotton 110,145 2.6 43,656 1.6 -60.4
Poppies 20,000 0.5 11,135 0.4 -44.3
TOTAL CASH CROPS 188,635 4.5 170,504 6.3 -6.9
Vineyards 324,228 7.7 162,570 6.0 -49.9
Others 969,081 22.9 279,072 6.6 -71.2
TOTAL 4,235,192 100.0 2,701,923 100.0 -36.2
CATEGORICAL SUB-TOTAL 3,266,111 77.1 2,422,851 89.7 -25.8
Source: 1890: 1307 S. V.S., 1890, 47-50; 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik idaresi, 
1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, t; 11-33.
Notes: For 1907 ‘Others’ include ‘rice, sesame and leguminous crops. ‘Others’ are not defined in the 
1890 statistics. Also see Text.
The estimates presented in Table 1.12 suggest a considerable (36.2%) 
contraction in the total area of land under cultivation. The estimates also maintain the 
relative resilience of wheat and maize production and the dynamism of tobacco 
production in the region. At any rate the contraction in the production of field crops 
cannot be seriously disputed. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we should anticipate a
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contraction in the agricultural sector at large and an associated decline in its 
contribution to the broader regional economy.
The data presented in Table 1.12, however, does not take into consideration the 
contribution of animal husbandry and sericulture to agricultural production. In the 
previous section I have maintained the dynamism and growth of these sub-sectors and 
hinted at the possibility of their rising importance in the Selanik region during this 
period. Therefore, it is imperative to employ alternative methods of estimation that 
would reflect the changes in the level of agricultural production. In addition, such an 
effort should help to test the accuracy of the data presented in Table 1.12.
Table 1.13.
Total Value of Agricultural Output in Selanik, 1890-1907 (Kuru$es in 1907 Prices)
Product 1890 % 1907 % % Change (1890-1907)
Wheat 75,048,972 13.6 73,451,664 19.4 -2.1
Barley 89,313,365 16.2 41,092,464 10.8 -54.0
Rve 67,758,000 12.3 27,084,540 7.1 -60.0
Oats 15,919,643 2.9 9,207,300 2.4 -42.2
Maize 112,743,596 20.4 76,121,961 20.1 -32.5
CEREALS TOTAL 360,783,575 65.3 226,957,929 59.8 -37.1
Silk Cocoons 13,654,896 2.5 17,215,444 4.5 26.1
Tobacco 24,916,740 4.5 65,877,449 17.4 164.4
Opium 5,284,736 1.0 1,949,107 0.5 -63.1
Cotton 41,579,738 7.5 9,439,539 2.5 -77.3
CASH CROPS TOTAL 85,436,109 15.5 94,481,539 24.9 10.6
Wool 8,875,000 1.6 11,418,930 3.0 28.7
Goat's Hair 4,550,000 0.8 2,951,520 0.8 -35.1
Milk 15,120,000 2.7 22,653,000 6.0 49.8
ANIMAL PRODUCTS 28,545,000 5.2 37,023,450 9.8 29.7
Grapes 77,760,000 14.1 20,826,918 5.5 -73.2
TOTAL 552,524,684 100.0 379,289,836 100.0 -31.4
Source: 1890: 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 47-50; 1907: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti istatistik idaresi, 
1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, t; 11-33.
Notes: 1) In the calculation of figures pertaining to wool, goat’s hair and milk, I have assumed that a
sheep yielded 1 okka (or 1,283 kg) of wool annually, a goat 0.5 okka of goat’s hair, and cows, 
buffaloes and beasts yielded 90 okka of milk annually. I also assumed that 60% of all beasts 
were female. The assumptions were based on the figures given in the 1890 yearbook. 1307 
S.V.S., 1890, 47-50.
2) The price data published in the 1907 statistics were used in computations. Weights were taken 
from the respectively from the 1890 yearbook and the 1907 statistics.
The data presented in Table 1.13 suggest that the total value of agricultural 
production declined by 31.0%, measured in 1907 prices, in the Selanik region during 
1890-1907. In other words, the positive contribution of cash crop production and animal 
husbandry was wiped out by the massive contraction in the primary sector of the
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agrarian economy, namely cereal production. It is very likely that the contribution of 
agriculture to the regional economy at large was much smaller in 1910 than it was two 
decades prior. This contention is also supported by demographic data, which suggests 
considerable de-population in rural areas, particularly from the turn of the twentieth 
century onwards.
2.2. Demographic Trends
2.2.1 Regional Population. The Overall Trends
The Ottoman authorities showed considerable interest in registering, updating 
and systematically publishing population figures throughout the nineteenth century. A . 
number of population censuses were carried out starting from the early 1830s. The early 
population censuses were limited both in terms of their scope and content and were 
primarily intended to register the tax-paying (male) population and to keep proper 
account of the adult Muslim men obliged to serve in the Ottoman armies. Unfortunately, 
most of these early censuses could not be completed in many provinces and the results 
remained confined largely to a few leading provinces.51
More comprehensive population counts were carried out during the Hamidian 
period, one in 1885 and the other in 1907. The surveys were carried out in all provinces 
of the Empire and all citizens were counted. These censuses were much more detailed 
than anything that preceded them and contained elaborate information on almost all 
aspects of demographic life, such as plain population figures pertaining to each and 
every district (kaza), the marital status, age, gender, ethnic background, occupation and 
birthplace of each individual. The Ottoman government published the information 
gathered in these censuses. In addition, the local authorities regularly published 
population estimates in the provincial almanacs (salnames). The data contained in the 
salnames probably were based on the population censuses and updated according to the 
local population registers kept by the provincial bureaucracy.52
See S. J. Shaw “The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914,” International 
Journal o f Middle East Studies, 9, (1975): 325-338; Karpat, Ottoman Population.
52 See Shaw “ The Ottoman Census System”; Karpat, Ottoman Population.
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In what follows, I use both sources to quantify the demographic changes in 
Selanik. However, it must be noted that these statistics contain certain weaknesses. The 
first weakness is the general under-counting and the second is the apparent under­
recording of the female population. Recently, Michael Palairet controlled for some of 
these weaknesses and produced alternative “corrected” estimates pertaining to the 
European provinces of the Empire. These estimates constitute the best data current 
available. Here, I will use Palairet’s corrected estimates for the province of Selanik for 
the years 1885,1896 and 1906.53
I also estimate the population of the province for two more benchmark years, 
1876 and 1912. However, the data must be adjusted to secure consistency with 
Palairet’s figures. For this, we must briefly consider Palairet’s method of correction. 
First, Palairet maintains that it is necessary to make an 8.0% upwards adjustment over 
official figures to account for general under-counting. However, Palairet refrains from 
adopting a different margin of error for pre-1885 data and uses the 8.0% margin 
throughout.54 Palairet’s reservation is justified, as there is no way of accounting for the 
degree of improvement in the accuracy o f censuses. Clearly, this reservation 
undermines the comparability of the early and later population estimates. Yet, the 
reservation is necessary to avoid any arbitrary distortion in the data set.
Secondly, Palairet accounts for the actual imbalance between male and female 
populations. The conventional method adopted by contemporaries was simply to double 
the male population reported in the censuses and the provincial registers to construct 
overall population figures. Palairet contests the accuracy of this method on the basis of 
his own research, as well as that of Todorova and Karpat. He maintains that there was 
an actual and persistent surplus of male population in the Balkan provinces of the 
Empire.55 He suggests tentatively that it is necessary to make a downward adjustment of 
4.2% in population estimates reached by doubling the male population, so as to account 
for the “real” excess of male population over females in the Macedonian provinces for 
the pre-1885 period.
53 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 13.
5^ Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 10-12. ,
55 Karpat, Ottoman Population; M. Todorova, “Population Structure, Marriage Patterns, Family 
and Household (According to Ottoman Documentary Material from North Eastern Bulgaria in the 60’s of 
the 19th century),” Etudes Balkaniques, 1, (1983): 59-72.
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Our data pertaining to 1876 comes from the official yearbook of that year. The 
yearbook reports 393,029 male residents for 1876.56 Following Palairet’s correction 
technique, I have estimated the provincial population at 813,287 in 1876.57 This is 
probably an underestimate, because, as I have noted, the 8.0% upward adjustment 
suggested by Palairet might not be sufficient to fully account for the under-counting 
inherent in these early population figures. Nevertheless, I maintain the estimate to 
assure consistency within our data set.
Table 1.14.
Population Growth in Selanik, 1876-1911
1- Population Estimates
Year -Official Estimates Corrected Estimates
1876 393,000 813,000
1885 990,000 1,069,000
1896 1,010,000 1,091,000
1906 921,000 995,000
1911 1,103,000 1,191,000
2- Percentage Growth Rates (Corrected Estimates)
Period Population Growth Average Annual Growth Rate
1876-1885 3.1
1885-1896 2.1 0.2
1896-1906 -8.8 -1.0
1906-1911 19.7 3.7
Source: 1876: 1293 S.V.S., 1876,45; 1885-1906: Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 13; 1911: Eldem, 
Osmanli imparatorlugu ’nun iktisadi § art lari, 19.
Notes: Growth rates are exponential.
I have extracted the population data for 1911 from the official figures published 
by the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture. According to the raw figures, the total 
population of the province, was 1,103,000 in 1911.58 In this case, however, there was no 
need to account for the ‘gender bias’, as the data were based on all-inclusive censuses, 
where both the male and the female population was systematically counted. 
Nevertheless, in line with Palairet, I made an 8% upwards adjustment over the official 
statistics, to account for any general under-counting, which may have remained in these
56 1293 S.V.S., 1876,45.
57 I first adjusted 393,029 upward by 8%, and reached an official estimate of 424,471.1 multiplied 
this number by two to estimate regional population, 848,943. Then, I accounted for the gender bias and 
brought this figure down by 4.2% to reach 813,287.
5% Eldem, Osmanli imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi § art lari, 19.
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more comprehensive censuses. Thus, I estimated the population of Selanik at around
1,191,000 in this period.59
These calculations yield relatively comprehensive and consistent population 
estimates for the two benchmark years under consideration. These estimates are 
presented together with Palairet’s estimates pertaining to the years of 1885, 1897 and 
1906 in Table 1.14. The estimates suggest rapid population growth during 1876-1885, 
followed by a period of notable slowdown in 1885-1897, and a clear decline during 
1897-1906. We observe quite a remarkable recovery after 1906. Within a matter of five 
years the regional population grew by 19.7% in total, at an annual rate of 3.7%, and 
reached an all time high of 1,191,000 on the eve of the Balkan Wars.
The erratic fluctuation of the population during the period under consideration 
calls for some historical explanation. The rapid growth of regional population during the 
period 1876-1885 must be attributed partly to the feebleness of the 1876 population 
estimate. As I have noted above, the 1876 estimate is not entirely reliable and is 
probably an underestimate. However, 3.1% annual growth rate cannot be attributed 
entirely to technical problems, no matter what the margin of error in the 1876 estimates 
might have been.60 Historical evidence corroborates this impression and points to 
certain factors that might have triggered the rapid growth in the region’s population 
during the 1870s and the early 1880s.
The waves of migration that hit the region in the aftermath of the Russo- 
Ottoman war of 1876 must have played an important, if  not the primary, role in this 
regard. Thousands of Muslim families fleeing from Bulgaria, Romania and the 
Caucuses found refuge in the Macedonian provinces in the aftermath of the war. The 
Ottoman government sent some of these migrant families to the Anatolian provinces; 
however, it seems many were settled in Selanik.61 The Ottoman government provided
59 J. McCarthy, The Arab World, Turkey and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook o f Historical 
Statistics, (Boston, MA, 1982),' 283. McCarthy estimates the residents for the province of Selanik to be 
1,347,915. However, his correction method is not consistent with that o f Palairet and is not sensitive to 
the “actual” inequality between male and female populations. Therefore, in order to maintain consistency 
within my series I have used Palairet’s method to correct the existing official estimates.
60 Ottoman annual rate of population growth stood at an average of around 0.8% during the late 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth centuries (Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nun iktisadi 
$  art lari, 23).
61 See N. ipek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Turk Gogleri, 1877-1890, [Turkish Immigration from 
Rumelia to Anatolia, 1877-1890] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kuramu Basimevi, 1992), for the migration of
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land, accommodation, seeds, draft animals and cash allowances for these refugees and 
helped them settle in the province.62 Although it is not possible to determine their 
number, the new settlers’ contribution to the growth of the regional population must 
have been significant.
We observe a relative stagnation in the region’s population from 1885-1897. 
This stagnation can be attributed to outward migration. Following the cessation of 
Thessaly to Greece in 1885, many Greek peasant farmers left Macedonian provinces 
and sought their fortunes in,Thessaly as farmers and agricultural workers. Although it is 
not possible to determine the scope of this migration, it seems to have reached such a 
level as to cause acute labour shortages throughout the Macedonian countryside. Mostly 
likely, Selanik was not an exception.63
1897-1906 was a period of unprecedented depopulation in the region. During 
this nine-year period, regional population declined by an average of 1.0% per annum. 
Again, large-scale demographic movements explain this swift contraction. This period 
witnessed mass emigration from Macedonian provinces, due to complex reasons, which 
will be studied in detail in the following chapters. However, for now it suffices to say 
that a combination of economic and political factors seem to have encouraged many 
unfortunate peasant farmers to migrate abroad, particularly to the United States. 
Adverse price trends and successive crop failures, an increasing rural tax-burden, 
regressive taxation practices and growing indebtedness followed by dispossession seem 
to have underlay the process of emigration.64 Also, mounting political instability in the 
region, particularly after the turn of the century, seems to have compelled many peasant 
families to emigrate abroad.65
Muslim population to the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath o f the Russo-Ottoman war. Also see Karpat, 
Ottoman Population, and Devlet istatistik Enstitusu, Osmanli Imparatorlugunun ve Tiirkiye ’nin Niifusu.
62 For the settlement of migrant families in Selanik see, BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 975/639, 3.Ra.l296
(24.2.1879); BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 975/74, 3.S.1296 (26.1.1879); BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 1526/124, 19.R.1297
(30.3.1880); BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 1526/329, 13.B.1297 (21.6.1880); BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 1528/1044, 
7.S.1298 (8.1.1881).
63 P.P.A.S., 1886, N. 24: 5. The exact words of the British Consul General Blunt are worth while 
citing: “Since the cessation of Thessaly to Greece, more than two-thirds of the Mussulmans of that 
country have emigrated chiefly to Anatolia. They are becoming replaced by Christian peasants from 
Macedonia, where farm labourers are getting scarcer and dearer every year”.
64 For details see Chapters 2 and 4.
65 B. C. Gounaris, “Emigration from Macedonia in the Early Twentieth Century,” Journal o f 
Modem Greek Studies, 7, (1989): 133-153. Also see, Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia.
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Finally, the post-1906 years witnessed the reversal of demographic trends in the 
region; we observe rapid recovery in regional population. At this time, however, certain 
political factors seem to have underscored this increase. The growing ethnic tensions in 
the Macedonian provinces erupted into wide spread political instability throughout the 
Balkans during this period.66 Many Muslim families still residing in Bulgaria sought 
refuge in Ottoman lands. Most of these immigrant families were sent to the Anatolian 
provinces; but again many chose to stay in Selanik, particularly in the relative security 
of the proliferating urban areas of the region. These refugees explain much of the 
population growth from 1906-1911.
Overall, we observe that the population of the region fluctuated around the 
1,000,000 benchmark during the period under consideration. Processes of emigration 
from and immigration to the region largely underscored the fluctuations in regional 
population. In the next section, we turn our attention to the changes taking place in the 
composition of regional population and its distribution between urban and rural areas.
2.2.2. Rural and Urban Population. Changing Balances
Existing research on Ottoman demographic history suggests that the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries constituted a period of rapid urbanisation in 
Selanik and other European provinces of the Empire. According to Palairet’s figures, 
the number of people living in towns with more than 2,000 people totalled 325,000 in 
1895, or 28.9% of the population of the province in 1895.67 Georgeon suggests that the 
urban population grew steadily throughout the 1890s and the early 1900s and reached
456,000 in 1906. Since the population of the province was 995,000 in 1906, Georgeon’s
66 For political tensions accumulating in the region See Shaw and Shaw, History o f the Ottoman 
Empire’’, J. Barros, “The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913, by D. Dakin,” Book Review, Balkan 
Studies, 10, (1969): 218-220; H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, (London, 1906); 
D. Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913, (Salonica, 1966); B. Jelavich, History o f the 
Balkans, V. 2, Twentieth Century, 1. P. (1983), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); L. S. 
Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, (1. P. 1958), (London: Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2000). Also see G. 
Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu, Jon Turk Ihtilali’nin Kokenleri (1903-1908), [Macedonian Question and the 
Origins of the Young Turk Revolution, 1903-1908] (Istanbul: Afa Yaymlari, 1996), and T. Uzer, 
Makedonya E§kiyalik Tarihi ve Son Osmanh Yonetimi [History of Banditry in Macedonia and the Last 
Ottoman Administration] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1979).
67 There appears to be some inconsistency in Palairet’s data. Palairet estimates the population of 
the Selanik province to be 1,091,000 in 1896 (Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 13). If so, the urban 
population, i.e. 325,000, would account for 29.8% of the provincial population. However, Palairet, based 
on Vasil K’nchov, puts the rate of urbanisation at 27.9% (Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 26).
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figure indicates that the urban population rose rapidly during the 1890s and the early 
1900s to reach 45.8% of the total in 1906.68
Palairet and Georgeon, however, do not provide information on the earlier years 
of 1876-1895 or the later years of 1906-1912. In order to make up for this deficiency, I 
compiled urban population estimates for four benchmark years, i.e. 1876, 1894, 1906 
and 1912. Two primary sources were used in the compilation of the series. The first 
source was the provincial almanacs published by the Ottoman government, which 
regularly reported the population of the towns and/or the number of residential buildings 
located in each town.69 I primarily used the. population figures to compile the series. 
However, for certain years and for some towns no population estimates were available. 
To get around this problem, I used the number of residential buildings as a proxy for 
determining the population of any ‘missing’ town at any given point in time. I assumed; 
a) that each household contained an average of five persons and b) that only one 
household resided in each residential building.70 Accordingly, I simply multiplied the 
number of residential dwellings by a coefficient of five to reach indicative estimates of 
urban population. I relied on this crude method of estimation especially for the 
population figures of 1876. Nevertheless, it was still impossible to estimate the 
population of ten towns due to a total lack of evidence. The available data pertaining to 
1894 and 1906 were relatively comprehensive and yielded population estimates for all 
towns listed in the provincial almanacs. These estimates are presented in the first three 
columns of Table 1.15.
The estimation of urban population for 1912 posed greater difficulties. Since no 
almanacs were published after 1908, I had to rely on contemporary British consular 
reports.71 The data contained in the consular reports were relatively limited,
68 f .  Georgeon “Le dernier sursaut, 1878-1908”, in R. Mantran (ed.), Histoire de I’Empire 
Ottoman, (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 523-576.
69 The relevant yearbooks include, 1293 S.V.S., 1876; 1312 S.V.S., 1895; 1324 S.V.S., 1906.
70 See A. Duben, and C. Behar, Istanbul Haneleri, Evlilik, Aile ve Dogurganhk, 1880-1940 
[Istanbul Households, Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940], (Istanbul: Ileti§im Yaymlan, 1996), 
61-75; M. Todorova, “Population Structure”. Studies of Duben and'Behar, and Todorova maintain that 
urban families were predominantly ‘nuclear’. Duben and Behar also estimate 4.7 persons for the average 
Muslim family in Istanbul in the early twentieth century. Todorova maintains that five member 
households were the most representative in North-Eastern Bulgaria, c.1850. The data presented in 
Appendix 2 appears to be in tune with Todorova and Duben and Behar’s findings. The relatively 
comprehensive 1906 statistics suggest that the average household size in the province of Selanik was 5.5. 
Excluding the town of Salonica, we reach an average of 5.1 persons per household. Thus, it seems to be 
safe to assume five persons per household.
71 F.O.A.S., 1913, N. 5234: 3-4.
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incorporating the population of only the main towns, namely Salonica, Tikve§, 
Karaferye, Gevgeli, Vodine, Siroz, Drama and Kavala. No estimates of residential 
buildings were cited. The towns mentioned in the British consular reports accounted for 
about 75% of the entire urban population of the province that was reported in the 1906 
almanac. Although 75% is considerably high, leaving the remaining 25% out of our 
calculations would have seriously undermined the comparability of the 1912 estimates 
with the earlier ones. In order to bring the British data up to par with the previous 
observations, I assumed that the population of unrecorded towns remained unchanged 
between 1906 and 1912. Accordingly, I carried the 1906 figures over to 1912. This is 
not an entirely arbitrary assumption to make, because both in the primary sources and 
the available secondary literature, 1906-1912 appears as a period of rapid urban 
growth.72 Similarly, there is no qualitative evidence to suggest significant de­
urbanisation in any part of the region. Therefore, if  anything, our estimates must be 
considered conservative and understate the scope of urbanisation as of 1912. In other 
words, the data was adjusted against the hypothesis to be tested, i.e. rapid urban growth.
Another difficulty arose from the nature of the official statistics. The almanacs 
reported statistics pertaining to towns which were sub-provincial (kaza) government 
centres. Therefore, several towns of economic and demographic significance could not 
be included in the data set. For instance, Agustos (Nausta), which was an important 
manufacturing centre with a population of over 10,000 at the time, went unreported. 
More importantly perhaps, several towns with populatipns between 2,000 and 5,000 
could not be included due to a lack of evidence.
72 See S. Dumont, “The Social Structure o f the Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the 
Nineteenth Century,” Southeastern Europe/L ’Europe du Sud-Est, 5, N. 2, (1979): 33-72; I. Tekeli, and S. 
Ilkin, “Ittihat ve Terakki Hareketinin 01u§umunda Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapismm Belirleyiciligi,” [The 
Determining Role of the Social Structure of Salonica in the Formation o f the Committee of Union and 
Progress], in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.), Tukiye 'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, 1071-1920, [Turkey’s 
Social and Economic History, 1071-1920], (Ankara: Metaksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 351-382; 
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia; A.Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey Yunanistan’da §ehircilik 
ve Modemle§me,” [Urban Planning and Modernization in Northern Greece during the Tanzimat Period], 
in P. Dumont and F. Georgeon, (eds.) Modemle§me Surecinde Osmanli Kentleri [Ottoman Towns in the 
Process of Modernization], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlan, 1996), 31-59; Lory, B. and A. Popovic 
“Balkanlarm Kav§agindaki Manastir, 1816-1918,” [Manastir at the Crossroads of the Balkans, 1816- 
1918], in P. Dumont and F. Georgeon (eds.) Modemle§me Surecinde Osmanli Kentleri [Ottoman Towns 
in the Process of Modernisation], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlan, 1996), 60-78; Palairet, The 
Balkan Economies’, M. Anastassiadou, Salonique, 1830-1912, Une ville ottomane a I’age des Reformes, 
(Leiden, New York, Koln: Brill, 1997). Also see Chapter 5.
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Table 1.15.
Urbanization in the Province of Salonica, 1876-1911
I - Estimated Population of Leading Urban Centers, 1876-1911
Town 1876 1896 1906 1911
Salonica 80,000 90,000 98,930 180,000
Istrumca 4,700 8,680 9,320 9,320
Tikve§ / Kavadar 4,000 4,557 11,022 21,000
Toyran 4,350 4,819 5,000 5,000
Avrethisar / Kalka§ 6,000 5,376 8,000 8,000
Katrin n.a. 2,869 2,093 2,093
Karaferye 9,570 8,891 14,000 14,000
Gevgeli n.a. 2,000 4,000 5,000
Kesendire / Poliroz 2,300 2,134 1,700 1,700
Longaza n.a. 1,716 2,000 2,000
Vodine 5,510 7,449 6,455 13,000
Yenice 5,080 8,281 8,500 8,500
Siroz 15,175 21,602 22,080 32,000
Petri? n.a. 4,651 5,745 5,745
Demirhisar 2,815 3,425 3,665 3,665
Cuma-i Bala n.a. 5,592 5,250 5,250
Zihne 1,750 2,424 3,175 3,175
Razlik n.a. 4,728 4,445 4,445
Menlik 2,660 n.a. 3,000 3,000
Nevrekop 3,530 5,755 7,170 7,170
Drama 1,985 6,933 12,700 13,000
Kavala n.a. 5,357 21,000 24,000
Provide n.a. n.a. 2,000 2,000
ALL REPORTED TOWNS TOTAL 149425 207,239 261,250 373,063
ADJUSTED TOTAL 168000 207,239 261,250 373,063
REPORTED TOWNS (5000+) 121,335 173,916 235,172 350,985
RURAL POPULATION 645,000 883,761 733,750 817,937
PROVINCIAL POPULATION 813,000 1,091,000 995,000 1,191,000
II - Summary Statistics Concerning Percentage Rates of Urbanization in Salonica
Summary Statistics 1876 1896 1906 1911
SHARE OF ALL REPORTED TOWNS 18.4 19.0 26.3 31.3
SHARE OF ALL REPORTED TOWNS (5000+) 14.9 15.9 23.6 29.5
ESTIMATES OF PALAIRET AND GEORGEON n.a. 28.9 43.0 n.a.
Source: 1293 S.V.S., 1876; 1312 S.V.S., 1896; 1324 S.V.S., 1906; F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5234: 3-4. 
Notes: 1) The values in brackets represent adjusted estimates (See Text).
2) Adjusted values constituted the basis for calculating the rates of urbanisation.
Despite the above-mentioned problems, the available data does allow for a 
careful analysis of broad trends of urbanisation in the region. The estimates are 
particularly comprehensive for towns above the 5,000 benchmark and include all 
primary urban centres in the region, save Agustos. In fact, focusing on these larger 
towns improves the internal consistency of our data set. More specifically, focusing on 
towns with a population of 5,000 and above moderates the problem of ‘missing’ and 
‘carry-over’ towns in the 1876 and 1912 estimates. According to this criterion, only 
Drama and possibly Kavala and Cuma-i Bala appear “missing” in the 1876 series. In 
order to overcome this deficiency and to bring the 1876 estimates categorically on par
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with the later estimates, I first calculated the percentage share of these three towns in the 
total population of the towns above 5,000 in 1894. The associated share was 9.9%. I 
then adjusted the initial 1876 (total) estimates upward by this rate to reach an indicative 
estimate of urban population for the same year. Both initial values and adjusted 
estimates (in parentheses) are given in Table 1.15.
Concentrating on more sizeable towns also enabled me to reduce somewhat the 
degree of reliance on the “carry-over” towns for the 1912 estimate. According to the
5,000 criterion, the ‘carry-over’ towns that appear in the 1912 series are as follows: 
Istrumca, Toyran, Avrethisan, Yenice, Petri?, Cuma-i Bala and Nevrekop. These towns 
accounted for 16.3% of the urban population (5,000 and above) in 1906. As has been 
noted, the share of ‘carry-over’ towns was 25.0% before the application of the 5,000 
criterion.
Admittedly, a narrower urban focus comes at an analytical cost. By leaving out 
the smaller towns, we loose an important dimension of urban growth in the region. One 
possible way of measuring the ‘loss* can be established through a simple comparison 
between our 1894 and 1906 estimates and those of Palairet and Georgeon, which 
include towns with more than 2000 residents. According to the estimates presented in 
Table 1.15, the rate of urbanisation as measured by the population of all towns above 
5000 stood around 16.0% in 1896 and 24.0% in 1906. As already noted, Palairet and 
Georgeon estimate the rate of urbanisation to be 29.0% in 1894 and 43.0% in 1906 
respectively. Thus, by leaving out smaller towns, we fail to account for a considerable 
part of the urban dynamic generated within the region. However, larger towns 
apparently accounted for the bulk of urban growth in the region. Therefore, it seems 
sensible to suggest that the more sizeable towns can constitute a solid basis for 
discussing trends in urbanisation. In what follows, we will concentrate exclusively on 
these larger towns.
The data presented in Table 1.15 suggest that urban population grew at an 
average rate of 3.1% per annum in the province between 1876 and 1911. The rate of 
‘urbanisation’ rose almost' threefold during the same period and reached an estimated 
29.0% on the eve of the Balkan Wars. By the end of the period, the region was certainly 
more urbanised than ever before. More importantly perhaps, the rate of urbanisation in 
the Selanik region was considerably higher than anywhere else in the Balkans. In the
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mid-1870s Selanik was slightly more urbanised than other Balkan regions. For instance, 
in the late 1870s and the early 1880s, the rate of urbanisation (including towns above
2.000) was 22.4% in Eastern Rumelia, 18.5% in Greece and 17.2% in Northern 
Bulgaria. At around the same time, the rate of urbanisation (including towns above
5.000) was 15.0% in Selanik. It is not easy to determine exactly how Selanik compared 
with these Balkan regions in the 1890s and the 1990s, due to differences in the criterion, 
used to measure the respective rates of urbanisation. However, it is very likely that the 
overall urbanisation rate in Selanik compared equally with these Balkan regions and 
possibly stood somewhere around 20.0%.73 By 1911, undoubtedly Selanik was more 
urbanised than any other Balkan region. For instance, in 1910, the rate of urbanisation 
(above 2000) was 24.0% in Greece, 21.7% in Eastern Rumelia, 18.8% in Bulgaria, 
18.0% in Romania, 13.0% in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 10.8% in Serbia.74 All these rates 
fall short of Selanik’s 29.0%, which only includes towns above 5,000. In this sense, the 
urban gap between Selanik and the rest of the Balkans seem to have widened during the 
period under consideration. The reasons for this rapid urbanisation constitutes a central 
theme throughout the following chapters. For now, however, it is important to note that 
this rapid urbanisation was underscored by a notable de-population of rural areas at 
large. After a considerable rise following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1876, rural 
population declined steadily throughout the late 1890s and the early 1900s to reach. 
733,750 in 1906. After this date, it seems rural population rose again by about 11.5% 
and reached 817,937 in 1912. It is important to remember that this level is somewhat 
exaggerated due to the probable underestimation of the urban population during this 
later period. Even so, it seems the rural population either remained constant or grew 
only very little during 1906-1912.
The demographic data I have so far considered are in conformity with the 
agricultural trends outlined above. The estimated 11.5% decline in rural population in 
Selanik during 1896 and 1906 is in conformity with the 26.0% contraction in the area of 
agricultural land under cultivation and the 31.4% decline in the total value of 
agricultural production between 1890-1906. Clearly, the agricultural sector was 
contracting during the 1890s and the early 1900s.
73 The share of all Reported towns in regional population was 21% in 1876 (See Table-2).
74 Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 240; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 26.
Conclusion
The discussion so far has shown that 1885-1910 was a period of serious 
retardation in the agricultural sector in the Selanik region. Agricultural production 
probably contracted by about 25% during this period. However, retardation and decline 
were not manifest in all sub-sectors of the agrarian economy. It took place mainly in 
cereal production, especially in the production of non-staple cereals. There were, 
however, other sub-sectors, which were dynamic and grew steadily throughout the 
period. The growth of sericulture, animal husbandry and especially of tobacco 
production are cases in point. Yet, the dynamism and growth of these sectors could not 
keep up with the swift contraction in cereal production and the sector in general 
contracted steadily during the period under consideration. Thus, in the process of overall 
agrarian decline, a dual agrarian structure emerged in the region, whereby dynamic and 
retarded sectors coexisted in growing contrast.
Another important point that should be underlined is that the trends in Selanik 
appear quite different from those in Ottoman agriculture in general. As I have noted 
above, the output estimates put forth by Eldem suggest considerable dynamism and 
growth in Ottoman agriculture during 1889-1907. According to his figures, Ottoman 
agricultural production grew by about 27.5% during this period, a growth rate, which 
stands in stark contrast to the sluggish performance of the Selanik region. More 
interestingly, the output estimates produced by Eldem suggest growth in almost all 
compartments of the agrarian economy, including cereal production, which according to 
Eldem grew by as much as 50% during the same period.75 This also stands in contrast to 
our diagnosis of retardation in the Selanik region.
In the following chapters, I will discuss the conjunctural and structural reasons 
that retarded the growth of the agricultural sector in Selanik. These factors include 
adverse price trends, intense foreign competition in both overseas and increasingly in 
domestic markets, high transaction costs, certain market failures, ineffectiveness of 
government policy and adverse harvest trends brought on by poor weather conditions. 
However, most of these factors can not explain the acute divergence in agricultural 
performance. The impression I get from the existing literature is that farmers throughout
75 Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi $artlari, 37.
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the Empire suffered from similar problems during the same period. It seems the 
variances in the success of government policy could explain some of the divergence in 
agricultural performance. As I shall discuss in Chapter 3, government’s reform efforts 
yielded limited success and materialised only towards the end of the period, and, in 
general, they failed to bring the desired effect in modernisation and growth in the 
Selanik region. In contrast, reform efforts yielded noteworthy success and supported 
processes of agricultural growth in certain parts of the Empire, especially in the 
Anatolian provinces. Government policy cannot, nevertheless, fully account for the 
striking contrast between Selanik and the Empire at large, for the reform efforts 
remained confined to a number of locations and probably contributed only marginally to 
the overall development of Ottoman agriculture during the period under consideration. 
Therefore, we should seek alternative factors that might account for the discrepancy in 
question.
This brings me to the technical and methodological problems involved in the 
estimation of output levels, which could explain a good portion of the divergence 
between agricultural performance in Selanik and the Ottoman economy at large. In my 
opinion, Eldem almost certainly overestimates the performance of the agricultural 
sector. Eldem bases his agricultural income estimates primarily on fiscal (tithe) data and 
on the data published in the salnames and in the official agricultural statistics. However, 
Eldem does not account for the distortion inherent in this fiscal data. He uses the tithe 
data nominally to estimate trends in output performance and does not take into account 
the general increase in agricultural prices. Besides, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Eldem allows for the 20% rise in the tithe rate. Finally, Eldem does not appear to have 
taken into account the government’s changing capacity to tax. Thus, it seems Eldem 
almost certainly overestimates the performance of Ottoman agriculture during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The degree of overestimation inherent in Eldem’s data is difficult to ascertain. 
However, if we were to account for the rise in the tithe rate alone, a rather conservative 
20% margin of error would appear plausible. If  we .were to account for all the 
drawbacks, Eldem’s data would yield quite a different picture of Ottoman agriculture. 
The overall trend would indeed be very close to that of Selanik, that is a steady 
contraction at least until the turn of the century, followed by a period of moderate 
growth and partial recovery. This observation is also in accord with the broader
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conjunctural trends prevailing throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin at the time. A 
contraction in agricultural production during the crisis ridden 1880s and the 1890s 
followed by sluggish recovery in the 1900s would be a more plausible thesis to put 
forward, rather than arguing for steady and robust growth in agricultural production. At 
any rate, the technical discussion that I have developed in the current chapter puts 
considerable doubt on the accuracy of Eldem’s estimates, which have been widely used 
by scholars since their publication in 1970.
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CHAPTER II
DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION:
THE MARKET PROCESS
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed the direction, magnitude and timing of the 
shifts taking place in the agrarian economy of the Selanik region during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I argued that the overall agrarian economy 
contracted notably from the mid-1880s onwards. I suggested, however, that this 
contraction was not even within the sector. The performance of certain sub-sectors was 
quite impressive while others remained sluggish or even retarded. Thus, processes of 
growth and retardation proceeded hand in hand in the agricultural sector, a situation 
which marked the emergence of a dual agrarian structure in the region. It was precisely 
this growing dualism that set the pattern of overall structural transformation in Selanik’s 
agrarian sector during the period under consideration.
In this chapter, I will consider the conjunctural and institutional dynamics of this 
broad process of transformation. I will concentrate mainly on market forces that 
underlined this complex process. First, I will consider demand side factors that pushed 
and pulled various sub-sectors of the agrarian economy either into growth or 
retardation. In this context, I develop a comprehensive approach that pays due attention 
to the shifts taking place both in the domestic and overseas markets. Such an 
‘integrated’ demand side approach contributes to and enhances our understanding of the 
nineteenth century Ottoman economy and the processes underlining its transformation. 
Ottoman economic historians, in general, and the proponents of the world system 
analysis (WSA), in particular, have considered overseas demand as the primary 
dynamic that conditioned the pattern and timing of the structural shifts taking place in
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Ottoman agriculture.1 They ignored, however, the impact of domestic demand on such 
processes of transformation and change.2 To a certain extent, this approach is justified, 
for the shifts taking place in the international economy had a significant impact on 
Ottoman agriculture during the nineteenth century. This impact was probably at its 
strongest during the late nineteenth century, when the economic domination of 
European capitalism largely went unchallanged on a global scale. However, it is not 
possible to understand fully the economic dynamics underlining the transformation of 
the agricultural sector without paying due attention to the shifts taking place in the 
domestic, particularly in urban, markets. This is especially the case for such primary 
crops as cereals, cotton, silk and tobacco that were traded and consumed in 
considerable, if not massive, amounts in domestic markets. Accordingly the current 
chapter develops a more balanced and comprehensive view of the shifts and changes 
taking place in the agrarian economy and considers the impact of domestic as well as 
overseas demand on the processes of agricultural growth and retardation.
I will also take into account certain institutional processes that conditioned the 
transformations taking place in the agrarian economy of the Selanik region. In this 
context, I borrow heavily from neo-institutionalist approaches and pay close attention to 
the structural attributes of ftie legal and organisational frameworks that regulated the 
exchange process at large.31 argue that the differences in the degree of effective market 
regulation and the costs incurred from certain market transactions, inter alia, explain the 
emergence of the dual agrarian structure outlined above. Besides, I consider the role 
played by certain public and semi-public institutions in providing technical, logistic and 
financial support to farming communities in. accord with their economic priorities and 
interests. In this context, I discuss the role played by financial and commercial agents 
and institutions that were firmly associated with European economic interests. The role
1 §. Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade, Investment and 
Production, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde 
Bagimlilik ve BixyiXme, [Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Economy] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi 
Yaymlan, 1994).
2 For a demand side criticism of the WSA see D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of 
the Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
3 See G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions, A Manifesto fo r a Modem Institutional 
Economics, 1. P. (1988), (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993); D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance, 1. P. (1990), (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); D. 
C. North, and R. B. Thomas, The Rise o f the Western World, A New Economic History, 1. P. (1973), 
(Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988); R. 
H. Bates, “Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of New Institutionalism”, in J. 
Harris, J. Hunter, and C. M. Lewis (eds.) The New Institutional Economics and Third World
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of the state will be considered only in passing, as this complex issue will be discussed in 
Chapter 3 at length.
Finally, I make an effort to bring, as much as possible, the actors in this 
transformation process into historical perspective. Whenever empirical sources allow 
for such analysis, I will bring the perspective of petty merchants, landlords, farmers, as 
well as the government officers, consuls and prominent members of influential 
merchant families into the discussion and consider their dynamic participation as an 
important factor that underlined the transformation of the agrarian economy.4 This effort 
will introduce a perspective from below into our narrative, which allows us to better 
understand the actual forces underlining transformations taking place in the agrarian 
economy of the region.
Overall, I will pursue a comprehensive market-oriented analysis that considers 
the economic conjuncture (i.e. demand side factors), institutional dynmics and human 
agency in discussing processes of agrarian change. This approach diverges somewhat 
from the standard WSA narratives that tend to overlook insitutional processes and put 
greater emphasis on the transformative role played by economic forces. The current 
approach also differs substantially from the standard modernist perspectives that 
emphasise the importance of institutional structures but inadequately discuss the 
importance of human agency in the processes of economic change.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In. the first section, I set the 
conjunctural background and briefly discuss the broad trends in international markets 
and in Ottoman agriculture during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 
the second section, I discuss the sub-sectors of the agrarian economy, which a) were not 
favored by the conjuncture of the international economy and b) suffered from certain
Development, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), for a broad discussion of neo-institutionalism 
and its basic conceptual traits and criticisms.
4 For ‘history from below’ approaches to Ottoman economic and social history, see D. Quataert, 
Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908, Reactions to European 
Economic Penetration, (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983); H. Berktay, “The 
Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/ Historiography”, in H. Berktay and S. Faroqhi 
(eds.), New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 109-185; 
A. Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, [1908 Revolution], (Istanbul: ileti§im Yaymlari, 1995); B. Ergene, “Maduniyet 
Okulu, Post-Kolonyal Ele§tiri ve Tarihte Bilgi-Ozne Sorunu: Osmanli Tarihfiligi ifin Yeni Dersler mi?,” 
[Sub-Altemism, Post-Colonial Criticism and The Problem of Knowledge and Subject in History: New 
Lessons for Ottoman History?], Toplum ve Bilim, 83 (2000): 32-47; N. Erdogan, “Devleti ‘Idare Etmek’: 
Maduniyet ve Dtizenbazlik,” [Managing the State: Sub-Altemism and Fraud,] Toplum ve Bilim, 83 
(2000): 8-31.
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institutional deficiencies and market failures. These sub-sectors mainly include cereal 
and cotton production. In the next section, I consider the sub-sectors, which, a) enjoyed 
favourable demand side conditions and grew rapidly despite similar, if  not as bitter, 
institutional weaknesses, b) benefited from some institutional support and effective 
market regulation and continued to grow despite unfavourable changes in economic 
conjuncture, and c) enjoyed favourable market conditions, institutional support, and 
effective market regulation. These sub-sectors include opium, silk and tobacco 
production, respectively. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks on the 
combined, overall impact of these interlocking institutional and conjunctural processes 
over agriculture in the Selanik region during the period under consideration.
1. The Conjunture and the Historical Context
The second half o f the Tong* nineteenth century witnessed the advent of an 
unprecedented transport revolution on a global scale. The world wide construction of 
railway networks and the appearance of steamships in international waters marked a 
breakthrough in transport history signified by a drastic decline in costs of 
transportation.5 The impact of the transport revolution was quite spectacular. The swift 
reduction in the costs of transportation diminished the economic significance of 
distances in world trade and enhanced integration in global commodity markets. This 
transformation not only underlined the extraordinary expansion of world trade during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,6 but it also gave way to the emergence 
of new patterns of specialisation within and between the “central” and “peripheral” 
regions of the world economy.7 Certain regions became increasingly specialised in the 
production of certain products, while others simply altered their economies and adjusted 
to emergent market conditions. Roughly speaking, the “peripheral” regions of Asia,
5 S. Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, The Industrialization o f Europe, 1760-1970, l.P. (1981), (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992); P. J. Hugill, World Trade since 1431, Geography, Technology, 
and Capitalism, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). According to a 
recent estimate put forth by O’Rourke and Williamson, real freight rates in global trade fell massively, by 
as much as 1.5% per annum, between 1840 and 1910. J. G. Williamson, “Real Wages and Relative Factor 
Prices around the Mediterranean, 1500-1940”, in J. G. Williamson and §. Pamuk (eds.) The 
Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 45-75.
6 Between 1870 and 1913 the value of world exports in constant 1990 prices increased by more 
than threefold; see A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, (Paris: OECD 
Development Center Studies, 1995), 239.
7 I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein, (Paris: 
Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison de Sicences de l’Homme, 1993).
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Latin America, Africa, and the Near East, and the areas of recent European settlements, 
such as North-West America, Australia and New Zeland, became increasingly 
specialised in the production of primary products.8 The first and second wave 
industrialisers of Europe, the rapidly industrialising economy of North-East America, 
and, albeit at a more modest rate and later in the century, Japan and Russia, emerged as 
leading industrial powers in the world economy.9 Agriculture gradually lost its relative 
significance in industrialising economies, although the sector still retained its political 
weight, particularly in countries where agrarian traditionalism had long taken the centre 
stage in power politics, such as in France, Germany, Russia and even in Japan.10
The impact of the transport revolution and the growing tide of globalization on 
the Ottoman economy was quite mixed. Enhanced globalization created new 
opportunities for Ottoman agriculture and increased overseas demand for certain 
agricultural products. Cash crop production constituted the most dynamic segment of 
Ottoman agriculture during this period. In particular, tobacco, silk, cotton, opium, 
rasins, figs and sesame found regular purchasers in the overseas markets and the 
production and exports of these important cash crops grew rapidly during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.11
8 A. G. Kenwood, and A. L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy, 1820-1990, 
An Introductory Text, 1. P. (1971), (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
9 M. Teich, and R. Porter (eds.), The Industrial Revolution in National Context, Europe and the 
USA, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. Sylla, and G. Toniolo, Patterns o f European 
Industrialisation, The Nineteenth Century, (New York and London: Routledge, 1991); P. Mathias, and S. 
Pollard, The Cambridge Economic History o f Europe, V VIII, The Industrial Economies: The 
Development o f Economic and Social Policies, (Cambridge and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1989); S. Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, The Industrialization o f Europe, 1760-1970, l.P. (1981), (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992); D. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991).
1® B. Moore Jr., Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the 
Making o f the Modem World, (London, New York and Ontario: Penguin Books, 1991); P. Anderson, 
Lineages o f the Absolutist State, (London: Verso, 1979); C. Mooers, The Making o f Bourgeois Europe, 
Absolutism, Revolution, and the Rise o f Capitalism in England, France and Germany, (London and New 
York: New Left Books, 1991); D. Blackburn, and G. Elley, The Peculiarities o f German History, 
Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany, (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, 1. P. (1990), 
(Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
I* C. Issawi, The Economic History o f Turkey, (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); D. Quataert, Ottoman Reform Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908, (Unpublished 
Ph.D. Diss., Los Angeles: University of California Los Angeles, 1973); D. Quataert, “Agricultural Trends 
and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1914”, in Workers, Peasants and Economic Change 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993), 17-30; V. Eldem, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu ’nun Iktisadi §artlari Hakkinda bir Tetkik, [Research on the Economic Conditions of the 
Ottoman Empire] l.P. (1970), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994); Pamuk, The Ottoman 
Empire; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlihk’’, Z. Toprak, “Modernization and Commercialization 
in the Tanzimat Period: 1838-1875”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 1, (1992): 57-70; R. Owen, The
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However, the tide of globalization also brought about certain problems for 
Ottoman agriculture. First, increasing competition in overseas markets put Ottoman 
farmers under economic strain and forced them to struggle with competitive prices 
offered by the primary producers of the Americas and Asia. Growing trade barriers 
caused severe problems for Ottoman farmers and rendered their access to export 
markets in Europe ever more difficult.12 Further, the producers of certain primary 
products, such as madder root and yellow berries, lost ground in international markets 
as artificial substitutes gradually took over world markets.13 Second, the local producers 
were soon faced with intense competition in domestic markets, which struck a blow to 
certain sub-sectors of Ottoman agriculture. The government could not provide the 
Ottoman farmers with the degree of protection that their counterparts enjoyed on the 
continent, for it was obliged to accede to the terms of the liberal trade agreements 
signed with European powers in the late 1830s and the 1840s.14 Under the 
circumstances, the trade barriers remained extremely low at 8.0% and left domestic 
producers highly exposed to overseas competition. For example, cereal and cotton 
producers struggeled to compete with imported goods in domestic markets. At times 
and in certain places, this competition yielded some success, but these sectors remained 
largely defensive in general and seriously retarded in some instances.15 Thus, overall,
Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, 1. P. (1981), (New York: I. B. Tauris & Company Ltd. 
Publishers, 1993).
1  ^Quataert, Ottoman Reform; D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, in H. Inalcik and 
D. Quataert (eds.) An Economic, and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-946; §. Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire in 
the ‘Great Depression’ of 1873-1896,” Journal o f Economic History, 44, N. 1, 1984, 107-118; Pamuk, 
The Ottoman Empire; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlilik; E.D. Akarli, The Problems o f External 
Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamit II: Origins 
and Solutions, (Unpublished Ph.D. Diss., Princeton: University o f Princeton, 1976); E.D. Akarli, 
“Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909”, Middle Eastern Studies, 28, N. 3, 
(1992), 443-476; T. Giiran, “Tanzimat Doneminde Tarim Politikasi”, [Agricultural Policy in the Tanzimat 
Period] in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.) Social and Economic History o f  Turkey (1071-1920): Papers 
Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History o f Turkey, (Ankara: 
Meteksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 271-277; T. Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi Uzerine Ara?tirmalar 
[Research on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Agriculture], (Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik, 1998).
Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, 29-31.
14 For the impact of trade treaties signed with European powers see, Frangakis-Syrett (1992); R. 
Owen, “The 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention: An Overview”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 7, (1992): 7- 
14; R. Kasaba, “Open-Door Treaties: China and the Ottoman Empire Compared”, New Perspectives on 
Turkey, 1, (1992): 77-89. Also see Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire.
15 Quataert, Ottoman Reform; D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”; E. D. Akarli “Economic 
Policy”; A. O. Akarli, “Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880-1910”, in §. Pamuk and J.
G. Williamson (eds.), The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London: Routledge, 
2000), 109-133.
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the transport revolution and the mounting tide of globalization in world commodity 
markets led to the emergence of a dual agrarian structure in Ottoman lands.
Another complex instiutional process underlied this dual structure. The Ottoman 
farmers, it seems, were at a transction cost disadvanatage vis a vis their counterparts in 
those parts of the world better integrated into the world capitalist markets. Despite the 
construction of some railways, transportation costs remained quite high during the late 
nineteenth century.16 This situation proved particularly detrimental for certain 
agricultural sectors. Above all, high railway tariffs and other costs of overland 
transportation affected adversely cereal production. This transportation cost problem 
was particularly distressing for cereal producers and was responsible for the relatively 
poor export and output performance of the sector.17 Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of 
certain regulations, meant to supervise transactions and secure fair trading, competitive 
pricing and prime quality in marketed produce led to market failures that caused 
insurmountable difficulties for Ottoman agriculturalists.18 In short, the ‘transaction cost* 
constraint underlined the retardation of certain compartments of Ottoman agriculture, 
most notably in cereal production.
The consolidation of European commercial and financial interests in the 
Ottoman empire underscored the emergence of a dual agrarian structure during the same 
period. On the one hand, the commercial houses and railway companies actively 
supported farmers and encouraged them to take up the production of commercial crops. 
They offered remunerative prices to encourage the production of these products and 
provided the Ottoman farmers with the financial means as well as logistic support that 
were necessary to take such action. 19 The commercial companies and agents thus
16 D. Quataert, “Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish 
Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908,” in , Workers, Peasants and Economic 
Change in the Ottoman Empire,' 1730-1914, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993), 63-80; V. Engin, Rumeli 
Demiryollari, [Rumelian Railways] (Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik ve Kitapfilik Ltd. §ti, 1993); Y. N Karkar, 
Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1914, (New York, Washington, Hollywood: Vantage 
Press, 1972).
17 Quataert, Ottoman Reform. Also see Quataert, “Limited Revolution”; B. Gounaris, Steam 
over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the Railway Factor, (New York: East 
European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1993); Akarli, “Growth and 
Retardation”.
18 Quataert, Ottoman Reform.
19 Quataert, “Limited Revolution”; O. Kurmu§, Emperyalizmin Tiirkiye ’ye Giri§i, [The 
Penetration of Imperialism into Turkey], 1. P. (1974), (Ankara: Sava§ Yayinlan, 1982); §. Pamuk, The 
Ottoman Empire', R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, The Nineteenth Century, 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1987).
74
contributed to the commercialisation of the agrarain economy at large and to the growth 
of certain sub-sectors that were favoured by the economic conjuncture in certain parts of 
the empire, especially in Western and Central Anatolian provinces.
On the other hand, European financial interests played an important role in the 
emergence of a dual agrarian structure. From the mid-1850s onwards, the Ottoman state 
borrowed heavily in the international money markets to finance its administrative and 
military modernisation programs. The terms of foreign borrowing were often 
unfavourable and obliged the Ottoman government to declare a moratorium on all its 
outstanding foreign debt in 1876. Following a five-year period of uncertainty and 
prolonged negotiations, the Ottoman government agreed to the establishment of the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA) in a decree that it issued on December 20, 
1881. The PDA was mainly a consortium of French, British, German and Ottoman 
representatives responsible for the reorganisation and repayment of the outstanding 
Ottoman debt. The Imperial Decree also granted the PDA the rights to administer, 
collect and to hold in deposit revenues accruing from salt and tobacco monopolies, silk 
tithes, and charges on spirits and fisheries. The PDA also held the rights to retain the 
Bulgarian tribute and the surplus of Cyprus revenues for the service of the outstanding 
foreign bonds.20 Until the last days of the Empire, the PDA retained its status and 
remained in charge of a substantial portion of government revenues, while at the same 
time managing the foreign debt service. It also assumed an important role in raising new 
loans in the European money markets and played an active part in financing of railway 
construction in the Ottoman Empire.21
In a broad macroeconomic sense, the PDA had retarding effects on the Ottoman 
economy. The PDA not only seriously circumscribed the fiscal powers of the Ottoman 
state and curtailed its capacity to institute wide ranging reforms, but it also undermined 
the accumulation of capital within the empire through massive capital transfers abroad.
20 D. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1929); Parvus Efendi, Tiirkiye’nin Mali Tutsakligi [Turkey’s Financial Dependency] 
(Istanbul: May Yayinlan, 1970); R. Suvla, “The Ottoman Debt, 1850-1939”, in C. Issawi (ed.), The 
Economic History o f  the Middle East, 1800-1914, A Book o f Readings, (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1966), 94-106; E. Kiray, Osmanli’da Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borqlar, 
[Economic Structure and Foreign Debt in the Ottoman Empire] (istanbul: ileti§im, 1993); and, Pamuk, 
Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlilik,.
21 D. Blaisdell, European Financial Control, Kiray, Osmanli’da Ekonomik Yapi; Pamuk, The 
Ottoman Empire. Also see O. Okyar, “A New Look at the Problem of Economic Growth in the Ottoman 
Empire (1800-1914)”, The Journal o f European Economic History, 16, N. 1, (1987): 7-50.
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Thus it helped prepare the macroeconomic grounds for underinvestment in the Ottoman 
economy.22
However, the PDA contributed in important ways to the development and 
growth of sericulture and tobacco production throughout the empire. The PDA and its 
administrative offshoots provided technical, logistic and financial support to farmers 
who were engaged in the production of these crops. The PDA also provided a legal and 
administrative framework that closely regulated the production and marketing of these 
products, especially of tobacco. Although some of the measures had a retarding effect 
on agricultural production in the short-run, they set the specific terms and conditions of 
marketing and thus defined the rules of the game in due exchange processes.23 More 
importantly, the PDA managed to enforce these regulations quite effectively and thus 
minimised, or rather moderated, certain market failures that had claimed much from the 
robustness of such unregulated sub-sectors of the agrarian economy as cereal and cotton 
production. In this respect, the regulatory framework set by the PDA and its 
enforcement powers seem to have contributed to the growth of sericulture and tobacco 
production. In what follows, we will concentrate on the dynamics of agrarian 
transformation in Selanik against the backdrop of the economic conjuncture and the 
structural processes outlined above.
2. Agricultural Production in an Unregulated Context
2.1. Cereal Production
The impact of the transport revolution was felt particularly strongly in world 
cereal markets. The costs of conveying bulky cereals declined by 50.0% to 70.0% 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This brought the cereal producers of 
North America, the Black Sea basin and the Indian subcontinent within easy reach of 
the expanding European consumer markets. In response, world cereal production and 
exports grew rapidly during the same period. Between c.1875 and c.1910, wheat 
production in the Black Sea region rose by 170.0% between c.1875 and c.1910. North
22 Quataert, Ottoman Reform', and, Akarli, “Growth and Retardation”.
23 Quataert, Ottoman Reform', Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”.
76
American wheat production grew by 85.0% while that of India increased 65.0%.24 
Wheat exports from Russia and the Danubian provinces rose more than threefold. 
Wheat exports from North' America almost doubled and Indian exports increased by 
more than seven times during the same period.25 Thus, the Black Sea basin, the frontier 
settlements in mid and North Western America and India, and other important primary 
producers such as Argentina and Australia emerged as the granaries of the world 
economy, providing cheap foodstuffs for the rapidly growing urban population of the 
industrial economies of Europe and north America.26
This expansionary process in world cereal trade was marked by an 
unprecedented price depression in European cereal markets. The cheap grains of 
“peripheral” areas soon glutted the markets, leading to a swift diminution in prices from 
the early 1870s onwards. Wheat prices in the United Kingdom decreased by about 50% 
between the early 1870s and the mid-late 1890s. Even throughout the reflationary 
period of 1896-1914, prices could make only a partial recovery in international markets. 
Wheat prices in the UK increased only about 17.0% during the period and still stood 
well below their early 1870 level on the eve of the Great War.27 The same deflationary 
trends were parallelled in the continent as well. This situation put European cereal 
producers under strong competitive pressure even in the domestic urban consumer 
markets.28
The continental economies responded swiftly to the ‘peripheral’ challenge. 
Modernisation of agriculture and effective protectionism constituted the primary axis of 
continental response to the intensifying overseas competition.29 Behind trade barriers, 
continental cereal production grew considerably. French wheat production increased by 
56.0%, German by 43.0%, Italian by 28.0% and Austria-Hungarian by 130.0% during 
the period under consideration.30
24 c. N. Hariey, “Transportation, the World Wheat Trade and the Kuznets Cycle, 1850-1913,”
Explorations in Economic History, 17 (1980): 228; W. Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 1885-
1939, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), 238-239.
25 Harley, “Transportation, the World Wheat,” 227-229.
26 Harley, ‘Transportation, the World Wheat,” 229.
22 Harley, ‘Transportation, the World Wheat,” 220-221.
2% S. Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, The Industrialisation o f Europe, 1760-1970, l.P. (1981), 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), 265; Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 34-35.
29 Between 1880 and 1900, tariffs on wheat imports increased from less than 10% to 40% in 
France and Italy and to 25% in Germany. See, Malenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 157-162.
30 Harley, “Transportation, the World Wheat,” 228.
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These developments disadvantaged greatly the cereal producing farmers of 
Selanik. Before the Hamidian period, Selanik had already become an important supplier 
of cereals for overseas markets. Cereal trade grew rapidly during the eighteenth century. 
According to Svoronos, cereal exports from Salonica increased almost tenfold from 
1,270 tons in 1763 to 11,290 tons in 1798.31 Local grains found regular purchasers in 
the leading port-towns of the Mediterranean basin, such as Trieste, Venice, Genoa, 
Marseilles, Istanbul and Alexandria.32
Regional cereal trade further extended its reach to the relatively distant northern 
European markets of Liverpool, Hamburg and Antwerp during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In the meantime, regular overseas trade with the Mediterranean 
markets continued to expand considerably.33 According to one contemporary estimate, 
cereal exports from Salonica stood around 28,000 tons in 1809.34 By the late 1860s, this 
figure had gone up to 40,000 tons.35
Despite the expansion in overseas trade, the region was not in a position to 
capture a commanding position in overseas markets. The cereals coming from the Black 
Sea basin literally out-competed the Macedonian produce in the Mediterranean and 
northern European markets. Local produce could be traded in large amounts only in 
times of great scarcity generated by unusual crop failures, wars and other exogenous 
factors that seriously disturbed the regular flow of supplies from the Black Sea basin. 
Otherwise, foreign merchants normally preferred the cheap and good quality Black Sea
N. Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique'au XVIIIe siecle, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1956), 277.
32 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 271-278; J. R. Lampe, and M. R. Jackson, Balkan 
Economic History, 1550-1950, From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations, (Bloomington: 
Indiana, University Press, 1982), 39-44; B. McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, 
Trade and Struggle for Land, 1600-1800, (Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, 
Sydney: Cambridge University press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 6-37; 
R. Kasaba, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Western Anatolia,” 
Review, 11 (1988): 215-288;Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 24-30; G. Harlaftis, A History o f Greek- 
Owned Shipping, The Making o f and International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), 3-38.
33 F.O.A.P., 1873, V. 29: 734; F.O.A.P., 1883, No: 6: 95; R.C.L., 1903, No: 190-95: 309. Also 
see Harlaftis, A History o f Greek-Owned Shipping, 6-24, for the impact of Greek independence on sea- 
bound trade in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Also see, Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia.
34 E. Themopoulou, Salonique, 1800-1875: Conjoncture Economique et Mouvement 
Commercial, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Paris: Universite de Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, 1994), 316. Also 
see N. Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 277.
35 Themopoulou, Salonique, 339-344.
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grains to the local produce and purchased Selanik produce mainly for regular market 
clearance.36
The advent of American and Indian competition in international markets, 
growing protectionism in the continent, and the ensuing price depression in international 
cereal markets in the aftermath of the transport revolution simply intensified 
competition and put local cereal producers under immense pressure. They now faced a 
multitude of challenges. They had to cope with the swift depression in cereal prices, 
compete with good quality cereal varieties in overseas markets, get around the problem 
of transportation costs, and jump over the hurdle of prohibitive tariff walls sheltering 
continental agriculture from foreign competition. Besides, they had to compete with 
imported cereals in the largely underprotected domestic markets. As we shall see, little 
could be done to overcome any o f these problems and the region failed to make a 
breakthrough in overseas cereal trade.
2.1.1. Price Depression and the Stalemate in Overseas Trade
The worldwide depression in cereal prices did not hit Selanik markets until the 
early-1880s. The inflationary moment of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-1877 and the 
disastrous crop failure of 1879 helped maintain local cereal prices for a while.37 From 
the early 1880s onwards, however, cereal prices started to decline rapidly in Salonica. 
The price depression was quite swift with prices descending by over 42.5% between the 
early 1870s and 1895 (See Table 2.1). The only exception to this secular downward 
trend was the speculative leap of 1891-1892, which' was caused mainly by the 
withdrawal of Russian cereals from the world markets due to the severe famine of 
1891.38 The ensuing vacuum in overseas markets increased the demand for local 
produce and fuelled cereal prices in Salonica almost up to the pre-depression levels. 
Once the Russians stepped back into the international markets, local prices went under 
and continued their uninterrupted descent until 1895.
36 Harlaftis, A History o f Greek-Owned Shipping; Themopoulou, Salonique.
37 F.O.A.S., 1883, N.6: 93; PRO, F.O. 195/1256, 17.10.1879, Blunt to Layard; BA, §D-Selanik, 
2008/41, 6.Ra.l296 (27.2.1879).
3SF.O.A.S, 1893, N. 1310: 5-6.
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The post-1895 price recovery was both slow and limited. Not even strong 
exogenous shocks could initiate a lasting recovery. For instance, 1896 was a bad year 
for cereal producers throughout the world. Crops had failed in India, Russia and in 
Western Europe.39 This situation increased the demand for Selanik grains and created 
many opportunities for local merchants to market their produce overseas at favourable 
prices. Not surprisingly, speculative trading in local markets quickly drew prices up to 
new heights. Prices started rising in Salonica from mid-April 1996 onwards and 
increased about 40% in just a fortnight.40 As the surplus of the hinterland rapidly glutted 
the Salonica market, however, local prices again went under. That year, cereal prices 
increased by a modest 5.0% on average, adding only marginally to the long-term 
recovery trend. Yet, local speculators, especially the leading cereal merchants of the 
region such as the Modiyano and the Alatini families, earned handsome profits from 
speculative trading and retained their undisputed control over the cereal market of 
Salonica.41
Chart 2.1.
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39 Asir, 14.R.1314 (22.9.1896), N. 110: 2.
40 Asir, 13.Ca.1314 (20.10.1896), N. 118:2.
Asir, 13.Ca.1314 (20.10.1896), N. 118: 2; Asir, 4. C. 1314, (10.11.1896), N. 124: 1.
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Another exogenous price shock was generated by the combined effect of the 
Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and the Spanish American War of 1898. To start with, the 
American harvest of 1897 was relatively poor and the possibility of war with Spain 
heightened speculative concerns in European cereal markets. Apprehensive of the price 
controls superimposed by a syndicate formed by leading American cereal merchants 
and trading houses, European merchants turned increasingly towards the alternative 
grain markets of the Mediterranean basin.42 From April onwards, the grain merchants of 
Salonica started to receive orders from their agents in Mersailles, Trieste, Genova, and 
Liverpool43
Simultaneously, the mounting tensions between the Ottoman and Greek 
governments over the diplomatic status of Crete erupted into armed conflict on April 10. 
The orders of the Ottoman army fighting in Northern Greece and Western Macedonia 
further increased the demand for cereals, fanning the inflationary moment in the local 
cereal markets. The region had entered 1897 with minimal grain stocks, which had been 
largely consumed largely during the previous year.44 Moreover, the harvest of 1897 was 
likely to be a poor one and was expected to stand below its normal level by as much as 
50.0%.45 In fact, the situation was serious enough to draw the attention of local 
authorities. The local government briefly considered the possibility of imposing an 
export ban and set up a special committee to monitor regional grain reserves. The 
committee eventually maintained that the local reserves were sufficient to provide 
supplies for both the local civilian population and the army and concluded that the 
region could release an extra 7,500 tons for export until the end of the year. The export 
ban was not imposed, but it became quite apparent that the existing stocks could not be 
sufficient to meet the incoming orders from the overseas markets.46 The situation gave 
way to a quasi-Kindlebergerian mania in Salonica. Prices rose by an unprecedented 
70.0% over just a fortnight between April 20 and May 9.47 However, soon it became
42 Asir, 2.M. 1316 (22.5.1898), N. 279: 1.
Asir, 25.Z.1315 (16.5.1898), N. 277: 1 ;D.T.O.G., 15.Z.1315 (6.5.1989), N. 692: 146.
44 PRO, F.O. 78/4835, 15.9.1897, Report by Mr. Consular Assistant Heathcore on the Harvest 
of 1897 in the District of Salonica; PRO, F.O. 78/4835, 20.9.1897, Capety to Blunt; PRO, F.O. 78/4835,
28.9.1897, Heathcore to Blunt.
45 PRO, F.O. 78/4835, 20.9.1897, Capety, to Blunt; F.O.A.S., 1898, N. 2270: 6; R.C.L., 1899, 
N.142-147: 1132.
46 Asir, 2.M. 1316 (22.5.1898), N. 279: 1.
47 Asir, 2.M. 1316 (22.5.1898), N. 279: 1.
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evident that the American syndicate was ready to relax price controls and provide 
European markets with sufficient supplies. Besides, the war with Greece lasted only a 
month.48 Under the circumstances, the speculative bubble burst in Salonica and the bull 
market in cereals could not realistically be maintained for long. Next year, stagnation hit 
the Salonica markets again, and the prices reverted to the mediocre levels of the long­
term recovery trend.49
Chart 2.2.
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Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 92-93. For raw figures in tons see Appendix 3. 
Note: 450,672 ton exports in 1877.
After 1905, a combination of domestic and international events drove cereal 
prices up rapidly. The first destabilising shock came with the demand boom generated 
by the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian revolution of 1905. War and revolution in 
Russia largely disturbed the Black Sea grain trade and almost instantly increased the 
European demand for local cereals. The situation fanned speculation in Salonica and 
cereal prices went up by about 15.0% on average in 1905.50 The 1905 stocks largely 
were exhausted by October, and the region entered 1906 with minimal reserves. A
48 PRO, F.O. 78/4835, 15.9.1897, Report by Mr. Consular Assistant Heathcore on the Harvest 
of 1897 in the District of Salonica.
49 F.O.A.S., 1898, N. 2270: 6; Asir, 2.M. 1316 (22.5.1898), N. 279: 1.
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severe local crop failure that year further depressed output levels, a situation that 
aggravated inflation in domestic markets.51 This time, however, the crop failures proved 
more persistent than usual, and a streak of successive harvest failures between 1907 and 
1910 seriously undermined the productive capacity of the region. Consequently, cereal 
prices in Salonica increased by 40% between 1904 and 1910. Only the above average 
harvests of 1911 and 1912 could reverse this inflationary trend.52 On the eve of the 
Balkan Wars, cereal prices were more or less restored to their pre-1875 levels. 
However, the export markets were a lost cause now as adverse economic conditions 
prevented local producers from competing in international markets.
Export performance of the sector remained unmistakably sluggish during the 
period under consideration. Cereal exports from Salonica lingered around an average of
70,000 tons, with only brief instances of rapid expansion and growth (See Chart 2.2). 
Even the construction of three important railway lines, which linked Salonica to the 
Macedonian hinterland, could not initiate a breakthrough in overseas trade. The opening 
of the Uskiip, Manastir and Istanbul railway lines in 1872, 1892 and 1894, respectively, 
could not jump-start overseas trade. Only two exogenous shocks, that is the Russo- 
Ottoman War of 1876 and the Russian famine of 1891, triggered a short-lived expansion 
in overseas trade. Following the restoration of balances in international cereal markets, 
however, regional exports settled back to the mediocre 70,000-ton benchmark and 
remained at that level until 1905. After this date, exports from the region declined 
swiftly. The above mentioned streak of harvest failures were responsible largely for the 
unusually poor export performance of the region. The gradual recovery materialised 
only with the reversal of harvest trends in the following years. Still, exports from 
Salonica amounted only to 44,770 tons in 1912.
A number of factors seem to have underlined the sluggish export performance of 
the region and its persistent failure to respond to emergent competition in the overseas 
markets. Serious supply side factors withheld the realisation of the export potential of 
the region. These supply side problems will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. It suffices to say for now that the failure to modernise agriculture, intense 
scarcity of labour, and the political instability that affected the Macedonian countryside
50 Asir, 20.Z.1321 (7.3.1904), N. 371: I; Asir, 2.S.1322 (18.4.1904), N.410: 1.
51 Asir, 20.Z.1321 (7.3.1904), N. 371: 1.
52 F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 5017: 8,F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5234: 7.
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largely undermined the region’s capacity to respond to the challenge of the overseas 
markets. However, equally serious problems affected the actual process of marketing 
and withheld the local cereal producers from making headway in the overseas markets. 
In what follows, I will concentrate on these market constraints in detail.
The Transaction Cost Constraint: The Railway Tariffs
High costs of overland transport had for long been a persistent and indeed 
prohibitive problem for local cereal producers. The main river systems of the region 
were too shallow and unpredictable, thus rendering the cheapest option for the 
transportation of bulky goods infeasible. The local merchants had to transport cereals 
overland from the interior to the port of Salonica for export. At that time, the roads were 
in poor condition and did not allow for easy cart transportation. Therefore, the caravans 
had to rely on more expensive animal transportation, which naturally increased the costs 
of overland transportation.53
This situation put the local farmers at a disadvantage, especially against their 
counterparts in the Black Sea region, who could transport their produce with relative 
ease, safety, and at a considerably lower cost along the extensive waterways provided 
by the Rivers Danube, Dniester, Dnieper and Don to the main Black Sea ports.54 
Similarly, the North American cereal producers could transport their produce on 
railways, lakes, canals and river systems with ease, safety, and at a relatively low cost. 
In this respect, the local producers were already at a ‘transaction cost’ disadvantage 
before the appearance of railways in the region. For instance, all transaction costs, 
including the insurance and octroi charges involved in transporting wheat from Chicago 
to Liverpool totalled to 50 cents per bushel, or covered only a third of Liverpool wheat 
price c.1870.55 In contrast, the local transport costs in Selanik could constitute as much 
as 50.0% of the f.o.b price of wheat in Salonica, and could amount to 50 cents per 
bushel in the mid-1860s.56 In other words, carrying grains all the way from Chicago to 
Liverpool could cost as much as transporting cereals over to the port of Salonica from 
its hinterland.
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 24-26.
54 Harlaftis, A History o f Greek-Owned Shipping, 3-38.
55 Harley “Transportation, the World Wheat,” 225.
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The construction of railways undoubtedly cut the cost of transportation and 
increased the speed and security of conveyance. In this respect, the positive impact of 
railways on regional cereal production cannot be denied.57 However, the railways did 
not come problem-free, and they did not solve all the problems associated with the 
transportation of bulky cereals everywhere in the region. First, the subsidiary roads 
linking the interior grain fields to the rail lines and to the major urban centres of the 
region remained in quite poor condition throughout the region. Under the 
circumstances, intermediary merchants were compelled to convey the cereal produce on 
animals to railway stations. Reliance on this rudimentary method of carriage increased 
the costs of transportation.58 Secondly, the tariffs on these railway lines were set at 
exorbitantly high rates, due to the high kilometric guarantees given by the Ottoman 
government to the railway companies.59 For instance, the railway tariffs on cereals 
could constitute as much as a third of the wheat prices and a half of the prices of oat, 
rye, barley or maize in Salonica in the 1880s.60
This situation disadvantaged local cereal producers and merchants alike. The 
mercantile community of Salonica in specific felt the pressure of the railway tariffs and 
put incessant pressure on the railway companies to reduce the tariffs.61 In 1888, Messrs. 
Alatini Brothers, the leading grain merchants of Salonica, voiced the concerns of the 
mercantile community in a report submitted to the British consulate:
Unfortunately, the ever-increasing competition of America and India, whose products find then- 
way to centres of production in Europe, and the low prices which are the natural result, have 
deprived the export trade of Salonica of all the development... In fact, the landed proprietors 
have found it impossible .to realise their harvests by sending them abroad owing on the one 
hand, to the low prices of the markets, and, on the other hand, to the tariffs of the Salonica 
Railway, which are still enormously high ...62
56 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 25.
57 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 87-130.
58 P.P.A.P., 1874, V. 32: 870,F.O.A.S., 1875, N. 17: 449.
59 For an excellent discussion of Macedonian railway tariffs and kilometric guarantees see 
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 74-86.
60 D.T.O.G., 16.R.1313 (5.10.1895), N. 562: 472.
61 PRO, F.O. 195/1585, 15.4.1887, Translated Petition Presented to the Ministry of Public 
Works by the Salonica Chamber of Commerce.
62 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 2-3.
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In the same year, the Alatini report also appeared in the semi-official journal of 
the Istanbul Chamber o f Commerce. The report pointed to the prohibitive nature of 
railway tariffs and subtly drew the Porte’s attention to the urgency of the matter.63 The 
voice of the Alatini report could not have gone unnoticed in Istanbul. The Alatinis were 
extremely powerful in Salonica. They controlled the bulk of the export/import trade, 
served as the primary grain suppliers for the provincial military garrisons, assumed a 
strong presence in local credit markets, had firm interests in urban construction industry 
and real estate market, and owned almost all industrial establishments in the city of 
Salonica.64 Together with other influential Jewish families of the town, the Alatinis 
owned or controlled all major business concerns in Salonica.65 The family maintained 
contacts in consular offices and government bureaus at the highest level. Such leading 
figures of the family as Alfred Alatini had established firm relations with local notables, 
government officials and European consuls residing in Salonica. Through these, 
connections they could, and seemingly did, put considerable political and diplomatic 
pressure on the Oriental Railway Company.
In the months following the publication of the Alatini Report, the concerns of 
the mercantile community led by the Alatini family took a more structured and official 
tone. The Salonica Chamber of Commerce and the provincial government assumed 
active initiative in the resolution of the matter and put incessant pressure on the 
representatives of the Oriental Railway Company. These efforts were backed strongly 
by the British consul, Mr. Blunt, who had been petitioning the embassy, complaining 
about the adverse effect of the railway tariffs on British trade with Serbia via the port of 
Salonica for almost a decade.66 The ensuing political and diplomatic pressures 
eventually bore fruit and forced the Oriental Railway Company to reduce the tariffs 
over the Salonica-Uskiip line.67
Reductions had an immediate positive impact on overseas trade. The hinterland 
stocks accruing from the bountiful harvest of 1888 and the yield o f the good harvest of
63 D.T.O.G., 15.N.1305 (26.5.1888), N. 178: 255-257.
M See Chapter 5 for details.
65 S. Dumont, “The Social Structure of the Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the 
Nineteenth Century”, Southeastern Europe/L’Europe du Sud-Est, 5, N. 2, (1979): 53-64.
66 PRO, F.O. 195/1360, 15.4.1881, Blunt to Goschen; PRO, F.O. 78/3646, 12.8.1884, Blunt to 
White; PRO, F.O. 78/4288,16.1.1890, Blunt to White.
67 F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 11-12,16.
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1889 were transported over to Salonica, glutting the market and causing a considerable 
reduction in cereal prices in 1889.68
However, world cereal prices declined even further during the 1890s and soon 
railway tariffs once again became a notorious problem for local merchants and 
producers. A glance at the contemporary newspapers and petitions reveal the intensity 
of the complaints of Salonica’s merchants and landlord’s about the exorbitance of the 
railway tariffs. For instance, a group of merchants from Salonica argued that the tariffs 
were preventing quite literally the traders from sending the produce of its hinterland to 
Salonica, even in times of buoyant demand and rising prices.69 Similarly, a group of 
landlords from the neighbouring province of Manastir complained about the “absurdity” 
of the high railway tariffs and pointed to the fact that trains arriving with goods at 
Manastir were returning to Salonica almost completely empty. This, they argued, was 
causing implicit revenue losses for the Ottoman government, whilst putting the local 
cereal producers at a serious disadvantage.70 Another anonymous merchant from the 
district of Selanik reprimanded the tariff policy of the Oriental Railway Company and 
suggested that a reduction in railway tariffs would actually increase the revenue of the 
company. He also argued that a reduction in tariffs would decrease the kilometric 
guarantee burden of the Ottoman government. A reasonable reduction would help 
generate a substantial recovery in grain trade and encourage cereal cultivation in the 
region. Thus, he held, the' company, the government, cereal producers and merchants 
would all benefit from potential tariff reductions.71
The political pressure exerted by local notables, prominent merchants and 
European consuls again bore fruit, and forced the railway companies to agree to further 
reductions on the Manastir line in 1894 and on the Uskup line in 1897.72 These final 
reductions could have a positive impact on local cereal trade, but they came too late to 
make a lasting impact on overseas trade. The damage had already been done over the 
previous two decades. Pressed hard under adverse conjuncture o f the international 
economy and prohibitive transportation costs, many long-time cereal producers in the 
region had already switched to the production of more profitable and less bulky cash
6SF.O.A.S., 1891, N. 822:5.
69 D.T.O.G., 16.R. 1313 (5.10.1895), N. 562: 472.
1 0 Asir, 30.B.1313 (29.12.1895), N. 190: 1
71 Asir, 13.N.1313 (26.02.1896), N. 198: 1.
77 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 15-16.
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crops, such as opium, tobacco, sesame, cotton, and silk cocoons.73 Besides, the crop 
failures of the 1897-1905 period undermined largely the export potential of the region. 
Under the circumstances, tariff reductions simply fell short of bringing about the desired 
effect.
The Marketing Process and Lack o f Regulatory Bodies:
Another serious problem that undermined the export potential of the region was 
the poor marketing quality of local grains. The cereal produce sent from the interior 
often arrived at Salonica in a heavily debased condition.74 Above all, wheat contained 
broken seeds mixed with rye, barley and oats, as well as with hay and sand. At times, 
the debris could weigh as much as 40.0% of the produce.75
Debasement hurt overseas trade in a number of important ways. First, the 
intermediary merchants had to pay for the transportation of mere debris over the roads 
and railways. Thus, debasement inflated the costs of transportation, which, as we have 
seen, were already prohibitively high. Second, the poor quality of the marketed produce 
undermined the commercial reputation of local cereals and seriously curtailed the 
competitiveness of the sector in overseas markets. European merchants, quite 
justifiably, favoured the better sieved Russian and American grains and showed interest 
in cereals from Salonica only under extraordinary conditions.76
There were a few reasons for the poor marketing quality of the local produce. To 
start with, the use of mechanised sieves was not widespread in the region. Thus, it was 
difficult to separate weak and broken seeds or sand and hay from the marketed 
produce.77 The lack of an institutional framework that would encourage the introduction 
and diffusion of this complex and expensive technology was largely responsible for the 
persistence of the problem throughout the region.78
73 D.T.O.G., 16.R.1313 (5.10.1895), N. 562: 472; F.O.A.S., 1896, N. 1663: 7.
1AAsir, 20.Za.1318 (11.3.1901), N. 566: 2.
75 Asir, 28.§.1319 (10.12.1901), N. 640: 2-3.
76 P.P.A.P., 1873, V. 29: 735; Asir, 20.Za.1318 (11.3.1901), N. 566: 2; Asir, 20.C.1320 
(15.9.1902), N. 717: 2.
77 Asir, 20.C.1320 (15.9.1902), N. 717: 2.
7  ^ See Chapter 3 for the difficulties encountered in the introduction, diffusion and maintenance 
of modem agricultural technology into the region.
88
In addition, there were serious problems in the marketing process itself that 
allowed for, and indeed quite openly encouraged, debasement. At the time, most of the 
surplus grain ended up in the hands of estate owners, intermediary merchants and tax- 
farmers.79 These agents either marketed the produce in nearby urban markets or sold it 
to local representatives of the large trading houses of Salonica. The representatives, in 
turn, forwarded the produce to Salonica and took a handsome commission in return for 
their services. No public authority or semi-autonomous body regulated or oversaw the 
marketing of cereals. The administrative councils and local municipalities could oversee 
marketing within urban centres they governed, but lacked simply the political and 
administrative capacity to regulate the marketing of cereals in the countryside and along 
the railway lines.80 Under the circumstances, the actual process of marketing went 
largely unchecked leaving much room for deceptive practices.
Debasement was the typical manifestation, or rather the outcome, of this 
unregulated market framework. It seems the producers probably sold the mixed, broken 
and sandy grains to the local merchants, arguing that they did not have mechanised 
sieves at their disposal. The local merchants and the tax-farmers further debased the 
produce before selling it to the intermediary merchants and the agents, probably 
claiming that the phoney farmers and landlords were responsible for the poor quality of 
the produce. The intermediaries acting on behalf of the trading houses and working on 
commission probably mixed the grains with more debris along the railway line and sent 
it to Salonica in quite poor condition.81
The exporters in Salonica faced a crucial decision. They could either fully cover 
the additional costs of exporting the produce in prime condition, or ship the debased 
produce as it was, accepting lower prices and further penalties for debasement in the 
well monitored English and French markets. Neither option was desirable for the 
trading houses. Sieving tons of debased produce would simply increase operational 
costs and lead to considerable loss of revenue. However, sending the debased produce 
abroad would both lead to lower prices and undermine the commercial reputation of 
local cereals in European markets.
79 See Chapter 4 for taxation practices and systems of land-tenure in Selanik.
For the organisation of local marketing networks see Chapter-5.
81 Asir, 2.Za.l319 (10.2.1902), N. 657: 1.
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The leading cereal traders of Salonica chose to sieve grains, especially primary 
cereals such as wheat and maize, in their warehouses and flour factories and incurred 
the ensuing operational costs.82 Disturbed by this situation the leading trading houses of 
Salonica took certain precautions that would help resolve the problem.83 They formed a 
cartel and imposed a surcharge of five paras for every kiyye of grain sold in the town, 
regardless of the quality or the condition of the grain produce. The surcharge was to be 
paid by the merchants and intermediary agents, who were largely responsible for 
debasement. In principle, the money accruing from the surcharge was to be collected 
under a special fund and used to sieve the debased grain in Salonica.84
The members of the cartel misused this fund. They happily shared the returns 
accruing from the surcharge and continued to sieve some of the produce in their private 
warehouses and flourmills. The produce marketed by smaller merchants, who did not 
have sieving facilities at their disposal, was not sieved at all and was shipped overseas 
in quite poor condition, much to the annoyance of the importers in Europe and other 
Mediterranean ports.85 At any rate, the actual producers, who already suffered from 
declining prices and high costs of transportation, ultimately paid the surcharge. The 
agents and intermediary merchants claimed the surcharge from the farmers, either 
directly by transmitting the surcharge or indirectly by offering lower prices.86
A decade later, members of the cartel voiced their concerns over debasement in 
a rhetorical fashion and asked for new legislation that would enable the municipal 
authorities to penalise deceitful merchants and intermediary agents. Thus, they argued, 
they could abolish the surcharge and ship the produce in prime condition to overseas 
markets.87
At the time, such regulatory legislation was not entirely unforseen in Ottoman 
lands. For instance, certain trade regulations had been instituted to secure the quality of
82 Asir, 2.Za.l319 (10.2.1902), N. 657: 1.
83 The entire grain trade of the city was managed by twenty merchant houses. In practice 
however most of the overseas trade was conducted by the Alatini and Modiano families. 1320 S .V. S. 
(1893:432-433).
84 Asir, 29.C.1324 (16.8.1906), N. 1104: Z
85 Asir, 29.C.1324 (16.8.1906), N. 1104: 2.
86 Asir, 29.C.1324 (16.8.1906), N. 1104: 2.
87 Asir, 2.Za.l319 (10.2.1902), N. 657: 1; Asir, 20.C.1320 (15.9.1902), N. 717: 2.
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grains in the neighbouring town of Dedeaga?. There, the exporters were obliged to buy 
the produce that contained a maximum of 2.0% debris. Anything above the 2.0% 
margin had to be cleaned by the intermediary merchants and delivered to the exporter in 
good condition. Naturally, all the associated costs of sieving were to be incurred by the 
intermediaries.88 Even in Salonica, the local officials and the municipal government 
closely monitored the marketing of red hot chilli peppers and successfully prevented the 
debasement of the produce.89
However, the situation was somewhat more complex for wheat trade. It was not 
easy to institute such regulatory measures in the heavily structured cereal market of 
Salonica. Neither the local municipality nor the local chambers of agriculture and 
commerce had the administrative muscle and the political capacity to monitor and 
regulate the overseas cereal trade, which was firmly controlled by the influential 
families of the town. Besides, the sheer size and scope of cereal trade rendered effective 
regulation even more difficult.90 Nevertheless, in 1907, local officials considered the 
establishment of a wheat exchange in Salonica, which would impose quality controls 
and ensure fair and competitive trading in the city markets.91 The large trading houses 
opposed the idea of a boursier, which potentially could jeopardise their hitherto 
unchallenged grip over Salonica market.92 Repeatedly, they argued against the 
establishment of the wheat exchange and put considerable pressure on the local 
authorities in order to prevent it. They claimed that the Salonica cereal market was not, 
after all, that important to necessitate a boursier.93
Their argument was somewhat justified. Cereal trade in Salonica had shrunk 
over the last few years and the city could actually do without a boursier, as it had done 
for decades. However, the line of defence put forth by the trading houses was also 
rhetorical. First, there were quite a few wheat exchanges operating successfully in such 
towns as Izmir, Konya, Ankara and Eski§ehir. Some of these towns had trading volumes 
comparable to that of Salonica.94 Secondly, the second clause of the regulations
88 Asir, 20.Za.1318 (11.3.1901), N. 566: 2.
89 Asir, 9.B.1322 (19.9.1904), N. 914: 2; Asir, 5.N.1324 (22.10.1906), N. 1122: 3
90 Asir, 31.R.1325 (3.6.1907), N. 1183: 2.
91 BA, §D-Ticaret, 1224/50, 26.N. 1325 (2.11.1907).
92 Asir, 29.C.1324 (16.8.1906), N. 1104: 2; Asir, 31.R.1325 (3.6.1907), N. 1183: 2.
93 Asir, 31.R.1325 (3.6.1907), N. 1183: 2.
94Asir, 24.R.1325 (6.6.1907), N. 1185: 2.
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governing the establishment and operation of cereal exchanges in the empire clearly 
stipulated that any town endowed with a chamber of commerce and agriculture was, in 
principle, entitled to a cereal exchange. Salonica was certainly fit for one.95
The Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Mahmud Kapanci Efendi, was not 
entirely convinced by the cartel members’ line of reasoning and demanded the 
establishment of a wheat exchange in Salonica. He presented his official application to 
the Sublime Porte on September 3, 1907. The Porte was quick to respond to the 
application, and the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works issued the necessary 
permit on October 30, 1907.96 The legal ground was ready for the establishment of a 
regulated ‘wheat-market’ in Salonica. However, the evidence at hand indicates that the 
plan did not materialise in practice because of the opposition of the trading houses. 
There is no sign that either the planned wheat exchange or the large trading houses did 
much to improve the quality of the produce marketed in Salonica. Debasement 
remained a problem.
2.1.2. Transformation of the Domestic Market: Between New Horizons and Old 
Problems:
The overseas cereal trade constituted an indispensable component of the regional 
economy earlier in the nineteenth century. As we have seen, cereals had been one of the 
leading, if not the primary, export items of the region. Export trade provided local 
farmers with an important source of livelihood and prosperity. It also brought riches to 
prominent landlords, local merchants, commercial intermediaries, and the leading 
‘bourgeois’ families of Salonica, and thus contributed to the overall process of capital 
accumulation. In this respect, the economic importance of the overseas cereal trade 
cannot be denied.
In fact, cereal trade was much more diffuse and extensive than the Salonica 
oriented export trade would suggest. Cereals constituted the main food staple of the
95 BA, SD-Ticaret, 1224/50,26.N. 1325 (2.11.1907).
96 BA, SD-Ticaret, 1224/50, 26.N. 1325 (2.11.1907); Manastir, 20.Za.1325 (26.12.1907), N.
1164: 2 .
local population.97 In urban areas, people mainly consumed standard white bread, which 
was made primarily of good quality wheat. The diet of the rural populace was somewhat 
more modest; peasant farmers normally consumed a peculiar type of bread baked from a 
blend of wheat and lesser grain varieties, such as, rye, barley, maize and oats.98 This 
special place of cereals as the basic food staple of the region presumably assured their 
vibrant and regular trading in local markets. Providing wheat supplies to urban centres 
constituted the primary axis of the regional cereal trade. According to the estimates 
presented in Table 2.1, the. consumption of wheat in urban areas accounted for about 65- 
70.0% of the total wheat consumption in the region. This should not come as a surprise, 
for the rural population relied mainly on their own produce for basic staples and 
remained outside the extended circuit of commodity exchange. In certain districts where 
cash crop production was particularly predominant, such as Drama, Kavala, San-§aban 
and Provide, the dependence of the rural population on markets for basic staples was 
more prevalent. The consumption of wheat in these locations probably accounted for the 
region’s remaining commercial wheat consumption. In general, however, the provision 
of wheat for the urban population appears to have accounted for the bulk of the regional 
trade in cereals. In what follows, I will concentrate on this urban dimension of the cereal 
trade.
Table 2.1.
Estimated Wheat Consumption in Selanik, 1876-1911 (tons)
Year
/
Total Output
II
Exports
I ll
Imports
IV
Domestic Consumption 
(Hii-rii))
V
Urban Consumption
1876 n.a. 50,184 - n.a. 38,640
1894 81,500 8,200 - 73,300 47,665
1906 79,750 2,100 6,900 84,550 60,088
1911 n.a. - 47,500 n.a. 85,804
Source: Output figures from 1890 salname and 1907 statistics. Exports from Gounaris, Steam over
Macedonia, 92-93. Imports from F.O.A.S., 1906, N. 3867: 10-11; F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 5017: 13 
-21. Urban Consumption based on adjusted urban population estimates presented in Table 1.15.
Note: In estimating urban wheat consumption, I assumed that each person would on average consume
200 kg. of wheat annually. I then multiplied this figure with the available estimates of urban 
population and reached indicative estimates of urban wheat consumption. Per capita 
consumption figures were based on, Giiran, 19. Ytizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 93.
97 T. Stoianovich, Balkan Worlds, the First and Last Europe, (Armonk, New York, London, 
England: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 209; J. Baker, Turkey, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1877), 86. 
For the diet of local populace also see Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, (London, 1908).
98 R.C.L., 31.1.1909, No. 262: 133-135.
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The local trade in wheat provisions seems to have grown steadily during the 
period under consideration. According to the estimates presented in Table 2.1, urban 
wheat consumption more than doubled between 1876 and 1911 and reached an all time 
high of 85,804 tons on the eve of the Balkan Wars. In due course, exports diminished 
from over 50,000 tons to virtually naught in 1911. Thus, the urban domestic market 
became predominant in regional wheat trade by the eve of the Balkan Wars.
The growth of urban demand for local cereals created many opportunities for 
cereal producers and allowed them to resist the tide of depression, particularly through 
the crisis ridden 1880s and 1890s. Indeed, local farmers increasingly turned towards the 
immediate domestic urban markets and specialised in provisioning the region’s growing 
urban population. Wheat and flour were imported in significant amounts only in times 
of severe crop failures. Otherwise, the domestic markets remained the exclusive source 
of local cereal consumption.
This is a telling observation. As I have noted, the Ottoman trade regime was 
quite liberal and the domestic markets were on the whole unprotected from the winds of 
foreign competition. Under the circumstances, we would normally expect the cheap 
American, Russian and Indian cereals and flour to capture a commanding position in the 
domestic urban markets. Therefore, we must seek alternative factors that can help 
explain the predominance of local produce in regional markets. Two preventive factors 
appear particularly important in this respect. The first is high harbour dues and charges 
prevailing in the port of Salonica. The second is, again, the prohibitive costs of overland 
transportation in the region.
Excessive harbour dues and charges, customs tariffs and various labour services 
charged at the port of Salonica had been a matter of complaint amongst the merchants 
involved in overseas trade." To start with, the ships calling at Salonica had to pay quite 
substantial anchorage dues that could vary between 10 and 30 kuru§QS, according to the 
tonnage of the ship and the duration of its stay in the port. In addition, merchants 
discharging and loading cargoes alongside the quay were obliged to pay an extra 
harbour due to the appointed quay commissioners. The normal rate was 20 paras per 
ton of cargo handled at the quay. However, the surcharge over cereals was subject to a
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different scale. The merchants had to pay one para per kile of wheat, maize, rye and 
sesame and three paras per kile of barley and oats discharged along the quay line.100 It 
is not easy to determine the rate of effective protection provided by these charges and 
dues. However, altogether they could amount to about 2.0% of the current wheat price 
prevailing in Salonica, adding only marginally to the protection provided by the 8.0% 
ad valorem import tariff.101
The porters of Salonica, however, imposed a more substantial trade barrier. The 
porters constituted one of the most powerful segments of the town’s working classes. 
They were organised under a powerful guild that regulated all matters pertaining to 
portage in the port. The guild set the charges of portage at considerably high rates and, 
through passive resistance and tough bargaining managed to dictate its terms to 
merchants and intermediary agents trading in Salonica.102 There is no evidence at hand 
that gives detailed information on the charges claimed by the guild. Therefore, it is not 
easy to determine the rate of protection provided by the extra costs of portage. However, 
considering the persistent protests of the local and foreign merchants and the incessant 
diplomatic pressure exerted by European consuls, we can reasonably suggest that the 
charges imposed by the guild of porters increased the tariff barriers quite 
substantially.103 These charges must have helped increase the effective rate of protection 
by an indeterminate but evidently significant margin.
99 PRO, F.O., 195/1641, 1890, Dispatch No. 49 prepared by Consul Blunt on ‘Dues authorised 
to be levied by the Salonica Quay Commissioners under the Sultans Firman’; PRO, F.O., 198/2029,
25.1.1897, Blunt to Currie; PRO, F.O., 198/2929,26.1.1898, Blunt to Currie.
100 p r o , F.O., 195/1641, 1890, Dispatch No. 49 prepared by Consul Blunt on ‘Dues authorised 
to be levied by the Salonica Quay Commissioners under the Sultans Firman’.
101 Consider the following hypotethical case: Let us assume that a 25 ton ship loaded fully with 
a wheat cargo anchored at Salonica in 1890. The ship would pay at least 10 kuru§ in total, or 40 paras per 
ton, for anchorage. In addition, the merchant would pay 38 paras per ton of wheat discharged at the quay, 
which adds up to about 80 paras in all. In 1890, the fob price of a ton of wheat in Salonica was about 37 
kuru$. Therefore, 80 para surcharge would correspond to 2.2% of the local price of wheat in Salonica.
102 j) Quataert, Social Disintegration; D. Quataert, “The Silk Industry of Bursa, 1880-1914,” in
H. Islamoglu (ed.) The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 284-299; D. Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” in D. Quataert and E. Ziircher (eds.), 
Workers and the Working Class- in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (London and New 
York: I. B. Tauris Publishers in Association with Institute o f Social History, Amsterdam, 1995), 59-74; S. 
Dumont, “Une organisation socialiste ottomane: la federation ouvriere de Salonique (1908-1912),” 
Etudes Balkaniques, 11, N. 2, (1975): 22-39; S. Dumont, “A Jewish, Socialist and Ottoman Organization: 
the Workers’ Federation o f Thessaloniki,” in M. Tunfay and E. Ziircher (eds.), Socialism and 
Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923, (London and New York: British Academic Press, An 
Imprint o f I. B. Tauris Publishers in Association with the International Institute of Social History, 
Amsterdam, 1994), 49-76.
103 For official complaints of the merchants o f Salonica see PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 3.7.1875, 
Blunt to Elliot; PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 18.7.1875, Blunt to Elliot; PRO, F.O. 198/2029, 25.1.1897, Blunt to
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The construction of a commercial harbour in Salonica and of a short railway line 
that linked the new harbour to the Salonica railway station in the early 1900s, reduced 
the rate of effective protection provided by the above discussed dues, charges and 
tariffs.104 The new harbour that allowed for direct anchorage and reduced harbour dues 
and other charges associated with moorage. The short railway line allowed trains direct 
access to the port, and curbed the monopolistic powers of the guild, which brought 
about a notable reduction in the associated costs of portage. Indeed, the construction of 
the rail line between the harbour and the railway station, seem to have somewhat 
constrained the powers of the guild. Many porters formerly employed between the 
quays and the railway station lost their jobs and became mere carriers wondering the 
streets of Salonica.105 Despite the blow, however, the guild did not entirely lose its 
influence in the town and continued to claim charges from traders in the port until the 
end of the period. The organisational power of the guild and its influence manifested in 
boycotts of Austrian and Greek goods in 1908-1910. The guild of porters and the 
boatmen of Salonica assumed active initiative in the organisation and execution of these 
successful boycotts and refused to handle Austrian and Greek cargoes, causing much 
distress among traders while earning the admiration of the local representatives of the 
Committee of Union and Progress.106
In addition, the construction of the new harbour did not lead to a reduction in 
harbour dues and charges as might be expected. Quite to the contrary, the French 
Harbour Company set the dues at exorbitantly high rates.107 For instance, the harbour 
due for wheat was set at 15 paras per 100 kg, or at 1.5 kuru§Qs per ton. The local price
Currie; PRO, F.O. 198/2929, 26.1.1898, Blunt to Currie; PRO, F.O. 195/2357, 30.4.1910, Lamb to 
Lowther.
104 gee Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, and Anastassiadou, Salonique, for construction of 
railway connection between the port and the railway terminal and the construction o f a new port in the 
town.
105 Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 60.
106 For the details of the boycott of Austrian goods and the leading role played by the porters 
and boatmen of Salonica see PRO, F.O. 195/2298, 23.10.1908, Lamb to Lowther; PRO, F.O. 195/2298, 
26.10.1908, Lamb to Lowther; PRO, F.O. 195/2330, 19.10.1909, Lamb to Lowther. Also see E. Yavuz 
“1908 Boykotu” [The Boycott of 1908], ODTU Geli§me Dergisi, Turkiye Iktisat Tarihi Uzerine 
Ara$tirmalar OzelSayisi (Special Issue on Turkish Economic History), (1978): 163-181.
For the details of the boycott of Greek goods in Salonica see PRO, F.O. 195/2358, 1.6.1910, 
Lamb to Lowther; PRO, F.O. 195/2358, 10.6.1910, Lamb to Lowther; PRO, F.O. 195/2358, 18.6.1910, 
Lamb to Lowther; PRO, F.O. 195/2358, 28.6.1910, Lamb to Lowther.
107 PRO, F.O., 195/2133,26.6.1902, Shipley to O’Conor.
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of wheat was about 32 kuru§ per ton at the time, that is c. 1900.108 Thus, the dues 
charged by the Harbour Company accounted for 4.7% of the local wheat price. These 
dues were clearly higher than those prevailing at any other Ottoman port in the 
Mediterranean.109 When combined with the surcharge claimed by the porters and the 
8.0% tariff, the harbour dues could provide some degree of protection for the regional 
cereal markets.
However, it seems the degree of protection provided by the tariffs, charges and 
other dues claimed at the port and the customs were not entirely sufficient to prevent 
imported cereals and flour from making headway in the internal domestic markets at the 
expense of the local produce. By the mid-1900s, the region had already become a 
regular importer of cereals and flour coming mainly from the Black Sea region. In 1911, 
imports accounted for about 40.0% of total urban wheat consumption in Selanik (see 
Table 2.1). In order to understand the underlining reasons for growing import 
dependency we must also consider the changes in the overall costs of transportation, 
particularly from Salonica towards the hinterland.
The exorbitant costs of transportation seem to have provided the sector with 
some degree of de facto  protection until the early and mid-1890s. Surely, the high costs 
of transportation were far from being a blessing for local merchants and farmers, for 
these costs prevented them from reaping fully the benefits of the growing home demand 
for cereals. For instance, as late as 1896, the railway tariffs, despite previous reductions, 
prevented the cereal producers of Avrethisan from sending their produce to the 
neighbouring town of Siroz, which was only a few railway stops away. Consequently, 
grain stocks piled up in the warehouses, waiting for a substantial recovery in prices that 
would allow for profitable trading within the region.110 Clearly, the high costs of 
transportation constituted a serious problem for almost everyone involved in the cereal 
trade, except perhaps the railroad companies.
Yet, the prohibitive cost of transportation also gave local cereal producers a 
substantial competitive edge against imported wheat and flour coming from United 
States, India and more importantly, from the Black Sea basin. The wheat producers
108 p r o , F.O. 195/2064, 1899, Convention, Port de Salonique.
109 p r o , F.O. 195/2064, 1899, Convention, Port de Salonique.
110y4«r, 5.Za.l313 (18.4.1896), N. 66: 1-2.
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located in the immediate hinterland of the leading towns benefited considerably from 
the protection provided by the high costs of transportation prevailing in the region. 
Apparently, this was an important factor that helped maintain cereal production in the 
region during the depression ridden 1880s and the early 1890s.
During the early l$90s, the situation changed dramatically for local cereal 
producers. The reduction of tariffs on goods travelling from Salonica towards Usktip in 
1891 brought the interior urban markets within easier reach of Russian and American 
producers.111 The construction of two new railway lines in the mid-1890s and the 
subsequent reductions in tariffs also helped liberalise the urban markets of the interior 
and intensified the competition faced by the local producers. The complaints of a group 
of merchants from Manastir illustrate the adverse impact of the tariff reduction on local 
trade. According to these merchants, the Oriental Railway Company charged O.L. 15 
for a wagonload of flour arriving from Manastir to Salonica in 1896. In contrast, cheap 
Russian flour coming from Salonica to Manastir was charged 40.0% less for the same 
distance and paid only O.L. 9 in railway tariffs. Under the circumstances, the local 
producers failed to market their produce and, more importantly, they faced intense 
overseas competition not only in Salonica but also in the recently rail-linked towns of 
the interior.112
Table 2.2
Cash Ovp Prices Relative to Wheat 1880-1912 (1880-1884=100)
Period Tobacco Cocoons Opium Cotton
1885-1889 111 121 119 107
1890-1894 88 117 116 82
1895-1899 125 102 117 91
1900-1904 199 114 117 125
1905-1909 156 91 129 104
1910-1912 207 120 190 130
Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, and Asir. For disaggregate data 
see Appendix 1 and 4.
m  PRO, F.O. 195/1768, 14.4.1892, Blunt to Clareford. This tariff reduction was the outcome 
of Britain’s diplomatic pressures to circumscribe the rapid advance of Austrian commercial interests into 
the Balkans.
*12 5.Za.l313 (18.4.1896), N. 66: 1-2. For similar complaints also see Asir, 13.N.1313
(26.2.1896), N. 52: I; Asir, 1 l.L. 1313 (27.3.1896), N. 59: 1-2; Asir, 9.Za. 1313 (22.4.1896), N. 67: 1.
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Not surprisingly, regional cereal trade soon came under the orbit of American 
and Russian trade. Trading houses of Salonica now increasingly preferred imported 
cereals and flour over the more expensive and poor quality local produce.113 Thus, the 
last bastion of local cereal producers, the domestic urban markets, fell to the hands of 
foreign competitors. The region became a regular importer o f wheat and flour in the late 
1900s.
Pressed hard under intense foreign competition both in overseas and domestic 
markets, the adverse income effect of sluggish prices, and the prohibitive costs of 
transportation, local cereal producers increasingly • turned towards alternative 
agricultural pursuits. As relative prices turned in favour of cash crops (see Table 2.2), 
farmers and landlords switched to the production of these more lucrative and less bulky 
cash crops. Thus, regional cereal production went into a notable crisis from the turn of 
the century onwards and emerged as a largely retarded sector by the end of the period. 
The rapid growth of cash crop production in the region must be associated, among other 
things, with the sustained crisis in and the gradual retardation of cereal production.
2.2. Cotton Cultivation: American Competition and the Blessing of the Domestic 
Market
Cotton was the single most important commercial crop of the Selanik region 
until the 1860s. We know that cotton was cultivated in the fertile plains of Siroz and 
was exported overseas as early as the sixteenth century.114 However, the real expansion 
of cotton cultivation came later in the second half of the eighteenth century. Strong 
overseas and local demand for cotton increased the attraction of cotton production for 
local farmers.115 By c.1800, the districts of Siroz, Zihne, Yenice and Selanik had 
become primary centres of cotton cultivation in the Ottoman Empire.116 Cotton exports 
from Salonica rose from 1,130 tons in the early 1750s to 1,630 tons in the late 1780s 
and reached a peak of 7,700 tons by c.1800.117 By the turn of the nineteenth century,
113 Asir, 5.Za.l313 (18.4.1896), N. 66: 1-2
McGowan, Economic Life, 42-44.
H5 Themopoulou, Salonique, 487.
H6 Stoianovich, “Land Tenure,” 403-404.
117 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 247; Themopoulou, Salonique, 512.
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cotton had become the primary commercial crop of the region, generating about
6,000,000 kuru§QS in export' earnings.118
After the turn of the nineteenth century local cotton producers began to run into 
serious difficulties. Both overseas and domestic demand for local cotton varieties 
contracted rapidly from the early 1810s onwards, pushing the sector into a severe 
recession. The rapid mechanisation of cotton spinning in continental Europe proved 
extremely injurious for overseas cotton trade of Selanik. The short, hard and thick 
cotton staple varieties produced in the region yielded satisfactory results in hand 
spinning but they were not ideally suitable for mechanised mule spinners.119 The rough 
cotton staple could not resist the strain of mechanised spinners and frequently broke in 
the spinning process. Breakage was a serious problem for mule technology. The entire 
machine had to be stopped until the operators fixed the breakage. Given the consequent 
productivity loss, most mill owners preferred the strong but soft American and Egyptian 
cotton varieties that could resist the continuous motion of the mule spinner. The high 
quality American cottons out-marketed the cotton varieties coming from the Levant. 
The cotton produced in Selanik proved no exception. Exports from Salonica declined 
from an all time high of about 13,000 tons in the late 1810s to less than 2,000 tons in the 
early 1850s. By the early 1860s, cotton exports had fallen to merely 600 tons.120
The decline of the local spinning industries from the 1820s onwards also struck a 
heavy blow to regional cotton production. Mounting British competition in overseas and 
later in domestic markets spawned the decline, indeed the collapse, of artisanal cotton 
spinning industry in the region as well as in Thessaly. This situation led to a further 
contraction in the demand for local cotton and pushed the sector into a severe crisis 
from the 1830s onwards. Production declined in all leading centres of cotton cultivation. 
By the 1860s, regional cotton production yielded only 3,500 tons in all.121
The American Civil War brought about a short-lived recovery in cotton 
production that lasted until the end of the 1860s. The disruption in the American cotton 
trade during the Civil War led to serious supply deficiencies throughout Europe and
1*8 Themopoulou, Salonique, 487.
1119 D. T. O. G., 30.B. 1304 (24.4.1887), N. 121: 115-116.
120 Themopoulou, Salonique, 512.
1^1 Themopoulou, Salonique, 512.
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forced European manufacturers to turn towards the old Levantine suppliers.122 Selanik 
was among the regions that attracted the attention of European merchants. However, the 
quality of the cotton staple produced in the region still constituted a serious and 
potentially prohibitive problem. The Ottoman government, in cooperation with a group 
of British merchants, took the initiative to improve the quality of cotton varieties 
produced in the region. The authorities imported and distributed 40 tons of Egyptian and 
64 tons of American cotton seeds in Selanik between 1863 and 1868. Local farmers 
successfully adopted the new seed, which yielded satisfactory results both in quality and 
quantity.123 In response, many farmers in Siroz and Zihne abolished the cultivation of 
tobacco, sesame and cereals and switched to cotton. Consequently, regional cotton 
production reached an all time high of 17,820 tons in 1867; about 11,000 tons were 
exported, and the rest remained in local storehouses waiting for purchasers.
Table 2.4.
Average Cotton Prices in Salonica, 1870-1912 (d/ton)
Period Average Price
1870-1875 1035
1880-1884 650
1885-1889 565
1890-1894 424
1895-1899 412
1900-1904 552
1905-1909 586
1910-1912 784
Source: Compiled from Gounaris Steam over Macedonia, and Asir. For details see, Appendix 4.
However, the cotton boom did not last long. The restoration of cotton production 
in the United States in the aftermath of the Civil War brought about a swift contraction 
in overseas demand for Levantine cottons.124 In Salonica, cotton prices plummeted by 
37.0%, at an annual rate of 4.7%, between the early 1870s and the early 1880s. The 
price of no other agricultural commodity, not even wheat, contracted so drastically. 
These adverse price trends forced many producers out of cotton production and
122 s ee r  Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), and O. Kurmu§, “The Cotton Famine and its Effects on the Ottoman Empire,” in H. 
Islamoglu (ed.) The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 160-169, for the impact of American civil war on Egyptian and Ottoman cotton production.
123 F. Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki$ [An Overview of Turkish Agricultural History],
Istanbul: Devlet Basunevi, 1938), 135. BA, $D-Selanik, 2033/27, 16.Ra.1287 (15.6.1870).
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compelled them to take up the production of more remunerative crops such as 
tobacco125
Establishment of a number of local cotton spinning concerns in the late 1870s 
and the 1880s gave way to a partial recovery in cotton production.126 In response to the 
fresh demand generated by new mills, cotton cultivation recovered in Siroz and Zihne. 
In 1886 British consul Blunt reported that the “cultivation of cotton in Macedonia [was] 
steadily [extending] owing to the establishment of cotton mills”.127 A year later the 
recovery was still notable and "... the cultivation of [cotton]... [was] increasing annually 
in the province owing to the progress made by the cotton manufactures”.128 An official 
Ottoman report published in the provincial newspaper Selanik in 1888 underlined the 
same connection between the emergence of local spinning concerns and the recovery in 
cotton cultivation. The correspondent suggested that “the opening of spinning factories 
in the vilayet caused an increase in the consumption of cotton and we have not the 
slightest doubt that if  our cultivators show energy and perseverance more awarding 
results will be obtained than from cereal crops”.129
Meanwhile, the quality of the local cotton staple had again emerged as a 
notorious problem. The cotton seeds imported during the American Civil War had 
largely degenerated over time, due to climatic conditions and inadequate cleaning.130 
The quality of cotton fibres deteriorated and the local cotton varieties fell short of 
meeting the needs of the local spinning concerns.
Nothing was done to improve the quality of local cotton varieties until the mid- 
1880s. Probably alarmed by the complaints of local mill owners, the Ottoman 
authorities took certain measures to restore the quality of cotton varieties in the 
region.131 Upon orders from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 2,570 kgs of
124 Themopoulou, Salonique, 505.
125 P.P.A.P., 1873, V. 29: 746; P.P.A.P., 1874, V. 32: 509.
126 See Chapter-5 for a detailed discussion of the growth of textile industries in the region. Also 
see D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing', D. Quataert, Workers, Peasants', Gounaris, Steam over 
Macedonia-, Anastasiadou, Salonique. Also see M. Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c.1800-1914, 
Evolution without Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
122 F.O.A.S., 1886, N. 24: 6.
!28 F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75:3.
!29 f .O.A.S., 1888, N. 348: 2; PRO, F.O. 78/4119, Extract from the Salonica Gazette, 1.5.1888.
130 BA, $D-Selanik, 2003/27,16.Ra.1287 (15.6.1870); P.P.A.P., 1874, V.32: 509.
131 D.T.O.G., 25.Z. 1305 (2.9.1888), N. 192: 418.
102
new American seeds were imported and distributed to cotton producers in Salonica in 
1886.132 Compared to earlier efforts, the scope of this seed refreshment project was 
small and yielded relatively limited results.133 As we shall see, the quality problem 
remained unresolved until the turn of the twentieth century.
Regional cotton production turned increasingly towards the domestic markets in 
the late 1890s and the early 1900s. The establishment of a number of new spinning 
concerns in Salonica, Agustos, Vodine and Karaferye increased the demand for cotton, 
which gave way to a notable increase in cotton prices in Salonica. Moved by the price 
increase, many farmers, especially the long frustrated cereal producers, switched to 
cotton production. By 1895 regional cotton production had reached 3,000 tons and 
probably continued to rise until the early 1900s. However, the degeneration of cotton 
seeds was now a notorious problem. Local mill owners were seriously considering 
cotton imports from overseas as the local varieties fell short of meeting the specific 
technical requirements of the mechanised ring spinners, which were commonly used in 
local mills.134 In response, the local authorities, in cooperation with the leading cotton 
merchants and yam producers of the region, imported 40 tons of cotton seed from the 
United States and Izmir and distributed them to farmers in Siroz and Zihne in 1898.135 
Apparently, the scheme was successful and the new imported seeds, especially the ones 
coming from the Izmir region, yielded satisfactory results.136 As such, domestic 
production could be maintained around 3,000 tons throughout the 1890s and the early 
1900s.137 Cotton imports into Salonica remained insignificant during this period.
The unprecedented growth in the tobacco business in the region seriously 
undermined regional cotton production after the turn of the century. As relative prices 
turned in favour of tobacco, many farmers, including the cotton cultivators of Siroz and 
Zihne switched to the cultivation of tobacco138 In 1905, regional cotton production had 
declined by almost a third and yielded no , more than 2,100 tons in total. This decline 
troubled the Ottoman government, for the growing attraction of tobacco production in
132 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 348: 2; PRO, F.O. 78/4119, Extract from the Salonica Gazette, 1.5.1888.
133 D.T.O.G., 25.Ra.1305 (11.12.1887), No. 154: 3.
134 Asir, 26.N.1315 (17.2.1898), N. 254: 2,D.T.O.G., 5.L.1315 (26.2.1898), N. 686: 68-69
135 BA, §D-Ticaret, 1213/17, 21.N.1316 (4.2.1899).
136 D.T.O.G., 5.L.1315 (26.2.1898), N. 686: 68-69; Asir, 23.N.1322 (1.1.1904), N. 935: 2.
I32 See Chapter 1, Table 1.8.
138 Asir, 1.N.1320 (1.12.1902), N. 737: 1; Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N. 754: 3.
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the region, at the expense of cotton, meant revenue losses. As cotton cultivators of 
Zihne and Salonica turned into tobacco producers, they began to pay their taxes to the 
PDA rather than the Ottoman Revenue Administration.139 Concerned by the growing 
fiscal predominance of the PDA, the government authorities attempted, rather in vain, to 
counterbalance the growing attraction of tobacco cultivation in the region and tried to 
keep farmers in cotton production as long as possible. These efforts, as before, 
concentrated mainly on the improvement of the quality of local cotton varieties. The 
anticipation was that better quality cotton would fetch higher prices and render cotton 
production still attractive for local farmers. Seed distribution schemes continued during 
the late 1900s.140
In addition, efforts were made to improve the quality of the marketed output. 
The ginners in the countryside were in the habit of manipulating the machines so as to 
obtain higher cotton turnouts. However, such manipulated machines did a poor job of 
cleaning debris and the seeds the cotton contained and, perhaps more importantly, they 
seriously damaged the cotton fibre. The cotton thus ginned fetched lower prices in 
Salonica.141 To prevent such fraudulent practices and to secure the quality of the locally 
ginned cotton produce, the Ottoman government appointed officials from local councils 
and agricultural inspectors to examine the ginning machines in Siroz and Zihne districts 
and authorised them to seal off the faulty machines.142
Evidently, these efforts could do little to regenerate growth in regional cotton 
cultivation. The attraction of tobacco production was simply overwhelming. By 1912, 
regional cotton cultivation yielded only 2,000 tons.143 Under the circumstances, local 
mills turned increasingly towards overseas suppliers and began to import cotton 
regularly from other Levantine markets, especially from the Adana, Izmir and Aleppo 
regions. A leading centre of cotton production had become dependent on imports by 
1912.
139 See below for the collection of tobacco and silk taxes by the PDA.
140 BA, Irade-TicaretyeNafia, 441/4319-7,26.S.1324 (20.4.1906).
141 Asir, 29.§.1322 (7.10.1904), N. 928: 2; Asir, 22.L.1322 (29.12.1904), N. 943: 2; Selanik, 
3.Za.l322 (9.1.1905), N. 1888: 2.
142 Asir, 21.Z.1323 (15.2.1906), N. 1051: 1 ;Asir, 12.M.1324 (8.3.1906), N. 1057: 2.
I42 See Chapter 1, Table 1.8.
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Thus, regional cotton production lost ground in both overseas and domestic 
markets, due to a combination of complex structural and conjunctural factors. First, the 
contraction of overseas demand and the intensifying competition in domestic markets 
seem to have constituted an adverse economic climate for cotton producers and 
underlined the decline of the sub-sector in the long-term. Many farmers ultimately 
turned away from cotton cultivation and sought new opportunities in the rapidly 
growing tobacco business. Secondly, the lack of regulatory bodies and an institutional 
framework that could help support and sustain medium and long-term growth processes 
made a significant difference between growth and retardation. The failure to maintain 
the quality of cotton seeds and of the marketed produce were the manifestations of this 
institutional weakness. In this regard, cotton producers shared a similar fate with cereal 
cultivators.
3. Agricultural Production under Overseas Influence:
3.1. Silk Production: Disaster and Recovery:
Sericulture had for long been a principal agrarian pursuit in the region. The 
districts of Selanik and Kesendire had already emerged as important centres of 
sericulture in the eighteenth century. The silk produced and spun by local farmers was 
sent regularly to the Italian peninsula and France, as well as to a number of important 
Levantine towns such as Bursa and Izmir.144 In addition, the silk cloth weavers of 
Salonica consumed considerable amounts of locally produced silk in weaving the 
famous headgears (turban) worn by the Janissary corps and the special silken bath 
towels (pe§temal) commonly used throughout the Ottoman Empire.145
The sector continued to expand during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
According to one contemporary estimate, regional silk output was around 12,000 kg at 
around the turn of the century. By 1845, raw silk production had reached 43,000 kg in 
the town of Salonica alone.146 The growth of the sector in this period, as before, owed
*44 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 260. These figures also contain silk coming from 
neighbouring province of Thessaly.
145 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 257-260.
146 Themopolou, Salonique, 459. Also see C. Issawi, Economic History o f Turkey, 257-258, for 
the growth of Macedonian silk production.
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much to the buoyancy of overseas and domestic demand for the yam and various cloth 
varieties produced in the region. The mechanisation of silk production in the region, and 
the subsequent improvements in the quality and, perhaps more importantly, the 
consistency of local produce, enhanced its marketability in the overseas markets.147
This expansionary process was interrupted from the late 1850s onwards, due 
mainly to a supply side shock superimposed by the appearance of virulent silkworm 
disease, namely pebrine, in the region.148 The disease first surfaced in France in the 
mid-1850s and spread rapidly, causing much devastation in almost all leading centres of 
sericulture in Europe and the Mediterranean basin.149 The disease spread rapidly in 
Selanik and seriously undermined regional silk cocoon production in the 1860s. 
Frustrated with the persistence of the disease, many producers abandoned sericulture 
and either left their mulberry groves unattended or simply uprooted trees and converted 
the groves into arable land during this period.150
The sector entered a phase of remarkable recovery from the early 1870s 
onwards. This recovery was linked primarily to the successful containment of the 
pebrine disease in the region. From the early 1870s onwards, the local sericulturists 
started importing pebrine-frQQ silkworm eggs raised in accordance with the Pasteur 
method. Initial experimentations with the sterilised (French) eggs were quite successful 
and yielded encouraging results in both quality and quantity. However, failures and 
frustrating results were also quite common during the early years of recovery. Many 
farmers purchased incredulous silkworm eggs at bargain prices and soon realised that
147 At the time, European silk weaving industries were turning increasingly towards 
mechanisation. Technically, it was imperative to use consistent silk threads in order to assure prime 
results in mechanised weaving. Otherwise the pieces turned out to be extremely poor in quality. Even 
though some consistency could be achieved in hand reeling, the results obtained in mechanised reeling 
were more satisfactory. The rise of mechanised spinning in Salonica enabled the sector to turn 
increasingly towards the overseas markets. In fact, throughout the early nineteenth century, raw silk 
exports to the Italian peninsula, France and the Levant grew rapidly to reach 43,000 kg in the early 1850s. 
See Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 260, and Themopoulou, Salonique, 468, for the growth of 
regional silk production and mechanised reeling in Salonica.
148 Both production and exports of silk almost collapsed in this period. According to 
Themopoulou’s figures Salonica silk production diminished down to 10,000 kg. See Themopoulou, 
Salonique, 468.
149 s ee k . Firro, “Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon, 1860-1914,” International Journal o f  
Middle East Studies, 22, (1990): 151-169; R. Owen, “The Silk Reeling Industry of Mount Lebanon, 1840- 
1914: A Study of the Possibilities and Limitations of Factory Production in the Periphery,” in H. 
Islamoglu (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 271-283; Owen, The Middle East, 155-160; Quataert, “The Silk Industry,” 284-299, for the impact 
of pebrine disease on sericulture in the Levant.
l 5 0 D .7 :a a ,  11.L.1304 (3.7.1887), N. 131: 184.
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the eggs were badly infected. Crops failed disastrously and the cultivators incurred 
heavy losses. Despite these failed attempts, however, the widespread introduction of 
imported pebrine-free eggs underlined the beginnings of a quick recovery in 
sericulture.151
More successful results in combating the disease were achieved in the late 1870s 
and the 1880s. In 1876, the Ottoman government banned the importation and sale of 
eggs that had not been raised and inspected in accordance with the Pasteur method.152 
This legislation was intended to prevent the infected eggs from entering the Ottoman 
production cycle. Apparently, the regulation served its purpose and helped improve the 
quality of egg varieties imported and sold in the region. Soon, local sericulturists started 
using, quite commonly, the prime quality Gamier and Fabre eggs imported from 
France.153 Also, alternative egg suppliers found increasing appeal among local cocoon 
producers. Large quantities of silkworm eggs were imported from Japan and the United 
States.154
Thus, the condition of the silkworm eggs improved noticeably within a decade, 
owing much to the efforts of local silk cocoon producers and merchants. By the early 
1880s, considerable progress had been made in combating the epidemic, and the 
silkworm disease was diminishing in important centres of production.155 By the late 
1880s, the disease had almost entirely disappeared from the region.156 Mulberry 
plantations and silk cocoon production were expanding in primary centres of sericulture 
such as Selanik, Gevgeli and Kesendire.157 In addition, the sector was making 
considerable progress in other parts of the province. In Karaferye for instance, an 
increasing number of people turned towards cocoon production. The development of the 
sector was particularly impressive around the town of Agustos, where the farmers began 
to plant new mulberry trees.158 Production expanded in other parts of the region such as
151 P.P.A.P., 1873, V. 29: 748.
152 D.T.O.G., 11.L.1304 (3.7.1887), N. 131: 184; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 247.
153 F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 7-8; 1320 S.V.S., 1902,480.
F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 254: 2; 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 52. Importation of Japanese and American 
eggs seems to have become a wide spread practice throughout the period.
155 F.O.A.S., 1883, C.N. 6: 101; F.O.A.S,, 1886, N. 24: 6. •
156 F.O.A.S., 1886, N :24: 6.
157 F.O.A.S., 1886, N. 24: 6; 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 52; 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 300-309.
158 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 52; 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 272.
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Vodine and Longaza, where sericulture had been abolished almost entirely in the 
previous decades.159
Table 2.5.
Average SUk Cocoon Prices in Salonica, 1870-1912 (d/lb)
Period Average Price
1870-1875 17
1880-1884 52
1885-1889 51
1890-1894 48
1895-1899 37
1900-1904 40
1905-1909 41
1910-1912 58
Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, and Asir. For details also see, Appendix 4.
These developments took place under quite favourable market conditions. The 
recovery of the silk industries in France, Italy and in such leading Ottoman centres of 
silk production as Bursa and Izmit provided the sector with some fresh demand 
stimulus. Consequently, cocoon prices began to rise from the early 1870s onwards.160 In 
1871, silk cocoons fetched \ ld  per pound. By the mid-1870s, the prices had risen 
massively to an average of 70d per pound.161 Later in the 1880s, the upward price trend 
was somewhat arrested due to mounting Japanese competition in overseas markets. 
Consequently, cocoon prices in Salonica fell down to an average of 5Id. Nevertheless, 
buoyant overseas and domestic demand for local produce helped maintain regional 
cocoon prices well above the pre-1875 levels (See Table 2.5).162
The swift rise in silk cocoon prices during the late 1870s and their relative 
stability throughout the 1880s constituted a strong market incentive to take up 
sericulture in the region. In the early 1890s, the provincial Ottoman authorities were 
reporting that remunerative prices served as the main motivation for farmers to take up 
silk cocoon production in the province of Karaferye.163 Similar market signals 
encouraged other farmers to turn to silk cocoon production in districts of Selanik,
159 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 52; 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 324.
160 P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N. 6: 100.
161 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 96-97.
162 F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 3.
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Vodine, Gevgeli and Kesendire. Overall, this commercial dynamic seems to have been 
the underlining force in the recovery of the sector.164
By the early 1890s, regional silk cocoon production had already made a 
considerable recovery and this expansionary process continued throughout the 1890s 
and the 1900s. This time, however, the expansion of the sector took place under 
relatively unfavourable demand side conditions, at least in the overseas markets. The 
rapid recovery of sericulture in Europe and the Levant and the general rise in world silk 
production, led to a notable downturn in silk cocoon prices. Selanik proved no 
exception and local prices started to decline from the early 1890s onwards. However, 
the sector continued to grow during this period. In the early 1890s, regional silk cocoon 
production yielded about 1,300 tons. By 1907, regional production had gone up by 
26.4% to reach 1,643 tons.165
The continued dynamism and growth of the sector cannot be attributed to the 
buoyancy of overseas demand. Growing Japanese competition in international markets 
seriously hurt Selanik’s silk cocoon exports, which declined from 371 tons in 1890 to 
246 tons in the late 1890s.166 The institutional support of the PDA and the expansion of 
the domestic demand for local silk produce were primary factors that sustained the 
dynamism of the sector.
The PDA actively encouraged the recovery and growth of sericulture in the 
region during the 1890s and the 1900s. PDA officials concentrated their efforts mainly 
on supplying mulberry plants free of charge to farmers willing to take up silk cocoon 
production. One of the pressing problems of regional silk cocoon production in the late 
1880s was the scarcity of mulberry plants. As has already been noted, during the 
depression years, many frustrated farmers uprooted their mulberry groves. The recovery 
of the 1870s and the 1880s increased the demand for mulberry leaves. Despite the 
plantation of new trees and the improvement of existing groves in some parts of the 
region, severe mulberry leaf shortages emerged throughout, forcing local mulberry leaf 
prices to rise.167 The immediate priority of the PDA was to tackle this supply side
163 1312 S.V.S., 1895,272.
164 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 272.
165 See Table 1.7.
166 See Table 1.7.
167 D.T.O.G., 11.L.1304 (3.7.1887), N. 131: 184; FOAS, 1889, N. 623: 4.
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problem. In 1891, the PDA officials imported 5,000 mulberry plants from Bursa and 
distributed them to farmers willing to take up sericulture. Next year, the scope of the 
project was extended, and additional 24,000 plants were distributed.168 The distribution 
schemes probably continued throughout the late 1890s and the 1900s and became better 
structured with the establishment of a mulberry plantation at the agricultural school in 
Salonica.169 The PDA’s efforts bore fruit. Silk cocoon production spread further into a 
number of new locations in the province. In districts such as Avrethisan, Katrin, 
Longaza and Razlik silk cocoon production was virtually nonexistent in the 1880s. By 
the 1900s, these districts too had become important centres of silk cocoon production.170
The PDA also took certain measures that helped ensure the quality of silkworm 
eggs imported into the region. As we have seen, the quality of eggs used by the local 
sericulturists had improved notably, owing much to the importation of disease free egg 
varieties from France, U.S. and Japan. The establishment of a silkworm egg factory by 
the Alatini Brothers in Salonica must have also helped improve the quality of the eggs 
used by the local silkworm raisers.171 However, it seems that some infected or weak egg 
varieties still found their way into the production cycle, and indeed, cheap imported 
eggs from France and Italy that did not carry an inspection ‘banderol’ turned out to be 
defective.172 The PDA, in cooperation with the Ottoman government, attempted to 
prevent this problem. First, a department of sericulture was established in the 
agricultural school near Salonica in the early 1900s and the silkworm eggs raised there 
were sold to producers at relatively low prices. Thus, the producers enjoyed a viable 
alternative to the cheap, uninspected eggs coming from Europe. Second, a special egg 
inspection committee was established in Salonica in 1906. The committee included 
Nesib Bey, the chief agricultural inspector of Salonica, Ihsan Efendi, a sericulture 
expert from the Agricultural School, and a number of officials from the PDA. The 
committee inspected samples from imported eggs, refusing the ones failing to adhere to 
the standards set by the Pasteur procedure.173 Apparently, the inspections were thorough
168F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 7-8.
169 Asir, 24.M.1319 (13.5.1901), N. 582: 2; T.Z.N.M., 20.11.1328 (3.5.1912), V. 18: 263.
170 1312 S.V.S., 1894,246-247, 257, 323,430; 1313 S.V.S., 1895,430.
171 F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 7-8.
172 R.C.L., 1907, N. 244-249: 480-484.
173 Asir, 13.Ca.1325 (24.6.1907), N. 1190: 2; R.C.L., 1908, N. 250-255: 830-831. Also see 
Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 248.
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and covered all eggs imported into the region, regardless of the label they carried.174 
These efforts probably improved the quality of silk cocoons produced in the region. In 
fact, contemporary sources explicitly attribute the growth of production and exports in 
the late 1900s to the improvement in the quality of silk cocoons produced in the 
region.175
Finally, the expansion of domestic demand was another factor that underlined 
the growth of the sector during the 1890s and the 1900s. Revival of silk reeling 
industries accompanied the containment of the pebrine disease and the subsequent 
recovery of sericulture in the region. Numerous filatures equipped with modem 
technology were opened in the environs of Salonica, Vodine and especially in Gevgeli. 
Most of these filatures were owned by private entrepreneurs, but the PDA, too, 
established a number of model filatures to encourage silk reeling in the region.176 The 
proliferating cotton and silk weaving industries consumed an increasing share o f the silk 
yam produced in the region.177 The regeneration of silk reeling and the buoyancy of 
demand for the silken cloth varieties in local, especially urban, markets and in other 
Ottoman towns, created a demand dynamic that underlined the sustained growth of silk 
cocoon production in the region during the 1890s and the 1900s.
At any rate, silk production was overall a success in Selanik during the period 
under consideration. The recovery from an epidemic that was highly contagious and 
difficult to contain must be considered a considerable success, given the difficulties 
encountered throughout Europe in combating the disease. The expansion of sericulture 
in the region in spite of mounting Japanese competition and declining prices is another 
indicator of the remarkable vigour of the sub-sector at large. This vigour derived from 
the buoyancy of home demand for locally produced silk, on the one hand, and the 
institutional support provided by the PDA and, to a lesser extent, the Ottoman 
government on the other. These demand side dynamics and institutional factors enabled 
sericulture to grow during the late 1890s and the early 1900s. A similar, if  not more 
dramatic, picture also prevailed in the case of tobacco production.
174 xhese inspection of French eggs carrying the official bandroles of inspection by the 
committee in Salonica led to the protests of the French government at both consular and embassy levels. 
See BA, §D-OMZ, 544/24, 20.B.1327 (7.8.1909).
175 F.O.A.S., 1909, N. 4359: 9;F.O.A.S., 1910, N. 4579: 11 ;FO.A.S., 1912, N. 5017: 10.
176 BA, $D-Maliye, 368/51, 28.B.1314 (2.1.1897); BA, §D-Maliye, 378/42,20.Ca.1316.
177 See Chapter 5.
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3.2. Tobacco Cultivation: Monopolies, Regulations and Foreign Trading Houses
Tobacco production was a long established agrarian pursuit in Selanik. Locally 
grown tobacco had found regular purchasers in Europe and throughout the 
Mediterranean basin at least since the seventeenth century.178 Besides, local people 
regularly consumed unusually large amounts of local tobacco, thus adding to the overall 
demand for local tobacco varieties.179 The local population, as well as European and 
Mediterranean consumers, favoured the local tobacco varieties for their smoking quality 
and flavour. In particular, Katrin, Kir, San §aban, Yenice, iske?e and Gumulcine 
varieties were favoured for their distinct sweet and smooth taste and appealing 
yellowish colour. Other lower quality tobacco varieties, such as Provide and Daridere, 
were ideal for blending purposes and added flavour and smoothness to the relatively 
strong Virgina tobacco varieties.180
Local tobacco production grew rapidly during the eighteenth century, owing 
mainly to the robustness of domestic and especially overseas demand. Output figures 
are not available for earlier periods, but we know that tobacco production yielded about 
10,000 tons in Yenice and Drama alone in c. 1800.181 Considering that regional tobacco 
production yielded about 18,000 tons in its golden era, just before the Balkan Wars, we 
can confidently assume that production probably increased rapidly during the century. 
Export figures confirm this observation. According to Svoronos, exports rose rapidly 
from a mere 1,000 tons in 1750 to reach 9,000 tons in c.1800.182
After the turn of the nineteenth century, tobacco production in Selanik ran into 
serious difficulties. The efforts of the Ottoman government to bring tobacco production
1^8 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 264; H. Inalcik, “The Ottoman State: Economy and 
Society, 1300-1600,” in H. inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f  the Ottoman 
Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 267- 
268; J. R Lampe, and M. R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950, From Imperial Borderlands 
to Developing Nations, (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1982), 40; A. §ener, Tanzimat Donemi 
Osmanli Vergi Sistemi [Ottoman Taxation System during the Tanzimat Era], (Istanbul: I§aret, 1990), 
159.
179 According to a nineteenth century account for instance all men, a majority o f women and 
most children used tobacco on a regular basis and consumed, on average, 7.7 kgs of tobacco annually. See 
Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki?, 164.
m D.T.O.G., l.Ra.1315 (31.7.1897), N. 656: 249-250.
181 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique-, Themopoulou, Salonique,.
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under tighter fiscal control had a retarding effect on regional tobacco production. The 
government used the internal custom duties and a number of other surcharges to 
maximise the revenues accruing from tobacco trade during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.183 Squeezed under regressive taxation and prohibitive tariffs and 
duties, many producers simply gave up tobacco cultivation and switched to the 
production of alternative crops such as cotton. By the 1860s, regional tobacco 
production had fallen to 6,000 tons in total.184
Heavy taxation practices of the Ottoman government also encouraged many 
merchants and producers to turn increasingly towards contraband trade. The tobacco 
trade conducted with Egypt as well as with other Levantine markets came under the 
orbit of contraband trade. In response, the Ottoman government declared tobacco a state 
monopoly in 1861, so as to consolidate its control over the tobacco trade and to prevent 
further revenue losses. The government banned imports to eliminate all foreign 
competition in the domestic markets. A wide range of new fiscal regulations and 
administrative measures were also instituted to consolidate the monopoly’s fiscal grip 
over tobacco production. Taxes were simplified. The standard 10% tithe remained in 
effect. In addition, all the excise taxes and customs duties previously claimed were 
consolidated under a new surcharge of 12 kuru$es per okka, which was called the 
mururiye (passage) charge. The mururiye was to be collected in cash and directly from 
the person selling the produce in local markets. Officials were appointed to collect the 
mururiye charges at local' fairs and market places.185 However, the export trade still 
remained outside the fiscal reach of the Ottoman government. The tobacco destined for 
exports remained exempt from the mururiye charges, mainly due to the pressure exerted 
by the European powers. Also, the tobacco sold in Istanbul was exempt from mururiye, 
and the importers in Istanbul were responsible for the payment of the surcharge.186
The immediate impact of the government monopoly on tobacco production in 
Selanik is hard to discern. Available evidence suggest that the introduction of the 
mururiye charge proved extremely injurious to the farmers producing lower quality 
tobaccos for consumption in domestic markets. In fact, some of these producers were
182 Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique, 264.
183 §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli, 159-160; Themopoulou, Salonique, 640-647.
184 Themopoulou, Salonique, 528.
185 §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli, 159.
186 §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli, 159.
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compelled to abandon tobacco cultivation because of the fiscal burden of the new 
levy.187 Contraband trade appears to have grown rapidly during the same period and the 
tobacco trade with the Albanian provinces and Egypt fell increasingly outside the 
immediate fiscal reach of the Ottoman government.
Upon its financial bankruptcy in the mid 1870s, the Ottoman government agreed 
to cede the tax revenues accruing from excise taxes and monopolies over to a group of 
Istanbul bankers in 1879. The ensuing consortium of bankers, commonly known as the 
Riisumat-i Sitte Idaresi (Administration of Six Revenues, ASR), was to remain in. 
control of these revenues for the next ten years. The revenues ceded to the consortium 
would be used to serve the outstanding Ottoman debt.188 Within this context, all the 
revenue accruing from the tobacco monopoly was put under to the management of the 
ASR.189
The establishment of the ASR led to the tightening of monopoly controls over 
the production and sale of tobacco The tobacco monopoly followed a hard line in 
taxation and managed to tune the tithe returns to levels of production in a more direct 
fashion, leaving relatively little room for tax evasion.190 The monopoly also tightened 
controls to eliminate contraband trade. As I have noted above, the tobacco trade 
conducted with certain Ottoman provinces, and especially with Egypt, increasingly 
became contraband over the last decade and a half. Many European merchants shipped 
the tobacco produce first to Malta, as if it were destined for exports, but then forwarded. 
the produce to Egypt. Merchants avoided the mururiye charges they would have paid 
had they sent the produce directly to Egypt. This practice inflicted considerable losses 
on the tobacco monopoly. The monopoly, in cooperation with local customs, began to 
set up insurmountable difficulties for tobacco exports to Malta in an effort to bring the 
trade with Egypt under its control.191
The preventive measures of the monopoly caused outrage among European 
merchants. The attitude of the monopoly and customs authorities led to repeated
187 P.P.A.P., 1874, V. 32: 508.
188 Issawi, Economic History o f Turkey, 361.
189 A. Veflk, Tekalif Kavaidi [Rules of Taxation], 2, (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Kanaat Matbaasi, 
1911), 314.
190 P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N. 6: 100,114.
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protests at both consular and embassy levels. The issue remained unresolved for a 
decade and was ultimately settled in favour of European trading houses in the late 
1880s.192 However, it is important to note that this was the first recorded attempt of a 
tobacco monopoly to bring the tobacco trade in Ottoman lands under its control.
Despite trade restrictions and heavy taxation, tobacco production and trade 
continued to expand in Selanik at least until the early 1880s. Once again, the dynamism 
of overseas demand generated considerable growth in the sector. Especially, the demand 
coming from Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Italian peninsula and France, in addition to 
Istanbul, constituted a boon to local tobacco production and largely underscored its 
expansion in this period. In 1883, the British Consul General Blunt was reporting that 
“tobacco is by a long way the leading product in the sancak of Drama where its 
cultivation is a very successful and paying industry and increases annually 
notwithstanding the heavy taxes it is subject to”.193 According to Blunt, local tobacco 
cultivation reached a prime state of perfection and the exports formed the most 
important part o f the trade by 1885.194
The formation of a new tobacco monopoly, Societe de la Regie Cointeresee des 
Tabacs de VEmpire Ottomane (Regie hereafter) in 1884, marked a watershed in regional 
tobacco production. The Regie was an offshoot of the PDA and was responsible for the 
collection and the management of the tithes accruing from tobacco production. In 
addition, unlike the previous Ottoman tobacco monopoly, the Regie was endowed with 
far reaching privileges that enabled it to control the production, processing and 
marketing of tobacco cultivated in the empire.195
According to the regulations governing the production and sale of tobacco in the 
empire, the Regie was obliged to grant permits and to extend short term credits for those 
willing to take up tobacco cultivation.196 Tobacco grown without a valid permit was
191 PRO, F.O. 294/11, 7.3.1881, Goschen to Blunt; P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N. 6: 100; PRO, F.O. 
195/1484, 7.9.1884, Anonymous Merchant to Blunt.
192 See below for details.
l92> P.P.A.P., 1883, N. 6: 100
l9 4 F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75:7-8.
195 for a detailed discussion of the establishment of the Regie and its powers see Quataert, 
Ottoman Reform; Parvus, Tiirkiye’nin Mali Tutsakhgi; Issawi, The Economic History o f  Turkey.
196 The following outline of the Regie regulations are based on the following sources: D.T.O.G., 
3.C.1304 (26.2.1887), N. 113: 59-60; D.T.O.G., 12.N.1304 (4.6.1887), N. 127: 156-157; Vefik, Tekalif 
Kavaidi, 314-318, and Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 265-267; Quataert, Social Disintegration, 13-14.
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considered contraband and could be confiscated by the Regie authorities. In addition, 
tobacco cultivation on plots smaller than half a donum and behind stone walls was 
forbidden so as to prevent petty smuggling. All permits had to be renewed on a yearly 
basis. The Regie was obliged to buy all the tobacco other than the produce sold to 
merchants for export purposes. When the Regie bought the produce, the Regie. 
authorities weighed the produce after the harvest and the price was determined through 
a though bargaining session between the producer and the representatives of the Regie. 
In case of irreconcilable disagreements, a third party, usually the village headmen or a 
local notable, was called in to help settle the dispute. Once an agreement was reached, 
the producers were expected to hand in the tobacco to the nearest Regie depot at their 
own expense. Upon delivery, the cultivator was given a certificate stating the quality, 
amount, and the value of the produce.
The Regie paid for storage for the first six months, but thereafter the owners 
incurred all storage expenses. If the product remained in the depots for two years 
without actually being purchased by the Regie, then the owners could ask the produce to 
be auctioned and sold for export. If the produce could be sold through auctioning, then 
the producer would receive the net sum after the deduction of storage expenses.. 
Otherwise, the Regie was obliged to purchase the tobacco immediately at a price 
determined through the mediation of third parties. At any rate, after the actual purchase, 
the Regie withheld the tithe from the producers and handed it over to the PDA at the end 
of each month. When the produce was sold for export, then the merchants were held 
accountable for the payment of the tithe directly to the Regie at a rate of 10.0% of the 
sale value of the produce. Finally, all the produce purchased by the Regie was 
processed, priced and sold by the Regie. The Regie could also export the cigarettes and 
numerous tobacco goods produced in its factories and workshops. Import restrictions 
remained in effect.
The entry of the Regie into the local tobacco scene initially led to a rapid 
expansion of tobacco cultivation in the region. Behind this expansionary process lay the 
competition between the Regie and trading houses. Habitually, the trading houses and. 
merchants operating in the region extended credits to producers prior to the cultivation 
of the tobacco plants on the basis of the understanding that they would be the sole 
purchaser of the final produce at the going market prices after the harvest. This practice 
was commonly known as -“booking” (peyleme). Local merchants and the agents of
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trading companies would often refuse to buy the tobacco produce previously “booked” 
by other merchants and agents, so as to circumscribe the bargaining power of the 
producers and to prevent cutthroat competition in the pricing process.197 Competition 
would take place prior to “booking”, when merchants and agents competed to secure the 
privilege to buy the best tobacco produce by extending short-term credits to local 
farmers. In this environment, taking part in the tobacco trade required a solid presence 
within the local marketing networks and a firm access to credit markets. Thus, only the 
agents of large European trading houses, well-connected local firms, and some 
prominent landlords and moneylenders were able to maintain a solid presence in 
regional tobacco markets. Smaller merchants were marginalised largely in spot markets; 
they either traded in inferior tobacco varieties or acted as agents cum commissioners of 
larger players.198 In this context, the practice of “booking” emerged as a means of 
securing a solid market share for large players in the regional tobacco trade without 
having to inflate purchasing prices.
The Regie entered regional tobacco markets quite forcefully and extended 
credits to local farmers who were willing to take up tobacco cultivation. The Regie 
expected to consolidate its control over processes of production and marketing. Thus, it 
could conveniently drive other competitors, especially the competing foreign trading 
houses, off the markets and assume a de facto monopoly position. It could then buy the 
best tobacco at favourable prices, tax the cultivators, process the tobacco, manufacture 
cigarettes, and sell them both for domestic consumption and exports under quite 
favourable terms. As we shall see, the primary motive of the Regie remained unaltered 
in the following decades and focused on the elimination of market competition in 
tobacco trade.
The liberal credit policies of the Regie and the competing trading houses induced 
a rapid expansion of tobacco cultivation, particularly in the district of Drama.199 
However, the extraordinary “boom” conditions did not last long. The aggressive credit 
policy of the Regie served its purpose and forced many competing merchants out of the 
tobacco market. The smaller players were out-competed by the Regie. The Regie 
liberally used credits and cultivation permits to “encourage”, if  not compel, the tobacco
197 For the practice of booking see Asir, 6.L.1320 (5.1.1903), N. 746: 1; Asir, 7.Z.1323 
(1.2.1906), N. 1048: 2.
198 Asir, 7.Z.1323 (1.2.1906), N.1048: 2.
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cultivators to sell their produce directly to the Regie, rather than to the agents and 
representatives of the trading houses that conducted the bulk of overseas trade in the 
region.200 Besides, under the new regulations, the merchants, instead of the producers, 
were obliged to pay the tithes directly to the Regie. This new fiscal burden probably put 
some of the small merchants at a disadvantage and helped elevate the Regie to a 
commanding position in local tobacco markets. In fact, within a few years the Regie and 
the Austrian tobacco monopoly Hertzog Company emerged as the primary purchasers in 
regional tobacco markets and were quite capable of controlling prices.201 Under the 
circumstances, the expected price rise never materialised (see Table 2.6). Quite to the 
contrary, regional tobacco prices started to decline notably from 1885 onwards, putting 
many indebted tobacco producers under financial strain. Besides, the complex practice 
of obtaining cultivation permits and the tobacco cultivators’ obligation to transport their 
produce over to the Regie depots at their own expense created additional problems.202 
Pressed hard under sluggish prices and restrictive, and sometimes costly, regulations, 
some farmers abandoned tobacco cultivation.203
The Regie also adopted a hardline policy to combat smuggling and contraband 
trade. Through a network of inspectors, controllers and armed guards, the Regie 
attempted to prevent the illegal production and sale of tobacco as strictly as possible. 
Producers with a history or a presumed tendency to engage in contraband trade were 
instantly denied permits of production. This restrictive practice was in fact against the 
regulations, which obliged the Regie to issue permits to anyone willing to take up 
tobacco production on open fields over half a donum. Nevertheless, the Regie officials, 
despite protests from the Ottoman government, continued to punish, sometimes 
unfairly, some tobacco producers suspected of engaging in contraband trade and 
cooperating with the intermediary merchants.204 It seems that the carrot (credits) and
199 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 8-9.
200 por the complaints of merchants about the Regie regulations see, PRO, F.O. 195/1484, 
Anonymous merchant to Blunt, 7.9.1884; F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 3; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 8-9.
201 D.T.O.G., 15.N.1305 (26.5.1888), N. 178: 255.
292 For the complaints of tobacco producers concerning the Regie regulations see F.O.A.S., 
1888, N. 254: 2; BA, §D-Selanik, 22.C.1305 (5.3.1888); PRO, F.O. 78/4119, Pecchioli to Blunt, 
2.4.1888; BA,M .V ,  51/36, 11.12.1305 (23.2.1890).
203 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 254: 2; D.T.O.G., 15.N.1305 (26.5.1888), N. 178: 255.
204 BA, SD-Selanik, 22.C.1305 (5.3.1888); BA, M. V., 51/36, 11.12.1305 (23.2.1890); BA, M. V., 
76/41, 7.Ra.l311 (17.9.1893); BA,M.V., 76/7,22.S.1311 (3.9.1893).
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stick (permits) policy of the Regie was crucial in bringing tobacco cultivation under its 
administrative and fiscal control, at least in the primary centres of tobacco cultivation.205
Table 2.6
Avenge Tobacco Bices in Sdotica, 1870-1912 (M )
M od Average Bice
1880-1884 40
1885-1889 36
1890-1894 28
1895-1899 35
1900-1904 54
1905-1909 54
1910-1912 77
Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, and Asir. For details see Appendix 4.
Note: The average tobacco price was based on the prices of three tobacco varieties, namely Guibek, Kir, 
and Prosotsani.
At the same time, in cooperation with the customs authorities in Kavala and 
Salonica, the Regie attempted to prevent the contraband Egyptian trade conducted 
through Malta. The British merchants willing to trade with Malta were asked for 
authentic certificates, which were to be received directly from the British customs 
authorities in London or Liverpool. Otherwise, the tobacco in which these merchants 
dealt would be considered contraband and denied clearance from the ports of Salonica 
and Kavala. As before, the restrictive measures of the Regie led to protests by British 
merchants and their local agents at the consular and embassy levels.206 Eventually, the 
conflict was resolved in favour of the British merchants in 1888, who were allowed to 
carry on their trade through Malta without restrictions.207 Nevertheless, the Regie's 
efforts to prevent contraband tobacco trade with Egypt via Malta, proved useful to the 
Regie in causing problems for intermediary merchants. In this sense, the Regie seems to 
have used its anti-contraband stance quite rhetorically to circumscribe the commercial 
influence of export companies and their agents in regional tobacco markets.
Despite the Regie's strong presence however, overseas trade with Europe, 
Istanbul and the Black Sea basin continued to expand during the 1880s, and exports rose
205 F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 10-11.
206 F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 3; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 8-9.
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to about 5,139 tons in 1886 to 8,556 tons in 1897.208 In this respect, contrary to the 
claims of British consuls, the Regie did not really hinder exports. It simply dominated 
the tobacco markets much to the annoyance of the British, French and Italian trading 
concerns operating in the region.209
The advent of the late-1890s saw crucial transformations in regional tobacco 
trade. In February 12, 1894, the Regie subcontracted its commercial transactions to 
Banque de Salonique according to an agreement signed between the two institutions on 
February 12, 1894. In turn, the Banque set up the Commercial Company o f Salonica 
Limited in London on March 14, 1895. The Commercial Company was granted the 
exclusive right to purchase and sell tobacco, cigarettes and cigars in and out of the 
region at prices set by the Regie. The Alatini, Fernandez, Misrachi, Salem, Morpurgo 
and other leading merchant families of Salonica controlled the Company. The profits 
were to be shared between the Commercial Company (30.0%) and the Regie (70.0%) 
after the deduction of a 5.0% share for reserve, 5.0% for interest payments, and an 
additional 7.5% for the administrative council of the province.210
Two primary reasons appear to have prompted this arrangement. First, the Regie 
lost considerable amounts of money due to the liberal credit policies it pursued during 
the previous decade, and evidently, it wanted to step back from the competitive risks of 
commercial transactions in tobacco trade. Secondly, the cost incurred through 
commercial transactions could be avoided through subcontracting, so that the Regie 
could simply capitalise on the profits accruing from the sale of tobacco, without really 
having to carry the economic and administrative burden of regulating and supervising 
market transactions. The contract was signed with the strongest and most respected of 
all the commercial and financial concerns operating in the region. Therefore, there was 
little risk in sub-contracting. Following the establishment of the Commercial Company, 
the Regie was engaged predominantly in the taxation of tobacco production and the
207 PRO, F.O. 78/4119, Pecchioli to Blunt, 2.4.1888.
208 See Table 1.7.
2®9 As has been implied, by the early 1890s, the Regie had become the primary purchaser in 
tobacco markets, together with the Austria-Hungarian tobacco monopoly, the Hertzog Company, and the 
two concerns conducted bulk of overseas trade through Salonica and especially through the port of 
Kavala, much to the annoyance of the British, Italian and French. See D.T.O.G., 15.N.1305 (26.5.188), N. 
178: 203; D.T.O.G., 4.Za.l307 (21.6.1890), N. 286: 295; F.O.A.S., 1896, N. 1663: 3-4.
2 19 E. Pech, Manuel des Societes Anonymes fonctionnant en Turquie, (Paris, 1907), 203-204.
120
prevention of contraband trade. From 1895 onwards, it simply withdrew from 
commercial transactions associated with tobacco production.211
This subcontracting arrangement was based on mutual interests. The merchant 
families, which had a major stake in the Banque de Salonique, could, and in fact did, 
benefit immensely from the sub-contracting arrangement. The trade was profitable and 
through their financial resources and solid presence in local marketing networks, the 
merchant families could virtually dominate the local tobacco trade. Indeed, in 1896- 
1897, the Commercial Company entered regional tobacco markets quite aggressively 
and made large purchases of tobacco That year, the tobacco sales for Commercial 
Company reached 3,100 tons, which was about 40.0% of the entire tobacco produce of 
the region at the time. In the following years, the tobacco sales of Commercial Company 
increased steadily and by the turn o f the century the concern had already become the 
primary purchaser of tobacco in the region. Its sales reached 4,180 tons in 1900-1901 
and climbed to 6,180 tons in 1902-1903.212 In these years, regional tobacco production 
yielded an annual average of about 8,000 tons; so the Commercial Company captured at 
least 75.0% of the tobacco trade. The produce bought by the Commercial Company was 
sold both in the domestic and overseas markets, but most of the produce was sent 
overseas, especially to United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France and Istanbul. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the bulk of the export trade was also conducted by the 
Commercial Company, with the possible exception of Austria-Hungarian trade, which 
was conducted exclusively by the Hertzog Company.213
By the turn of the nineteenth century regional tobacco trade had become largely 
oligopolistic. The booking convention continued all along and enabled the two primary 
players, the Hertzog Company and the Commercial Company, to control purchasing 
prices at the expense of the tobacco producers.214 Local agents and prominent notables 
and landlords played a crucial role in this process. Usually, the agents would book the 
produce of entire villages and sometimes sub-districts, prior to the harvests. Once the 
tobacco was harvested, the agents would arrive at the local markets and bargain first 
with the prominent landlord of the district. Upon apparently dramatic and rumpus
211 Pech, Manuel des Societes, 203; Asir, 27.N.1313 (11.3.1896), N. 53: 1.
212 Pech, Afanuel des Societes, 203.
213 Asir, 18.N.1320 (11.12.1902), N.742: I; Asir, 14.Za.1320 (12.2.1903), N.757: 1.
214 Asir, 18.N.1320 (11.12.1902), N.742: 1; Asir, 14.Za.1320 (12.2.1903), N.757: 1; Asir, 
9.Z.1320 (3 3.1903), N.764: 2-3; Asir, 12.Ra.1321 (8.6.1903), N. 789: 1.
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bargaining, the landlord would accept with great disappointment and often outrage a 
considerably low price for his quality tobacco. Thus, the price would be set for the 
entire village or sub-district and other smaller producers and sharecroppers would have 
to sell their produce at the same ‘market’ price to the agents. Behind closed doors, the 
prominent landlord would not only get a handsome commission, but would in fact 
receive a higher price than the rate negotiated publicly.215 As such, the actual 
purchasing price was controlled and handsome profits accrued to landlords, agents and 
the export companies.
The civil war in Cuba and the subsequent American-Spanish War induced a 
notable rise in global tobacco prices from 1896 onwards. The Commercial Company 
benefited from the price rise and generated its highest ever profits between 1896-1898. 
In 1896, 3.3 million kuru§es were distributed to shareholders. In 1897, the profits 
reached a record 7.8 million kuru$es, although they fell to 4.3 million kuru§QS in the 
following year.216 Clearly, the company’s oligopolistic control over the domestic 
tobacco markets and its capacity to mediate the purchase prices in cooperation with the 
Hertzog Company secured' handsome profits for the company. However, the Cuban 
conflict and the Spanish War also induced American tobacco concerns to show growing 
interest in the high quality tobacco varieties produced in Selanik. American companies 
entered regional markets and made considerable purchases from 1897 onwards.217 After 
a few years of regular trading and preliminary networking, American tobacco concerns 
established permanent offices in Kavala and Xanthia in 1902.218 The firms pursued an 
extremely aggressive pricing policy, and, contrary to the spirit of the booking 
convention began to offer higher prices and credits to producers.219 Thus, within a few 
years, American tobacco concerns, especially Johnston Mayer Company, rose to 
prominence in local tobacco trade, at the expense of the established oligopolies.220
The increasing overseas demand for local tobacco varieties and the intensifying 
competition between the tobacco concerns operating in the region led to a substantial
215 Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N.754: 1.
216 Pech, Manuel des Societes, 204.
217 Asir, 16.Za.1319 (24.2.1902), N. 661: 2.
218 F.O.A.S., 1904, N. 3250: 4.
219 Asir, 29.Za.1319 (10.3.1902), N. 665: 2; Asir, 10.Z.1319 (20.3.1902), N. 668: 2.
220 F.O.A.S., 1904, N. 3250: 4; Asir, 30.L.1320 (29.1.1903), N.753: 2.
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rise in regional tobacco prices.221 Rising prices encouraged many farmers to switch to 
tobacco cultivation in this period. Production boomed in Drama, Kavala, San-§aban and 
Yenice and spread rapidly into new locations, such as Avrethisan, Karaferye, 
Demirhisar, Nevrekop, Gevgeli and Siroz, which were better known as the leading 
cereal and cotton producing districts of the region.222 Production increased from 7,500 
tons in 1897 to 11,750 tons in 1907. Exports also rose proportionately from 8,556 to 
9,479 tons during the same period.223
The dynamism and growth of the sector appears to have continued until the eve 
of the Balkan Wars. According to one estimate, tobacco production in Selanik probably 
yielded about 18,000 tons, and exports from the entire Macedonian hinterland reached 
an all time high of 18,889 tons in 1912.224 Clearly, tobacco cultivation constituted the 
most dynamic sector of the regional economy during the period under consideration.
Despite strong American and European presence in regional markets, the Regie 
remained in control of local tobacco production. It issued cultivation permits, collected 
the tithes and led the efforts to prevent smuggling. On all fronts, the Regie acted quite 
rigorously. Even though the Commercial Company conducted the commercial 
transactions of the Regie, the producers who, for one reason or another, could not sell 
their produce to intermediary merchants and agents for export purposes often brought 
their produce to the Regie depots.225 This was an important advantage for the local 
tobacco producers as it secured the sale of their produce regardless of the prevailing 
market condition, because the Regie was obliged to purchase all the produce grown 
legally within the region. However, this convention also posed serious problems for the 
cultivators. The Regie depots were not always situated in the vicinity of their villages. 
The cultivators, possibly small-scale producers, were at times obliged to carry their 
produce over long distances. Delays were quite common, and in fact, the producers who 
failed to deliver their produce to the depots on time were frequently accused of being
1 Direct link between mounting (American) competition and rising prices is also supported by 
contemporary accounts. See Asir, 28.B.1320 (30.10.1902), N.728: 1; Asir, 12.Ra.1321, N.789: 1; BA, 
TFR.l.A., 2/177, 23.10.1320 (5.1.1905).
222 Asir, 10.Z.1319 (20.3.1902), N. 668: 2; 1.N.1320 (1.12.1902), N.737: 1; BA, TFR.1.SL., 
35/3478, 23.1.1323 (5.4.1907).
223 gee Table 1.7.
224 See Palairet, The Balkan Economies.
225 xhe sale would be conducted by the Commercial Company But still, in tune with 
regulations, all the produce not directly sold to merchants was, in theory, bought by the Regie; hence the 
compulsion to deliver the produce over to the Regie depots.
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engaged in contraband trade.226 Besides, some depots were in a deplorable state; 
tobacco bales were thrown on top of each other and lay unattended for months before 
they were actually bought by the Commercial Company.221
The producers engaged in smuggling were, whenever caught, punished severely 
by the Regie authorities. At times, the Regie carried out unfairly executed confiscations. 
For instance, when harvests turned out to be poor, the Regie realised that the produce 
fell short of the initial output estimates set by its officers prior to the realisation of the 
harvest. Thus, many producers faced charges of involvement in illegal contraband trade 
and they were quite unfairly punished by the Regie authorities. Similarly, when harvests 
turned out to be bountiful, the Regie accused the farmers of undertaking illegal tobacco 
cultivation on plots larger than initially reported to the representatives of the Regie228 
The tobacco producers .often complained about these measures to government 
authorities. At times, the Ottoman government found the Regie justified in its actions 
and acknowledged that, despite its harshness, the Regie was acting in line with 
regulations. Sometimes, however, the government found the Regie's measures 
unjustifiably harsh and unfair and protested them. For instance, the inspections of the 
Regie guards (kolcus) often took excessively abusive tones. There are reported cases of 
guards publicly searching and beating women suspected of possessing tobacco under 
their skirts.229 At times, the kolcus even entered the household of tobacco growers 
unlawfully and searched for unregistered tobacco while at the same time abusing 
women and girls.230 The Ottoman government rebuked such offensive and unlawful, 
acts, but the Regie's powers remained largely unchecked.
The cumbersome and sometimes vexatious regulations and policies of the Regie, 
farmers did not discourage farmers from tobacco cultivation. The unprecedented boom 
in tobacco prices encouraged many to remain in tobacco production and attracted others 
to the sector, regardless of the inconvenience caused by the Regie. Many tobacco 
producing small farmers benefited considerably from their engagement in the trade. The
226 See BA, TFR.1SL., 35/3478,23.1.1323 (5.4.1907).
227 For the depot problems see BA, TFR.l.MN., 35/3402, 27.XII.1321 (12.3.1906); BA, 
TFR.l.KV:, 59/5826, 14.11.1322 (27.4.1906); TFR.1.KV., 64/6354, 10.IV, 1322 (23.6.1906).
228 For example see BA, TFR.l.KV., 28/2769, 6.V.1321 (19.7.1905); BA, TFR.1SL., 11/1032, 
21.11.1321 (4.5.1905); BA, TFR.l.MN., 69/6856, 23.V.1323 (5.8.1907); BA, TFR.l.MN, 84/8309, 
28.11.1323(10.2.1908).
229 BA, TFR.1SL., 8/730, 11.1.1321 (24.3.1905).
230 BA, TFR.l.KV., 8/745,10.XI.1320 (23.1.1905).
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positive income effect of tobacco cultivation appears to have spread relatively evenly 
throughout the countryside, as the American bid raised the purchasing prices upward 
from the early 1900s onwards. There are reported cases of petty tobacco growers 
improving their old houses and farm buildings, building.walls around their fields, and 
buying new animals in this period.231 Clearly, these basic investments could not have 
been carried out in an adverse conjuncture and under poor distributional arrangements.
Overall, the story of regional tobacco production emerges as a broad, multi­
layered process of tension and constant struggle between the foreign trading houses, the 
Regie and the local tobacco producers. The competition between the trading houses 
specialising in export trade and the Regie appear to have worked in favour of local 
tobacco producers, particularly after the robust entry of American trading companies 
into regional tobacco markets around the turn of the century. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, the rapid growth of tobacco cultivation had far reaching 
consequences. For instance, the dynamism in tobacco cultivation can be directly 
associated with the growth of urban processing industries and broader processes of 
urban growth in the region. Thus, the American and European trading houses, as well as 
the Regie, emerged as strong “growth poles” capable of generating processes of 
propulsive growth in other sectors of the regional economy as well. Yet, more sterile, or 
contained, processes of growth also emerged under favourable market conditions 
without much propulsive impact on other sectors of the regional economy. Opium 
production, which had no immediate forward linkages within the regional economy, 
appears to be a case in point.
3.3. Opium Production: The Dynamism of the Overseas M arkets
Poppy cultivation was virtually unknown in Selanik prior to the 1860s. A 
“Turkish” farmer from the district of I§tib in neighbouring Kosova introduced the crop 
into the region for the first time in 1865. This anonymous farmer bought a handful of 
poppy seeds on a visit to Karahisar in central Anatolia and cultivated them on his farm 
back in I§tib. Encouraged by the success of his experiment, he extended the cultivation
231 Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N.754: 1.
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of the crop to a much larger scale in the following year and again achieved prime results 
in both quality and quantity.232
The success of this pioneering initiative seems to have set an example in the 
district and encouraged other farmers to take up poppy cultivation. Soon, poppy 
cultivation had spread throughout the province of Kosova and from there expanded 
rapidly into the province of Selanik. By the 1880s, the northern districts of Istrumca and 
Tikve§ had become important centres of poppy cultivation.233 Thus, within a matter of 
two decades, regional opium production had increased from virtually nil to 62 tons in 
1880.234
Behind this expansionary process lay mainly the buoyancy of overseas demand 
for the high quality opium produced in the region. The expansion of pharmaceutical 
industries in Europe and the United States, the rising military and medical demand for 
opiates, and the (forced) “liberalisation” of the opium trade in Asia, especially in China, 
increased the world demand for opium from the 1870s onwards.235 The exceptionally 
high quality opium produced in the region thus found much acclaim amongst European 
and American merchants.236 More often than not, foreign and Ottoman merchants 
purchased the opium harvest almost entirely. The bulk of the local produce was shipped 
by British merchants and sent to China for immediate consumption. The remaining 
produce was sent to the United States, Germany and France to be used in 
pharmaceutical industries..In addition, some opium was sent regularly to Istanbul to be 
used in hospitals, army headquarters and coffeehouses.
In response to growing demand for opium, world opium production increased 
considerably over the last few decades, which led to a notable reduction in world opium
232 P.P.A..P., 1883, N. 6: 101.
233 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 53.
234 See Table 1.9.
23  ^M. Booth, Ha§ha§tan Eroine, Uyu§turucunun 6000 Yillik Oykiisu [From Opium to Heroine, 
The 6000 Year Histroy of Drugs] (Istanbul: Sabah Kitaplan, 1997).
23 6 The rich soils of the I§tiblTikve§ basin and the arid climate of the region in general, created 
an environment that was particularly well suited to the cultivation of poppies. The poppy yields were 
usually high in quality and contained high dose of morphine extract, which could go up to 12% to 13% of 
the weight of the opium produce. At the time, only the prime quality opium produced in Malatya and 
Karahisar region in central Anatolia could yield such high levels o f morphine. In fact, the opium 
produced in Kosova and Selanik was superior to many other varieties produced throughout the Empire. 
For instance, the much favoured Izmir produce was quite inferior and scarcely contained 9% morphine 
extract in total (P.P.A.P., 1883, C. N. 6: 101; F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 3).
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prices.237 Opium prices in Salonica followed the global trend. Between the early 1880s 
and the late 1890s for instance, opium prices in Salonica declined by 18.1% (See Table 
2.3).238 This was a considerable decline. However, when we consider the balance of 
changing relative prices in the region, it is possible to argue that opium possibly 
constituted the most lucrative cash crop produced in the region during this generally 
deflationary period (See Table 2.2). In fact, many farmers who took up poppy 
cultivation in this period were responding to strong market signals and remunerative 
prices. In 1890, British Consul General Blunt reported that the local farmers were 
increasing their sowings of poppy in response to the high prices offered by American 
and British merchants.239 In 1895, Blunt argued that “.. .the cultivation of the poppy has 
largely increased in Macedonia, and as, moreover, the Salonica and Constantinople 
varieties are most in demand in foreign countries, it may be confidently expected that 
the annual harvest here will before long begin to rival that of Asia Minor”.240 
Accordingly, both exports and production of opium grew rapidly during the period. 
Output increased from 61.7 tons in 1880 to 201.1 tons in 1902, while exports grew 
proportionately from probably around 55-60 tons to over 200 tons during the same 
period.241 The overwhelming weight of exports in total production leave little doubt 
about the propulsive impact of strong overseas demand on regional opium production.
Table 2.3.
Average Opium Prices in Salonica, 1870-1912 (d/lb)
Period Average Price
1870-1875 u a
1880-1884 144
1885-1889 139
1890-1894 132
1895-1899 118
1900-1904 114
1905-1909 161
1910-1912 254
Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, and Asir. See Appendix 4 for details.
237 Booth, Ha$ha§tan Eroine.
238 The opium prices seem to have declined proportionately throughout the empire. During the 
same period, opium prices declined in Istanbul as well. In the late 1890s for instance, the Geyve and 
Nallihan produce fetched 17% and 18.3% less compared to the early 1880 price levels. The inferior 
Malatya produce was marketed for 39% below its early 1880s levels (Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 300).
239 F.O.A.S., 1891, N. 822: 3; F.O.A.S., 1891, N. 962: 4.
240 F.O.A.S., 1896, N. 1663:7.
241 See Table 1.9.
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Two additional factors seem to have underlined the rapid expansion of poppy 
cultivation in the region. The Ottoman government provided considerable support for 
poppy producers and actively encouraged the production of the crop. The government 
granted attractive tax exemptions for farmers who took up poppy cultivation for the first 
time. Local authorities also provided logistic and technical support to interested farmers. 
Agricultural inspectors were sent to the districts to inform farmers on the exigencies of 
poppy cultivation and opium production. These measures must have encouraged the 
expansion of tobacco cultivation throughout the region.242
The compactness of opium and the relatively low costs of transportation 
associated with the product probably constituted another incentive that encouraged 
poppy cultivation. Indeed, many cereal producers of the interior districts turned 
increasingly towards poppy cultivation so as to avoid the prohibitive railway tariffs that. 
had held them back from marketing their bulky cereal produce in Salonica.243 Under the 
circumstances, poppy cultivation continued to expand especially in the interior 
mountainous districts of the region during the late 1890s and the 1900s.244
Both the production and exports of opium fell considerably in the post-1905 
period. Output declined swiftly to 77 tons and exports contracted to 75 tons in total by 
1908.245 This contraction was due mainly to a streak of bad harvests that hit the region 
during the mid-late 1900s. Crops failed disastrously in 1905, 1907, 1908 and 1909.246 
However, buoyant British and American demand for local opium remained firmly in 
place. The ensuing supply deficiencies gave way to a substantial rise in opium prices 
(see Table 2.3). This price increase occurred despite a notable deterioration in the 
quality of the opium produced in the aftermath of harvest failures; on occasions, the 
morphine content was reported to have fallen to 11.0%. Still, the local produce, 
competed well with other opium varieties produced in the Levant.247 Indeed, later in
242 For details of the government’s support to local opium producers see Chapter 3.
243 D.T.O.G., 16.R.1313 (5.10.1895), N. 562: 472.
244 Asir, 21.R.1314 (29.9.1896), N. 112: I; Asir, 12.B.1318 (5.11.1900), N. 531: 1; D.T.O.G., 
16.R.1313 (5.10.1895), N. 562: 472.
245 See Table 1.9.
246 R.C.L., 1905, N. 214-219: 829; F.O.A.S., 1906, N. 3655: 4; F.O.A.S., 1909, N. 4359: 9; 
F.O.A.S., 1910, N. 4579: 12.
242 For instance, inferior opium varieties produced in the ‘Izmir’ region were often marketed as 
the produce of ‘Selanik’ in Istanbul markets, much to the annoyance o f local merchants (Asir, 18.N.1323 
(16.11.1905), N. 1027: 2; Asir, 9.Ra.l324 (3.5.1906), N. 1073:2).
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1912, agreeable weather conditions enabled output levels to rise to more than 100 
tons.248
Despite the setback caused by harvest failures, opium retained its commercial 
significance, and accounted for about 9.0% of the total value of exports from the port of 
Salonica in the late 1900s, generating an average value of over £100,000 per annum.249 
At the time only tobacco could generate comparable export earnings. Thus, through half 
a century of sustained expansion and growth, opium became one o f the leading 
commercial crops of the region. More importantly, Selanik became one of the leading 
centres of poppy culture in the Levant, fulfilling the expectations of Consul Blunt in 
1895. Behind this expansionary process lay favourable market trends, the high quality 
of the produce, buoyant, almost inelastic overseas demand, low costs of transportation 
and the active encouragement of the Ottoman government. In this respect, opium 
appears as the antithesis of cereal production, which suffered from the (absence of) 
same factors that underlined the growth of opium production during the period under 
consideration.
Conclusion
Demand side factors and institutional processes largely underlay the emergence 
of a dual agrarian structure in the region during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Favourable demand conditions were largely responsible for the rapid growth 
and success of silk cocoon, opium and especially tobacco production in the Selanik 
region. In contrast, cotton and cereal production suffered from tight competition in the 
overseas and, especially after the turn of the century, in the largely under-protected 
domestic market. Under these circumstances, both sub-sectors performed poorly and 
remained largely retarded until 1912.
The success of tobacco production and sericulture in the region owed much also 
to the regulatory framework and the institutional support provided by the PDA and the
248 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 344. This figure seems to be an overestimate. According to 
a British consular report, the 1912 opium yield was 1600 cases (F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5234: 9). At the time 
an opium case weighed 141 lbs. (F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 4797: 10), which brings the 1912 harvest to slightly 
over 100 tons.
249 Gounaris, Steam oyer Macedonia, 94-97.
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foreign trading houses. The'PDA actively encouraged and supported the farmers willing 
to take up sericulture in the region and thus contributed in important ways to the 
recovery and growth of silk cocoon production in Selanik. The case of tobacco followed 
a similar but relatively more troubled path compared to that of silk cocoon production. 
The tobacco Regie initially had a retarding effect on tobacco production. The Regie’s 
efforts to bring the production, taxation and marketing of this lucrative crop under its 
control initially scared some farmers away from tobacco production and drew smaller 
merchants out of business. However, once the Regie established its control, it provided 
considerable financial support to local farmers and actively encouraged the development 
of tobacco production in the region. The Regie also tightly controlled and regulated the 
production and marketing of tobacco and thus set the rules of the game in the tobacco 
business. More importantly perhaps, the Regie effectively enforced these rules and 
managed to bring some degree of order and regularity into the production and marketing 
processes. The strict, if  draconian, presence of the Regie in regional tobacco markets left 
little room for such fraudulent practices as debasement, which, as we have seen, created 
serious problems for cotton and cereal exporters during the same period. In this regard, 
through its regulatory powers and active support, the Regie contributed to the 
development of tobacco production in the region.
However, the strict pricing and taxation policies of the Regie withheld the 
positive income effects of tobacco production from reaching the lower strata of the 
agrarian society at large. The Regie and the Austrian tobacco monopoly, Hertzog 
Company, set prices at low levels that best served their financial interests often at the 
expense of the producers. The local landlords participated in this process and used their 
influence to set the local prices at considerably low rates in return for handsome 
commissions and remunerative prices for their own produce. Nevertheless, this apparent 
“market-failure” did not hinder the development of the sector due to the robustness of 
both the home and overseas demand during this period. The entry of Americans into 
local tobacco markets seriously challenged the Regie’s and Hertzog Company’s 
oligopolistic grip over regional tobacco markets and turned the situation somewhat in 
favour of tobacco producers. The Americans entered local markets in an aggressive 
manner and made massive purchases at high prices, often at the expense of the Regie. 
Attracted by the remunerative prices offered by the American companies, many farmers 
turned to tobacco cultivation and consequently regional tobacco production and exports 
grew rapidly during the 1900s and brought handsome returns to all parties involved in
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tobacco trade. Thus, within the context of a more competitive market formation and a 
solid institutional framework that regulated and enforced the rules of the game, tobacco 
production rose to unprecedented levels in Selanik.
The case of tobacco sets the counterfactual against which we can consider both 
cereal and cotton production. Both of the latter sub-sectors suffered from the lack of 
regulatory bodies that could oversee the production and marketing of crops and enforce 
the rules of the game without leaving much room for deceitful trading practices. The 
debasement of cereal crops that surfaced in the process of unregulated market 
transactions emerged as a serious problem that undermined cereal and cotton exports 
from the region. The sluggish export performance, in turn, largely circumscribed the 
growth potential of cotton and cereal production. Cereal production also suffered from 
prohibitive transaction costs that held grain marketing at bay. This situation undermined 
the export potential of regional cereal production and circumscribed its capacity to serve 
the rapidly growing urban markets. Yet, transportation costs, together with the charges 
and tariffs levied at the port of Salonica, provided local cereal producers with some 
degree of protection and allowed them to benefit from growing domestic urban demand 
during the 1890s. However, the gradual reduction in railway tariffs and port charges 
later in the 1900s reduced this slight margin of protection and exposed local markets to 
intense foreign competition. Subsequently, the sector contracted further, and, by the end 
of the period, the region became a net importer of cereals.
It is interesting to note that opium production, too, sets the counterfactual to 
cereal production in this respect. Opium trade was largely unregulated. However, opium 
cultivators benefited from high quality opium produced in the region, and also enjoyed 
lower transportation costs. Thus, opium production grew rapidly, often at the expense of 
cereal and cotton production, until the early 1900s. After this date, however, severe crop 
failures disrupted opium production and the sub-sector remained largely retarded until 
the end of the period.
Overall, in this chapter, we have seen the ways in which demand side factors and 
institutional processes conditioned the emergence of a dual agrarian structure in the 
region. Certain demand conditions and institutional processes simply favoured the 
production of certain crops whiles others remained largely ‘excluded’ during the period 
under consideration. Here the sub-sectors that could articulate with overseas markets
131
and were directly affiliated with European financial and commercial interests grew by 
leaps and bounds. Other sub-sectors, such as cotton and cereal production, suffered 
from unfavourable demand conditions and struggled to keep up with intensifying 
foreign competition in a frustrating institutional void. The financial weakness and the 
organisational inaptitude of the Ottoman government were largely responsible for the 
persistence of the feeble institutional framework. In the following two chapters, we turn 
our attention to government policy and consider the role played by the Ottoman state in 
processes of agrarian transformation discussed above.
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CHAPTER III
DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION - 2: 
AGRICULTURAL REFORM AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that demand-side conditions and certain 
institutional processes underlay the emergence of a dual agrarian structure in the region, 
which was characterised by the coexistence of retarded and dynamic sub-sectors. I 
suggested that adverse demand conditions set the broad conjunctural background to the 
retardation of such important sub-sectors as cereal and cotton production. I also argued 
that certain market failures and prohibitive transportation costs undermined the. 
production of these crops during the same period. In contrast, the dynamic sectors, 
namely tobacco and silk cocoon production, benefited from favourable demand 
conditions and/or adequate institutional support and systematic market regulation. For 
instance, tobacco production benefited immensely from the buoyancy of overseas 
demand as well as the institutional support and the regulatory framework provided by 
the tobacco Regie. Likewise, logistic and technical support provided by the PDA was 
important for the rapid development of silk cocoon production from the late 1880s 
onwards. Finally, opium production grew in response to robust overseas demand for the 
high quality opium produced in the region.
These developments, however, did not take place in a political void. The 
Ottoman government interfered with agrarian processes and tried to enhance the 
strength and stability of the sector. In this chapter, we shall turn our attention to this 
important issue and consider the role of the state in processes of agrarian change. This 
effort is important for a number of empirical and conceptual reasons.
Research on agricultural reform policies, concentrated mainly on the Anatolian 
provinces and paid little attention to other parts of the empire.1 The current chapter
1 D. Quataert, Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
diss., Los Angeles: University of California Los Angeles, 1973); T. Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi 
Uzerine Ara^tirmalar [Research on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Agriculture], (Istanbul: Eren Yayincilik, 
1998); T. Giiran, “Tanzimat Doneminde Tanm Politikasi”, [Agricultural Policy in the Tanzimat Period] 
in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.) Social and Economic History o f  Turkey (1071-1920): Papers Presented 
to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History o f Turkey, (Ankara: Meteksan
133
attempts to fill this persistent lacuna by concentrating on the impact of government 
policy on agriculture in the Selanik region during the period under consideration, using 
original and virtually unused evidence gathered from European and Ottoman archives. 
In this respect, the chapter constitutes a significant empirical contribution to Ottoman 
economic history.
A thorough discussion of government policy is essential for the integrity and 
comprehensiveness of our analysis of agrarian change in the Selanik region. So far, I . 
have concentrated mainly on market processes and considered European capitalism as 
an important dynamic that determined the broad pattern of agrarian transformation in 
the region. However, endogenous factors also played an important role in this 
transformation process and need to be taken into account. Focusing on state policy 
allows us to consider the endogenous dynamics of agrarian change in the region.
First, let me clarify the conceptual parameters of my approach. It is important to 
note that agricultural policy was not a sterile, unidirectional process that ran from the 
“state” to the “civil society”. Quite the contrary, agricultural reform was a dynamic and 
interactive process deeply influenced by the economic and political power struggles. 
Government officers and bureaucrats strove to mediate and control this conflict-ridden 
process and attempted to preserve and consolidate the political and economic interests 
of the central government in due course. In this regard, I consider agricultural policy as 
an integral part of the central government’s quest for economic and political power, 
rather than a straightforward drive for economic modernisation.
Political centralisation remained one of the primary concerns of the Ottoman 
government during the Hamidian era.2 The central government attempted to consolidate 
its political and administrative presence in the provinces during this period. Toward this 
end, the government took certain administrative measures and invested in infrastructure 
projects, on the one hand, and attempted to involve local notables (e§raf) more directly 
in the political process, particularly in the Anatolian and Arab provinces, on the other.
Limited §irketi, 1980), 271-277; F. Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§ [An Overview of Turkish 
Agricultural History], Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1938).
2 E. D. Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in 
Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamit II: Origins and Solutions, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton: 
University of Princeton, 1976); E. D. Akarli, “Abdulhamid II’s Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the 
Ottoman System,” in D. Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, (Jerusalem and Leiden: Yad 
Izhak Ben-Zvi and E. J. Brill, 1986), 74-89; E. D. Akarli, “Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman 
Bilad Al-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840,” in Temimi (ed.), La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a 
Vepoque ottomane, V. 3, (Zaghouan: Publications du Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes, 
Morisques, de Documentation et d’Information, 1988), 41-56; C. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); I. 
Ortayli, Imparatorlugun En Uzun Ytizydi [The Longest Century of the Empire], l.P. (1983), (Istanbul: 
ileti§im Yaymlari, 1999); S. J. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem 
Turkey, V. II, Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise o f Modem Turkey, 1808-1975, (Cambridge, 
New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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As such, the government sought to deepen its authority and establish a diffused and 
more indirect power base in the provinces. I argue below that agricultural policy 
constituted an integral component of the government’s efforts to expand its influence in 
the provinces. Through a combination of political persuasion and financial support, the 
authorities tried to involve the local notables into processes of agrarian reform and 
hence into broader decision making processes. As such, they sought to maintain a solid 
basis for governance in the provinces, especially in places where ethnic and political 
tensions were particularly intense. As I shall demonstrate, Selanik was a case in point.
The government’s concern for agricultural reform was in line with its fiscal 
concerns. Agriculture was the largest sector of the Ottoman economy and constituted 
the primary source of revenue for the Ottoman government. Ceteris paribus, a robust 
agrarian economy meant that the government could improve its fiscal profile and use 
the sources at its disposal to finance its costly military and administrative reform 
projects.4 In this context, the government attempted to provide technical, logistic and 
financial support to farmers, especially to small-scale peasant farmers who constituted 
the backbone of Ottoman agriculture, with a view to promoting growth and stability in 
the sector. The Selanik region was no exception.
However, agricultural policy making was a complex process within which the 
fiscal and political concerns of the Ottoman government often proved irreconcilable. 
The government officials apparently found themselves in an impasse whereby they 
could not attain both policy objectives simultaneously. The fiscal feebleness and the 
organisational inadequacies of the provincial governments often forced officials to 
compromise fiscal concerns in favour of political priorities. For instance, when the 
government used the fiscal means at its disposal to secure the alliance and cooperation 
of notables, it failed to provide sufficient support to actual cultivators due mainly to 
insufficiency of public funds. Likewise, the authorities’ attempt to support the 
cultivators in order to enhance agricultural production proved politically untenable in 
the face of the active and/or passive resistance of notables who jealously wanted to 
maintain their grip over public resources. Under the circumstances, the authorities tried 
to find a compromise between political priorities and fiscal concerns. It seems political
3 For the fiscal reforms see Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures’, Y. Cezar, Osmanli 
Maliyesinde Bunahm and Degi§im Donemi (XVIII, yy. dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih), [Era of Crises and 
Change in Ottoman Fiscal Policy (Fiscal History From XVfflth Century to the Tanzimat)] (Istanbul: Alan 
Yaymcilik, 1986); T. Giiran, Tanzimat Doneminde Osmanli Maliyesi: Biitgeler ve Hazine Hesaplari, 
1841-1861 [Ottoman Finances in the Tanzimat Period: Budgets and Financial Calculations, 1841-1861] 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1988); A. §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli Vergi Sistemi 
[Ottoman Taxation System during the Tanzimat Era], (Istanbul: i§aret, 1990).
4 For a discussion of the inherent fiscalism of the reform efforts see Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 
and G. A. Sayar, Osmanli Iktisat Dii§uncesinin Qagda§la§masi, [The Modernisation of Ottoman 
Economic Thought] (Istanbul: Der Yayinlan, 1986).
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priorities reigned supreme and the officials ultimately used the organisational and fiscal 
means at their disposal to secure the political cooperation of notables.5
As it will be explained below, similar processes were at work in the Selanik 
region.6 The authorities sought to consolidate the economic and political power-base of 
the (Muslim) notables and thus attempted to prevent the dissolution of the political 
status quo in the region. Consequently, the efforts to modernise agriculture remained 
limited, yielding little success towards the end of the period. This policy line ultimately 
failed as ethnic tensions eventually erupted into armed conflict in 1912. Nevertheless, 
agricultural policy was consequential in the sense that the failure to provide adequate 
financial and technical support to the actual farming communities consolidated the 
market-induced processes of agrarian retardation in the region.
In what follows, I concentrate first on the government’s efforts to create an 
agrarian bureaucracy that would carry out certain reform projects in the countryside and 
provide technical and logistic assistance to farmers. Second, I discuss the government’s 
efforts to provide financial support to fanners. In the final section, I focus on the actual 
implementation of these policies and the practical aspects of the reform initiative. In this 
context, I discuss the attempts to introduce new techniques of production into 
agriculture and to encourage greater diversification in the sector. In this section, I also 
discuss the impact of ‘crisis management’ schemes instituted by the authorities. The 
chapter ends with some concluding remarks on the impact of government policy on 
processes of agrarian transformation in the Selanik region.
1. The Creation of an Agrarian Bureaucracy and the Selanik Agricultural 
School
The establishment of an agrarian bureaucracy constituted an important 
component of agrarian reform policies pursued by the Ottoman government during the 
Hamidian era. The authorities concentrated their efforts on two issues in the process of 
bureaucratic reorganisation. First, they focused on the administrative reorganisation of 
the agrarian bureaucracy at both the ministerial and provincial levels. Second, they 
worked on the creation of a cadre of agricultural experts who would help introduce and
5 Akarli, “Abdulhamid ITs Attempt to Integrate,” 74-89; Akarli, “Provincial Power Magnates,”
41-56.
6 For ethnic and political conflicts in Macedonia see B. Jelavich, History o f the Balkans, 
Twentieth Century, V. 2, 1. P: (1983), (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1994), 89-94; L. S. 
Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, (1. P. 1958), (London: Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2000), 513-544.
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dissipate new techniques of production throughout the countryside. Both tasks posed 
serious difficulties for the Hamidian authorities, which faced grave fiscal, 
administrative and political problems that circumscribed their capacity to set up and 
maintain a working and effective bureaucratic apparatus. Nevertheless, as it has been 
amply demonstrated by Quataert, the authorities took important steps in this direction 
and managed to implement agricultural reform policies that yielded significant results, 
particularly in the Anatolian provinces of the empire.
In what follows, first I briefly discuss the broad processes in bureaucratic 
reorganisation within central and provincial governments and then move on to consider 
effects of these developments in the province of Selanik. In this context, I discuss the 
organisation of an agrarian bureaucracy in Selanik and assess the activities of the 
agricultural schools set up,in the region. I point out the organisational strengths and 
weaknesses of the provincial agrarian bureaucracy and argue that certain weaknesses 
superimposed by fiscal insolvency and administrative inadequacies seriously impaired 
the capacity of the provincial government to carry out extensive reforms in the 
countryside until the late-1890s. Afterwards, however, the provincial bureaucracy 
dealing with agricultural matters became more effective, thanks mainly to the efforts of 
agricultural inspectors appointed to the districts. Despite these developments, the 
administrative capacity and the organisational reach of the agrarian bureaucracy still 
fell short of the needs of an extensive region that faced a multitude of agricultural 
problems ranging from grasshopper attacks to the adverse effects of the persistent 
depression in cereal markets. In this context, the difficulty of attracting the graduates of 
agricultural schools to poorly paid government posts hampered the reform efforts.
1.1. Bureaucratic Organisation: Prospects and Limitations
The early foundations of an agrarian bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire date 
back to the Tanzimat period. Various councils and commissions dealing with 
agricultural matters were established within the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, 
and the Ministry of Commerce at different points in time during the early years of the 
Tanzimat era. The most important of these councils were the Council of Agriculture 
(Ziraat Meclisi) and the Council of Public Works (.Nafla Meclisi) established in the
Q
1840s and the 1850s, respectively. These councils primarily served as advisers to the 
central government and prepared regular reports on the condition and problems of 
agriculture in the provinces and made proposals to overcome these difficulties.
7 See Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-154.
8 Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91; T. Giiran, 19.Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 45-63; A. Akyildiz, 
Osmanli Merkez Te§kilatinda Reform [Reform in Ottoman Central Administration] (Istanbul: Eren 
Yayinlari, 1993), 127-140.
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Apparently, the councils played an important role in shaping the direction of 
agricultural policy. For instance, the appointment of agricultural directors (ziraat 
mudurleri) to the provinces was, first suggested by the Council o f Agriculture. 
Subsequently, the central government approved the proposal and appointed officials to 
the provinces.9
The creation of a separate budget for public works in the late 1840s, the 
foundation of a department overseeing agriculture and public works within the Council 
of State (§ura-i Devlet) in 1868, and, the establishment of an independent Ministry of 
Commerce and Agriculture (Ticaret ve Ziraat Nezareti) in the same year were 
important developments that laid the foundations of an agrarian bureaucracy during the 
Tanzimat period. The establishment of the first agricultural school near Istanbul in 1847 
was another important step in this respect.10
Despite these initial developments, however, the Ottoman agrarian bureaucracy 
remained in its relative infancy until the end of the Tanzimat period. The 
implementation of agricultural reform policies formulated by the above mentioned 
councils, remained largely confined to a number of pilot projects in designated locations 
and a few logistic and legislative measures intended to encourage the growth of 
commercial agriculture in the empire. The pilot projects involved providing credit, 
seeds and plants to local farmers in a number of sub-provinces in Anatolia. The 
measures taken to encourage the growth of commercial agriculture were mainly 
legislative acts, which included exemptions from various tithes, abolishing trade 
monopolies and other restrictions against the marketing of agricultural products, and 
customs duty exemptions for imported agricultural machines and quality seeds. Yet, 
government efforts remained limited during this period and the apparent growth of 
agricultural production was primarily instigated by the initiative of the provincial 
farming and mercantile communities.11
With the advent of the Hamidian era important steps were taken to set up an 
agrarian bureaucracy both in the centre and the provinces. The most important 
developments at the centre were the foundation of a Scientific Committee for 
Agriculture (Ziraat Heyet-i Fenniyesi) in 1892, and the establishment of the Ministry of 
Forests, Mines and Agriculture (Orman, Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti) in 1893. The 
Scientific Committee acted as the central government’s agent to direct agricultural 
reform and assumed numerous responsibilities that ranged from determining the general 
direction of agricultural reform policy to supervising the newly established agricultural
9 Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§, 83-84.
10 Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§, 198-204; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91; Giiran, 
19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 45-59.
11 Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§, 76-140; Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 45-59.
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schools and model farms. The establishment of a new independent ministry was also 
important, as it helped create a separate bureaucratic entity that dealt exclusively with 
agricultural matters as distinct from commerce and public works. As such, the agrarian 
bureaucracy could determine its policy objectives and priorities and use the budgetary 
sources at its disposal to set up and maintain a more centralised bureaucratic system in 
the provinces.12
The establishment of better structured agrarian bureaucratic organisations at a 
provincial level was another important development of the Hamidian era. From the 
early 1880s onwards, the central government started appointing agricultural inspectors
1 7to the provinces on a regular basis. These agricultural inspectors were responsible 
mainly for the administration of the agricultural schools and model farms in their 
respective provinces and often acted as the practical carriers of the reform programs. In 
addition, the agricultural inspectors participated actively in the implementation of the 
‘crisis management’ policies of the Ottoman government, and directed a wide range of 
schemes to this effect, such as combat against diseases and the attack of hazardous 
insects and seed distribution schemes designed to counterbalance the adverse effects of 
crop failures. However, as Quataert rightly points out, the efforts of the agricultural 
inspectors fell short of bringing about the desired effect in reform and modernisation.14
Another important development at the provincial level during the Hamidian era 
was the establishment of semi-autonomous Chambers of Agriculture (Ziraat Odalari) 
from the early 1880s onwards. The members of these chambers were elected from 
amongst the prominent provincial notables, agriculturalists and merchants. The duties 
of the chambers included the preparation of regular reports on the condition of 
agriculture and the factors impeding its development. However, the executive powers of 
the chambers were quite limited. The chambers could do very little without the 
authorisation and financial support of the local and central governments, except for 
organising minor agricultural exhibitions and competitions to encourage agricultural 
development. Thus, the chambers mainly served as transmitters of information between 
the provinces and central government until they were officially abolished in the mid- 
1890s. After this date, many agricultural chambers merged with the local chambers of 
commerce and continued to provide information and support to central as well as 
provincial governments.15
12 Kurdoglu, Turk Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§, 198-203); Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91; Shaw 
and Shaw, History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 230-234.
13Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91.
14Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 336-345.
15 Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91.
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The formation of an agrarian bureaucracy in the province of Selanik followed 
the broad pattern described above. The best sources that provide information on the 
development of an agrarian bureaucracy in the region are the provincial yearbooks 
{salnames) published by the government. The 1882 yearbook clearly shows the 
weakness and indeed the virtual absence of a comprehensive bureaucratic apparatus 
dealing with agrarian matters at the onset of the Hamidian era. The only government 
department that could have dealt with agricultural matters during this early period was 
the administration of forests {Orman Idaresi) situated in the provincial capital, 
Salonica. The department included an inspector general, another inspector for the 
districts of Drama and Siroz, and three administrative assistants in all.16
Selanik’s bureaucracy grew steadily throughout the 1890s. By the late 1900s, 
there was at least one agricultural inspector in each kaza. Besides, there was also one
17chamber of commerce and'agriculture m almost every district. Both the agricultural 
inspectors and the chambers of commerce and agriculture worked actively to encourage 
modernisation and to combat natural disasters in their respective districts. Although the 
efforts yielded some success in combating the adverse effects of natural calamities, the 
energetic venture of a handful of agricultural inspectors fell short of providing
1 ftsufficient technical and logistic support to farmers. Here the main problem seems to 
have emanated from the priorities of the local government. The provincial authorities 
were apparently reluctant to allocate sufficient public funds towards extensive agrarian 
reform. Instead, available fiscal resources were used primarily to consolidate the 
organisational power and the bureaucratic reach of the other compartments of the 
provincial bureaucracy, such as the departments of tax collection, justice and public 
security.19 In other words, the local government seems to have pursued a more direct 
approach to resolve its fiscal and political problems and prioritised reform in areas of 
fiscal and administrative organisation. Agrarian reform came further down the list of 
official priorities.
1.2. The Agricultural School of Salonica: Potential and Reality
The Hamidian authorities showed considerable attention to the education and 
training of agricultural experts. During the 1880s and the early 1890s, numerous bright 
graduates of the leading Ottoman schools, such as the Imperial Lycee (Mekteb-i Sultani) 
and the Civil Service School {Mekteb-i Mulkiye), were sent to France, Belgium and 
Germany on full government scholarship to study agricultural sciences. Upon
16 1299 S.V.S., 1882, 58-168.
17 1324 S.V.S., 1907.
18 See below for a discussion of the crisis management policies of the local government.
19 See Chapter 4.
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graduation, these students served as agricultural inspectors in the provinces and 
eventually ascended to higher posts within the bureaucratic hierarchy. The government
70also appointed these experts to teaching positions in agricultural schools.
Three major agricultural schools were established in Istanbul, Salonica, and 
Bursa during the Hamidian era. The schools successfully educated and trained hundreds 
of agricultural experts. The graduates of the prestigious Halkah Agricultural School in 
Istanbul entered the bureaucratic hierarchy on quite advantageous terms and rose 
rapidly in the ranks to reach positions of power with relative ease and speed. The 
graduates of the schools in Salonica and Bursa often had to settle for with lesser 
bureaucratic positions in the provinces.21
The agricultural schools contributed significantly to the creation of a cadre of 
educated agrarian bureaucrats. However, it is important to note that the participation of 
these agriculturalists into the actual reform process remained limited. Only a small 
portion of the graduates became agricultural inspectors and worked in close contact 
with farming communities. The majority of the graduates either became desk-bound 
bureaucrats in administrative positions or pursued careers elsewhere in the private 
sector.
The Agricultural School of Salonica {Selanik Hamidiye Ziraat Ameliyat 
Mektebi) opened in early October 1889 with a glittering ceremony, which was attended 
by the governor general of Selanik, high ranking bureaucrats and officers and
77prominent local notables. The school was located about seven kilometres west of 
Salonica. The school complex included numerous school buildings, student dormitories, 
spacious gardens, and a model farm of about 150 hectares. Altogether, the entire 
complex cost the local government more than O.L. 5,000, significantly overshooting the 
estimated budget of O.L. 4,000.23
The school policy for student selection had a distinctly ‘populist’ overtone. The 
basic requirements for admission were straightforward and emphasised Ottoman 
citizenship, fitness, youth and prior academic excellence.24 The populist emphasis was 
evident in the sensitivity of the school administration towards the class status and
20 Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 64-91.
21 Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 92-109; i. Tekeli and S. Ilkin, Osmanli imparatorlugu’nda Egitim 
ve Bilgi Uretim Sisteminin Olu§umu ve Ddnu§iimu [The Formation and Transformation of the Education 
and Systems of Information in the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Dil Tarih Kurumu Yayinlan, 1993), 
80-81.
22 D.T.O.G., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 250: 488-499; F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 10.
23 D.T.O.G., 26.Za.1306 (24.07.1889), N.188: 271; D.T.O.G., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 
250:488-499.
24 1313 S.V . S, 1895, 125.
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religious background of the students. The entrants were to be from farming families 
(giftgi) and no priority was given to any particular religious community in admission. 
Apparently, these two principles were emphasised to secure the incorporation of the 
school graduates in the actual process of reform and innovation in rural areas. In 
favouring the giftgi sons for instance, the authorities sought to create a cadre of well 
trained experts who had deep rooted family interests in farming and were therefore 
more likely, at least in principle, to be engaged in agricultural pursuits upon graduation. 
Similarly, by maintaining a careful balance between the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
entrants, the administrators-were hoping to reach all farming communities, irrespective 
of their cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds.25 Thus, new techniques and 
know-how would be better disseminated at the grassroots level and reach a wider range 
of cultivators through the active agency of school graduates.
The school was run like a military academy. The students were kept under close 
supervision and were subject to strict disciplinary measures. All students were to board 
at the school quarters throughout the academic year and all their expenses, including a 
monthly allowance of 10 kuru$&s, were to be met by the government. The average day 
of the students was strictly structured. Education was intense and captured much of the 
day. Each day the students attended five and a half hours of classroom teaching and 
three and a half hours of practical training in the field. Between the classes and the 
training sessions they were given a total of three hours of rest and breaks. They had an 
additional five hours for other needs and duties, such as cleaning, prayers, physical 
exercise and homework. The remaining eight hours were reserved for sleeping.
The three-year course syllabus was based on the program of the French 
agricultural schools.27 In the first year, the students took basic courses in religious 
education, Turkish, French, calculus, geography, public administration and drawing. In 
the second year, they followed more advanced courses on the same topics and in 
addition took general courses on agricultural science, chemistry, metallurgy, botany and 
animal husbandry. In their final year, they focused on specialised topics such as the 
construction and design of agricultural buildings, agricultural industry and technology, 
agricultural chemistry, techniques of combat against hazardous insects and animals, 
sericulture, horticulture, viticulture and general accounting. In the same year, they also 
completed their core courses on Turkish and French. Throughout, the students went
25 D.T.O.G., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 250: 488-499.
26 1313 S.V.S., 1895, 125. For an excellent account of colonial education systems see T. 
Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, Berkeley, (Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 
1991),and R. Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” in R. Guha (ed.) 
Subaltern Studies, I, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). For Ottoman comparisons see F. Go9ek, 
The Rise o f the Bourgeoisie and the Demise o f the Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
21 D.T.O.G., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 250: 488-489.
281313 S.V.S., 1895, 126-127; 1320 S.V.S., 1902, 385-386.
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through applied training in the model farm and became familiar with the most up-to- 
date techniques and tools of production.29 Thus, they found ample opportunity to 
understand the practical exigencies of their trade on the field.
Until the turn of the century, two main groups of teachers were employed side 
by side at the school. The first group included agricultural experts, who were probably 
educated abroad and/or had served for many years as agricultural inspectors and gained 
considerable experience in the field. This group included the energetic agricultural 
inspector of Selanik, Vitalis Efendi - the first headmaster of the school - and his 
colleagues Avadisyan, Kalfayan, Onnik and Ali Osman Efendis. These experts 
delivered lectures strictly on technical topics, such as agricultural science, sericulture, 
animal husbandry, viticulture, horticulture, chemistry and geology.30 A second group of 
predominantly Muslim teachers, possibly graduates of the Darulfunun (Faculty of 
Sciences) or the Dariilmuallimin (Faculty of Education) in Istanbul, such as Suad Bey 
(the second headmaster of the school), Fazli Necib, Mahmud, Arif and Ali Haydar 
Efendis, gave general courses on geography, history, calculus, Turkish, French and 
public administration.31
This academic staff, which combined expert agriculturalists and professional 
teachers, ran the entire program successfully until 1904. From 1889-1904, about ten to 
fifteen students graduated from the school each year, adding up to a potential sum of 
about 200 young and well trained agriculturists. After 1904, the staff of the school was
39replaced by a new group of exclusively Muslim teachers. The new teaching staff was 
possibly the product of the Halkali Agricultural School in Istanbul. These teachers 
carried the program of the school successfully until 1912. Throughout, the quality of 
education at the school remained one of the highest by Ottoman standards.
The quality of education and the strict quasi-military atmosphere of the school 
ensured that its graduates.would be disciplined, well-mannered, literate, numerate, 
multi-lingual and faithful individuals who were also equipped with the specialised 
knowledge of modem agricultural techniques. These ‘giftgi youngsters made into 
technicians’ were to be the harbingers of modernisation in the Ottoman countryside 
and, the closest Ottoman term that would signify a gentlemen, i.e. an efendi, was 
bestowed upon them after their graduation. Ironically, the efendi graduates of the school
29 See below for the role of Model Farm in the trial and introduction o f new techniques of
production, technology and of new agricultural products into the region.
30 1313 S.V.S., 1895,126-127; 1320 S.V.S., 1902: 385-386.
31 1313 S.V.S., 1895, 126-127; 1320 S.V.S., 1902, 385-386. Also see B. Kodaman, Abdiilhamid
Devri Egitim Sistemi [The Education System of the Hamidian Era] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kuramu 
Basimevi,1991), and Tekeli and Ilkin, Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nda Egitim, for details of technical and 
literary higher education and the training of teachers throughout the Hamidian period.
1324 S.V.S., 1907, 239.
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were perhaps too well educated and refined for the task they were intended for at the 
first place. Apparently, many graduates showed little interest in going back to the 
countryside and sharing their acquired expertise with their fellow countrymen for a 
number of cultural and economic reasons.
After three years of exposure to intensive education, urban lifestyle and culture, 
many students grew more ambitious and pursued a career elsewhere, particularly in 
administrative hierarchy. The best graduates of the school often moved into higher 
education. They enrolled at the Halkali Agricultural School in Istanbul and eventually 
joined the ranks of high calibre Ottoman bureaucrats employed in ministries and other 
leading public institutions. Some of the less successful graduates joined the ranks of 
local government officials and started their careers as bureaucrats in administrative 
offices in a sub-provincial centre. These positions, however, were relatively limited in 
number and mostly at low administrative levels with little prestige and prospect. 
Besides, low pay in government service and the irregularity with which the government 
officers received their salaries was also an important factor that discouraged graduates 
from pursuing their careers in the public sector. Under the circumstances, most 
graduates of the school pursued careers in the private sector and became clerks, 
accountants, translators and administrators, or started their own petty businesses in 
commerce, services and even manufacturing. Thus, they continued to enjoy urban 
lifestyles and the prestige that came with their educational background and status.34
The authorities soon realised that it would not be possible to attract the 
graduates of the Agricultural School into public service without good and regular pay 
and prospects of promotion within the bureaucratic system. Given the limited fiscal 
sources at their disposal, the authorities considered (alternative) ways of enticing the 
graduates into public service at the grassroots level. On one occasion, for instance, the 
authorities entertained the idea of employing the graduates as ‘inspectors of agriculture 
and technical matters’ (ziraat ve fen mudiiru) in each district (kaza). The cost of these 
appointments was to be met by a new animal surtax of one or two kuru§QS for each 
Targe headed animal’ in every district. In another case, the authorities thought of 
offering the graduates teaching positions in the elementary schools in villages and small 
towns, where they could get into direct contact with farming communities and share 
their expertise with the farmers on the field. The graduates appointed to the schools
33 See C. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989) and Kalemiyeden Mulkiyeye, Osmanli Memurlarmm Toplumsal Tarihi, [From Scriber to the 
Bureaucrat, The Social History of the Ottoman Civil Servants], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlan, 
1996), for a detailed discussion of the living standards of Ottoman civil servants during the Hamidian era.
34 SeeAsir, 10.§.1323 (9.10.1905), N. 1016: 2;Asir, 28.B.1324 (17.8.1906), N. 1112: 2.
35 BA, TFR.l.A., 16/1597, 12.11.1319 (25.1.1904).
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were to be paid a monthly salary of 300 kuru§Qs.36 In addition, they were to be kept 
exempt from military service.37
It seems that such proposals either never really materialised or failed to achieve 
the desired effect. For instance, there is no evidence to suggest that the above. 
mentioned public fund was ever created. Likewise, the plan to attract agricultural 
experts to teaching posts in villages and small towns does not appear to have 
materialised in significant numbers.38 A reform proposal presented to the Sublime Port 
in 1907 indicates that the local authorities were still complaining about the 
insufficiency of properly trained specialists in agricultural bureaus and other related
*7Q
government offices in the districts. The establishment of a new agricultural school in 
Siroz in the early 1910s apparently did not change the situation significantly, and the 
problem of recruiting agricultural experts in government offices persisted until the end 
of the period.40 The inadequacy of expert staff largely undermined the government’s 
ability to provide technical and logistical assistance to farmers. This problem, as we 
shall see, became particularly apparent in the attempts to diffuse up-to-date 
technologies and other modem techniques of production in the countryside. It is 
important to note, however, that the authorities, nevertheless, did their best to promote 
agricultural ‘development’ and worked hard to provide technical and logistic assistance 
to farmers. They devoted considerable energy, time and resources to encourage greater . 
diversification, growth and stability in the sector. These efforts, despite the limitations 
discussed above, yielded important results that will be discussed below. The credit 
policy of the Ottoman government constituted the pillar of agricultural reform in the 
empire.
2. Public Credit Policy and the Agricultural Bank
2.1. General Developments
One of the most tenacious problems of the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
economy was underinvestment. Capital investment concentrated mainly in the 
construction sector and was primarily used to finance costly infrastructure projects,
36 Asir, 28.B.1324 (17.8.1906), N. 1112: 2.
37 Asir, 10.§.1323 (9.10.1905), N. 1016:2.
38 A report published in 1912 mentions the appointment of a school graduate o f the agricultural 
school to an elementary school in one of the villages in the district of Drama (T.Z.N.M., 30.11.1328 
(13.5.1912), N. 18: 261). However, I have not been able to find trace o f similar appointments in 
contemporary sources. Indeed, complaints concerning the inadequacy of agricultural experts appear 
regularly in reports. See below.
39 TFR.l.UM., 25-A/2493, 15.6.1326 (28.8.1910).
40 T.Z.N.M., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 264-265.
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such as the construction of railways, roads, harbours, etc.41 Investment levels remained 
considerably low in crucial sectors of the economy. In manufacturing, for instance, 
overall investment levels evidently remained insufficient, despite the establishment of a 
number of factories in basic consumer industries and the apparent dynamism in certain 
compartments of artisanal and rural manufacturing industries 42 Underinvestment was 
notable also in agriculture. In general, conventional techniques of production persisted 
in the sector. These techniques yielded modest results in productivity and only a 
tentative bulwark against natural hazards that regularly disrupted agricultural 
production. The gains on the technology front remained confined to regions with a high 
degree of commercialisation and materialised only towards the very end of the 
Hamidian era. Otherwise, expansion agricultural lands was normally the main avenue to 
agricultural growth and the sector remained at a Schumpeterian standstill in general43
Other problems and impediments that underscored the Schumpeterian standstill 
included the scarcity of capital, or rather its ‘unavailability’ for investment. The dearth 
of capital was associated with a number of complex structural and conjunctural factors, 
some of which were typical of all peripheral economies in nineteenth century, and 
others were more peculiar to the Ottoman economy. Briefly, strong rent-seeking 
motives, tightening European financial control, the liberal trade regime of the empire, 
and intensifying international competition were all important factors that accentuated 
underinvestment in key sectors of the economy during the nineteenth century, in 
general, and throughout the Hamidian era, in particular.44
From the very early days of the Tanzimat era onwards, the government 
authorities sought ways to overcome the problem of underinvestment in the economy.
41 V. Eldem, Osmanli imparatorlugu'nun Iktisadi §artlari §artlari Hakkmda bir Tetkik, 
[Research on the Economic Conditions of the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 
1994); §. Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade, Investment and 
Production, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and, §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde 
Bagimlilik ve Buyume, [Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Economy] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi 
Yaymlari, 1994).
42 D. Quataert, “The Silk Industry of Bursa, 1880-1914,” in H. islamoglu (ed.) The Ottoman 
Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 284-299; D. Quataert, 
Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age o f the Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); D. Quataert, Workers, Peasant and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, 
(Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993); D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in H. Inalcik and D. 
Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-946. Also see Chapter 5.
43 Quataert, Ottoman Reform; D. Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1800-1914, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1992). Also see O. Okyar, “The Role of the State 
in the Economic Life of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” Asian and African Studies, 14, (1980), 
143-164; Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlilik, A. O. Akarli, 
“Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880-1910,” in §. Pamuk and J. G. Williamson (edsj, 
The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London: Routledge, 2000), 109-133.
44 See E. Kiray, OsmanlTda Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borqlar, [Economic Structure and Foreign 
Debt in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: ileti§im,1993); E. Eldem, Osmanli Bankasi Tarihi [The History 
of the Ottoman Bank], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlan, 2000), and Akarli, “Growth and Retardation in,” 
109-133.
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Their efforts concentrated primarily on agriculture. They set up a number of public 
credit institutions that would provide financial assistance to farmers and agricultural 
reform projects.
The most important public credit institutions that were set up during the 
Tanzimat era were the ‘district funds’ {memleket sandiklari).45 The sandiks were first 
established in the European provinces of the empire in the early 1860s and spread 
rapidly in other provinces thereafter. The sandiks were mainly cooperatives that 
extended credit exclusively to their members. They were administered by locally 
elected members who often came from the higher echelons of the social hierarchy, that 
is to say they were a notable landlord or a prominent merchant and the like. The capital 
was provided by the sanddC s participating members, who granted a certain portion of 
their produce to the cooperative each year. The interest rates on loans were kept at 12% 
per annum. Credit was granted to the members either on the basis of real estate 
collaterals or on personal guarantees acquired from third parties. The net annual profit 
o f the sandik was to be used for the construction of public works and schools within the 
district.46
The sandiks provided the farming communities with a viable alternative to local 
moneylenders, who often lent money at exorbitant rates of interest, which could reach 
up to 40% per annum. Tlie terms of payment, especially for short term credits, were 
also quite unfavourable. These usurious practices often brought peasant proprietors 
under acute economic distress, which, at times, gave way to full dispossession under a 
growing cycle of indebtedness 47 The sandiks could potentially play an important role in 
securing small peasant proprietorship in agriculture. Providing cheap loans to farmers 
could help consolidate their financial profile and help them get through difficult times 
without having to lose their property and become dispossessed tenant farmers on the 
land they once held in ownership. The sandiks were particularly important in 
counterbalancing the dislocating effects of market processes and of natural calamities, 
which often forced farmers into indebtedness that could lead to loss of property. The 
stabilising potential of the sandiks becomes even more evident when we consider the 
1858 Land Law and the subsequent legislation that liberalised the land regime of the 
empire and rendered dispossession a more likely scenario for peasant proprietors in 
economic distress.48
45 Here I would like to acknowledge Carter Findley’s suggestion for the translation of memleket 
sandiklari as ‘district funds’ into English.
46 Y. S. Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 1888-1939, [Agricultural Bank of the • 
Turkish Republic, 1888-1939], V .l, (Istanbul: Kenan Basimevi ve Kli§e Fabrikasi, 1939), 2-5; Giiran,
19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 151.
47 The rate of interest charged by usurers could reach up to 40% per annum. See Giiran, 19. Yiizyil 
Osmanli Tarimi, 135-136. Also see Chapter 4.
48 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of property rights and die associated land legislation.
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However, the sandiks suffered from a number of serious drawbacks. First, the 
capital of the sandiks was often insufficient for the purposes they were set up for. 
Secondly, the existing funds were mismanaged and ended up in the hands of notables 
and other prominent men, rather than the actual cultivators genuinely in need of 
financial support. Moreover, the debtors often did not pay back their dues to the 
sandiks, whose financial profile was thus further undermined in the medium term. 
Finally, the sandiks’ capital was often transferred to the coffers of the central and 
provincial government at times of acute fiscal crisis, leaving little or no capital for local 
use. These drawbacks claimed much from the efficacy of the sandiks and their potential 
could never be fulfilled.49
In the early 1880s, The sandiks were reformed and transferred into local ‘benefit 
funds’ (menafi sandiklari). In comparison to the memleket sandiklari, the newly 
established menafi sandiklari were somewhat better financed and put under closer 
supervision of the central government. A surtax (menafi iane hissesi) of 1.0% was 
added to the standard taxes with the specific purpose of financing the benefit funds. 
This surtax constituted the primary source for the newly established funds, menafi 
sandiklari, and aimed at securing a regular flow of capital into them. In addition, the 
authorities introduced certain measures to check and control the sandik councils, which 
were still administered by locally elected members. The sandik administrations were 
asked to keep proper and regular accounts of their transactions and they were required 
to report regularly to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works about their activities 
on a quarterly basis. In addition, the authorities brought down the official rate of 
interest to 9.0%, much to the benefit of the debtors.50
Despite these important developments, the menafi sandiklari suffered from the 
same problems that had impaired the operation and effectiveness of their predecessors. 
The local magnates continued to usurp available public funds. In addition, the benefit 
funds encountered serious problems in the collection of interest and capital payments 
and thus considerable financial difficulty. Unable to bring some degree of order to the 
finances and administration of menafi sandiklari, the central government ultimately 
suspended their operations and started preparations for the establishment of a more 
structured public credit institution in the late 1880s.51
49 Kurdoglu, Turk, Ziraat Tarihine Bir Baki§, 231-235; Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat 
Bankasi, 5-7; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 130; D. Quataert “Dilemma of Development: The Agricultural Bank 
and Agricultural Reform in Ottoman Turkey, 1888-1908”, International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 6, 
(1975): 212-213; Giiran, 19.Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 152.
50 Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 7-15; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 130-131; 
Quataert, “Dilemma of Development,” 212.
51 Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 10; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 131-132.
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The Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) was established in 1888. The bank was 
much better financed and administered in comparison to anything that preceded it. The 
bank was put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works. A 
central administrative committee (idare meclisi) comprised of appointed and salaried 
bureaucrats oversaw the organisation, operation and general activities of the bank. 
Branches were established in all provincial centres and in leading sub-provinces 
(sancak) and districts (kaza). These branches were administered by a centrally 
appointed director, a deputy director, and a committee made up o f local representatives. 
The entire bank network was organised in the form of a well structured bureaucratic 
hierarchy. Each bank branch in a lesser administrative unit was accountable to the bank 
branches in higher administrative centres. The provincial branches were directly 
accountable to the administrative committee in Istanbul.
The capital of the bank came from a number of sources. First, all assets of the 
menafi sandiklari were transferred to the Agricultural Bank. Secondly, a third of the 
annual net profits of the bank was added every year to its capital. Finally, the above 
mentioned surtax menafi iane hissessi provided the bank with an important source of 
regular capital inflow.53
The credit policy of the bank was quite clear and, in principle, the bank 
provided financial assistance to cultivators at low rates of interest and favourable terms 
of payment. The rate of interest was set at 6.0%, and an additional 1.0% was charged 
for administrative expenses. The payment of loans could be spread over a period of one 
to ten years, depending on the nature of the credit arrangement. Farmers who were 
directly engaged in agricultural production and who could prove their genuine need for 
credit for agricultural purposes were eligible to apply for a loan. The official proof of 
these qualifications was to be obtained from the local village council of elders (ihtiyar 
meclisi). Credits were extended to cultivators against their mortgaged property and, 
rarely, on the basis of collective guarantees. Each applicant had to prove his genuine 
ownership of the real estate that would be mortgaged and the relevant documentation 
had to be approved by the local village council of elders. The bank assessed the value of 
the real estate shown as collateral and decided on the final terms of the credit 
arrangement. Failure to pay the outstanding debts ended in sequestrations. The bank 
auctioned off the sequestered property to the highest bidder. The only exception to this 
practice was failure to pay outstanding debts as a result of natural disasters, which could 
seriously upset agricultural production and give way to acute financial distress in the 
short and the medium terms. Finally, the ceiling for individual credits was scaled in
52 Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 45-51, 110-127; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 
132-133; Quataert, “Dilemma of Development,” 212-217; Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 152-153.
53Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi; Quataert, Ottoman Reform; Quataert, 
“Dilemma of Development,”; Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi,
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accordance with the capital worth of each bank branch. The credit ceiling was set at
5.000 kuru§ts for branches with capital worth less than one million kuru§QS. A . 
maximum of 10,000 kuru§QS and 15,000 k,uru§QS were granted to the applicants in bank 
branches with a capital worth ten and fifteen million kuru§QS, respectively.54
The annual profit of the Agricultural Bank was distributed among the branches, 
provincial administrations and the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works. As I have 
noted above, a third of the profits was set aside as capital for the bank. Another third 
was sent to the provincial governments to finance schemes that would promote 
agricultural development and secure the stability of the sector in that province. Finally, 
the remaining third of the annual bank profits was forwarded to Istanbul to finance the 
agricultural reform projects undertaken directly by the central government. Thus, the 
bank served as a public credit institution as well as the financier of agrarian reforms.55
The Agricultural Bank, too, suffered from a series of drawbacks, particularly in 
the early years of its formation. Credit application procedures often proved too complex 
and cumbersome for ordinary farmers. The typically uneducated farmers often failed to . 
understand the details of bureaucratic procedures and filed incomplete or inadequate 
applications. Faulty applications often led to the outright denial of credit to needy 
farmers.56 Thus, simple ignorance and unfamiliarity with new bureaucratic procedures 
prevented the ordinary farmers from access to the public credit markets. Moreover, the 
bureaucratic procedures were quite costly and could raise the effective rate of interest to 
15.0%, or higher in the case of short-term loans.57 Under the circumstances, many small 
peasant farmers turned to the private credit markets where procedures were less 
cumbersome and familiar practices normally defined the specific terms of the credit 
arrangement between the moneylender and the debtor.
The attitude of bank administrators seems to have created additional problems. 
Apparently, bank administrators examined the applications carefully and in general felt 
reluctant to extend credits to small peasant farmers who had limited financial means at 
their disposal. The bank administrators had good reason to act cautiously in assessing 
risky applications. Delays in debt payments and defaults on outstanding debts w ere.
54 Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 196; Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 132-149, 
Quataert, “Dilemma of Development,” 212-218; Giiran, 19.Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 134-139.
55 Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 143-149, Quataert, “Dilemma of Development,” 212-218; Giiran, 
19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi, 144-146.
56D .r.aG .,7.C a.l310 (27.11.1892), N. 413: 565-566.
57 According to one contemporary report, the expenses associated with a credit application worth
1.000 kuru$es was as follows: 9.5 kuru$es for notary fees, 20 paras for stamp allowance, 5 kuru§es for 
registration fee, 19 kuru§es for processing fees (miiba§iriye), and 50 kuru§es for other legal expenses, 
which adds up to a total of 84 kuru§es (D.T.O.G., 23.C.1309 (23.1.1892), N. 369: 115). This suggests that 
the procedural fees could constitute an additional and up-front 8.4% on one-year loans. Thus, the official 
effective rate of interest could go up to 15% and even more (D.T.O.G., 4.Ra.l308 (18.10.1890), N. 303: 
493).
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common, and caused much trouble for the bank administrators. In addition, bogus 
applications and other fraudulent practices often led the bank to lose money. For 
instance, the exaggeration of the value o f the real estate shown as collateral was a 
common practice that cost bank branches dearly. Similarly, the difficulties encountered 
in the sale of sequestered property put bank administrators in trouble sometimes and 
compelled them to assign the property back to the original owner at the bank’s expense. 
These problems underlined the administrators’ caution in assessing credit applications 
and possibly enticed them to extend credits to those who could afford to pay it back, 
instead of the small-scale peasant farmers. Under the circumstances, the available 
public funds ended up in the hands of local notables, who could readily exert pressure 
on bank administrators and obtain the available funds. The less fortunate segments of 
the rural society, that is the small holders, sharecroppers and other agricultural workers, 
were thus largely excluded from the public credit markets.58
This situation was further underscored by the requirement of real estate as 
collateral against outstanding debts. The dispossessed farmers, especially sharecroppers 
and other agricultural workers employed on private estates (giftliks), could not apply for 
bank credits. Also, many modest farmers in possession of small holdings remained 
reluctant to mortgage and risk their property, which constituted their primary source of 
livelihood. Thus, many farmers preferred to deal with the local moneylenders, who, 
unlike the Agricultural Bank, willingly accepted a share of the annual harvest as 
collateral against outstanding debts. This practice did not put peasant holdings directly 
at risk and constituted a strong incentive to deal with the local moneylenders, despite 
the high rates of interest prevailing in private credit markets.59
Despite its shortcomings, the bank contributed to the development and stability 
of agriculture in important'ways during the Hamidian era. First, notwithstanding the 
above mentioned problems and limitations, some public credits found their way into the 
hands of peasant farmers. The standardisation and simplification of the application 
procedures, the increasing familiarity of the farmers with bank practices, the 
improvement of bank services, and the increasing acceptance of collective guarantees 
as collateral against bank loans, significantly improved farmers’ access to public credit 
markets, particularly after the turn of the century. Thus, the bank contributed 
significantly to the development of the sector in leading centres of commercial 
agriculture. As we shall see below, Selanik was not an exception.
58 Atasagun, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi.
59 D.T.O.G., 4.Ra.l308 (18.10.1890), N. 303: 493; D.T.O.G., 28.Ca.1310 (18.12.1892), N. 416: 
605; D.T.O.G., 5.C.1310 (25.12.1892), N. 417: 618.
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Secondly, the Agricultural Bank funds played a crucial role in the 
implementation of the agricultural reforms and crisis management schemes initiated by 
the central or the provincial governments. The most important initiatives of the 
Ottoman government in this regard involved the establishment of agricultural schools 
and model farms and the appointment of agricultural inspectors to the provinces. The 
bank funds regularly transferred to the coffers of the central and provincial 
governments helped finance these projects. Also, the Agricultural Bank funded most 
crisis management schemes, such as seed distribution programs and settlement projects.
2.2. Developments in Selanik
In Selanik, both large and small proprietors depended heavily on local usurers in 
order to acquire short-term loans on the eve of the Hamidian era. Memleket sandiklari, 
and later menafi sandiklari, remained largely dysfunctional or fell short of meeting the 
needs of local farming communities, due mainly to the above discussed organisational 
drawbacks and the ill-administration of local funds.60 The British Consul to Salonica, 
Richard Wilkinson, highlighted the customs prevailing in the private credit markets 
during the early 1870s as follows:
No facilities whatever are afforded, either by the Government, or by special public 
companies. Loans are raised from private parties, commonly as usurious rates of interest, 
varying from 15 to 24 per cent. These loans are generally contracted for the purpose of 
replacing stock, or, in seasons of bad harvest, for purchasing seeds.
Mortgages are seldom effected, but, when this occurs, the rate of interest is the same as 
stated above.
The following method is resorted to by large proprietors to obtain advances on their 
estates. A deed is drawn up before the Mehkeme, or Ecclesiastical Court, in which the 
proprietor acknowledges the amount borrowed and appoints die lender his attorney, 
empowering him at the same time, on the expiration of the term mentioned in the said deed, 
to sell his estate in case of non-payment. The rate of interest is from 15 to 24 per cent. Small 
proprietors borrow at the same rate of interest, but give either personal security, or pledge 
their crops.61
The establishment mf the Agricultural Bank altered the situation significantly in 
Selanik as well and provided farming communities with a viable alternative to the local 
usurers. The bank started its operations in 1889 with 22 branches that were located in 
all districts of the province.62 The branches were established with the modest capital
60 According to the S.V.S. 1299 (1882), there were only 10 benefit fund {menafi sandigi) 
branches in the province of Selanik. The sandik branches were located in the districts o f Selanik, Yenice, 
Avrethisan, Kesendire, Vodine, Toyran, Istrumca, Menlik, Zihne and Drama.
61 P.P.A.P., 1870, V. 27: 304.
62 Ziraat Bankasmin 1305 Senesinden 1308 Senesi Gayesine Kadar Miiddette Vukubulan 
ikrazatim Mubeyyin Istatistik Defteridir, 1309 (1891), Istanbul: Dersaadet Matbaasi.
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stock accruing from the now abolished menafi sandiklari. The total capital stock of the 
bank branches in the region did not exceed 10,000,000 kuru$es in 1889. Within a 
decade, this amount had risen rapidly to reach 21,000,000 kuru$es in 1900. The capital 
of the bank continued to increase during the 1900s and rose by more than 50% to reach 
32,000,000 kuru$es in 1908.63
The bank branches pursued a liberal credit policy. According to official 
statistics, between 1889 and 1908, the bank distributed loans worth an average of about
4.190.000 kuru§QS every year. This suggests that the bank had injected a total sum of
79.610.000 kuru§es worth of capital into the agricultural sector solely through the 
extension of credits during the same period.64 This sum was quite significant by 
contemporary standards. For example, one of the most important infrastructural 
investments in the region, i.e. the new commercial harbour of Salonica and the new 
quays, cost the Civil List and the contractor company a total of 30,000,000 kuru§Qs at 
around the turn of the century.65 The waterworks, trams and the gas and electricity 
works of Salonica cost another 22,000,000, 4,400,000 and 11,000,000 kuru§QS, 
respectively, adding up to 37,400,000 kuru§QS in total.66 The significance of the amount 
injected into the sector by the Agricultural Bank becomes even more evident if  we 
consider the real worth of 4,190,000 kuru§es in terms of farm tools and implements it 
could buy at the time. At around the turn of the century, a standard, single bladed 
American iron plough was sold for 150 kuru$es in Salonica, and a good quality 
mechanised sieve of French make cost , about 1,400' kuru$es. Therefore, crudely 
speaking, the capital provided by the bank was theoretically sufficient to buy, in 
nominal terms, about 27,900 iron ploughs, or 2,990 mechanised sieves every year on
IV7average.
The credits extended by the bank were quite significant also in per capita terms, 
and must have improved the financial profile of the farmers noticeably. The bank 
extended an average of over 4,000 loans every year between 1889 and 1908. The 
average loan was about 1,100 kuru§Qs. According to Eldem*s tentative estimates, per 
capita income level in the Selanik province was also about 1,100 kuru§es in 1907. If 
this figure is accurate, than the average loan would have doubled the yearly income of 
the average farmer. Alternatively, a standard farmer could have bought seven American
63 See Appendix 5 for the rise in the loans of the agricultural bank branches in the region 
between 1889 and 1908.
64 Also see Appendix 5.
65 See Chapter 5.
66 E. Pech, Manuel des Societes Anonymes fonctionnant en Turquie, (Paris, 1907), 185,192,198.
67 For agricultural machine prices see O.M.Z.M., 1 l.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), V. 76, N. 1: 28-31.
68 Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu ’nun iktisadi $artlari, 227. The same estimate is confirmed by 
H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, (London, 1906), 48. Brailsford suggests that the 
annual income of an average Macedonian farmer was around 1,100 kuru§es in the early 1900s.
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iron ploughs with this amount, or more than three-quarters of a good quality 
mechanised sieve imported from France.69
These aggregate values and broad average figures point to only the potential 
contribution of the bank to agricultural development, of course. The actual contribution 
of the bank remains to be established according to the distribution of credits and the 
ways in which these loans were used.
One often comes across swift criticisms of the bank’s credit policy in 
contemporary sources. For example, contributors to one of the leading newspapers of 
Salonica, Asir, time and again pointed to the importance of extending credits to actual 
giftgis (cultivators), rather than the estate owners whose use of credits for productive 
ends was by no means certain. Such diffuse credit policies, they argued, would ideally 
ensure productivity gains in agriculture and help elevate the financial profile of the 
peasant farmers under economic distress. Besides, providing credit to small scale 
peasant farmers could enable them to respond to emerging market signals robustly and 
to switch to the production of agricultural products favoured by the economic 
conjuncture.70
On one occasion, for example, an anonymous, and suspiciously literate, farmer 
from Yenice complained about the dominance of landlords in public credit markets in a 
letter to the Asir. He argued that this practice left little credit available to actual 
cultivators. He alternatively demanded a more equitable distribution of credits and 
suggested that the extension of credits directly to the cultivators would be more 
beneficial for the development of the sector at large. Besides, the more equitable 
distribution of available funds, he argued, would have important spill-over effects. It 
would enable more farmers to use modem technology, and the widespread use of the 
new technology would, in turn benefit a larger group of cultivators, and thus help 
overcome difficulties involved in the diffusion of new techniques throughout the 
countryside.71
These contemporary accounts have a point and reflect the built-in biases of the 
bank’s credit policy. Similar complaints concerning the distribution of credits surface in 
archival sources as well. For instance, inquiries over favouritism in the distribution of 
bank credits are common amongst the provincial governments’ correspondences with
69 For agricultural machine prices see O.M.Z.M., ll.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), V. 76, N. 1: 28-31.
70 See Asir, 21.B.1314 (26.12.1896), N. 137: 1; Asir, 6.§.1314 (10.1.1897), N. 141: 4; Asir, 
12.B.1322 (22.9.1904), N. 915: 2 for such complaints.
71 Asir, 6.§.1314 (10.1.1897), N. 141: 4. For the difficulties encountered in the introduction of 
modem technology see Section-3 below.
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the centre.72 These examples of favouritism confirm the validity of the complaints 
voiced in the Asir.
Available qualitative evidence supports the concerns raised in the contemporary 
sources. The data presented in Appendix 5 suggest that the districts where giftliks were 
prominent absorbed the bulk and an increasing share of the bank loans during the 
period under consideration. More specifically, the districts of Selanik, Karaferye, 
Vodine, Katrin, Avrethisar, Nevrekop, Gevgeli and Petri^ all locations where estates 
were common, received about 25-30.0% of the bank loans during the late 1880s and the 
early 1890s. By the turn of the century, they received about 35-45.0% of the loans. 
Their share increased even further after the turn of the century and reached slightly over 
50.0% in 1908. Accordingly, the share of the districts where small peasant 
proprietorship was more prominent decreased steadily in the same period.
Overall, it seems reasonable to suggest that the bank’s credit policy favoured the 
estate owners. Despite all the justifiable criticisms raised by the above mentioned 
contemporary observers, this preference was in line with the fiscal and political 
considerations and priorities of the Ottoman government. First, most giftliks were 
primarily engaged in cereal production, and most districts where giftliks were 
particularly common were the leading centres of cereal production in the region. 
Considering the predominant weight of cereal production and its crucial fiscal 
importance for the government, we can suggest that providing financial support for 
cereal producers was a reasonable policy objective, particularly in the depression struck 
1880s and 1890s. From this strictly conjunctural perspective, it appears almost natural 
that the estate owners would receive the lion’s share of the available public funds, due 
to their involvement in cereal production. Indeed, a report published in the Journal of 
the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (Dersaadet Ticaret Odasi Gazetesi) reflects the 
government’s clear concern to provide credit to estate owners in locations where giftliks 
were particularly common, such as Selanik, Adana, Aydin and Yanya, during the 1880s 
and the 1890s.73
We also know that the Ottoman government openly supported the production of 
crops that remained within its fiscal reach during the Hamidian period. As it has been 
noted in earlier chapters, the PDA appropriated the tithes accruing directly from the 
production of silk, tobacco and spirits. Under the circumstances, the government’s 
efforts concentrated primarily on providing support, fiscal or otherwise, to farmers of 
crops taxable by the central government, such as cereals, cotton, opium, sesame,
72 The details of complaints over the distribution of public credits can be found in BA, 
TFR.1.MN., 4/355, 16.11.1320 (29.1.1905); BA, TFR.1.KV., 31/3080, 25.5.1321 (7.8.1905).
73 D.T.O.G., 12.N.1312 (9.3.1895), N. 532: 109.
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leguminous products, potatoes etc. Very little, and mostly technical, support was 
provided to fanners engaged in tobacco production, sericulture and viticulture.74 This 
seems to have been precisely the case in Selanik as well. The cereal producing districts 
received an increasing share of the public funds, whereas the share of the districts 
specialising primarily in the production of tobacco and in sericulture declined steadily 
during this period. More specifically, Drama, Kavala, San-§aban, Cuma-i Bala, 
Provide and Kesendire, all of which were important centres of sericulture and tobacco 
production, received a steadily declining portion of public funds. In the late 1880s and 
the early 1890s, the share of these districts was 20%. By the late 1900s their share had 
gone down to 10-15%.
However, it is interesting to note that the districts where cotton and opium 
production was particularly prominent also received a diminishing share of the public 
funds, despite their growing economic as well as demographic importance. For 
instance, Siroz and Zihne, leading centres of commercial agriculture and especially of 
cotton production, received a steadily declining share of the bank loans. Likewise, the 
primary centres of poppy cultivation, Kbprulu, Tikve§ and Istrumca received a 
decreasing share of the public funds. This is a peculiar situation, because one would 
expect an uninterrupted and increasing flow of funds into these districts in accord with 
the government’s willingness to support farmers specialising in the production of 
commercial crops that brought tax revenue directly to the government. The clear 
decline, both in absolute and relative terms, of funds flowing into Siroz, Zihne and 
Tikve§ compels us to pay attention to the political factors underlining the distribution of 
public funds in this period.
The assignment of an increasing share of public funds to cereal producing 
regions where estates {giftliks) were particularly prominent, could well have been 
associated with the growing political instability in the region. Local notables who were 
typically Muslim landlords with considerable local power and influence owned most 
estates. In this respect, the preservation of a strong Muslim contingent in the 
countryside might have assumed political significance in the region, where ethnic 
tensions and political instability were particularly noticeable and gradually intensifying. 
The authorities considered the support of the notables, especially of the powerful 
Muslim landlords, imperative for the preservation of the political status quo in the 
region.75 It is likely that the assignment of public funds to landlords and other men of 
local prominence was a way of consolidating their fiscal profile and thus securing their 
political position in the turbulent Macedonian countryside. In this sense, providing 
credits to local magnates could well have served as a practical tool to affect a political
74 Quataert, Ottoman Reform.
75 See Chapter 4 for the land policies that favoured Muslim landlords in the Selanik region.
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alliance between the local authorities and notables. Simple favouritism and outright 
abuse of public authority might have also played a significant role in the allocation of 
public loans to notables. However, the political motive stands out as the more likely 
dynamic in the unequitable distribution of the public funds. This impression is 
supported by the apparent, yet quite informal, ‘alliance’ that emerged between Muslim 
landlords and the bank officers in the region, especially after the Bulgarian uprising of 
1903. Reportedly the bank authorities often sequestered the lands of Bulgarian and 
Greek peasant farmers, who were indebted to the bank before the maturation date of 
their loans and assigned the sequestered land to Muslim landlords. Such practices often 
led to complaints and open conflicts between the new (Muslim) landlords and the 
former owners of the sequestrated property. Interestingly enough, Muslim landlords, 
who quite rhetorically argued that non-Muslim speculators were acquiring considerable
77landed property in the region at their expense, also voiced similar complaints. These 
accusations and counter-accusations carried a strong political overtone that complicated 
the economic picture considerably. Clearly, there was intense political conflict over the 
acquisition of landed property in the region. Seemingly, the Agricultural Bank was an 
important player in this process.
Overall, a shifting compromise between political priorities and fiscal 
considerations of the Ottoman government seems to have influenced the credit policy of 
the bank. Yet, the bank still contributed to the agricultural sector in important ways. 
First, despite limitations, the Agricultural Bank did extend credits to thousands of 
farmers, small and large. Some of these credits were definitely used for unproductive 
purposes. For example, some peasant farmers simply used bank credits to relieve their 
burden of interest on their outstanding debts to the local landlords and moneylenders. 
They simply transferred the debt burden to the bank, which charged a much lower
70
interest rate on relatively favourable terms of payment. In other instances, the money 
was simply mismanaged and wasted in one way or another. Such cases probably ended 
up in sequestrations and subsequent dispossession. In addition, however, the small 
peasant farmers used the bank credits to purchase farm animals and seeds, to carry out 
minor repairs and improvements in residential buildings, bams and gardens, to pay 
taxes, and to purchase and repair farm tools and implements.
76 For comparisons see Akarli, “Abdiilhamid 13’s Attempt to Integrate”; Akarli, “Provincial 
Pow'er Magnates “.
77 See Chapter 4 for details.
78 Asir, 6.§.1314 (10.1.1897), N. 141: 4. At the time the average price of a simple American 
plough was 125 kuru$es and the sieves cost 1,250 kurn§ts each. Therefore, with the O.L.400-500 in 
question a landlord could purchase 300-400 ploughs and 30-40 mechanised sieves. The sum involved is 
certainly considerable. Prices are based on the list published in OM.Z.M., ll.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), V.76, 
N.l: 26-31.
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Finally, the profits of the agricultural bank financed the reform efforts of the 
provincial government. The expenses of the agricultural school, model farms and the 
salaries of the agricultural inspectors were all paid by the bank profits accruing to local 
government coffers. Similarly, the crisis management schemes, which we will discuss 
in the next section, were all financed by the bank profits. In this respect, the bank’s 
contribution to the reform efforts and to the overall stability of the sector must be 
emphasised along with the drawbacks that hindered its operations.
3. Reform Efforts and Crisis Management: Obstacles and Promises
On the eve of the Hamidian era, customary techniques of tillage and cultivation 
dominated Selanik’s agrarian economy. Farm tools were of the simplest kind. They 
included the standard wooden ploughs, wooden-pronged pitchforks, flinted wooden
70threshers, hand sickles, rudimentary wooden harrows and hand sieves. The production 
methods were also conventional. Crop rotation was rarely practiced and fields were 
normally left for fallow every second year round. The use o f fertilisers remained 
confined to the application of animal pest during the fallow season.80 Irrigated 
agriculture was also limited, and most farmers depended on annual rainfall for the 
realisation of their crops. Finally, the main method used to increase production was land 
reclamation from forests and woods.
These conventional techniques of production had been in use for centuries and 
yielded satisfactory results both in terms of subsistence and commercial needs. This 
technological base proved capable of supporting the growing population of the region 
and could uphold a regular and expanding export trade in agricultural products for 
centuries. In this respect, the technology and methods of production used in the region 
constituted a working technological base that was tested and had proved its worth on 
numerous counts.
The conventional technology was also practical and easy to maintain. The 
farmers could easily repair and even replace certain parts of their tools and farm 
implements on their own. The odd iron-monger and the carpenter could undertake 
repairs of a more complex nature and could provide the farming communities with 
spare parts and new supplies at affordable costs. In this sense, the existing technological
79 See J. Baker, Turkey, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1877), 405-407, for an excellent 
depiction of farming techniques in Selanik on the eve of the Hamidian era. Also see D.T.O.G., 11.C.1307 
(22.1.1891), N. 266: 56-57 for a brief discussion of farming techniques in the region. For the technology 
and techniques of production used in agriculture in other parts of the Empire see Quataert, Ottoman 
Reform', Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer, and, Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi.
80 See 1307 S.V.S., 1890,47.
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base in agricultural production was sustainable and, perhaps more important, 
economically feasible.
Finally, the conventional technology and methods of production developed 
through a dynamic process, adapting themselves to local conditions and changing 
circumstances over centuries. For instance, the existing methods of production 
emphasised the liberal use of land, which constituted the abundant factor of production 
in the region. Likewise, the technology in use was in accord with the climatic and 
geological conditions of the region. For example, the wooden ploughs that merely 
scratched the surface of the soil, without turning it inside out, suited to the arid climate 
of the region well, as this method helped maintain the limited humidity of the soil. 
Similarly, the inadequacy of irrigated agriculture was, among other things, due partly to 
the salinity of underground waters, which led to hardening of the soil and ultimately 
rendered it uncultivable.81 The widespread practice of leaving fields for fallow was also 
in tune with certain geological features of the region. In many parts, the soil was 
deficient in some of the essential minerals, such as nitrogen. Therefore, regular 
fallowing and the application of animal pest during the fallow season were imperative 
to regenerate the strength of the soil and prevent its eventual exhaustion.
The effectiveness, practicality, economic feasibility and the environmental 
suitability of the existing technological base explain its persistence for centuries. As we 
shall see, these factors continued to underscore the stickiriess of this technological base 
also during the period under consideration. However, certain developments that took 
place in this period rendered alternative modem technology somewhat attractive to 
local farmers. In order to understand the underlining dynamics of this process, we must 
first consider the drawbacks of the conventional technology.
First, the conventional technology was not labour saving. This situation 
constituted a serious problem in agricultural production, because labour constituted the 
scarce factor of production in the region. In labour-dependent private estates (giftliks), 
where a combination of sharecropping arrangements and seasonal wage-labour 
typically constituted the primary form of labour procurement, the labour market 
constraint was felt particularly strongly. The estate owners often sought alternative 
ways of cutting down on labour costs and finding ways of recruiting labourers under
81 F. Adanir, “The Macedonian Question: The Socio-economic Reality and Problems of its 
Historiographic Interpretation,” International Journal o f Turkish Studies, V. 3, N. 1, (1984-85): 45-47. 
The problem of salinity was particularly prominent in low-land plain locations, such as the Vardar and 
Siroz plains.
82 Adanir, “The Macedonian Question,” 45-47.
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more favourable conditions. Among other things, one of the options available to estate 
owners was the introduction of labour-saving techniques and technology.83
Secondly, although the existing technology could, under ideal weather 
conditions, yield quantitatively successful results, it could not always secure the quality 
of the final produce. Especially in cereal production, the quality of the final crop could 
not be secured with the rudimentary wooden pitchforks and hand sieves that were used 
to clean the produce off the debris and chaff it naturally contained. This undermined the 
quality of local produce and constituted a serious disadvantage in marketing.84 Besides, 
the hand sieves were not well suited to the selection of strong and healthy seeds for next 
year’s sowing. Poor quality seeds often undermined the yield ratios and kept overall
or
levels of productivity below the potential leyels by as much as 25-50.0%.
Finally, the technological base fell short of securing the stability of production 
and left it highly exposed to weather conditions and natural factors. Heavy reliance on 
rainfall increased the risks of draughts, which could, and indeed did, lead to serious 
crop failures and cause much economic distress for farming communities throughout 
the region. Similarly, the absence of dams and dykes along the riverbanks increased the 
chances of flooding in these ‘hydraulic’ locations. Also, the wooden ploughs that could 
not cut the soil deeply and evenly, left seeds exposed to attack of hazardous animals 
and insects.86
Two economic processes magnified the weaknesses of the existing 
technological base and encouraged the adaptation of modem techniques of production 
and technology from the early 1880s onwards. First, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the severe depression in cereal prices caused a demand induced crisis in 
regional cereal production and put local farmers under economic and financial strain. 
Declining prices and tightening competition in international and domestic cereal 
markets constituted an incentive to increase productivity, cut down on costs of 
production, and improve the quality of marketed products. The second process that 
encouraged the introduction of productivity enhancing techniques was the tightening of 
regional labour markets from the mid-1880s onwards. Accelerating seasonal migration
83 See Chapter 4.
84 See Chapter 2 for the problems emanating from the poor quality of marketed cereal output.
85 Asir, 4.C.1314 (10.11.1896), N. 124: 1; Asir, 11.C.1314 (17.11.1896), N. 126: 1. In both 
articles the agricultural inspector of the province of Selanik, Vitalis Efendi, was arguing that it would be 
possible to increase the seed yields from 8:1 to 10:1 or even to 12:1 by careful selection. Similarly, 
British vice-consul residing in the neighbouring province of Kosova, Mr. Shipley, was complaining that 
the seed yield ratios were remaining well below their potential due to “the very inferior quality of the seed 
which is foisted [by landlords] upon the peasants, over 30% of which is weed...” (F.O.A.S., 1901, N. 
2730: 23).
86 See D.T.O.G., 15.M.1305 (3.10.1887), N. 144: 33; D.T.O.G., 2.Za.l309 (28.5.1892), N. 387: 
259; BA, §D-Orman, Maden ve Ziraat, 522/46, 1314; T.Z.N.M., 30.H.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 262-263 
for endemic grasshopper invasions in the region.
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to Greece, Bulgaria and the Anatolian provinces in the aftermath of the Russio-Ottoman 
war gave way to acute labour shortages in rural areas. ,The tightness of rural labour 
markets deemed it more difficult for landlords to find and recruit cheap labour for 
employment in their estates.87 Under the circumstances, estate owners increasingly felt 
the need to introduce labour saving techniques of production and technology.
Apparently, most contemporary sources understood the need to take innovative 
steps on the technological front and emphasised, on numerous occasions, the 
importance of introducing productivity enhancing technology and certain new 
techniques of production into agriculture. These measures included the introduction of 
iron ploughs, mechanised sieves and reapers, effective combat against hazardous 
animals, and the construction of extensive water management systems and irrigation 
networks. The iron ploughs would help recover soil strength and allow for deep and 
even tillage that ideally would improve overall productivity.88 The mechanised sieves 
would undercut product and seed quality and provide farmers with an edge in marketing 
and increase productivity.89 The reapers would also save on labour costs.90 Effective 
combat against hazardous animals, such as mice, crows, and grasshoppers, would not 
only improve overall productivity but also prevent frequent crop failures emanating 
from the attack of such animals.91 Finally, the construction of dams, dykes and canals, 
ideally would reduce the vulnerability of agricultural production to adverse climatic 
conditions.
Despite much acclaim the widespread introduction of modem farming 
techniques and technology remained limited. The projects that required extensive 
capital outlays, such as the construction of water management systems and irrigation 
networks remained extremely limited. In the British, French and Ottoman sources I 
have consulted, I came across only a few, and mostly unsuccessful, attempts to carry 
out such projects. For instance, repeated attempts to convert the marshes of the Vardar 
River and Lake Yenice into arable land failed to materialise. These swamps remained
87 P.P.A.S., 1886, N. 24: 5.
**Asir, 11.§.1317 (14.12.1899); N.440: \;Asir, 21.C.1318 (16.10.1900), N.525: 1.
89 Asir, 21.B.1314 (26.12.1896), N. 137:1.
90 According to one contemporary estimate a mechanised reaper could ideally reduce the cost of 
production by about 30% per donum of land. See O.M.Z.M., 8.Za.l321 (27.1.1904), V .ll, N 119: 27.
91 Asir, 4.Z.1315 (25.4.1898), N.272: 1; Asir, 4.§.1315 (7.12.1899), N. 438: 1; Asir, 8.C.1318
(3.10.1900), N.521: 2.
92 Especially the silence of the documents pertaining to the Imperial State Council (§ura-yi 
Devlet), especially to Public Works (Nafia), Commerce (Ticaret), Forests, Mines and Agriculture 
{Orman, Maden ve Ziraat), Contracts (Mukavelat) and provincial (Selanik) files, is quite telling. 
According to the 1858 Ottoman Land Law, land reclamations and construction of buildings on miri lands 
had to be permitted by the government authorities and, usually, within die Ottoman bureaucracy such 
decisions passed through the State Council. Therefore, failure to detect such infrastructure investments 
among these files can be considered convincing evidence that such projects remained limited in the region 
throughout.
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firmly in place without any significant improvement until the end of the penod. 
Likewise, the attempts of a group of prominent notables and merchants led by the 
chairman of the Istrumca Chamber of Commerce, Umur Bey, to drain off 10,000 
donums (1,000 hectares) of flooded fields and to construct dams along the riverbanks of 
the district also failed.94
Similarly, the construction of canals and irrigation networks remained extremely 
limited and was confined ,to the isolated, efforts of a few prominent landlords and 
merchant bankers. For instance, at a relatively late date, in 1904, Yako Savol 
Modiyano, who was one of the leading Jewish bankers of Salonica, and Hifzi Bey, who 
possibly was a local notable, combined their efforts to construct canals that would 
connect the Vardar River to a certain giftlik situated in close proximity to the 
riverbanks. An Italian engineer, Monsieur Ariogani, was employed in the construction 
of the canal, which cost the two entrepreneurs a total of O.L. 1,000.95 The project was 
successfully completed and the first rice and grain produce of the farm was harvested in 
1906.96
The Yako Savol and Hifzi initiative set an example in the district and other 
landlords soon showed interest in similar projects. However, unless they had access to 
firm financial sources it was very difficult, and indeed undesirable, for absentee 
landlords to finance and maintain such extensive infrastructure outlets. Besides, the 
construction of irrigation networks often called for the cooperative participation of 
numerous neighbouring farmers. Such cooperation was not always easy to obtain. 
Often, farmers with direct access to riverbanks were opposed to the passage of canals 
through their property, considering it a net loss of arable land. Even when all parties 
could agree to the legal, technical and financial terms of such projects, the actual 
process of water management created difficulties, such as the adjustment of water levels 
and the distribution of water between proximate and interior fields. These technical and 
management difficulties further discouraged such costly infrastructure projects, which 
would have ideally helped increase productivity and secure the stability of agricultural 
production.97
The efforts to introduce modem farm implements also yielded limited success 
until the early 1900s. In the sources I have consulted, I managed to find only a few 
references to the introduction of modem farm tools and implements. A report prepared 
by Austria-Hungarian consul in 1885 mentions the importation of some fifty reapers of
93 See 1312 S.V.S., 1895,159.
94 Asir, 6.Za.l315 (28.3.'l898), N. 264: 2.
95 Asir, 15.Ca.1322 (29.7.1904), N. 899: 2.
96 Asir, 24.B.1324 (13.9.1906), N . l l l l :  1.
91 Asir, 24.B. 1324 (13.9.1906), N . l l l l :  1.
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Johnston Manufacturing Co. of Balatavia into Salonica.98 However, all other 
contemporary sources suggest “technological stagnation” in agriculture at least until the 
turn of the century."
This stagnation can be attributed to a number of financial, technical and cultural 
reasons. First, most farmers often found it difficult to afford modem farm tools and 
machines in the depression struck 1880s and 1890s. The financial constraint was felt 
strongly among peasant farmers in possession of small holdings, and many found it 
difficult to purchase even the cheapest of modem farm implements, such as the iron 
ploughs, and continued to rely on conventional tools. Also, the difficulties that the 
farmers encountered in the acquisition of public credits and the exorbitance of the 
interest rates charged in the private capital markets prevented the introduction of new 
techniques and tools of production. In addition, other investments, such as 
improvements in houses, farm buildings, fences, fountains, wells and the purchase of 
additional farm animals, could well be so imperative as to push the purchase of new 
tools and machines further down in the list of priorities.100
The absentee qiftlik owners, who had a better financial profile, probably found it 
difficult to invest in new technology under adverse economic conjunctures. However, 
the main factors that discouraged such investments appear to be more technical and 
cultural than purely economic, as we shall see below.
Certain technical and logistic drawbacks constituted a serious, and possibly the 
primary, obstacle to the modernisation of the technological base. The lack of effective 
agencies that could help choose, introduce, diffuse and maintain the appropriate 
technology was particularly problematic.101 At least until the late-1890s, the 
commercial houses importing agricultural machinery into the region were, in general, 
poorly connected to the hinterland. Most suppliers lacked material representation in the 
interior towns and often operated through the obscure agency of commercial travellers. 
It seems that the farmers willing to import new farm implements, at times, found it 
difficult to actually locate an appropriate intermediary who would be reliable not only 
in the commercial transactions involved, but also in providing some sort of technical 
support.102 Often, the farmers bought the equipment in an ad hoc manner. They either
n P.PA.S., 1886, N. 24: 5; D.T.O.G., 26.B.1302 (11.5.1885), N: 10: 4.
99 P.P.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 8; P.P.A.S., 1897, N. 1837: 3; P.P.A.S., 1898, N.2111: 20.
100 Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N. 754: 1.
101 For the difficulties encountered in the diffusion process see I. Tekeli and S. Ilkin, The Public 
Works Program and the Development of Technology in the Ottoman Empire in the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Century, Turcica, 28, (1996); and, Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer.
102 Asir, 6.§.1314 (10.1.1897), N. 141: 4. In this account, an anonymous ?iftlik owner from 
Yenice complains that most farmers who were actually willing to import new machines could not find 
intermediaries in the area and were forced to go to Salonica to actually purchase the equipment. 
Eventually, the farmers did not import the ploughs. It is important to note that, Yenice was one of the
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had to rely on the word of the intermediary merchants or, whenever available, choose 
from catalogues provided by the suppliers. In any case, often there was very little or no 
didactic display. Without an informed choice the farmers could rarely be able to use the 
tools in question properly.103 Occasionally, the local landlords who introduced modem 
technology into their estates soon realised that that the new tools were not well suited to 
local conditions. For instance, during the early 1880s, a number of estate owners 
imported the most up-to-date iron ploughs from England. However, it soon became 
apparent that these iron ploughs were too heavy for the local oxen and buffaloes. After 
a few years of persistent trial, the landlords threw aside the British ploughs and reverted 
to the use of conventional wooden ploughs.104
Inadequate provision of spare parts and technical support constituted another 
problem for local farmers. The farmers were unfamiliar with the new technology and 
often found the tools and implements difficult to use and maintain. The local iro n . 
mongers were also not entirely informed about the exigencies of the new technology 
and found it difficult to manufacture spare parts and to repair the new farm implements. 
Under the circumstances, many farmers refrained from buying the unfamiliar and 
complex technology that was difficult to maintain.105
Finally, certain cultural factors underlined the technological stagnation of the 
1880s and the 1890s. First, most farmers and landlords had become suspicious of the 
practicality of modem technology after the failure of early attempts to introduce new 
farm implements and machines into estates. Moreover, the fact that the conventional 
implements and tools constituted a working and proven technological base probably 
underlined the disregard for new technology among the farming communities. Under 
the circumstances, widespread scepticism emerged as another obstacle to overcome 
before modem technology could be introduced in any considerable scale.
main agricultural centres in the region (1307 S.V.S., 1890: 48) and was situated along the Manastir- 
Salonica railway line. (B. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the 
Railway Factor, (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 51-53).
103 See Asir, 19.B.1313 (4.1.1896), N. 35: 2; Asir, 11.§.1317 (14.12.1899), N. 440: 1, for 
complaints about the lack of meaningful display and training on new farming techniques and tools.
104 D.T.O.G., 26.B.1302 (11.5.1885), N.. 10: 4; P.P.A.S.', 1886, N. 24: 5; Asir, 5.M.1314 
(16.6.1896), N. 82: 1; 1318 K.V.S. (1900: 355-356). The technically and logistically inconsiderate 
importation of technology is best illustrated in an example given by Baker: “I heard of one instance of a 
gentleman who had an estate on the sea shore and who spent £6000 on machinery, with the view of 
cultivating the land on a very extensive scale, but did not take into calculation the weight of the engines, 
etc., and die mechanical arrangements necessary for landing them The consequence was, they arrived at 
the beach o f the estate, but there was no provision for getting them on the shore from the lighters, and in 
the attempts to accomplish the task they sank into the sand and the sea ... I believe the engines lie in the 
sand to this day”. See Baker, Turkey.
105 See Asir, 3.§.1313 (18.1.1896), N. 577: 2 and O.M.Z.M., ll.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), V. 76, N. 1: 
28-31, for complaints concerning the complexity of imported technology and the difficulties encountered 
in finding spare parts in particular.
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Second, absentee landlords residing in urban areas often had a relatively limited 
understanding of agriculture and showed little interest in the actual management of the 
estates. Therefore, many giftlik owners probably were not interested in the introduction 
of modem technology. It seems that many giftliks, especially small and medium-sized 
ones, simply provided basic consumer goods, such as flour, leguminous products, 
vegetables, fruit, diary products, poultry, eggs, meat, wood for fire, wines and spirits, 
for the household of the absentee landlord. Thus, while maintaining their potential as a 
source of rent income and profit, the giftliks probably assumed a “provisionst” 
significance for many absentee landlords. Consequently, productivity probably 
remained a relatively marginal issue and the continuity of production assumed much 
greater importance within the context of the giftlik economy.
Nevertheless, the labour market constraint still constituted an important 
incentive to introduce labour-saving techniques and technology. In this regard, 
however, the landlords faced the opposition of their tenants, who openly resisted the 
introduction of new techniques that would undermine their position on the estates and 
make them somewhat redundant in the work process. The resistance of tenant farmers 
reportedly impaired the introduction of new technology into estates on numerous 
occasions.106
The government could have played an important role in easing the technical and 
cultural difficulties encountered in the introduction and diffusion of new technology 
and techniques of production throughout the countryside. In this context, the 
government could have assumed active agency in choosing the appropriate technology, 
providing farming communities with tools, farm implements, spare parts and technical 
support, and carrying out educational programs that would display the advantages of 
modem technology.
In practice, the government played only a limited, yet in certain ways important, 
role in overcoming these obstacles. The local governments were more successful in 
providing assistance in the choice and introduction of appropriate technology. 
However, the local authorities did little in terms of practical displays, giving 
encouragement and education to farming communities, or providing supplies and 
technical support.
The model farm attached to the Agricultural School played a leading role in the 
first time introduction of new farm tools and agricultural machines into the region 
during this period. The model farm was equipped fully with the most up-to-date
106 Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 100. Also compare Quataert, Ottoman Reform, 168.
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technology imported from abroad, chiefly from Britain, France and the United States.107 
The imported tools and machines were used extensively on the ground and numerous 
experiments were carried out to test their suitability to local conditions. For instance, 
the staff carried out experiments with iron ploughs on the model farm and decided that 
single bladed American ploughs were ideally suited to local conditions and to the 
specific needs of the local farming communities. The American ploughs were simple in 
design and easy to handle. They were also affordable and cheaper to maintain in 
comparison both to other imported plough varieties and the conventional wooden 
ploughs.108 Similarly, experiments with mechanised sieves yielded successful results 
and showed that properly selected wheat seeds yielded between 1:10 to 1:15, as 
opposed to the conventional 1:8 ratio.109 Also, the first tractors to be seen in the region 
were introduced and tested in the model farm.110
The model farm also concentrated on introducing more advanced methods of 
production. The most up-to-date techniques of production were successfully introduced 
into the fields, vineyards, gardens and groves, and the mulberry plantations situated 
within the model farm.111 New high yielding seed varieties of barley, summer wheat, 
parrot seed and some new products, such as asparagus and potatoes, were tested.112 The 
department of sericulture also produced healthy silkworm eggs that were raised in 
accord with the Pasteur methods.113 The departments of dairy products and animal 
husbandry experimented with the production of pasteurised cheese, butter and yogurt 
and introduced modem techniques of chicken and pigeon raising.114 The first 
experiments to apply chemical fertilisers were also carried out in the model farm.115
In this period, the primary problem was in the dissipation of technology 
throughout the countryside. In this respect, the inadequacy of agricultural experts and 
other bureaucratic staff constituted a serious problem and largely circumscribed the 
government’s capacity to help dissipate new techniques of production through displays,
107 From the very early days onwards the farm was equipped with die most up-to-date 
technology, which was chiefly imported from Britain, France and United States. See F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 
623: lO andD.r.aG ., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 250: 488-489.
108 See the report prepared by the agricultural inspector of Selanik, Vitalis Efendi, on the 
suitability of American ploughs to local conditions in Asir, 25.Za.1316 (6.4.1899), N. 369: 1.
109 Asir, 28.C.1314 (4.12.1896), N. 131: 3. Also see, Asir, 16.Ra.1320 (23.6.1902), N.691: 2, for 
the successful use of mechanised sieves in the model farm.
110 Asir, 14.L.1323 (11.12.1905), N.1033: 1-2.
111 D.T.O.G., 17.S.1307 (12.10.1889), N. 250: 489; Asir, 28.C.1314 (4.12.1896), N. 131: 3. The 
mulberry plants of the model farm were used extensively in the region and sent to other parts of the 
empire, to locations as distant as Adana and Aleppo (BA, Irade-Orman ve Maden, 3296/338-1, 8.M.1319
(27.4.1901)).
112 D.T.O.G., 26.§.1306 (27.4.1889), N. 226: 201; Asir, 28.C.1314 (4.12.1896), N. 131: 3; Asir,
24.§. 1314 (8.1.1897), N. 146: 1.
113 BA, Irade-Orman ve Maden, 2226/4097-2, 23.Z.1320 (22.3.1903).
114 Asir, 28.C.1314 (4.12.1896), N. 131: 3; BA, trade- Orman ve Maden, 1080/610-2,. 
22.Ca.1326 (21.6.1908).
115 BA, irade-Rusumat, 1993/781-3,26.§.1319 (7.12.1901).
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demonstrations and other means of inducement and encouragement. Nevertheless, the 
agricultural inspectors did their best to help promote agricultural development and took 
certain measures to enhance the diversity of production and contribute to the overall 
stability of the sector. In this context, the encouragement of cash crop production and 
the crisis management schemes assumed great importance.
The local authorities actively encouraged the production of poppies in the 
region. Agricultural inspectors were sent out to the countryside to show methods of 
poppy cultivation and opium production to the farmers willing to take up the production 
of the crop.116 Also, the government granted a one-year tax-exemption to farmers taking
117up poppy cultivation to further encourage its production. The local authorities also 
took measures that would help revitalise silk cocoon production in the region. As we 
have seen, regional silk cocoon production had been badly hit by the malignant pebrine 
disease in the 1860s and the 1870s. In order to help revitalise the sector, the government 
took a number of precautions such as banning the importation of uninspected silkworm 
eggs into the region,118 and assisted the mulberry plant distribution schemes of the 
PDA.119 Likewise, the authorities supported cotton cultivation. They imported 
American and Egyptian seeds that yielded much better results in quality and quantity in
comparison to local cotton .varieties and distributed theni to cultivators throughout the
120region.
The local authorities also devoted considerable energy and financial sources into 
crisis management during this early period in order to secure the continuity of 
production and overall stability of the sector. In this context, the government’s primary 
concern was to counterbalance the dislocating effects of frequent harvest failures that 
were triggered by adverse weather conditions, that is mainly draughts, and other natural 
hazards, such as floods and grasshopper attacks. Apparently, the authorities used a 
blueprint policy package to counterbalance the short and medium term effects of 
harvest failures. A closer look at the ways in which they coped with the severe cereal 
crop failures of 1874, 1879, 1885-86 and 1888-90 reveals the pattern of crisis 
management measures. To start with, all three harvest failures were triggered by
171adverse weather conditions, i.e. either by severe draughts or untimely rams. In all 
cases, the harvests materialised significantly below their average levels (by as much as
n6P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N.6: 101.
117 P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N.6: 101.
m  D.T.O.G., 11.L.1304 (3.7.1887), N. 131: 184. Also see Quataert (1973: 247).
n9D.T.O.G., 1 l.L. 1304 (3.7.1887), N. 131: 184;F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 7-8.
120 See D.T.O.G., 25.Ra.1305 (11.12.1887), N. 154: 3; D.T.O.G., 25.Z.1305 (2.9.1888), N. 192: 
418; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 348: 2; PRO, F.O. 78/4119,1.5.1888, Extract from the Salonica Gazette.
121 For 1874 see, P.P.A.S., 1874, V. 33: 952; P.P.A.S., 1875, N. 17: 447-449; PRO, F.O. 
195/1007, 31.1.1873, Blunt to Granvillekly; PRO, F.O. 195/1007, 17.2.1873, Blunt to Elliot. For 1879 
see F.O.A.S., 1883, N.6: 93 and for 1885 see F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 2; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 254: 2.
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30-50%). At times and in certain places, the crops failed almost totally, causing acute
grain shortages. In each crisis, the local authorities, especially the local chambers of
commerce and agriculture, were alarmed by the inadequacy of local grain supplies and
immediately sent warnings to the central provincial vilayet officials urging them to take
instant measures in order to ensure grain supplies for local consumption needs. Upon
these requests, the vilayet brought the issue directly to the attention of the Porte, and
asked at once for, a) the imposition of export prohibitions, which would secure regional
supplies and help redirect surplus grain earmarked for marketing towards the deficit
areas within the region, and, b) the transfer of additional monetary funds or in kind
provisions (seeds) with a view to help restore cereal production in the region.
Apparently, each time, the Porte responded with unusual speed and precision to the
requests. First, it issued the necessary legislative orders to back the prohibition of
exports and successfully resisted the protests of the local mercantile communities
involved in grain trade and the diplomatic pressure that European consuls put on the
1government in the name of liberal trade. Secondly, by granting tariff exemptions to 
the farmers willing to import new seeds and by actively encouraging grain imports into 
the region, the Porte not only secured sufficient supplies for local consumption, but also 
indirectly encouraged the continuation of cereal production.123 Thirdly, through the 
agency of various public credit institutions, particularly through the inenafi sandiklari 
and the Agricultural Bank branches, Istanbul provided the funds necessary to finance 
the efforts to send provisions to the needy farmers. On numerous occasions, the local 
bank branches distributed credit to the distressed farmers, thus providing them with the 
financial means to purchase seeds and draft animals necessary to restore their interest in 
cereal cultivation.124 In support of the measures taken by the bank, the local authorities 
also assumed full responsibility in crises management and successfully executed seed 
distribution schemes in selected disaster areas.125 As such, in the short term, the 
Ottoman authorities played a crucial role in preventing harvest failures from reaching 
famine proportions, and in the medium-term, helped maintain levels of cereal 
production during these crucial years which were marked by a persistent depression in 
the price of cereals.
122 For the details of export bans see Chapter-2 and for 1974 see PRO, F.O. 195/1007, 28.4.1874, 
Blunt to Locock; PRO, F.O. 195/1007,12.6.1874, Blunt to Elliot; for 1879 F.O.A.S., 1883, N.6: 93; PRO, 
F.O. 195/1256, 17.10.1879, Blunt to Layard; BA, M.V., 6/14, 11.S.1303 (18.11.1885); BA, M.V., 7/3, 
30.Ra.1303 (6.1.1886); BA, M.V., 8/79, 24.C.1303 (30.3.1886).
123 BA, SD-Selanik, 2008/41, 6.Ra.l296 (27.2.1879); BA, M.V., 52/18, 17.B.1307 (9.3.1890);. 
BA, M.V., 54/18, 10.L.1307 (29.5.1890); BA, M.V., 56/39, 1.M.1308 (17.8.1890); BA, M.V., 57/28,
25.M.1308 (10.9.1890).
124 For approved proposals for financial support to drought hit farmers in Selanik see BA, M. V., 
38/7, 1.R.1306 (5.12.1888); BA, M.V., 54/19, 10.L.1307 (29.5.1890); D.T.O.G., 4.Za.l307 (21.6.1890), 
N. 286: 294; BA, M.V., 58/39, 20.S.1308 (5.10.1890). For examples of rejected proposals, due either to 
notable recovery in districts or insufficiency of local funds, see BA, M.V., 24/34-1, 30.Z.1303 
(18.9.1887); BA, M .V, 62/60, 6.B.1308 (15.2.189i). Also, for an example of financial assistance to local 
farmers hit by heavy rains and hail see BA, M. V., 68/75, 10.C.1309 (10.1.1892).
125 BA, Irade-Ticaret ve Nafia, 25/1399,4.B.1315 (28.11.1897).
168
Overall, government policy seems to have assumed, to a large extent, a 
defensive overtone in the depression struck 1880s and the 1890s and prioritised stability 
and greater diversification over modernisation as such. More notable progress seems to 
have taken place on the technology front from the late 1890s onwards. In 1897, for 
example, 406 iron ploughs, twenty-three mechanised sieves and seven miscellaneous 
machines worth a total of about 84,000 kuru§QS were imported into Salonica.126 In the 
following year, about 248 iron ploughs, ninety-six mechanised sieves and nine 
miscellaneous machines were imported and sold in Salonica at a cost of 144,000 
kuru§Qs.127 In 1905, 216 iron ploughs, 30 sieves and 37 other machines including a . 
tractor were imported and sold.128 Statistics pertaining to the late-1900s are lacking. 
However, available qualitative sources suggest that the relative dynamism on the
1 7Q
technological front continued uninterrupted.
The underlining reasons for this relative dynamism can be attributed to a 
number of important institutional developments. In order to contain the growing ethnic 
tensions in the Macedonian provinces, the Ottoman government implemented a series 
of administrative, military and financial reforms in the early 1900s. Broadly speaking, 
the primary objectives of this reform scheme was to enhance the administrative 
capacity of the government, improve public security, improve the fiscal profile of 
provincial governments, and to generally better the economic and political conditions in 
the region.
The details of this reform scheme shall not detain us here. It is important to note, 
however, that, the reforms had serious repercussions on government’s agrarian policy . 
as well and prioritised modernisation along with stability and diversification as a policy 
objective. The clear emphasis on modernisation found its prime manifestation in a 
reform proposal prepared by the local authorities and presented to the Sublime Porte. 
This report underlined the significance of providing logistic and technical support to 
farmers, of further research into modem agricultural methods, greater diversification, 
and improvement in product quality. To this effect, the report recommended the 
employment of additional agricultural inspectors, the establishment of new model farms 
and agricultural schools, and the foundation of numerous agricultural machinery depots 
(zirai alet depolari) that would rent and sell new farm tools, implements and machines
1 30on favourable financial terms to local farmers in leading centres of agriculture.
126 Asir, 26.Z.1318 (15.4.1901), N. 574: 2.
127 Asir, 26.Z.1318 (15.4.1901), N. 574: 2.
128 Asir, 24.B.1324 (13.9.1906), N. 1111: 1.
129 See below.
130 BA, TFR.1.UM., 22/2200, 1323 (1905-06). Also see BA, TFR.l.SL., 67/6692, 29.1.1323. 
(11.4.1907); (BA, TFR.1.M., 23/2249, 1326 (1908-09) for similar reform proposals.
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Important measures were taken in the direction recommended by the reform 
proposal during the late 1900s and the early 1910s. The local authorities opened another 
model farm near Salonica in the early 1910s. The new model farm was situated in close 
proximity to Salonica-Uskup and Salonic^-Istanbul railway lines and encompassed a 
total area of 14 hectares. The farm was fully equipped with modem farm implements 
and machines, which included mechanised harvesters and water pumps. Experiments
with high-yield seed varieties and new agricultural products were also carried out in the
1^1 *new model farm. In addition, numerous experimentations with modem farming
techniques, technology and agricultural products were carried out also in the newly
1
founded Agricultural School in Siroz.
The new school and the model farms also assumed a more active role in the 
dissipation of new technology and products throughout the countryside. They sent out, 
free-of-charge, harvesters and mechanised sieves to near-by villages and estates during 
peak harvest time to assist the farming communities and to demonstrate the advantages 
of using these modem machines. For example, the Agricultural School in Siroz sent out 
harvesters to the northern districts of Cuma-i Bala and Nevrekop and provided good 
quality cotton and maize seeds to local farmers in Siroz in 1912.133
Another significant development in this later period was the establishment of 
agricultural machinery depots in leading centres of agriculture throughout the region. 
The largest depot was established in the district of Selanik. This depot sold a wide 
range of farm implements and machines, which included iron ploughs, mechanised 
sieves, iron harrows, hoes, reapers, harvesters, beehives, butter-chums, machines used 
to make milk cream and spare parts. Smaller depots were also established in Siroz, 
Istrumca, Drama, Vodine, Karaferye and Yenice. These secondary depots only sold 
essential tools and machines, such as iron ploughs, hand sieves, harrows, hoes, reapers, 
beehives, butter-chums, cream machines, and spare parts. In every depot, there was a 
workshop that could repair old machines and other farm implements and provide spare 
parts.134 The depots offered low prices and favourable terms of payment to cultivators. 
Each item was sold to farmers for 20.0% below its retail price, and the payments were 
spread over a period of five years. More costly machines, such as sieves, reapers and 
harvesters, could be rented out from the depots in return for a small fee and put to work 
in estates and villages under the supervision of agricultural inspectors.135
131 T.Z.N.M., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 260-261.
132 T.Z.N.M., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 260-261,263.
133 T.Z.NM., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 260-261.
134 BA, TFR.l.UM., 22/2200,1323 (1905-06); T.ZN.M., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 260-261.
135 BA, TFR.l.UM., 22/2200, 1323 (1905-06).
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The more active involvement of agricultural schools and model farms in the 
dissemination of new technology and especially the establishment of the agricultural 
machinery depots must be considered important developments that underlined the 
relative dynamism on the technological front from the early 1900s onwards. The 
agricultural depots appear to have been particularly important in this respect. In 1909 
alone, the depots sold numerous agricultural machinery, including a total of 153 iron 
ploughs, 715 spare iron blades for imported ploughs, six mechanised sieves, thirty 
harvesters, 697 beehives and 100 other miscellaneous farm tools and machines.136 The 
next year, the depots sold another 138 iron ploughs and numerous machines.137 Besides, 
the repair and other services provided by the depots probably helped ease the technical 
problems encountered in the maintenance and adaptation of new technology and 
contributed to the relative technological dynamism of this period.
We cannot attribute this relative dynamism solely to the efforts of the Ottoman 
government. We should also take into consideration the active involvement of private 
initiatives in this process. First of all, the agents of agricultural machine manufacturers, 
especially from Germany, Austria-Hungary and the United States, seem to have 
improved their connections in the hinterland and started working with local agents, 
rather than the odd commercial traveller.138 The suppliers also put greater emphasis on 
the provision of spare parts.139 In addition, the establishment of a number of workshops 
in Salonica, which manufactured, among other things, simple farm implements and 
spare parts, was another important development that helped ease the technical and 
logistic difficulties encountered in the introduction of new technology in the previous 
decades.140
Second, it seems that the landlords and local notables began to assume a more 
active role in the introduction and, perhaps more importantly, the dissemination of new 
techniques. For instance, upon the suggestions and persistent encouragement of Vitalis 
Efendi, Haci Nafi Bey from Istrumca agreed to import 100 iron ploughs and sold the
136 T.Z.N.M., 30.11.1328 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 266-267.
137 PRO, F.O., 195/2359,24.11.1910, Lamb to Marling.
138 PRO, F.O., 195/2111, 23.3.1901, Freeman to O’Connor; O.M.Z.M., ll.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), 
V. 76, N. 1: 28-31. The latter source gives detailed information on the names o f agents importing and 
selling machines and farm implements throughout the Macedonian countryside. Most of these agents are 
cited as ‘merchants’ (tiiccar). However, there are also the names of landlords and prominent government 
officers listed as ‘men of interest’ (eshab-i alaka). Also see P.P.A.P., 1905, N. 3655: 11 for the 
penetration of machinery suppliers deeper into the Macedonian hinterland.
139 T.Z.M.N., 25.Ca.1330 (13.5.1912), N. 18: 266-267.
140 Asir, 20.§.1324 (11.10.1906), N. 1119: 4 ; ^ r ,  26.Z.1318(15.4.1901), N. 574: 2; 1315S.V.S. 
(18??: 578). It seems that at least one such workshop producing iron furnaces and farm implements was 
established in Salonica during this period. The factory manufactured iron ploughs based on American and 
Greek models and a wide range of spare parts for imported foreign machines and other farm implements. 
A second concern was established in the late-1900s within the context of the Salonica Hamidiye 
Industrial school (1320 S.V.S., 1903, 392). However, the contribution of this concern remained limited as 
it was primarily intended for educational purposes.
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tools to the local farmers for about 20% below their retail price.141 In 1900, another 
landlord from the district of Selanik bought a mechanised sieve for O.L. 14 and after 
cleaning his own produce, set out to sieve the grain harvest of the neighbouring farms 
and villages in return for small contributions.142 The same year, numerous landlords 
undertook similar measures and imported 50 mechanised sieves and made the machines 
available for general public use in their respective districts.143 In 1904, landlords from 
the district of Selanik successfully introduced the use of modem machinery in their 
estates.144 Some prominent notables even went so far as to import fancy tractors around 
1900s. Upon the encouragement of Vitalis Efendi again, the brother of a certain 
Siileyman Pa§a, Ali Bey bought a tractor worth O.L. 400 in 1905. The machine could 
till 30 to 40 donums of land per day and, with its fifteen horsepower traction, could t i l l . 
the land 30 to 40 centimetres deep.145 Within ten days, two prominent landlords, Hifzi 
and Rahmi Beys, combined their financial means to import another tractor with exactly 
the same qualifications.146 Probably, other landlords took similar measures, but, their 
efforts remained limited and went under-reported in the available sources.147
The underlining reasons for the landlords’ growing interest in the introduction 
of new technology are not easy to ascertain. However, it is possible to make a few 
suggestions. First, the above mentioned developments in logistics, namely the 
encouragement and support of government officers and the technical guidance of the 
agricultural school and the model farm(s), might have played an important role in 
enticing landlords to introduce new technology into their estates.
Second, labour scarcity seems to have incited the adaptation of productivity 
enhancing technology, especially iron ploughs, reapers and mechanised sieves, into the 
estates. Especially, the acceleration of emigration to Greece, Bulgaria and the United. 
States, the growing attraction of booming urban sectors, and the rapid growth of cash 
crop production, particularly of tobacco production seem to have aggravated the 
difficulty of finding and recruiting agricultural workers in the estates by the end of the 
first decade of the century.
141 Asir, 25.Z.1316 (6.4.1899), N. 369: 1.
142 Asir, 1.C.1318 (26.9.1900), N. 519: 2.
143 Asir, 12.B.1318 (5.11.1900), N. 531: 1.
144 P.P.A.S., 1904, N. 3430: 11.
145 Asir, 14.L.1323(11.12.1905), N.1033: 1-2.
146 Asir, 24.L.1323 (21.12.1905), N. 1036: 2.
147 More general statements indicative of growing landlord interest in the importation of 
technology can be found in Asir, 17.C.1319 (30.9.1901), N. 622: 3; P.P.A.S., 1906, N. 3867: 15. Also the 
above mentioned report published in the journal o f the Ministry of Forests, Mines and Agriculture 
mentions many landlords and man of local prominence, who imported small numbers of machines and 
other farm implements directly from suppliers (O.M.Z.M., ll.Za.1317 (12.3.1900), V. 76, N. 1: 28-31). 
For instance, a certain Suad Bey from Selanik imported a chicken machine in 1897 (BA, Irade-Rusumat, 
735/382-5, 16.R.1315 (13.9.1897)). It Is highly probable that these silent, yet significant, efforts 
continued into the 1910s.
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Despite the growing landlord interest the introduction of new technology and 
techniques of production remained limited even in this later period. The introduction of 
new technology remained confined to a number of giftliks owned by prominent notables 
and merchants. The problem was that the new technology and techniques of production 
could not reach all the way to the thousands of peasant farmers, who continued to 
constitute the backbone Of agriculture in the region. Despite the improvements 
discussed above, agency problems, financial constraints, different investment priorities, 
the ‘stickiness’ of the existing technological base, preconceptions and ignorance 
persisted to create insurmountable difficulties for the dissemination of new technology. 
In 1911, the British consul residing in Salonica was reporting to London that, despite 
the efforts of local authorities, the ‘insurmountable conservatism’ of the majority of 
farmers in the region was a serious impediment to the general employment of up-to-
1 48date agricultural machinery. The “insurmountable conservatism” of local fanners 
was underlined by the above-mentioned set of complex economic and technical factors.
The attempts to promote greater diversification in agriculture and to support 
farmers willing to produce (taxable) cash crops and other agricultural products 
continued also in this later period. For example, the authorities set up special 
committees for the inspection of silkworm eggs imported into the region. These 
measures contributed significantly to the containment of the pebrine disease and the 
growth of silk cocoon production in the region, particularly after the turn of the 
century.149 Similarly, the support provided to cotton cultivators continued. The 
distribution of high yielding seed varieties that were better suited to the arid climate of 
the region contributed to the growth of cotton cultivation in important ways, at least 
until the commencement of the unprecedented boom in tobacco cultivation early in the 
twentieth century.150 The authorities encouraged farmers also to produce alternative 
crops such as red peppers, roses, fruit, and vegetables.
The crisis management schemes continued as well. Now, however, the 
government largely failed to maintain the levels of cereal production, due mainly to the 
sheer persistence and scope of harvest failures that hit the region between 1897 and 
1910. In the pre-1897 period, harvest failures materialised sporadically and their after 
effects usually did not last more than a year or two. In 1897-1910, the harvest failures 
proved more persistent and could last as long as four to five years in succession as they 
did in 1897-1902 and 1907-1910. Contemporary European sources maintain that 
unusually severe climatic conditions and mainly severe droughts caused these fits of 
harvest failure. Chronic underinvestment in cereal production, especially
in F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 5017: 8.
149 Asir, 13.Ca.1325 (24.6.1907), N. 1190: 2;R.C.L., 1908, N. 250-255: 830-831.
150 BA, §D-Ticaret, 1213/17, 21.N.1316 (4.2.1899); D.T.O.G., 5.L.1315 (26.2.1898), N. 686: 68- 
69; Asir, 23.N.1322 (1.12.1904), N. 935: 2.
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underinvestment in irrigation and drainage, and the acceleration of rural de-population 
must have also played a significant role in deepening the effects of unfavourable 
weather conditions. At any rate, the impact of these two uninterrupted runs of harvest 
failure was quite severe and entailed a notable contraction in regional cereal production 
in this later period.
The Ottoman government remained consistent in implementing crisis 
management schemes and went on to support the needy cultivators. The available 
archival documents suggest that the seed distribution schemes, tariff exemptions, cheap 
credit procurements all remained in effect. For instance, the Agricultural Bank extended 
credits to the needy farmers in the Siroz district upon orders of the local authorities.151 
Given the growing attraction of cash crop production, especially that of tobacco, and the 
sheer magnitude and persistence of harvest failures, it was difficult to sustain cereal 
production through crisis management policies or other similar measures. Yet, it is fair 
to suggest that the cereal producers of the region would have suffered severely from the 
harvest failures in the absence of the government’s persistent efforts to contain the 
crisis. In this sense, the government’s contribution to the overall stability of the sector 
must be highlighted.
Conclusion
From a comparative perspective, what the Ottoman government could not do 
strengthen and modernise agriculture appears to have been more consequential than 
what it actually did. Examples of successful agrarian modernisation under the auspices 
of the government are abundant and set the counterfactual against which we can assess 
the role of government policy in the Ottoman empire during the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries. For instance, the effective protection provided by corporatist 
governments in the European continent contributed to the modernisation and growth of 
agriculture.152 Likewise, the guiding support and the active encouragement provided by 
the Japanese government to farming communities contributed to the rapid development 
of the sector during the Meiji period.153 In contrast, bounded by the terms of the liberal
151 For the extension of credits to needy farmers see, BA, TFR.1.SL, 216/21558, 29.7.1327 
(12.10.1911). For import duty exemptions and seed distribution schemes, see BA, TFR.1.SL, 164/16390, 
13.10.1325 (26.12.1909).
152 P. Bairoch, “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914”, in P. Mathias and S. Pollard, The 
Cambridge Economic History o f Europe, The Industrial Economies: The Development o f Economic and 
Social Policies, V. VIII, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1- 160.
153 See P. Francks, Japanese Economic Development, Theory and Practice (London: Routledge,
1993).
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trade agreements signed with European powers, the Ottoman government could not 
provide the same degree of protection to farmers. Under the circumstances, 
government’s ability to provide technical, logistic and financial support became 
extremely important for the strength and robustness of the sector in the Ottoman 
Empire. However, the organisational feebleness of the Ottoman government, which was 
ultimately due to its financial and political weakness, withheld its ability to provide 
effective support to the agricultural sector. Efforts towards this end often yielded limited 
results, remained confined to a number of commercial centres, and failed to bring about 
the desired effect in agricultural modernisation. The diplomatic, fiscal and political 
constraints of the Ottoman government largely set the background to the apparent 
“weakness” and vulnerability of the agricultural sector during the period under 
consideration.
Selanik was not an exception. Although the authorities managed to take 
important steps in the introduction of new means and methods o f production in the 
agricultural schools and model farms, they failed to encourage the diffusion of this new 
technology throughout the countryside, mainly because of serious financial and 
institutional constraints. Some success could be achieved in this regard only towards the 
end of the period, but the accomplishments were limited in scope and remained 
confined to a limited, if significant, number of estates. Indirect measures, such as tax- 
exemptions and encouragement schemes yielded results that were more considerable 
and assisted the development of commercial agriculture, especially the growth of cash 
crop production, in the region. Likewise, the successful crisis management schemes 
helped maintain the overall stability of agricultural production to a certain extent. 
Consequently, we can consider the Ottoman state as a facilitator of commercialisation 
and stability in the sector.
Within the limits of this overall policy, the authorities appear to have 
compromised fiscal concerns for pressing political priorities. This tension becomes 
particularly apparent in the distribution of public funds through the medium of the 
Agricultural Bank. Clearly, the bank provided some support to the farming communities 
under acute economic distress. The bank credits enabled these communities to better 
respond to market signals in the short term and gave them the financial edge necessary 
to maintain their ownership status over land in the medium term. The bank also 
provided funds for the reform and ‘crisis management’ schemes of the government. For
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all these reasons, the contribution of the bank to the overall stability and 
commercialisation of the agrarian economy must be emphasised. However, the 
Agricultural Bank also appears as a great under-achiever, or rather a missed 
opportunity, in terms of facilitating modernisation in agriculture. The predominance of 
notables in public credit markets seriously undermined the potential of the bank to 
contribute to agricultural development. In this context, the political considerations of the 
state and its efforts to maintain the influence of Muslim notables in the countryside 
appear to be particularly important.
Some notables responded to the support of the Ottoman government and took 
active initiative to modernise and enhance production, but only towards the end of the 
period and under extremely distressing political conditions. However, these efforts 
remained limited and came too late to make a lasting difference in the sector. The 
disintegration following the Balkan Wars virtually demolished all and it was up to 
Greek authorities to revitalise agriculture in the region in the aftermath of the Great 
War. The delayed response of the local notables to the support and encouragement of 
the Ottoman government can only be understood against the backdrop of the broader 
distributional processes at work. In the following chapter we turn our attention to a 
discussion of property rights, tenure systems and taxation to complete our analysis of 
the dynamics of agrarian change in the Selanik region during the period under 
consideration.
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CHAPTER-IV
THE DYNAMICS OF DISPOSSESSION AND THE LOGIC OF
RENT-SEEKING:
PROPERTY RIGHTS, TENURE SYSTEMS AND TAXATION
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I have discussed the forces underlining the 
transformation of the agrarian economy at large. I have argued that the dynamic 
interplay between world economic forces and the modernisation efforts of the Ottoman 
government led to the emergence of a “dual” agricultural economy in the region, 
involving retarded and rapidly growing sub-sectors. I have noted that the sub-sectors 
that articulated well with the world economy grew rapidly in response to robust 
overseas demand and the active support of the offshoots of European economic interests 
in the region, namely large trading houses and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration 
(PDA). Silk cocoon, opium and especially tobacco cultivation grew rapidly in the region 
under such favourable demand side conditions, and with the financial, technical and 
logistic support of the above mentioned establishments. In contrast, the sub-sectors that 
were not favoured by the conjuncture of the world economy went into a process of 
serious retardation, despite the government’s efforts to promote economic growth and 
stability in these “excluded” sub-sectors of the agrarian economy. The fiscal and 
organisational feebleness of the Ottoman government, and certain institutional 
inadequacies, which manifest particularly in the organisation of the marketing 
processes, undermined efforts to modernise agriculture. In this process, prohibitive 
transaction costs that were superimposed by the reckless tariff policy of railway 
companies and the lack or ineffectiveness of market regulation proved particularly 
detrimental, and the ensuing transaction cost constraint further undermined the growth 
potential of the “excluded” sub-sectors.
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In this chapter, I will discuss the transformation of socio-economic institutions 
that conditioned the direction and pattern of economic change in the Selanik region 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this broad context, I will pay 
close attention to distributional processes, and concentrate on the connections between 
property rights, systems of land tenure, and taxation, on the one hand, and processes of 
capital accumulation, commercialisation, and urbanisation, on the other. I will utilise an 
eclectic analytical framework in discussing these complex issues. I will borrow from 
two established traditions' in economic and social history, namely neo-Marxism and 
neo-institutionalism. I will use the neo-Marxist approach to discuss mainly, a) the 
pattern of surplus appropriation and capital accumulation in the regional economy, and 
b) the dynamics of rural displacement, dispossession and urbanisation.1 As such, I hope 
to discuss the structural processes and the institutional dynamics underlining the crisis 
of the agrarian economy, on the one hand, and the growing tide of urbanisation in and 
emigration out of the region, on the other. I will also borrow from neo-institutionalism 
to discuss the forces underlining the commercialisation of the regional economy at 
large, and that of the agricultural sector in particular.2 I will concentrate on the relations 
of property and distribution as important determinants of how and to what extent 
economic agents could be incorporated into the market economy. More specifically, I 
will discuss property rights, systems of land tenure and taxation as crucial institutional 
processes that conditioned the incentive structures faced by economic agents. As such, I 
hope to shed light on the acute under-investment in agriculture and on the forces that 
underlay the persistence of strong speculative motives in the regional economy.
1 This literature is vast and a full assessment of the basic discussions revolving around this 
complex theoretical and historical issue is beyond the scope of the thesis. However, the primary 
contributions to this literature can be cited as follows: K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, 1. 
P. (1964), (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1978); Dobb, M. (1963) Studies in the Development of 
Capitalism, 1. P. (1946), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. R. Hilton (ed) The Transition from 
Feudalism to Capitalism, (London: New Left Books, 1976); E.P. Thompson, The Making o f the English 
Working Class, 1. P. (1963), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); R. Brenner “Agrarian Class Structures 
and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe”, Past and Present, 70, (1976): 30-35; R. Brenner, 
“The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism”, New Left Review, 104, 
(1977): 25-93. For a comprehensive account of this literature see H. J. Kaye, The British Marxist 
Historians, An Introductory Analysis, 1. P. (1984), (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
A more exchange oriented approach within the neo-Marxist tradition can be found in the works 
of P. Sweezy, “The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Science and Society, 14, (1950): 134-157; 
A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, (New York: Monthly Press Review, 
1967); I. Wallerstein, The Modem World-System I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1974).
2 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, the Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); D. C. North and R. B. Thomas, The Rise o f the Western World, A New 
Economic History, 1. P. (1973), (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, 1. P. (1990), (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); E. L. Jones, 
Growth Recurring, Economic Change in World History, l.P. (1988), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
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Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to clarify some of the 
conceptual and methodological issues central to this discussion. First, it is important to 
re-emphasise that the nineteenth century Ottoman economy was an inseparable part of 
the still expanding global capitalism. As we have seen in previous chapters, local 
economic structures evolved and metamorphosed in tandem with this tide of 
globalisation. Distributional processes and property relations were not isolated from this 
process of articulation and metamorphosis. Quite to the contrary, they represented an 
important socio-economic domain within which the process of globalisation was starkly 
felt. However, the social and economic domain of redistribution and of property also 
constitutes a multi-layered and complex arena of political power struggles and of social 
and economic conflict. la  this sense, the distributional processes and relations of 
property consist of context bound historical contingencies, which can dissect, distort, 
and at times resist against the global processes at work.
The dynamic interaction of the “local” and the “global” processes underscored 
the emergence of an amorphous economic structure in Ottoman lands that dialectically 
accommodated elements both in line with the moment of globalisation, on the one hand, 
and those that undermined or mitigated it, on the other. In other words, the socio­
economic domain as defined by property relations and distributional processes embody 
the tensions and contradictions, and indeed the peculiarities, of the “Ottoman” path to 
peripherisation and modernity. In this respect, they constitute an important, if 
indispensable, component of economic change and transformation. As we shall see, the 
case of Ottoman Selanik proves no exception.
In what follows, I will first introduce the basic features of the classical Ottoman 
land regime and discuss its broad transformation from the sixteenth century onwards. 
This long-term perspective on land and taxation matters will set the historical and 
conceptual background against which I will consider the transformations taking place in 
Selanik during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The discussion will 
mainly centre around two broad issues; namely, the gradual consolidation of property 
rights and increasing commercialisation of land as a primary factor of production. In 
addition, I will concentrate on the Ottoman taxation system, and assess its impact on the 
processes of capital accumulation, and the organisation of the relations of production in
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agriculture. In the second section, I will consider the developments in Selanik and 
concentrate mainly on the institutional framework within which property rights were 
secured and enforced, and the legal stipulations that helped proprietors to appropriate 
the surplus produce. In the third section, I will discuss the implications of these legal, 
institutional and organisational conditions for the transformation of the regional 
economy, in conjunction with economic and political developments.
1. The Transformation of the Ottoman Land Regime and Systems of 
Taxation: A Long-Term Perspective
The pillars of the Ottoman political status quo during the “classical” period 
rested on the extensive coordinating powers of a relatively centralised patrimonial state 
apparatus. The patrimonial state mediated processes of political integration, 
redistribution, and of warfare through a network of interlocking and hierarchical 
tributary arrangements.3 In Islamic jurisprudence, conquest constituted one of the 
primary means through which ownership over land could be established. Conquest gave 
proprietary rights to the Islamic community (umma), and the Islamic state, as the 
custodian of the rights of the umma and of the Islamic, or §er 7, order at large, emerged 
as the primary legitimate authority that could establish proprietary rights over 
conquered lands.4
3 For the adaptation of Weber’s concept of patrimonialism to the Ottoman case see C. Findley, 
Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). For a more refined version of the Weberian approach see K.Barkey, Bandits and 
Bureaucrats, The Ottoman Route to State and Centralisation, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); 
and, F. Gofek, The Rise o f  the Bourgeoisie and the Demise o f the Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). Also see H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600, 1. P. (1973), 
(London: Phoenix, 1994); H. inalcik, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600,” in H. 
Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, 
(Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9-410, for a comprehensive 
discussion of the Ottoman state apparatus and its broad organisation during the ‘classical period’. Also 
see R. A. Abou-El-Haj, Formation o f the Modem State, The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); H. Islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant in 
the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman 
Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century, (Leiden, New York and Koln: E. J. Brill, 1994); J. Haldon, “The 
Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives”, in H. Berktay and S. 
Faroqhi (eds.) New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 
18-108; J. Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode o f Production, (London and New York: Verso; 
1993).
4 H. Cin, Osmanli Toprak Diizeni ve Bu Duzenin Bozulmasi [Ottoman Land System and its 
Degeneration] (Konya: Selfuk Universitesi Yayinlan, N. 105,1992), 9-12, 49-62; M. T. Sonmez, 
Osmanli ’dan Giinumiize Toprak Mulkiyeti, Agiklamali Sozliik [Land Ownership from Ottoman Times to
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The practice of bringing conquered lands under the custodianship of the state 
served two important purposes. First, this practice enabled the state to collect taxes from 
conquered lands. This was indispensable for the creation of a public treasury and for the 
upkeep of the broader state apparatus and its armies. Secondly, the state largely drove 
its legitimacy from its ‘custodianship’ over the rights held by the umma as stipulated by 
the fundamental principles of §er ’i law. The preservation of umma*s right to benefit 
from all worldly possessions (ayn), that ultimately belonged to God, was particularly 
important for establishing a solid ideological basis for legitimate rule in tune with the 
precepts of Islamic legal tradition.5
The Ottomans inherited these Islamic practices, as well as some of the deep 
rooted Byzantine conventions, and brought much of the conquered land under the direct 
custodianship of the state and hence the public treasury. These lands were termed state 
{miri) lands.6 The political, economic and military power of the Ottoman state rested 
upon its legitimate control over the miri lands. The sultan granted military fiefs (dirliks) 
to prebendal families and other members of the military class. The appointed fief 
holders (timariots) held the rights to revenue collection within the dirlik territory. In 
addition, the timariot was given a private plot (hassa giftlik) for his subsistence needs. 
In return, the timariot was responsible for the upkeep of a certain number of cavalrymen 
and for serving in the Ottoman army during military campaigns. The timariot was also 
accountable for maintaining public order within the dirlik territory and for regulating 
matters pertaining to taxation.7
Within the context of the miri land system, the actual occupiers of the land, i.e. 
the peasant cultivators (reaya) in possession of small holdings (gift-hane), held usufruct
the Present, A Comprehensive Dictionary] (Ankara: Yayimevi A.§., 1998), 215-223; inalcik, “The 
Ottoman State,” 44-54; 103-118.
5 See H. islamoglu-inan “Peasants, Commercialisation and Legitimation of State Power in 
Sixteenth Century Anatolia,” in Q. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture 
in the Middle East, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 57-76; islamoglu-inan, State 
and Peasant.
6 For a categorical discussion of miri lands see Cin, Osmanli Toprak Diizeni, 49-62; inalcik, 
“The Ottoman State,” 103-119, and Islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant, 56-70.
7 For a discussion of the dirlik/timar system see, O. L. Barkan, Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 
[Land Issues in Turkey], Collected Works, V. 1, (istanbul: GOzlem Yayinlan, 1980), 805-872; H. inalcik, 
The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600, 1. P. (1973), (London: Phoenix, 1994), 104-120; 
Cin, Osmanli Toprak Diizeni, 64-96; and, H. Gerber, The Social Origins o f the Modem Middle East, 
(London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), 9-17.
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(tasarruf) rights.8 However, the state held the plain ownership (rakabe) of the land. This 
situation practically rendered the occupier of the miri land to be the state’s perpetual 
“tenant”. This tenancy relation between the state and the tenant was expressed in a 
special contractual deed called the tapu. Thq tapu contract set the terms and conditions 
of tenancy and specified the obligations of the raiyyet. These obligations mainly 
included the regular payment of all §er’i and customary (orfi) taxes certain services due 
to the state and the timariot. In return, the holder of the tapu deed acquired exclusive 
rights of possession and usufruct. Yet, the tenant could not independently carry out 
certain legal transactions and make alterations on land that entailed rights of plain 
ownership. That is, the miri land could not be independently leased, sold, mortgaged, 
shown as collateral or bequested by the raiyyet. Only the usufruct rights held by the 
tenant could be transferred' (ferag) to a third party, conditional upon the payment of a 
transfer fee and the permission of the local timariot granted before the local Islamic 
courts. Similarly, the fields under cultivation could not be converted into orchards and 
vineyards, as these alterations would altered the miri status of the land into freehold 
property (,miilk), in accordance with certain principles of §er’i law (see below). 
Similarly, the law prohibited the construction of buildings and the planting of fruit trees 
without special permits.9
The miri system of land tenure and the associated dirlik system were imperative 
for the broader organisation of the Ottoman political status quo and for the 
consolidation of state power. First, the state maintained its ultimate ownership over 
conquered lands and thus jealously retained its rights over land matters and control over 
taxation. Second, the separation of usufruct rights from plain ownership over miri lands 
and the associated restrictions brought over the sale, transfer and mortgage of such 
property enabled the central government to the subsistence of the peasant farmers and to 
prevent, at least in theory, their alienation from the land through dispossession. The 
preservation of small peasant proprietorship helped keep the countryside politically 
pacified. The (unarmed) peasant farmers constituted a politically more manageable 
social group that could not directly challenge the authority of the state and the sultan.
8 For the legal position of cultivators see inalcik, “The Ottoman State,” 108; Barkan, Tiirkiye’de 
Toprak Meselesi, 725-788.
9 For a detailed discussion of usufruct rights over miri lands see Cin, Osmanli Toprak Duzeni, 
115-166, and Sonmez, Osmanli’dan Guniimiize Toprak, 52-54,201-203.
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Besides, the dirlik system helped finance the upkeep of a police force in the provinces 
and served as an important mechanism of social control and political pacification.10
The dirlik system also helped contain the power base of the local military 
contingent. As we have seen, the assignment (tejviz) of the miri lands to peasant farmers 
presupposed the separation of usufruct rights from that of revenue collection, which 
withheld, at least in theory, the local timariot from emerging as a powerful feudal lord 
over the dirlik territory. The authority of the timariot was further checked by the 
presence of local judicial authorities that effectively prevented him from monopolising 
all powers of jurisdiction, policing and of surplus appropriation in his person. The 
sultan’s capacity to transfer and dismiss fief holders was also important in 
circumscribing the timariot9s power and securing his obedience to central authority. 
Finally, the upkeep of a central army directly loyal to the person of the sultan 
empowered him with considerable powers of negotiation, deterrence and, when 
necessary, armed intervention against the provincial military elite.11
Thus, a structural link between processes of surplus appropriation, military 
organisation and social control was established within the context of the classical dirlik 
system. The state’s custodianship and control over the miri lands constituted the very 
basis of this organisational process.
The miri lands constituted the primary axis of the Ottoman land regime in the 
early modem period.12 Yet, other forms of property also prevailed. Islamic 
jurisprudence recognised land reclamation as another important source of establishing 
proprietorship over land. Individuals who converted ‘dead’ (mevat) lands into arable 
land could acquire proprietary rights over the thus “vivified” lands, provided that they 
acted with due permission and knowledge of the judicial authorities. Such lands became 
the freehold property (miilk) of the individuals who ‘vivified’ them. Islamic 
jurisprudence, as well as other Ottoman practices emanating from established customs 
(orf), also recognised as freehold property, a) the lands within or in close proximity of 
towns and villages; b) orchards, vineyards and gardens; c) former miri lands sold to 
private parties; c) some of the lands granted to participants in military campaigns; and,
See, Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats.
11 See, Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats.
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d) some lands left in possession of Christians who converted to Islam following the 
conquest. The recognition of these lands as freehold mtilk property was conditional 
upon the acquisition of the title-deed (temlikname) from judicial authorities or directly 
from the sultan.13
The proprietor (malik) of the mtilk land could sell, transfer, use and benefit from 
it, subject to minor restrictions and the usual §er’i and customary taxes.14 Mtilk lands 
could be inherited directly by the children, parents, spouses, siblings and other 
immediate relatives (<asabe) of the deceased proprietor.15 Mtilk lands were inviolable 
properties of the malik and the malik could exclude others from using and benefiting 
from it. Mtilk property could not be easily confiscated. §er'i law allowed for 
confiscation primarily to protect the property from damage and deterioration. For 
instance, in cases of extreme (fahi§i) abuse; the malik could lose his/her proprietary 
rights.16 The state could confiscate mtilk for public interest as well; however, such 
seizures could be carried out only under extraordinary circumstances and the state was 
obliged to pay the full value of the property to the malik in question.17
Mtilk property could be endowed to pious foundations and other charitable 
organisations as set by the fundamental principles of §er ’i law. According to the §er'ia, 
the endowment of property for religious or charitable purposes had to be the personal 
act of an individual out of His/her devotion to God. Thus, only mtilk lands could be used 
to form a vakif. Such vakifs were termed as 'real1, or 'proper', vakifs {yakf-i sahih), 
whereby both the ownership and the usufruct rights of the owner were transferred in 
perpetuity to the legal entity of the vakif itself*.18 The property donated to a vakif was
12 inalcik suggests that about 87% of land was miri in the early sixteenth century and most of 
this miri land was administered under the timar system (Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 110).
12 See Cin, Osmanli Toprak Dtizeni, 26-35; M. T. Sonmez, Osmanli'dan Guniimiize Toprak,
203-205.
14 For a discussion of the legal rights associated with and restrictions over the use of mtilk see 
Cin, Osmanli ToprakDtizeni, 9-17; Sonmez, Osmanli’dan Gtinumtize Toprak, 203-205.
15 Barkan, Ttirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 352-353; Cin, Osmanli Toprak Dtizeni, 271-292.
15 H. Karaman, Anahatlariyla Islam Hukuku, Hususi Hukuk [Precepts of Islamic Law, Private 
Law], V. 2, (istanbul: Ensar Ne§riyat, 1985), 279-280; Sonmez Osmanli’dan Giiniimiize Toprak, 171.
12 Cin, Osmanli Toprak Dtizeni, 26-35; Sonmez, Osmanli’dan Guniimiize Toprak, 203-205.
18 Another form of vakif was the one formed by the endowment of state {miri) lands, or rather of 
the revenue that accrued from them. This type constituted a deviation from the §er’i principle that defined 
a vakif as the pious act of an individual. Consequently, vakifs formed by the assignment of miri land were 
called the gayr-i sahih (improper) vakifs. Only the sultan, or a person authorised by him, had the liberty to 
permit the use of miri lands for the formation of such endowments, and on the condition that they served 
clearly defined religious or charitable purposes beneficial to all Muslims and/or the public in general. The
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definitive and inalienable; that is, it could not be reconverted into mtilk once donated to 
a vakif.19The endower/founder (vakif) had the right and the obligation to determine the 
exact purpose and organisation of the vakif The vakifs were also exempt from the non- 
§er'i taxes, and were thus subject to considerably lighter fiscal dues.20 This fiscal 
advantage constituted the primary economic motive in converting mtilk lands into vakif 
status. Besides, the vakifs enjoyed other privileges that brought considerable economic 
advantages for the administrators of vakif property. For instance, the endower could 
stipulate in the vakif deed that the management of the vakifs should be inherited by his 
descendants.21 The lands donated to a vakif were inalienable properties of the vakif That 
is, they could be leased, "but not sold or bought as freehold property; [they were] not 
subject to suit and seizure for nonpayment of debt, so could not be used in the ordinary 
way as security for borrowing".22 In this sense, the administrators of the vakifs and their 
heirs could benefit from the property on quite favourable fiscal terms, without having to 
worry about loosing the property as a result of indebtedness and other financial 
obligations. A vakif was also entitled to collect a fair rent, that is rent at the going 
market rate, from its tenants under the protection of the law. Thus, the vakifs emerged as 
the rent-yielding property par excellence within the context of the Ottoman land 
regime.23
The Ottoman land regime underwent a fundamental transformation during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Underneath this process lay fiscal problems of the 
Ottoman state. The need to adapt to new and expensive military technologies, and 
frustrating wars fought over a vast territory for extended time periods put incessant 
pressure on state finances and constantly drained revenues accruing to the imperial 
treasury. The cost of keeping and training regular professional armies equipped with 
expensive military hardware in ever-larger numbers put a regular (cash) burden on the
state retained its basic ownership rights (rakabe) on such property, but the right to administer the property 
was transferred to the endowment as stipulated by its deed. See Cin, Osmanli Toprak Dtizeni, 37.
L. Steeg, “Land Tenure,” in E. L. Mears (ed.) Modem Turkey, A Politico-Economic 
Interpretation, 1908-1923 Inclusive, with Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities, (New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1924), 240.
20 Steeg, “Land Tenure,” 242.
21 Steeg, “Land Tenure,” 241. Also see R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856- 
1876, (New York: Gordian, 1963), 257; M. A. Ubicini, Osmanli’da Modernle§me Sancisi [Pains of 
Modernisation in the Ottoman Empire], 1. P. (1851), (Istanbul: Tima§ Yayinlan, 1998), 199.
22 Davison, Reform, 258.
23 B. Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent, The Peasants ’ Loss o f Property Rights 
as Interpreted in the Hanafite Legal Literature o f the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods, (London, New York 
and Sydney: CroomHelm, 1988), 108.
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treasury and intensified the fiscal crisis. In addition, the growing administrative 
expenses of the Ottoman government ruling over a vast empire, one that stretched from 
central Europe to the Caucuses and from Crimea to Yemen further exacerbated the 
fiscal problems. These adverse fiscal circumstances called for a substantial realignment 
of Ottoman state finances. Here, the primary challenge that the Ottomans faced was the 
creation of alternative sources of cash revenue for the central treasury and the adoption 
of more intensive and “monetised” methods of tax collection.24
The Ottoman response to the emergent fiscal crisis was quite mixed and 
involved a number of fiscal, financial, and monetary measures. Domestic borrowing, the 
regular debasement of the currency, the introduction of new taxes, the sale of miri lands 
as mtilk property to private parties, and the attempts to impose tighter fiscal controls on 
vakifs were some of the measures taken by the Ottoman government in response to the 
mounting fiscal crisis.25 From the viewpoint of our discussion, the most important 
development took place probably within the miri system of land-tenure. The Ottoman 
government systematically waived some of its control over the miri lands to gain certain 
short-term fiscal advantages. One of the most consequential developments in this regard 
was the gradual expansion of the practice of tax farming throughout the imperial 
domains.
Tax farming, or iltizam, was already a common form of tax collection during the 
classical period. The collection of the taxes due on miri lands assigned to the central 
treasury or other imperial revenue sources such as customs were regularly auctioned off 
to individuals in return for an up-front cash payment (maktu). These miri lands were 
termed mukataali, or miri mukataa. According to this arrangement, which was similar 
to a rental transaction, the lease holder acquired the right to collect the due taxes for a 
specified period of time as stipulated by the rental contract drawn between the state and 
the lease-holder. Following the termination of the contract, usually after one or two 
years, a new agreement had to be reached and another maktu payment made before the 
tax farmer could assume the same tax collection privileges.26
24 M. Gen?, “XVIII. Yiizyilda Osmanli Ekonomisi ve Sava§”, [Ottoman Economy and War in 
Eighteenth Century], Yapit, 49, N.4, (1984): 51-61; Y. Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim and Degi§im 
Donemi (XVIII, yy. dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih), [Era o f Crises and Change in Ottoman Fiscal Policy 
(Fiscal History From XVmth Century to the Tanzimat)], (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1986).
25 See Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim.
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Although tax farming constituted an important method of revenue collection for 
the imperial treasury throughout the classical period, the practice remained largely 
confined to the lands where revenue was assigned directly to the public treasury. The 
miri lands granted as dirliks were kept outside the tax farming system. However, tax 
farming was gradually extended to include the dirliks assigned to the provincial military 
cavalry during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. First, smaller dirlik units, that 
is the timars, were converted into mukataah status. Gradually, larger units devoted to 
the financing of higher military and administrative positions {has and zeamet) were 
brought under the mukataa system. More importantly, the duration of the mukataa 
arrangements was slowly expanded to cover longer time periods. Finally, in 1695, the 
government began to allow the holding of the mukataas for the lifetime of the 
leaseholder. The lands held by this long-term arrangement was called malikane 
mukataa. In the malikane system, the leaser of the right to collect the taxes due on a 
specific land or area {mukataa) on a life-time basis paid an up-front lump sum amount, 
and, in addition, pledged to pay a certain fixed cash amount to the treasury annually. In 
return, the ‘owner* of the malikane acquired the right to collect revenue within the 
territory in question during his lifetime. Thus, the malikane mukataa holder emerged as 
the collector of taxes and rent on miri lands in return for a fee.27 Legally speaking, the 
state still held the rights of plain ownership {rakabe) over the malikane, but the long­
term nature of his lease and ability of the lessee to negotiate the passing of the mukataa 
to his heirs under similar terms blurred the differences between purely state-contracted 
rights and outright ownership in practice.28
By the end of the eighteenth century, the mukataa system had expanded 
considerably. The standard malikane practice was now quite common throughout the 
empire and constituted an important source of regular cash flow into the imperial 
treasury. In addition, the government adopted certain methods that helped expand the 
mukataa system on a broader social basis. For instance, the treasury introduced the 
practice of issuing chits or shares {esham) against the tax revenue, or rather the net 
future profits, expected from mukataah miri lands with a view to attract smaller 
investors to tax farming and raise the necessary capital to finance the mounting
26 Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim', Gen?, “XVIII. Ytizyilda Osmanli Ekonomisi”.
27 Gen?, “XVIII. Ytizyilda Osmanli Ekonomisi”.
28 A. Salzmann, “Qualifying the ‘Institutionality’ of the Ottoman State: The Malikane Mukaraa 
[Lifeterm Revenue-Contracting] and Proprietary Realities in the 18th Century Middle East”, Unpublished
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budgetary deficits.29 Although these practices secured the flow of cash revenues directly 
into the treasury and enabled the central state to meet its expenses, the mukataa system, 
fell short of resolving the fiscal crisis of the central government, for it led to the 
appropriation of agrarian surplus by local agents at the expense of the central treasury. 
Yet, the eighteenth century also witnessed the diffusion of state authority in the 
provinces and the realignment of Ottoman finances. In this sense, it is possible to argue 
that the new fiscal arrangements/system suited not only the emergent financial 
requirements of the state but also its internal political realities.30
This process of fiscal and political realignment was accompanied by an 
expansion of the relatively ‘autonomous’ socio-economic domain accommodated by the 
miilk and vakif properties. The acquisition of miilk property through §er 7 sales, as well 
as through land reclamations, and the subsequent endowment of such property to vakifs 
appear to have been particularly important in this respect.31
The structural impact of the conversion of newly acquired miilk property into 
vakif status was twofold. On the one hand, the vakifs provided the local power magnates 
with an ideal source of rent income that was inviolable, inalienable and that brought 
considerable fiscal advantages to the endower. Thus, the vakifs helped consolidate the 
financial profile of the local power magnates and contributed to the ‘primitive 
accumulation’ of capital through systematic appropriation and marketing of the 
economic surplus generated within the vakif domain. On the other hand, the vakifs also 
strengthened the prestige of the local power magnates. The welfare functions and public
Paper presented at the Seminar on the Political Economies o f  the Ottoman, Safavid and Mugal Empires 
held at Harvard University on March 17-20,1991.
29 For the details of the esham practice see Cezar, Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim, 79-88.
20 M. Gen?, “Osmanli Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi”, [Malikane System in Ottoman 
Finances], in O. Okyar and U. Nalbantoglu (eds.), Turkiye lktisat Tarihi Semineri [Turkish Economic 
History Seminar], (Ankara: Hacettepe Universitesi Yaymlan, 1975), 230-296; §. Pamuk, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu’nda Paranin Tarihi [The History of Money in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi 
Yurt Yaymlan, 1999), 174-187.
21 H. Inalcik, “The Emergence of Big Farms, Qiftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants,” in Q.
Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1991), 19-28; G. Veinstein, “On the Qiftlik Debate,” in Q. Keyder and F.
Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1991), 37-47; B. McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and
Struggle fo r  Land, 1600-1800, (Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney:
Cambridge University press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 45-79,121-170.
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services provided by the vakifs often signified the endowers’ influence and helped 
consolidate their power.32
The emergence of tax farming, or more specifically the malikane system, as the 
dominant form of revenue collection restructured and transformed land tenure and 
surplus appropriation relations over miri lands. The long tenure of the tax farmer over a 
given mukataa enabled him to establish a dominant position over the cultivators of the 
land. The latter became rent-payers liable to the tax farmer. In other words, the 
malikane mukataa system obscured the tenancy relation between the state and the 
raiyyet, and practically replaced it with a tenancy relation of a private nature set 
between the tax farmer and the occupier of the land. Thus, within the malikane 
mukataas, the tax farmer emerged as a rent collector, or the appropriator of the 
economic surplus generated within the mukataa area. The holder of the malikane came 
close to acquiring the status of a ‘proprietor’ cum landlord.33 More importantly, certain 
prominent individuals used their influence and position to obtain, from Istanbul, the 
necessary permission to convert parts of their malikanes into private estates, which they 
subsequently endowed as vakifs. Such practices enabled certain local power magnates 
(ayan) to amass considerable economic power and to enhance their political influence 
within their respective territories, especially in the eighteenth century.34
The emergence of the local ayan as a powerful group did not necessarily imply 
the immediate loss of government control over the provinces; nor did it mean automatic 
de-centralisation. Indeed, many ayan remained loyal to the central authority and served 
as active agents of central government throughout the provinces.35 However, others
32 For the political and social functions of the vakifs see, N. Ozbek, “The Politics of Poor Relief 
in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 21, (1999): 1-34.
33 Y. Nagata, “The Role of the Ayans in Regional Development During the Pre-Tanzimat 
Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmaoglu Family,” in Studies on the Social and Economic 
History o f  the Ottoman Empire, (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995), 119-133; Nagata, Tarihte Ayanlar, 
Karaosmanogullari Uzerine bir Inceleme [Ayans in History, A Case Study on Karaosmanogullari], 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu B^simevi, 1997).
34 B. MacGowan, “The Age of Ayans, 1699-1812,” in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An 
Economic and Social History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637-758; Nagata, “The Role o f the Ayans”; Nagata, 
Tarihte Ayanlar, Also see Y. Nagata, “The Decline of the Ottoman Empire’s Doctrine of State 
Landownership: The Development of the Qifthk Type of Landownership,” in Studies on the Social and 
Economic History o f  the Ottoman Empire, (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995), 135-139.
33 A. Salzmann, “Qualifying the ‘Institutionality’ of the Ottoman State”; Nagata, Tarihte 
Ayanlar, Akarli, “Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840,” in 
Temimi (ed.), La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a Vepoque ottomane, V. 3, (Zaghouan:
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worked against the authority of Istanbul. In the existing literature, it is not yet exactly 
clear what led some ayan into insurgence, while others simply chose to cooperate with 
and remain loyal to the central authority. However, what the government could deliver 
to the local elite, both politically and economically, appears to have made the critical 
difference in the ayan's decision between compliance and insurgence. In this context, it 
is interesting to note that the ayan in such areas as Egypt and Rumelia that had 
considerable economic potential and solid links to the emerging ‘world economy’ 
managed to seriously challenge the authority of Istanbul. Yet, other, more contingent, 
political and even diplomatic factors played an important role in the ebbs and flows of 
power relations between the centre and the provincial ayan in the eighteenth century.
During the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the early years of the Tanzimat 
period (1839-1876), radical measures were taken to exert the authority of the central 
government over the provinces in a more direct and effective manner. The central 
government organised a series of military campaigns to eliminate the sway of the 
insurgent provincial magnates. In some instances, the state reclaimed the landed 
property held by the ayan in the form of malikanes in order to curb the ayan's economic 
and political power. The leaders of some prominent ayan families were appointed to 
distant locations as governors and officers. In addition, the long defunct dirlikltimar 
system was abolished and the associated miri lands were brought under the direct 
control of the public treasury.36
The internal political and military turmoil that accompanied the liquidation of 
malikanes and of certain vakifs brought about considerable confusion over land matters 
and taxation. The reformers of the Tanzimat era paid due attention to issues of 
landownership and property rights and took a series of administrative and legislative 
measures that would help reinstate state control over land-matters and bring some order 
to fiscal matters. These measures included the enactment of special laws that regulated 
the administration of vakifs, the use of agricultural lands, the acquisition of title deeds, 
the inheritance of landed property and collaterals in the 1840s and the 1850s.37 
However, the most important and comprehensive piece of legislation enacted during the
Publications du Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et 
d’Information, 1988), 41-56.
36 s. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History o f  the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, V. II, Reform 
Revolution and Republic: The Rise o f  Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, (Cambridge, New York, New 
Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6-17.
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Tanzimat period was the 1858 Land Law. A thorough analysis of the 1858 Land Law 
shall not detain us here. But, it is important to discuss certain important features of the 
Land Law in order to clarify our technical discussion of property rights.
The 1858 Land Law remained largely true to the word and the spirit of the 
classical Ottoman laws (kanuns) pertaining to land matters and introduced certain 
complementary but important principles that helped clarify some of the complex legal 
issues at hand. In this context, the 1858 Land Law attempted to reassert the supreme 
custodianship of the state over miri lands and, clause after clause, elucidated the specific 
rights and obligations of the title deed holders.38
As in the classical land regime, the state retained the plain ownership (rakabe) of 
the miri lands and granted the exclusive right of usufruct (tasarruf) to actual cultivators, 
conditional upon the exchange of the old title deeds in their hands with a new certificate 
of tenancy, also called tapu, at the local government offices.39 This principle of re­
registration was important in order to clarify the confusion prevailing over the rights of 
proprietorship associated with miri lands. This measure, as signified in the tapu concept, 
confirmed the state’s plain ownership over miri lands and defined the central 
government, once again, as the ultimate authority that could establish and confirm
37 Barkan, Tiirkiye’de ToprakMeselesi, 317-332.
38 G. Baer, “Land Tenure in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1800-1950,” in C. Issawi (ed.), The 
Economic History o f  the Middle East, 1800-1914, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1966), 83-84; D. Warringer, “Land Tenure Problems in the Fertile Crescent in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries,” in C. Issawi (ed.), The Economic History o f  the Middle East, 1800-1914, (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 72; K. Karpat, “The Land Regime, Social Structure, 
and Modernisation in the Ottoman Empire,” in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), Beginnings o f  
Modernisation in the Middle East, The Nineteenth Century, (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), 86-90; S. Yerasimos, Azgeli§mi§lik Siirecinde Tiirkiye, Tanzimattan 1. Dunya 
Savanna [Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment, From Tanzimat to the Great War], V.2, (Istanbul: 
Gozlem Yaymlan, 1975), 705; Barkan, Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 343; P. Sluglett, and M. Farouk- 
Sluglett “The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some Preliminary Observations,” in 
T. Khalidi (ed.,) Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, (Beirut: American University 
of Beirut, 1984), 413; D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert 
(eds.) An Economic and Social History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 857; H. Islamoglu-Inan, “Hukuk, Miilkiyet, Me§ruiyet, 
Mukayeseli Tarih Yazimi 19m bir Oneri,” [Law, Property, Legitimacy, A Suggestion for Comparative 
History], in Osmanli’dan Cumhuriyet’e Problemler, Ara§tirmalar, Tarti$malar, 1. Uluslararasi Tarih 
Kongresi, 24-26 Mayis 1993, Ankara, [From Ottoman Times to the Republican Era, Problems, Research 
and Debates, 1st International History Conference, 24-26 May 1993, Ankara], (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt 
Yaymlan, 1998), 1-13; H. Islamoglu-inan, “Administering Property: Law and Statistics,” Unpublished 
Paper Presented at Conference on Shared Histories o f  Modernity: State Transformation in Chinese and 
Ottoman Contexts at Sabanci University in Istanbul on May 15, 2000; H. Gerber, The Social Origins o f  
the Middle East, 68-70.
39 Arazi Kanunnamesi, (Land Code), O. Oeker (ed.), Osmanli Kanunlari Serisi: 2 [Ottoman 
Law Series, V. 2], (Istanbul: Ebru Yaymlan, 1985), 14, Article 3.
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proprietary rights over miri lands. The same measure also secured the integrity of the 
legal rights held by the possessor of the title deed. The possession of the tapu certificate 
simply signified the possessor’s legal claim to proprietorship over miri lands on a 
legally enforceable basis. This aspect of the Land Law was of crucial importance, as it 
defined property rights as a legal category signified by the possession of the tapu deed. 
That is, no other legal condition, such as the obligation to pay certain §er 7 and 
customary taxes etc., could signify the proprietary rights of the title deed holder over 
miri lands, with the same degree of certainty, as did the title deed. In this sense, the 
1858 Land Law helped clarify matters pertaining to the ownership and use of miri lands, 
and, ceteris paribus, facilitated the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Given the importance of the tapu, the legal framework that regulated the actual 
acquisition of the title deeds was of prime importance for the consolidation of the 
proprietary rights held by the title deed holders. The 1858 Land Law primarily adopted 
the principle of individual 'ownership' (ferdi tasarruf hakki) over miri lands and 
required the registration of title deeds on an individual basis for each village household. 
Accordingly, Article 8 forbade collective landholding and Articles 130 and 131 
prohibited the acquisition of the lands of an entire (occupied) village by a few 
individuals.40 Thus, the Land Law openly gave priority to the acquisition of the title 
deeds by the actual possessors cum cultivators of the land, or the reaya as such.
However, certain clauses of the law, also implicitly allowed collective 
landholding and the acquisition of title deeds for large tracts of land by individual 
parties. For instance, Articles 15-18 of the Land Law practically allowed collective, or 
rather shared (bi 7 i$tirak), ownership over miri lands.41 Article 78 stipulated that 
anyone who brought miri land under cultivation for more than ten years without a legal 
permit could acquire a title deed to that land upon the payment of the due registration 
fee. Also, a person who had practically occupied abandoned (mahlul) land for over ten 
years and had kept it under cultivation during this period could acquire the title deeds 
freely even if s/he did not have a legal permit to start with. Should there be conflicting 
claims thereof, however, the occupier could still obtain a deed upon the individual’s 
acceptance and confession to his/her unlawful act, the settlement of the conflict and the
^A razi Kanunnamesi, 20, 69-70, Articles 8,130, 131.
41 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 21-22, Articles 15-18.
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payment of the registration fee.42 Likewise, any individual who put dead mevat land into 
productive use could acquire the tapu certificate and assume full rights of possession 
and usufruct as stipulated by the law 43
It is important to note that the practice of granting tapu deeds to persons who 
had reclaimed or ‘vivified’ mevat lands deviated from the classical practice of granting 
such lands as miilk property to the persons in question. As we have seen, the mevat 
lands previously had been associated, albeit indirectly, with the relatively “autonomous” 
socio-economic domain of the miilk and vakif categories. However, the 1858 Land Law 
established a careful association between mevat and miri categories and thus implicitly 
extended state ownership into the domain of mevat lands. This deviation form the 
classical practice underscores the state’s concern with consolidating its control over 
land matters. In fact, the state’s immediate concern was to clarify the legal status of 
landed property and to deepen state control therein, rather than a straightforward and a 
priori commitment to the preservation of the proprietary rights o f the reaya. Quataert 
points out that the 1858 Land Law helped legalise and confirm patterns of landholding 
within the miri/mevat domain. Existing research on the actual registration of title deeds 
supports Quataert’s view and depicts a highly diverse picture whereby both the reaya 
and prominent individuals in possession of large tracts of land registered the land in 
their name and acquired title deeds. Local power balance, traditions and other more 
contingent political factors seem to have played an important role in the registration 
process and the subsequent acquisition of the title deeds by private parties.44
Despite important organisational and institutional drawbacks, the 
aforementioned developments contributed to the consolidation of the proprietary rights 
of title deed holders. The inadequacies of provincial administrations and the justice
42 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 48, Article 78.
43 Arazi Kanunnames, 58, Article 103.
44 For the registration of title deeds by powerful individuals and tribal leaders at the expense of 
the actual occupiers of the land see, D. Warringer, “Land Tenure Problems,” 72-75; Sluglett and Farouk- 
Sluglett “The Application of the 1858 Land Code”; A. Jwadieh, “Aspects of Land Tenure and Social 
Change in Lower Iraq during the Late Ottoman Times,” in T. Khalidi (ed.), Land Tenure and Social 
Transformation in the Middle East, (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), 333-356; H. Gerber, 
The Social Origins o f  the Modem Middle East. For examples of the registration of title deeds by 
independent peasant farmers see M. Mundy, “The State of Property: Late Ottoman Southern Syria (The 
Kaza ‘Ajlun, 1875-1918),” in H. Islamoglu (ed,), Constitutions o f  Property in Comparative Perspective, 
(Albany and Paris: State University of New York Press for the European Science Foundation, 
Forthcoming); M. Mundy, “Village Auhtority and the Legal Order of Property (The Southern Hauran, 
1876-1922),” in R. Owen (ed.), New Perspectives on Land Issues in Middle Eastern History, 
Forthcoming; Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,”.
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system; simple incompetence of some government officers and judicial staff, and 
corruption in government offices seem to have compromised the efficacy of the legal 
and administrative measures, particularly during the crucial transitionary years of the 
Tanzimat era.45 Later in. the Hamidian period, the improvements in provincial 
administration seemingly helped overcome some of the difficulties encountered in the 
previous years 46 Also, the land surveys undertaken by the authorities seem to have 
further improved the situation in favour of the title-holder (see below). It is my 
impression that most of the disputes over land ‘ownership* were settled and most 
individuals in possession of miri lands came to hold a tapu whether through surveys, 
corrupt practices, brutal force or by way of legal action by the mid-1890s. As we shall 
see in the case of Selanik, the disputes during this later period were largely over the 
violation of rights held by individuals. Proof of proprietorship, to the best of my 
knowledge, was hardly a serious and inconsolable matter. The litigants could normally 
prove their ownership status before the courts and other government offices. Local 
governments and judicial authorities systematically decided in favour of those who 
could prove, beyond reasonable doubt, their ownership status and enforced the law to 
their best capacity. In this respect, proof of ownership, that is the possession of a tapu 
certificate, now constituted an important source of power. In the case of those 
individuals who managed to acquire tapus for sufficiently large miri territory, these 
documents also allowed holders to appropriate the economic surplus generated within
45 For the inadequacies of the Ottoman legal system during the Tanzimat era see H. Cin, 
“Tanzimat Doneminde Osmanli Hukuku veYargilama-Usulleri,” [Ottoman Law and Legal Procedures in 
the Tanzimat Era], in H. D. Yildiz (ed.), 150. Yilinda Tanzimat [Tanzimat in its 150th Anniversary] 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan, 1992), 11-32; G. Bozkurt, ‘Tanzimat and Law,” in Tanzimat’in 
150. Yildoniimii Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, Ankara 31 Ekim -  3 Kasim 1989 [Tanzimat in its 150th 
Anniversary, Conference Proceedings, Ankara 31 October -  3 November 1989] (Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu Basimevi, 1994), 279-286; Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of 
Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic], V. 3, 1985, “Tanzimat’tan Sonra Kanunla§tirma Hareketleri,” 
[Legalisation Efforts after Tanzimat] by B. Tahiroglu; Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi. 
[Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic], V. 3, 1985, “Tanzimat’tan Sonra Resepsiyon,” 
[Legal Reception after Tanzimat] by U. Azrak. For a more general account see, 1. Ortayli, 
Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyih [The Longest Century of the Empire], l.P. (1983), (istanbul: lleti§im 
Yaymlan, 1999).
46 For improvements in provincial administrations and the legal system during the Hamidian era 
see Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia o f Turkey from Tanzimat to the 
Republic), V. 1, 1985, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Ulke Yonetimi,” [Public Administration from 
Tanzimat to the Republic] by M. Cadirci; Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi 
[Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic], V. 1, 1985, “Tanzimat ve Me§rutiyet 
Donemlerinde Yerel Yonetimler” [Local Administrations during the Tanzimat and Constitutional Era] by 
I. Ortayli; I. Ortayli, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yonetim Gelenegi [The Tradition of Local 
Administrations from Tanzimat to the Republic], (Istanbul: Hil Yaymlari, 1985); I. Ortayli, “II. 
Abdulhamid Devrinde Ta§ra Burokrasisinde Gayrimtislimler,” [Non-Muslims in Ottoman Provincial 
Bureaucracy during the Hamidian Era], in Sultan II. Abdulhamid ve Devri Semineri, 27-29 Mayis 1992 
[Seminar on the Hamidian Era, 27-29 May 1992], (istanbul: Edebiyat Faktiltesi Basimevi, 1994), 163- 
172.
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the miri lands on a legally enforceable basis. The tapu concept as set by the 1858 Land 
Law constituted the legal basis of this empowerment.
The 1858 Land Law and the supplementary legislation enacted during the 1860s 
and 1870s brought about important relaxations over the acquisition and transfer of miri 
property. As we have seen, the classical land regime put important restrictions on the 
transfer of miri lands. At first, the 1858 Land Law adopted similar restrictive principles 
in regulating the transfer of miri property. However, subsequent legislation introduced 
important relaxations in transactions, especially in those related to sales, mortgage, 
collaterals, leases and inheritance.
Sale, Mortgage and Collateral: According to the 1858 Land Law, the title-deed 
holders could not fully and directly exercise certain rights associated with the plain 
ownership (rakabe) of the land. For instance, the title-deed holders could not sell the 
land. They could transfer (ferag) their title deeds to a third party but only with the 
permission of the local authorities.47 Similarly, the creditors could not get miri lands 
sequestered as a result of the title-deed holders' failure to pay his/her outstanding debts, 
because technically the land was not the property of the title-deed holder. Upon the 
death of the title deed holder the debts would simply accrue to his/her heirs. If no heirs 
could be found, then the land could be “sold”, or more appropriately re-assigned, to 
others by the state.48 By the same token, the miri lands could not be held as collateral. 
However, the law allowed die title deed holder to relinquish his/her rights to creditors in 
trust (yefaen ferag). In this case, the creditors would “withhold” (hapis) the title to the 
land and the title-deed holder could not reclaim his rights without the full repayment of 
the debt49 If the title-deed holder failed to pay the outstanding debts in his/her lifetime 
and if his/her heirs could not pay them either, then the title deeds would remain 
practically “withheld” by the creditors or their heirs, providing them the right to reclaim 
the debt in the event that the land was auctioned for reassignment by the government 
authorities. The proceeds from the auction would go to the creditors primarily, after the 
deduction of a certain fee (commission) by the state.50
47 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 29-30, Articles 36, 38. Also see O. L. Barkan Tiirkiye’de Toprak 
Meselesi, 344; H. Cin, Osmanli Toprak Dtizeni, 166-167.
48 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 65-66, Article 115.
49 Arazi Kanunnamesi> 66, Article 116.
50 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 67, Article 118.
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Although these regulations allowed the transfer of miri lands and theoretically 
enabled the title-deed holder to show it as collateral against debt and other liabilities, the 
regulations were still quite restrictive. For instance, the existing legislation practically 
barred the title deed holders from access to credit markets on favourable terms and 
discouraged creditors from extending long-term credits to farmers, due mainly to the 
technical complications and the long-term risks associated with the practice of ‘vefaen 
ferag’ and “land capture” {hapis). In this respect, the 1858 Land Law, fell short of 
meeting the specific needs of the rapidly growing commercial economy, for it did not 
allow land to become fully commodified, not yet.
In the 1860s and the 1870s, however, the Ottoman government enacted 
supplementary legislation that largely liberalised the transactions related to mortgages 
and collaterals. First, the restrictions on the sale of miri lands to pay the outstanding 
debts of the title-deed holder were removed. Two pieces of legislation promulgated in 
1861 allowed the sale of property against the debt owed to the state during the lifetime 
of the title deed holder. In 1869, new legislation endorsed the sale of title deeds for the 
payment of all private debts during the lifetime of the title holder. In 1872, the scope of 
this legislation was extended further to hold the heirs of the title deed holder 
accountable for the payment of outstanding debts owed to the state. In 1911, the existing 
legislation was adjusted to include debt to private parties as well.51
Similar modifications eased the technical difficulties encountered in using land 
as collateral. A regulation enacted in 1869 made the sale of the title deeds of an 
indebted individual compulsory upon his/her death even if s/he had heirs. This 
legislation was important as it provided the,creditor’s the vague, if  not impractical, right 
to ’’withhold” the title deed of the debtor with enforceability. According to Barkan, this 
legislation closely approximated the practice of vefaen ferag  to an absolute collateral 
{kati ferag).52
Lease: Previously, the title-deed holder could not independently lease the miri 
land in his possession to a third party. The 1858 Land Law expanded the usufruct rights 
held by the title deed holders and granted them the exclusive right to use and benefit
O. L. Barkan, Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 1980, 346; Cin, Osmanli Toprak Duzeni, 339-343.
52 Barkan, Tiirkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, 348.
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from the miri land in their possession. Thus, Article 23 openly allowed leases.53 Articles 
10 and 14 secured the ultimate proprietary rights of the title-deed holder against third 
parties and stipulated that no other person could cultivate or benefit in any other way 
from the land without the permission of the title-deed holder. If such an unlawful act did 
occur, the title-deed holder retained the right to have the perpetrators expelled by due 
legal action.54
Inheritance: The classical land regime put important restrictions over the 
inheritance of miri property. Prior to the enactment of the 1858 Land Law, Ottoman 
legislation recognised only the sons and daughters of the title deed holder as legal 
heirs.55 If no such heirs could be identified, the property would then accrue to the public 
treasury (beyt-iil mat), which would then reassign the land to a third party as stipulated 
by the law. The close relatives of the deceased, such as the partners, parents and the 
siblings had to make, like any other legal party, the necessary down payment (hedel-i 
menfaat) to acquire the title deed. In this respect, the old Ottoman legislation defined 
inheritance rights on a narrow basis for miri lands in comparison to freehold miilk 
property, which, as we have seen, could be inherited, without any extra cost, by close 
relatives (asabe) of the malik.
The 1858 Land Law extended the right of inheritance on miri lands quite 
considerably and recognised the parents, as well as the children, of the deceased as legal 
heirs.56 Supplementary legislation enacted in 1867 allowed the inheritance of title deeds 
also by the siblings, spouses and grandchildren of the title-deed holders.57 Thus, by the 
1870s, the laws governing the inheritance of miri property approximated quite closely 
those that regulated the inheritance of freehold miilk and vafo/property.
The consolidation of the proprietary rights over miri lands and the liberalisation 
of transactions related to sales, mortgages, collaterals, leases and inheritances involving 
miri lands had important economic repercussions. First, the liberalisation of these 
transactions brought the proprietorship of miri land close to freehold status. Secondly,
53 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 23-24, Article 23.
54 Arazi Kanunnamesi, 20-21, Articles 10, 14.
55 Cin, Osmanli Toprak Duzeni, 259-261.
5^ Arazi Kanunnamesi, 36, Articles 54, 55. Also see Barkan, Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 357-
358.
57 Barkan Tiirkiye ’de Toprak Meselesi, 359-360; Cin, Osmanli Toprak Duzeni, 344-346.
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the land legislation allowed the near complete commodification of land as a primary 
factor of production. These two consequential developments serve as a key to 
understanding the underlining dynamics of agrarian transformation, during the 
Hamidian era. The implication of the legal measures for a) the commercialisation of 
agriculture, b) the structuration of land and credit markets, and c) the transformation of. 
the relations of production in agriculture is particularly important to note.
a) Consolidation of property rights meant first and foremost that the proprietors 
could exercise their “ownership” rights freely, subject only to minor regulations and 
usual fiscal obligations. They could exclude all other parties from interfering with the 
production process and from violating the property in a way that would undermine the 
proprietors' capacity to fully benefit from it. Besides, the extension of the rights of 
inheritance practically prevented the return of miri property to the public treasury (beyt 
til mat) upon the death of the proprietor and thus secured the continuity of ownership 
within the broader family unit.
These liberties and privileges in ownership must have, ceteris paribus, 
constituted a strong incentive for the proprietors to respond to market forces, increase. 
production, and to invest in the property.58 Hence, the land legislation, in its broad 
structural sense, seems to have articulated well with the ongoing commercialisation 
process in agriculture. In this respect, we can consider the Ottoman government as an 
important agent of commercialisation and integration with the capitalist world economy, 
particularly during the Hamidian era.
b) The increasing commodification of land allowed the establishment of a solid 
structural link between land and credit markets. Theoretically speaking, the 
liberalisation of the mortgage of land and of its use as collateral helped reduce 
“transaction costs” in land and credit markets and rendered transactions easier and more 
definitive for all the parties involved. The new legislation also enabled the proprietors to 
have direct access to credit markets, especially for long-term loans. Indeed, thousands 
of farmers were able to receive credit on favourable terms from public credit 
institutions, particularly from the Agricultural Bank, showing their miri “property” as 
collateral during the Hamidian period. Similarly, transactions in private credit markets 
expanded notably, following the liberalisation of regulations that governed collaterals
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and mortgages. Many private banks, individual bankers and usurers extended credits to 
land owners quite liberally during the same period. Although some of the credit thus 
obtained could not always be put to productive use, such financial arrangements 
nevertheless enhanced the flexibility of the agrarian economy at large.59 In this respect, 
the increasing commodification of land articulated firmly the moment of 
commercialisation and of the spread of modem capitalist relations in the countryside.
c) The commodification of land and the consolidation of property rights also had 
important repercussions for the restructuring of the relations of production in 
agriculture. Firstly, the commodification of land increased the title deed holders’ risk of 
dispossession and thus added to their insecurity. Indeed, many proprietors lost their 
entitlement to land under distressing mortgages and became tenants on the lands they 
once held in ownership in almost all parts of the empire during the Hamidian era. Other 
dispossessed farmers left for urban areas and joined the ranks of the urban working 
classes and provided the necessary cheap labour power for the growing urban sectors. 
Such dynamics of dislocation reflected the cmel face of the ongoing “modernisation” 
process. However, these dislocations also helped accelerate the rise of a “market 
society” in Ottoman lands.60
Secondly, the liberalisation of leases contributed to the liberalisation of tenancy 
relations over all miri lands. Now, the title deed holder could become a rentier landlord 
over miri property. The exclusiveness of the rights of usufruct empowered the title deed 
holder with the capacity to appropriate the surplus generated within the miri property on 
a legally enforceable basis. In this respect, the land legislation seems to have allowed 
the primitive accumulation of capital in Ottoman lands. However, the surplus 
appropriated by the landlords rarely found its way to productive ends. Intense 
competition in both overseas and domestic markets increased the risks associated with 
such productive investments. In addition, high transaction costs emanating from certain 
institutional inadequacies prevented proprietors from undertaking investment in key
Also see Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”, 861.
59 See Chapter 3 for the distribution of Agricultural Bank credits.
60 Here the term market society is based on Polanyi’s conceptualisation of transition from 
barter-based traditional societies to those characterised by the presence of comprehensive networks of 
commodity exchange regulated and secured by the body-politique. Within this context, the key process 
emerges as the commodification of labour power and its incorporation into the market process through 
economic dislocation and political mediation. See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
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productive sectors of the economy, especially in agriculture.61 Under the circumstances, 
the Duesenberry effect absorbed the income accruing to the landlords and they spent 
their money to finance the lavish life styles they led in towns.62 In some instances, the 
proprietors invested considerable sums into real estate development, particularly in the 
growing urban areas.63 However, the proprietors appear to have invested the bulk of 
their capital into usury practices and financial arbitrage, both within the empire and in 
European money and stock markets.64 The chronic financial insolvency of the Ottoman 
state also created ample opportunities for these people of economic means profit 
considerably from extending short-term credits to the government. The most common 
form of such lending was tax farming. In order to understand the logic of this usury 
practice we should consider briefly the systems of taxation that prevailed throughout the 
empire during the period under consideration.
From the early years of the Tanzimat period onwards, the central government 
attempted to centralise taxation practices and tried to put the sources of tax revenue 
under the responsibility of appointed governors and officers. The central government 
abolished the practice of tax fanning in 1840/1841 and commissioned salaried officers 
for the collection of tithes in the provinces.. However, this practice (emaneten idare) led 
to significant reaction and confusion over the collection of taxes and gave way to a 
notable contraction in government revenue. The appointed tax collectors were often 
forced into isolation and encountered immense difficulties in collecting the taxes and in 
converting the in-kind tax payments into cash, before forwarding the due amount to
61 See Chapters 2 and 3 for the institutional factors that impaired the development of 
agricultural sector.
62 The Dusenberry effect can be summarised as follows: “even if per capita incomes in 
backward regions rise ... any potentially favourable impact on savings will be annihilated by an increase' 
in the propensity to consume as people in these regions try to catch up with the consumption standards 
prevalent in the industrially advanced countries”. See D. Hunt, Economic Theories o f  Development: An 
Analysis o f  Competing Paradigms, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989), 55.
62 See Chapter 5.
64 E. Kiray, Osmanli ’da Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borglar, [Economic Structure and Foreign Debt 
in the Ottoman Empire] (istanbul: lleti§im, 1993); H. Kazgan, Galata Bankerleri [The Bankers of Galata] 
(istanbul: TEB Yaymlari, 1991); G. Kazgan, Tanzimat’tan XXI. Yiizyila Tiirkiye Ekonomisi, Birinci 
Kureselle$meden tkinci Kiireselle$meye [Turkish Economy from the Tanzimat to the Twenty-First 
Century, From the First Wave of Globalisation to the Second] (istanbul: Altm Kitaplar Yaymevi, 1999); 
E. Eldem, Osmanli Bankasi Tarihi [The History of the Ottoman Bank] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yaymlari, 
2000). For the speculative transactions of notables in Istanbul Stock Exchange see, A. Fertekligil, 
Tiirkiye ’de Borsa ’nm Tarihqesi [The History of Stock Exchange in Turkey] (istanbul: iMKB Yaymlan, 
1993),.
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Istanbul. The failure of the practice of direct tax collection inevitably compelled the 
government to revert to the practice of tax farming in 1843-1844.65
The authorities nevertheless tried to impose tighter controls over the tax farmers 
and took certain measures to improve the system of tax collection in favour of the 
central treasury and of the cultivators, who suffered immensely in the hands of tax 
farmers. The efforts had only limited success, and the predominance of local agents in 
fiscal processes went largely unchallenged until the end of the Tanzimat period. 
Provincial notables (e§raj), powerful merchants and usurers especially managed to 
capture commanding positions in tax farming auctions either through influence or the 
sheer use of the financial power at their disposal.66
During the early years of the Hamidian era, the authorities systematically tried to 
impose tighter controls over the tax collection processes. They attempted to introduce 
more effective methods of direct tax collection; to replace the proportional tithe with a 
fixed land tax; to contract the due taxes collectively to villagers themselves, rather than 
to tax farmers; to impose tighter controls on the activities of tax farmers; and to increase 
the competitiveness and fairness of tax-farm auctions. The efforts of the central 
government were only partially successful. At times and in certain parts of the empire, 
the power and influence of local agents simply proved impermeable, and the practice of 
tax farming continued to be the dominant form of revenue collection. This was the case 
especially in Eastern Anatolia and the Arab lands, where local notables, sheikhs and 
other feudal lords still reigned supreme.67 In more central areas, that is in the Rumelian 
and Anatolian provinces, administrative inadequacies and corrupt practices 
compromised the effectiveness and applicability of the decrees and regulations 
promulgated by the central government. Besides, the sustained price depression of the 
1880s and the 1890s abated the attraction of tax farming and many risk averse tax 
farmers shied away from auctions. Under the circumstances, a few tax farmers with
65 E. D. Akarli, The Problems o f  External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits 
in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamit II: Origins and Solutions, (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton: 
University of Princeton, 1976); E. D. Akarli, “Economic Policy Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909,” 
Middle Eastern Studies, 28, N. 3, (1992): 443-476. A. §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli Vergi Sistemi 
[Ottoman Taxation System during the Tanzimat Era], (istanbul: i§aret, 1990); Z. Karamursal, Osmanli 
Mali Tarihi Hakkinda Tetkikler [Studies on Ottoman Fiscal History], (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basimevi, 1989).
66 K. Karpat, “The Land Regime,” 84-86; Barkan Tiirkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, 343; Y. Cezar, 
Osmanli Maliyesinde Bunalim, 244-280; Shaw and Shaw, History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 114; Quataert, 
“The Age of Reforms,” 854-855.
201
considerable economic power and local influence dominated auctions and acquired 
privileges in taxation at exorbitantly low prices at the expense of the central treasury.68
The efforts of the central government apparently yielded more significant results 
only towards the end of the Hamidian era. Arguably, the most significant quantitative 
indicator of the government’s increasing capacity in revenue collection is the proportion 
of the actual tithe receipts {tahsilat) to the expected total tithe revenues (tahakkukat). 
According to Shaw’s figures, the ratio of tahsilat to tahakkukat rose steadily from about 
72% in the late 1890s to 84% in the early 1910s.69 A number of administrative and 
economic reasons seem to have underlined this improvement in the efficiency of tithe 
collection. The establishment of more comprehensive systems of local government 
seem to have contributed significantly to the government’s capacity to collect taxes, 
especially in commercially developed, central, and rail-linked areas of the empire. Also, 
the control of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA) over the collection and 
management of an increasing share of the tithe revenues in certain districts seems to 
have helped improve the overall efficacy of tax farming. Finally, the recovery in 
agricultural prices seems to have increased the attraction of tax farming, particularly for 
smaller investors. Hence, higher bids for tax-farms, less tax in arrears, and a better 
approximation of the actual to the expected revenues became possible.70
Whatever the improvements in the government’s capacity to impose tighter 
controls on tax farming may have been, the practice still remained the primary means of 
tithe collection throughout the empire. About 90-95% of the provincial tithe revenue 
was collected by means of tax farming during the Hamidian era.71 The persistence of tax 
farming was consequential. First, certain aspects of tax farming, which we shall discuss 
in greater detail in the next section, had regressive effects on agriculture and put peasant 
farmers under economic distress. Secondly, tax farming was a lucrative means of 
income generation from which the investors could expect to earn up to 30% in profits, 
depending on the economic conjuncture, the market position of the tax farmer, and his
67 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures', Quataert, Ottoman Reform.
^^Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures.
69 s. J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue Systems,” 
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 6, (1975): 453.
70 See Chapter-1 for a discussion of the impact of rising prices on tax farming returns.
71 Akarli, The Problems o f External Pressures', S. J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Tax Reforms”.
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capacity to extract surplus from the taxpayers.72 At no point in the nineteenth century 
did an investment yield such high returns. Thus, tax farming, together with landlordism, 
emerged as the primary rentier activity, especially if the investor was a person of local 
prominence and influence.
Overall, the metamorphosis and restructuring of the land regime and systems of 
taxation had important implications for the transformation of the Ottoman economy 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These developments were in 
line with the moment of capitalist incorporation and underscored the consolidation of a 
highly commercialised economy with considerable potential for primitive accumulation 
and long-term capitalist transformation. In this broad process, landlords, tax farmers, 
merchants and usurers, who appropriated and/or marketed the rural surplus, acted as the 
active agents of the ongoing commercialisation process.73 However, commercialisation 
did not immediately translate into processes of modernisation and full-blown capitalist 
transformation. The attractiveness of usury practices and financial arbitrage undermined 
the valorisation of capital and withheld agents from investing into agriculture and 
manufacturing Also, the desire and ambition to lead opulent (urban) lifestyles 
intensified the problem of underinvestment in key sectors of the agricultural economy. 
Under the circumstances,, the development of modem sectors as well as agriculture 
remained limited, and the Ottoman economy lagged seriously behind its contemporaries 
in Europe as well as in Asia and the Americas.74 Meanwhile, the insecurities of the 
Ottoman population and their exposure to market risks became greater than ever before. 
Many farmers lost their entitlement to land under unfavourable market conditions and 
became tenants over the lands they once held in “ownership”.75 Others sought their 
fortunes elsewhere in urban areas and overseas.76 This process of displacement amid 
commercialisation marks the emergence of a “market society” in Ottoman lands. We 
now turn to the manifestation of this process in the Selanik region.
72 R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, The Nineteenth Century, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1987); Quataert, Ottoman Reform.
73 See Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire.
74 A. O. Akarli, “Growth and Retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880-1910,” in §. Pamuk and 
J. G. Williamson (eds.), The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London: Routledge, 
2000), 109-133.
75 T. Giiran, Tanzimat Doneminde Osmanli Maliyesi: Biitgeler ve Hazine Hesaplari, 1841-1861 
[Ottoman Finances in the Tanzimat Period: Budgets and Financial Calculations] (Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu Basimevi, 1998).
76 See B. C. Gounaris, “Emigration from Macedonia in the Early Twentieth Century,” Journal 
o f  Modem Greek Studies, 7, (1989): 133-153, for a discussion of the forces underlining emigration to US 
from Macedonian provinces.
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2. Relations of Property and (Re)Distribution: The Selanik Region, c.1880- 
c.1910
2.1. Thd Consolidation of Property Rights: Registration, Deliverance of Justice and 
Law Enforcement
The registration of the title deeds proceeded steadily in Selanik during the 
Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. During the Tanzimat era, the authorities took a number 
of important administrative measures that would bring some order to cadastral records 
and secure the more systematic registration of the title deeds. First step taken in this 
direction was probably the fiscal surveys carried out by the Ottoman government during 
the early 1840s. These surveys were primarily intended to bring some order to the 
payment of property and income taxes. The records were kept in quite a detailed manner 
and the authorities registered the precise nature, the basic characteristics and the value 
of the real estate held by individuals in almost all provinces of the empire. Selanik was 
included in this broader scheme. The local authorities registered the real property held 
by individuals in the province.77 This early fiscal survey was a preliminary step to revise 
and update the existing land as well as tax registers.78
Important administrative measures were also taken to register the title deeds and 
to supervise land transactions on a regular basis during the last decade of the Tanzimat 
period. Following the promulgation of the Law of Provincial Administration in 1864, an 
imperial registry (Defter-i Hakani) was established to register all land transactions. In 
the early 1870s, the Defter-i Hakani was further expanded to register land transactions 
at a sub-provincial (sancak) level. In addition, special committees called the tahrir-i 
emlak komisyonlari were set up to oversee the registration of title deeds in the sancaks. 
Numerous government offices (emlak kalemi) were also established in the sub-districts 
(kazas) to supervise and administer matters pertaining to real property on a regular
77 T. Giiran, “Tanzimat Doneminde Tarim Politikasi”, [Agricultural Policy in the Tanzimat. 
Period] in O. Okyar and H. inalcik (eds.) Social and Economic History o f  Turkey (1071-1920): Papers 
Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History o f  Turkey, (Ankara: 
Meteksan Limited §irketi, 1980), 271-277; T. Guran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi Uzerine Ara§tirmalar 
[Research on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Agriculture], (Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik, 1998).
7% islamoglu-inan, “Administering Property”.
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basis.79 Thus, a comprehensive and well-diffused regulatory bureaucratic system had 
been instituted on the eve pf the Hamidian period.
The special committees (tahrir emlak komisyonlari) were particularly active 
during the last years of the Tanzimat period. These committees began to register title 
deeds and conducted land surveys throughout the region from the early 1870s 
onwards.80 Apparently, the early efforts of the committees and other government offices 
failed to bring complete order to local registers. Disputes over the ownership of landed 
property could still be seen. An example drawn from Ottoman and British archives 
should illustrate the point.
In the early 1870s, a heated dispute arose between the heirs of a certain Hasib 
Pa§a and the dragoman of the British Consulate in Salonica, Mr. Bizzo, concerning the 
ownership of a certain estate (giftlik) named Citros located in the district of Karaferye. 
Mr. Bizzo claimed that Citros was sold entirely to him by the deceased Hasib Pa§a. 
However, the heirs of Hasib Pa§a argued that their father held the estate in partnership 
with Mr. Bizzo. Subsequently, the litigants were asked to provide the authorities with 
conclusive proof of ownership. The heirs of Hasib Pa§a failed to provide the tapu to the 
court, but they insisted on their claims. Subsequently the local authorities carried out an 
investigation into the local registers to determine the exact legal status of the estates 
held by the heirs of Hasib Pa§a. The authorities managed to confirm Hasib Pa§a's 
ownership of sixteen estates in the district of Karaferye, but failed to find conclusive 
evidence to confirm his ownership over twenty estates, which were currently held by his 
heirs. Citros was among this latter group. In any case, the dispute between the heirs of 
Hasib Pa§a and Mr. Bizzo could not be resolved for decades, hence causing 
considerable upset for the British diplomats in Istanbul and Salonica. As late as 1904, 
the appeals and the hearings were still continuing.81 The importance of this case is that it
79 See 1299 S.V.S., 1882. Also for organisation of provincial governments Shaw and Shaw, 
History o f  the Ottoman Empire, 83-91.
See, BA, §D-Selanik, 2005/1, 24.§.1289 (27.10.1872). Also see the reports published in 
P.P.A.P., 1870, V. 27: 273-303, which cite regularly the registration o f title deeds by local authorities 
throughout the European provinces. The widespread registration of title deeds in the European provinces, 
particularly in the province of Selanik, is also mentioned by J. Baker, Turkey, (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1877), 397-398.
81 BA, §D-Selanik, 2006/15, 22.S.1292 (30.3.1875). Also see PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 22.1.1873, 
Blunt to Elliot, Salonica; PRO, F.O. 195/283, Memorandum on the Administration o f  Justice in 
Macedonia, by H. du Vallon, N. 152, 29.10.1904.
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illustrates the continuing confusion over ownership of landed property and points to the 
feebleness of local land registers in the early 1870s.
More focused and systematic efforts were made to register the title deeds and to 
update cadastral records came later in the 1870s and the 1880s. The bureaucratic 
machine set up during the last decade of the Tanzimat era apparently served its purpose 
well. It seems that the defteri hakani, the emlak tahrir komisyonlari and the emlak 
kalemleri managed to supervise land transactions and brought some degree of order to 
the land registers. In addition, the authorities carried out two more land surveys, one in 
1878 and the other in 1886. These surveys facilitated the registration of the title deeds 
on an extensive basis throughout the province. Finally, another land survey conducted in 
1907 probably secured the near universal registration of title deeds in the region.82
The proprietors themselves showed considerable interest in land registration and 
assumed active initiative to acquire their tapu certificates from the local government 
offices. As we have seen, the law provided the title deed holders with security of tenure 
and granted them exclusive rights of usufruct and possession on a legally enforceable 
basis. This legal empowerment and the security provided by the law probably 
constituted a strong incentive for the proprietors to register the land in their name and to 
acquire their title deeds. A few examples from the districts of Razlik and Drama should 
illustrate the point:
At some point during the early 1900s, eight villagers from Panya village in the 
district of Razlik reclaimed land from the nearby woods and used it for a number of 
years without registering the property. In 1909, the villagers applied for registration at 
the local government offices. The local authorities initially showed some concern over 
the use of the land without a legal permit for a number of years, but ultimately granted 
the title deeds to the villagers, once the villagers proved that they had paid all due taxes 
during the time of their unlawful occupation.83 As such, the villagers managed to 
legalise and consolidate their entitlement to land and could now enjoy all the legal 
privileges that the law granted.
82 Gerber, The Social Origins o f the Modem, 77; Quataert, The Age o f Reforms, 860.
83 BA, TFR.1.SL., 209/2862,13.5.1325 (26.7.1909).
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In another case, a certain Hiiseyin Pehlivan from the village of Rasovika in 
Drama, applied for a title deed for the four donums o f land he had reclaimed from the 
local woods. He argued that he had been in possession of this land for twenty three 
years and that he was entitled to a tapu certificate in accordance with Article 78 of the 
1858 Land Law, which granted title deeds to those cultivating a piece of land for more 
than ten years without a valid permit. However, investigations carried out by the local 
village council showed that Hiiseyin Pehlivan had been in possession of the land for. 
only three years. Thus, Hiiseyin Pehlivan could not acquire the title deed he sought.84 
Yet, the case shows the growing interest of the land holders in registering their lands, 
obtaining title deeds, and thus legalising their claims to “ownership”. The desire of 
Hiiseyin Pehlivan to register the land in his name and his knowledge of the due legal 
procedure is telling in this respect.
The actual implementation and enforcement of the law was also imperative for 
the consolidation of the proprietary rights of title deed holders. The inadequacies of the 
Ottoman justice system and law enforcement agencies are well known and need not be 
reiterated here in great detail. It suffices to say that the corruption and incompetence of 
judges, procedural complications and inconsistencies, overcrowded court rooms, 
endless delays and appeals in legal proceedings, and the ineptitude of the provincial 
security forces were among the causes of the poor administration of justice and law. 
enforcement throughout the Tanzimat era.85 In addition, political and diplomatic 
pressures frequently brought to bear upon the Ottoman courts undermined the 
impartiality of court decisions and at times compelled the judges to prioritise the 
interests of certain prominent individuals over others. This appears to have been 
particularly true for the legal cases involving the Civil List, certain high-ranking 
officers, prominent notables, influential merchants and European citizens protected by 
capitulary treaties. In short, the impartial and generic application and enforcement of the 
law was compromised by the organisational, political, fiscal and, at times, diplomatic 
feebleness of the Ottoman state in this early period.
84 BA, TFR.1.SL., 139/13863,28.1.1323 (10.4.1907).
8  ^ See Tanzimat'ton Cumhuriyet’e Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Turkey from' 
Tanzimat to the Republic], V. 3, 1985, “Tanzimat’tan Sonra Kanunla§tirma Hareketleri” [Legalisation 
Efforts after Tanzimat] by B. Tahiroglu, 588-601. Also see, Cin, “Tanzimat Doneminde”; Bozkurt, 
“Tanzimat and Law”; Azrak, “Tanzimat’tan Sonra Resepsiyon”; Ortayli, Imparatorlugun En Uzun 
Yiizyih.
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Some of these problems proved persistent during the Hamidian period as well. 
Corruption still prevailed in courtrooms, and this weakness enabled certain powerful 
individuals to exert pressure upon local courts and to influence the decision of some 
corrupt and opportunistic judges. Besides, the organisational inadequacies of the overall 
legal system continued to impair the efficiency and the alacrity of the legal proceedings, 
much to the disappointment and frustration of the litigants.86 Yet, the increasing 
autonomy of the judicial organs; the regularisation and standardisation of the court 
procedures; improvements in the hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation of the entire 
justice system, and the appointment of much better trained graduates of the newly 
established Imperial Law School (Mekteb-i Hukuk-u §ahane) to the courts were all 
important developments that helped improve the efficiency, fairness and the internal 
consistency of the overall legal system during the Hamidian period.87
In addition, the general improvement in the organisation and diffusion of the 
security forces, especially that of the rural gendarmerie, as well as the establishment of 
telegraphic services and the construction of railways helped create a more effective 
bureaucratic government organisation and presumably eased some of the technical 
difficulties encountered in the implementation and enforcement of the law.88
During my research in the Ottoman archives, I came across interesting legal 
cases which indicate that the local authorities showed considerable sensitivity towards 
the proprietary rights of the title deed holders and managed to successfully enforce court 
decisions, despite the complexity and political sensitivity of the cases involved. These 
cases are only illustrative and the full verification of the point I base on them requires in 
depth research into local court registers. Still, the cases at hand point to the 
unmistakable concern of the local authorities to honour the ownership rights of the title- 
deed holders and attest to the presence of a comprehensive legal and bureaucratic 
framework that was capable of delivering justice and enforcing the law. It is also 
important to note in this context that I have not run into a legal case to the contrary, that 
is a case wherein the authorities remained insensitive to a violation of the proprietary 
rights held by landowners.
86 PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 22.1.1873, Blunt to Elliot, Salonica; PRO, F.O. 195/283, Memorandum 
on the Administration o f  Justice in Macedonia, by H. du Vallon, N. 152, 29.10.1904.
87 Shaw and Shaw, History o f  the Ottoman Empire,” 216-218; 246-251.
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Yako Savol Modiyano, a prominent banker of Salonica, owned an estate {giftlik) 
in the northern district of Gevgeli. He rented the estate to a lawyer named Mente§ 
Istromi. Mente§ administered the estate and forwarded the annual rent to Yako Savol 
after retaining his share. In the early 1900s, Mente§ took Yako Modiyano to court, 
arguing that the estate actually belonged to him and that Mr. Modiyano had acquired the 
estate illegally. We do not know what prompted Mente§ to resort to such action, but he 
seems to have put considerable pressure oil the judges of the nizamiye court in Gevgeli 
in an effort to influence their decision. The local court was unable, and perhaps 
unwilling, to resolve this delicate case and forwarded it to the higher court in Salonica. 
Yako Savol presented the tapu certificate and the contract of tenancy signed with 
Mente§ to the court in Salonica, whereupon the judge ruled in favour of Yako Savol.89
Another case involved the violation of a giftlik belonging to a certain colonel 
(miralay) E§ref Bey by the tenants of a neighbouring giftlik owned by another local 
notable, Salahaddin Bey. Salahaddin held that the vineyard in between the two estates 
belonged to his giftlik. Possibly acting under Salahaddin's instructions, his tenants, 
entered the vineyards in dispute and harvested the grapes without E§ref s permission. 
E§ref Bey notified the local authorities and brought legal action against the intruders. 
The local authorities carried out an investigation into local land registers, and concluded 
that the vineyards in question fell well within the borders of E§ref s estate and that they 
clearly stood outside Salahaddin’s. E§ref was then asked to produce the title deeds as 
proof of ownership at the court, which he did. Consequently, the local judge decided 
that the intruding tenants had caused a damage of O.L.lOO in E§refs property and 
accordingly ordered Salahaddin to pay the full amount to E§ref as the guarantor (kefil) 
of the tenants. The tenants remained in custody throughout the proceedings.90
In yet another case, the tenants of the giftliks of Viraste and Istavroz in Longaza 
refused to pay their dues to the Greek (absentee) landlord and occupied the property 
claiming that they were the actual proprietors of the land. However, the landlord applied, 
to the local court and presented the judges his tapu certificate. The court ruled in favour 
of the landlord, who subsequently called in twelve gendarmes from the local garrison to 
expel the tenants. The tenants retaliated by burning the woods adjacent to the estate.
Shaw and Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire, 246-251.
89 BA, TFR.1.SL, 10/991, 7.IE.1319 (20.5.1903).
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Subsequently, the landlord hired a dozen of armed guards (bekgis) to protect the estate 
from the possible attacks of his former tenants and demanded further protection from 
the local authorities.91
In another similar case, the Bulgarian tenants of a certain Akil Bey from Cuma-i 
Bala went on “strike”, and refused to carry out their duties. Akil Bey was furious, as he 
had paid the annual wages of the tenants worth 2,330 kuru§QS in advance. He notified 
the local authorities (kaymakamhk) in Cuma-i Bala and presented his tapu certificate 
and the contract of tenancy. He demanded that the tenants be expelled from his property 
instantly. The local authorities sent an officer escorted with a couple of gendarmes to 
the estate to carry out investigations. Some of the tenants complained that they did not 
carry out the boycott of their own will and were forced to do so upon the pressure of 
Bulgarian bands operating in the region. They added that they had nothing personal 
against Akil Bey and that they wanted to continue working in his estate. However, other 
tenants were less complacent. They argued that they wanted to leave the estate, but 
added that they could not do so in the middle of winter (January). They asked for the 
permission of Akil Bey to stay in the estate until the end of March. However, Akil Bey 
insisted on the immediate deposition of those who did not accede to the terms of the 
tenancy agreement and those who supported the Bulgarian bands. The local authorities 
were somewhat reluctant to carry out the depositions and expressed some concern about 
the political sensitivity of the case. However, the governor of the district (kaymakam) 
decided that Akil Bey was the proprietor (mutasarrif) of the estate and that he was 
entitled to demand the removal of the insurgent tenants. Accordingly, he ordered the 
deposition of the tenants, although he added that due care should be taken during the 
deposition not to aggravate the (political) situation further.92
In another case, the ownership rights of a Bulgarian landlord from Cuma-i Bala 
were at stake. Sometime in the early 1900s, the military commander of the district, Salih 
Pa§a, purchased an estate, which had been sequestered and subsequently auctioned by 
the Agricultural Bank upon the failure of a Bulgarian landlord, Mi§a, to pay his debts to
BA, §D-Selanik, 2030/3, 15.Ra.1316 (3.8.1898). For a similar border dispute see BA, 
TFR.l.SL., 14/1349, 11.R.1321 (7.7.1903).
91 BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 1622/3318, 8.Ca.l306 (10.1.1889); BA, TFR.1.SL., 115/11479, 
15.C.1324 (27.8.1904).
92 BA, TFR.1.SL., 67/6684,15.XI.1320 (28.1.1905).
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the Bank.93 However, Salih Pa§a began to claim rent from the tenants occupying the 
neighbouring estate still owned by Mi§a. At the time, Mi§a was in Bulgaria, so his 
tenants informed Mi§a's father about the situation. Mi§a’s father took the case to the 
local court and requested the termination of Salih Pa§a's “unlawful interference”. The 
court carried out an investigation, which confirmed Mi§a's ownership of the land. A 
subsequent court decision asked Salih Pa§a to withdraw from Mi§a’s property 
immediately and to pay back the rent he had appropriated unlawfully from the tenants to 
Mi§a. Salih Pa§a objected to the court's decision and argued that the tenants were trying 
to avoid the payment of their dues and to force him out of his property.94 Unfortunately, 
the available documentation does not reveal how the case was ultimately resolved. It is 
quite unlikely that Salih Pa§a could win the case unless he proved Mi§a's title deed 
wrong.
Certain common features of the cases cited above are important to note. In all 
cases, the tapus and in some cases the local land registers were used systematically to 
prove and confirm land ownership. Once the ownership status of the litigants was 
established beyond reasonable doubt, the courts and the local authorities ruled strictly in 
favour of the title deed holder. Also, the courts and local authorities applied the law 
quite systematically, regardless of the religious and the ethnic affiliation of the litigants 
involved. Particularly, in the case of Mi§a, the protection of the property rights of a 
Bulgarian landlord in his absence against a Muslim landlord illustrates the generality 
with which the law was applied by the courts. Finally, it is important to note the way in 
which the law was enforced by the Ottoman authorities. In the case of E§ref versus 
Salahaddin, the local authorities held the intruding tenants under custody. Salahaddin 
was probably obliged to pay the O.L.lOO in question promptly to E§ref so as to secure 
the release of his tenants. In the cases involving the Greek landlord from Longaza and
93 BA, TFR.l.SL., 43/4266, 8.IIL1320 (24.5.1904).
94 BA, TFR.1.SL., 45/4481, 1.V.1320 (14.7.1904); BA, TFR.1.SL., 48/4763, 25.V.1320 
(7.8.1904). The reasons behind the concerns of the Bulgarian tenants become more apparent when we 
consider the following citation from Draganof: “In 1904 a Turkish society was founded at Kumonovo to 
dispossess the Christian proprietors. Several rich beys and the functionaries of the agricultural bank were 
members of this society. The functionaries of the bank illegally sold several landed estates belonging to 
Christians and mortgaged to the bank. Trai'co Stoianoff, Dimitri Christeff, and Spas Ilieff of the village of 
Mlado Nagoritchino, caza of Kumanovo, saw the following properties sold before the expiry of the 
mortgages: The first, 50 dulums for a debt of £T 12.5;.the second, 60 dulums for a debt of £T 20, and the 
third, 40 dulums for a debt of £T1. The purchasers of these lands are Turks who have received title deeds 
after having paid off the mortgages. The Russian and Austrian consuls were acquainted with this 
circumstance”. See Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, (London, 1908), 39.
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Akil Bey from Cuma-i Bala, too, we witness the actual involvement of the local 
gendarmerie forces to enforce the law.
Thus the legal cases above illustrate the authorities’ concern for maintaining the 
integrity of the title deed holders’ proprietary rights. By this time, the title deed holders 
not only held exclusive and inviolable rights to use and benefit from their property, but 
they also enjoyed the security and empowerment provided by the legal enforceability of 
their rights. In other words, the legal entitlement to land became a real source of social 
and economic power for title deed holders. The crucial matter here is to determine the 
exact socio-economic conditions under which proprietors could exercise this power. For 
this, we need to discuss the land tenure relations that prevailed in the region during the 
Hamidian era. This discussion should cast some light on the underlining dynamics of 
commercialisation and economic dislocation in the regional economy.
2.2. The Peasant Proprietors, the Landlords and Their Tenants
2.2.1. Landholding Patterns
Small peasant proprietorship and estate ownership coexisted in Selanik during 
the Hamidian period. It is difficult to determine the relative weight of these two forms 
of landholding due to a lack of published statistics and detailed research into cadastral 
registers. Secondary sources often maintain that giftliks were particularly widespread 
and constituted the predominant form of landholding in the region during the second 
half of the nineteenth century.95 This view is to a certain extent correct. As we shall see, 
estates were indeed quite common in certain parts of the region. However, the 
contention that the giftliks constituted the predominant form of landholding seems 
somewhat illfounded. The problem emanates from the sources and the methodology 
used in reaching this conclusion.
First, the historical evidence used to support this argument is flimsy. To our best 
knowledge, the Ottoman government did not publish comprehensive statistics on
95 J. R Lampe, and M. R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950, From Imperial 
Borderlands to Developing Nations, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); B. Gounaris, Steam 
over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the Railway Factor, (New York: East 
European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1993); Gounaris, Steam over
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landholding. In the lack of official statistics, most contemporary observers contrived 
estimates an ad hoc manner. For instance, the oft-cited estimate of the British consul 
Wilkinson, which suggested that the giftliks accounted for about 60% of all the land 
under cultivation in the province of Selanik in the late 1860s, was probably not based on 
reliable evidence.96 The estimates put forth by the Bulgarian historian Draganof appear 
equally tenuous. Draganof suggests that over 75.0% of the arable land was held by 
giftlik owners in the late 1900s.97
Secondly, there seems to be a tendency to make sweeping generalisations about 
landholding patterns on the basis of highly selective evidence that pertains to a limited 
number of districts where giftliks were particularly common. The evidence put forth by 
Lampe and Jackson on giftlik formation in the Macedonian provinces is a case in point. 
According to their figures, about 41.7 to 77.5% of all rural settlements in the districts of 
Selanik, Menlik, Demirhisar and Petri? were giftliks in the mid-1870s. Thus, Lampe and 
Jackson conclude that the giftliks constituted the predominant form of landholding in 
broader Macedonia.98 However, these (low-land/valley) districts were quite untypical 
and had a particularly high concentration of giftliks for certain historical reasons.99 
Similarly, the oft-cited British data published by Issawi is equally misleading. Issawi’s 
figures suggest that about 40% of all holdings were estates larger than 200 hectares in 
the district (kaza) of Selanik during the early 1860s. Again, the district of Selanik was 
one of the locations where giftliks were unusually common, and hence, the data 
published by Issawi cannot be taken to represent the broader patterns of landholding in 
the region at large.100
Macedonia; §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik ve Biiyume, [Dependency and Growth in the 
Ottoman Economy] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yaymlari, 1994); Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”.
96 Wilkinson seems to have based his estimates on a previous report sent to London. This report 
suggests that estates larger than 50 acres (200 donums) accounted for 60% of all the land under 
cultivation in the district of Selanik. The same report also maintains that estates larger than 75 acres (300 
donums) surfaced 25% of all agricultural land in the district of Drama. We do not know at all how the 
British consuls compiled this data. See, C. Issawi, The Economic History o f  Turkey, 203.
97 Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, 36.
98 Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 136.
99 inalcik associates giftlik formation in European provinces with extensive land reclamations 
carried out by notables. See H. inalcik, “The Emergence of Big Farms”; McGowan, Economic Life in 
Ottoman Europe', and, F. Adanir, “The Macedonian Question: the Socio-economic Reality and Problems 
of its Historiographic Interpretation,” International Journal o f  Turkish Studies, 3, N. 1, (1984/85): 43-64. 
For opposing views on fiflik formation see G. Veinstein, “On the Qiftlik Debate”, in Q. Keyder and F. 
Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991), 35-56).
100 Issawi, Economic History o f  Turkey, 203.
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In the absence of reliable statistics, two proxies can help us delineate the 
landholding patterns in the region, namely the ratio of households residing in giftliks to 
all rural households and the share of giftliks in all rural settlements. The first proxy can 
be used to indicate, albeit tentatively, the probable weight of giftliks in overall 
landholding, under the somewhat vague assumption that the land under cultivation in 
giftliks and peasant villages, or karyes proper, would be a function of the number of 
resident households. The second proxy, that is the share of giftliks in all rural 
settlements, can give us important hints about the variations in landholding patterns in 
the region.
The data on rural settlements can be extracted from the provincial yearbooks 
(salnames). Almost all salnames contain information on the number of rural settlements 
in Selanik, but only the yearbook of 1896 includes detailed information on the number 
of rural households residing in respective giftliks and peasant villages. Therefore, I 
decided to use the 1896 salname to determine the patterns of landholding that prevailed 
in the region during the mid-late 1890s. This data set is presented in Table 4.1. 
According to them, 75.0% of all rural settlements in the province included peasant 
villages (karye) and the remaining 25.0% included giftliks. The peasant villages 
accounted for a massive 89.0% of all the rural households in the province, while the 
remaining 11.0% resided in giftliks. Although it is difficult to determine the precise 
share of giftliks in actual landholding on the basis of this evidence, the sheer weight of 
village households in total rural households suggest that small peasant proprietorship 
was probably the primary, if not the dominant, form of landholding in Selanik during 
the late nineteenth century. This point is also supported by the generally held contention 
that the giftliks in the region were usually small and medium sized. Although some 
estates could be well over 2,000 hectares, most giftliks varied between 100-500 hectares 
and the average size of giftliks stood somewhere between 300-350 hectares.101 If so, 
given the sheer weight of karyes and peasant households would suggest even more 
strongly that small peasant proprietorship was the most typical form of landholding in 
the region.
I®* M. Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c.1800-1914, Evolution without Development, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 342.
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Table 4.1.
Patterns o f Landholding in the Province o f Selanik, c. 1895
Distribution o f  Rural Settlements Distribution o f  Rural Households
Western and Central Low-Land Districts (Incekara and Vardar Plains)
District giftliks Karyes Total g iftlik  % Ciftliks Karyes Total g iftlik  %
Selanik 64 36 100 64 2,241 4 ,576 6,817 33
Karaferye 63 8 71 89 1,965 1,786 3,751 52
Yenice 55 34 89 62 1,919 4,488 6,407 30
Vodine 35 30 65 54 1,161 3,503 4,664 25
Katrin 22 15 37 59 826 1,760 2,586 32
Total 239 123 362 66 8,112 16,113 24,225 33
Vardar Valiev
Avrethisar 31 113 144 22 1,254 5,292 6,546 19
Toyran 11 71 82 13 305 4 ,724 5,029 6
Gevgeli 23 62 85 27 1,211 5,108 6,319 19
Tikve$ 25 99 124 20 772 6,331 7,103 11
Total 90 345 435 21 3,542 21,455 24,997 14
Karasu Valiev
Petri? 27 44 71 38 833 4,217 5,050 16
Demirhisar 5 76 81 6 121 7,706 7,827 2
M enlik 6 42 48 13 111 4,244 4,355 3
Total 38 162 200 19 1,065 16,167 17,232 6
Siroz, Drama and Zihne Plains
Siroz 27 141 168 16 1,413 12,676 14,089 10
Kavala 4 21 25 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Drama 16 90 106 15 212 8,571 8,783 2
Zihne 5 38 43 12 117 5,567 5,684 2
Sari §aban 8 52 60 13 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 60 342 402 15 1,742 26,814 28,556 6
The Highland Districts (Northern Mountainous Range)
Istromca - 65 65 - - 4,379 4,379 -
Koprulu - 89 89 - - 5,776 5,776 -
Nevrekop 8 120 128 6 353 12,687 13,040 3
Cuma-i Bala 4 26 30 13 213 3,386 3,599 6
Razhk - 12 12 - - 4,699 4,699 -
Total 12 312 324 4 566 30,927 31,493 2
The Southern Peninsula
Longaza 14 85 99 14 424 8,776 9,200 5
Kesendire 10 137 147 7 282 5,667 5,949 5
Total 24 222 246 10 706 14,443 15,149 5
Provincial Aggregates
Province 463 1,506 1,969 24 15,733 125,919 141,652 »
Source: Com piled from 1312 S .V .S., 1895.
The data presented in Table 4.1 also suggest considerable variation in 
landholding patterns in the region. Qftlik concentration was particularly high in lowland 
districts and along the valley stretches. For instance, the concentration of giftliks was
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extremely high in the lowland districts of Selanik, Yenice, Karaferye, Vodine and 
Katrin, which are situated over the Vardar plain and along the valley stretches of the 
Incekara river basin in western Selanik. In these districts, 66.0% of all rural settlements 
were giftliks and about 33.0% of all rural households resided on giftliks. The giftliks 
were also quite common in central and northern districts that stretched along the Vardar 
and Karasu valleys, although it must be noted that peasant holdings assumed much 
greater importance in central and northern districts in comparison to the low-land 
districts of the Vardar plain and the Incekara river basin. Qftliks were particularly 
common in the plain/valley districts of Avrethisar, Gevgeli, Tikve§ and Petri?. A quarter 
of all rural settlements in these four districts were giftliks and over 16.0% of all rural 
households lived on giftliks.
Almost everywhere else, however, peasant villages {karyes) dominated the 
countryside. Small peasant proprietorship was the dominant form of landholding in 
northern highland districts, in the mountainous southern peninsula and along the Siroz- 
Zihne-Drama-San §aban range. In the northern highland districts, peasant villages 
accounted for 96% of all rural settlements and 98% of all rural households. Compared 
to these highland districts, giftliks were relatively more common along the Siroz-Zihne- 
Drama-San §aban range. In Siroz, for instance, there were numerous large estates, some 
of which could be as large as 20000-30000 donums (2000-3000 hectares).102 Still, small 
peasant proprietorship constituted the predominant form of landholding in these 
districts. About 85% of all rural settlements that were scattered along the Siroz-Zihne- 
Drama-San §aban range were peasant villages, and about 94% of all rural households 
resided in karyes. Small peasant holdings were particularly predominant in leading 
centres of tobacco production. In Drama for instance, giftlik households constituted only 
2% of the total. Unfortunately, household data is not available for the districts of Kavala 
and San §aban, but considering the overwhelming weight of karyes in these districts, 
we can suggest that small peasant holdings were dominant also in Kavala and San 
§aban. Finally, small peasant proprietorship appears to have been the dominant form of 
landholding also in the mountainous range that stretches southwards along the southern 
peninsula.
102 por instance, 236 households resided in the giftlik of Sarmisakli. Assuming that each, 
household worked on 100 donums (see Section 4.3), we can suggest that the size of Sarmisakli could have 
been over 23,000 donums (1312 S.V.S., 1895, 374).
216
The evidence presented above puts considerable doubt on the view that giftliks 
constituted the dominant form of landholding in the region during the late nineteenth 
century. Alternatively, the same evidence suggests that small peasant proprietorship was 
probably much more important than that assumed in existing secondary sources. In this 
context, the predominance of small peasant proprietorship in cash crop producing 
districts of the Siroz-Zihne-Drama-Sari §aban range is particularly important to note. 
This observation suggests that small peasant proprietors constituted the backbone of 
commercial agriculture, which was the most dynamic component of the region's 
agrarian economy during the period under consideration.103 Yet, the data presented 
above also underline that the giftliks constituted an integral component of the regional 
economy. In what follows, I will discuss the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics of the peasant 
household economy and of the giftliks to highlight their relative weaknesses and 
strengths. This discussion should shed some light on the dynamics of agrarian change, 
growth, retardation and urbanisation in the Selanik region during the period under 
consideration.
2.2.2. Peasant Household Economy
Small peasant proprietors were people of modest means. Peasant holdings were 
quite small, rarely exceeding fifty donums. The best data on the size of peasant holdings 
are available from the 1907 agricultural statistics, which contain valuable and unique 
information on the size of peasant holdings in leading districts of Selanik. These data 
are presented in Table 4.2. According to the statistics, 32.0% of all rural households that 
were engaged directly in agricultural production cultivated plots smaller than ten 
donums and about 87.0% of them cultivated holdings smaller than 50 donums. The 
households that worked on holdings larger than 50 donums constituted only 13.0% of 
all rural households engaged in agricultural production. The official statistics suggest 
that the average size of all these holdings was around 13 donums. However, this average 
figure might be an underestimation, as the official figures tend to somewhat understate 
the area of land under cultivation; hence, the average size of the “typical” peasant
103 s ee p Adanir, “Ottoman Peasantries, c.1360 -  c.1860,” in T. Scott (edj The Peasantries o f  
Europe: From the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, (London and New York: Longman), 269-310.
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holding appears smaller than it actually was.104 Most contemporary sources often cite 
20-30 donums as the average size of the “typical” peasant holding.105
Table 4.2.
Distribution and Average Size o f  Holdings per Household in the Province o f  Selanik, 1907
Land Total Total Total Total Average
Under Number Number of Number of Number of Size of
District Cultivation of Households Households Households Holding
in each Households Cultivating Cultivating Cultivating per
District in each Less than Between More than Household
(Doniims) District 10 Donums 10-50 Donums 50 Donums (Doniims)
The Sub-Province (Sancak) o f  Selanik
Yenice 85,780 3,250 200 3,050 - 26.0
Vodine 62,700 3,000 500 2,000 500 21.0
Istrumca 50,400 . - 3,750 1,900 1,500 350 13.0
Karaca Abad 82,500 6,000 1,500 3,000 1,500 14.0
Total 281,380 16,000 4,100 (26%) 9,550 (60%) 2,350 (14%) 17.6
The Sub-Province (Sancak) o f  Drama
Drama 104,650 6,515 1,000 4,000 1,515 16.0
Provide 16,186 3,000 1,000 1,900 100 5.0
Rop^oz 27,865 3,000 200 2,700 100 9.0
Total 148,701 12,515 2,200 (17%) 8,600 (69%) 1,715(14%) 11.8
The Sub-Province (Sancak) o f  Siroz,
Siroz 171,000 20,000 8,000 9,000 3,000 9.0
Menlik 40,150 4,000 500 2,500 1,000 10.0
Razlik 41,450 2,925 2,155 770 - 14.0
Petrie 148,417 6,417 1,925 3,850 642 23.0
Demirhisar 41,300 7,300 3,000 4,000 300 6.0
Total 442,317 40,642 15,580 (38%) 20,120 (50%) 4,942 (12%) 10.9
Provincial Statistics
Total 872,398 69,157 21,880(32%) 38,270(55%) 9,007(13%) 12.6
Source: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Senesi Avrupa-yi Osmani Ziraat
Istatistigi [1323 Agricultural Statistics of the European Provinces of the Ottoman Empire] 
(Istanbul: Dersaadet Mahmud Bey Matbaasi, 1907), k, n).
Many peasant proprietors also owned small garden plots or vineyards attached to 
their houses. These small plots were usually about 2-3 donums in size. The peasant 
farmers grew vegetables, fruit trees and various legumes in these gardens for immediate
*04 For the weaknesses of the 1907 statistics see Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanli Donemi 
Tarim Istatistikleri, 1909, 1913 ve 1914 [Agricultural Statistics of Turkey during the Ottoman Period], 
Prepared by T. Giiran, (Devlet istatistik Enstitiisii, Tarihi istatistikler Dizisi, V.3, Ankara: Devlet istatistik 
Enstitiisii Matbaasi, 1997), XXII.
105 P'P A.P., 1870, V. 27: 304; and, Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, 39. 30 donums appear 
as a reasonable estimate. According to Giiran the average size of peasant holdings in the Anatolian 
provinces was around 34 donums. Small -holdings also dominated the Anatolian countryside. The 
distribution of Anatolian holdings was similar to that of Selanik province. In 1909, 26.6% of all holdings 
were smaller than 10 doniims. 48.2% were between 10-50 donums and only 25.2% were larger than 50
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consumption within the household unit. The vineyards provided the grapes used to 
produce wine, spirits, vinegar and grape syrup, all of which were important items of 
consumption for peasant families. They often marketed the surplus produce of the 
gardens and vineyards ill the nearby towns and fairs and thus earned extra cash 
income.106
The peasants were also engaged in animal husbandry. The animal inventory of 
the “typical” peasant household included one or two oxen used mainly as draught 
animals, a few cows, sheep or goats, pigs (in the case of Christian farmers) and 
chickens. These animals were often kept in the bams attached to the house and the 
livestock was raised in the communal pasture lands and the woods surrounding the 
villages. The peasants consumed the milk, butter, cheese, skins and wool obtained from 
these animals and also marketed some of their produce for extra cash income.107
The peasants relied on traditional technology and techniques of production. The 
farm implements were simple but practical, easy to maintain and cheap to replace. 
Production methods were'conventional. Crop rotation was rarely practiced and lands 
were left for fallow every second year round. Irrigated agriculture was largely limited, 
and the farmers depended mainly on annual rainfall for the realisation of their crops. 
The use of fertilisers remained limited to the application of animal pest during the 
fallow season.108
The family unit provided the main source of labour power in these small peasant 
farms. Men and women worked the fields and the garden plots collectively, taking 
responsibility for different tasks. Able-bodied men cultivated the fields, while women 
and children contributed to the reaping of crops. Women also undertook housework, 
attended to farm animals, spun yam, and wove cloth, carpets, rugs and blankets for 
household consumption. The younger men, and sometimes the younger women, took up 
seasonal employment on a regular basis. Men either worked in urban construction 
industries or in giftliks as farm hands during the peak harvest season. Women took up 
seasonal employment in tobacco processing and silk reeling industries and sometimes
doniims. See T. Giiran, 19. Yiizyil Osmanli Tarimi Uzerine Ara?tirmalar [Research on Nineteenth Century 
Ottoman Agriculture] (Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik, 1998), 82.
l0 6 P.P.A.P, 1870, V. 27: 304.
107 P P A .P ,  1870, V. 27: 305.
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worked as domestic servants in urban areas.109 Recourse to seasonal employment was 
more common amongst highland villagers and peasants in possession of very small 
holdings. Such practices probably remained relatively limited in cash crop producing 
lowland districts, where the demand for labour power was relatively high due to the 
labour-intensive nature of cash crop production.
Small peasant proprietors did occasionally hire farm hands to ease the burden of 
the family members during the harvest season. The employers provided food and shelter 
for the agricultural workers, and the wages were normally paid in cash at the going 
market rate. Such arrangements took place mainly in years when harvests were 
particularly bountiful. Abrupt changes in the size of the family unit triggered by 
untimely deaths, departure of able bodied men for military service, and marriages might 
have also prompted peasant proprietors to hire wage labourers on a seasonal basis. Yet, 
contemporary sources suggest that such arrangements remained relatively limited and 
the family unit normally served as the main source o f labour power in small peasant 
farms.110
The quest for alternative sources of labour power was more apparent in larger 
peasant holdings that could not be cultivated entirely by a single family. Relatively well 
off peasant proprietors in possession of larger holdings, say over 50 donums, usually 
rented parts of their property to less fortunate peasant families residing in the same 
village. The latter either held very small holdings or had become entirely dispossessed 
for whatever reason.111 Recruitment of sharecroppers from outside the village 
community was rare because of the tightness of rural labour markets, where the giftlik 
owners keenly competed to recruit as many labourers as possible to be employed in 
their estates (see below). It is not possible to determine how widespread these small- 
scale tenancy arrangements were, due to lack of conclusive evidence.
The peasant proprietors were subject to a number of fiscal dues and obligations. 
The most important of the taxes paid by peasant proprietors were the tithe (a§ar) and the
Also see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the technological base of Ottoman agriculture 
during the late nineteenth century.
109 See Chapter 5.
HO See P.P.A.P., 1870, V. 27: 303-305. Also see Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire’, Pamuk, 
Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimli\ik.
H I Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire’, Pamuk, Osmanli EkonomisindeBagimlilik,.
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animal taxes (agnam and canavar resmi). They also paid a number of fixed taxes, which 
included the road tax (yol vergisi), paid either in cash or in labour-services, and a 
property tax (vergi). In addition, Muslim men were obliged to serve in the army. 
Christian subjects were exempt from military service, but they had to pay a military 
exemption tax (cizyefbedelat-i askeriye).112 Some proprietors also paid certain irregular 
dues to rural guards and sometimes to armed bands and other local bandits for 
“protection”, particularly in the highlands where banditry was more common.113 After 
the payment of these taxes and dues, the peasants retained all the income accruing from 
the marketing of their produce and from earnings acquired through by-employment and 
seasonal work.
Overall, the peasant household economy stood on a tenuous balance between the 
security of self-sufficient production, the risks incurred from exposure to market 
processes, the real burden of fiscal obligations and, last but not least, the natural and 
climatic conditions to which they were exposed. The size and value of the marketable 
surplus and the demand for the goods and services provided by the family units were 
important determinants of the cash earnings that accrued to the family unit. 
Unfavourable market trends and the lack of demand for the goods and services provided 
by the family could seriously upset the cash flows. Also, dislocating shocks of harvest 
failures, the untimely death of able-bodied men and women, absence during military 
service and, perhaps more importantly, the death of draught animals could upset 
seriously the precarious balance of the household economy. In fact, such distressing 
shocks constituted the weakest link in the broader organisation of the peasant economy 
and could shake its foundations, namely labour power, draught-power and harvests. The 
difficulty of meeting financial obligations, particularly the payment of taxes and dues 
collected in cash, could 'be very distressing for the peasant farmers. Yet, under 
favourable economic conjunctures and benign climatic conditions, the peasants could 
enjoy relative prosperity and security of subsistence.
Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms”; A. Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi (Rules 
of Taxation), V. 2, (Dersaadet (Istanbul): Kanaat Matbaasi, 1911).
i Consider the following cynical comment of the British vice-consul residing in Manastir 
concerning the security services provided by the bands.
“In some instances these small bands have raised money from the villages upon the promise to 
defend them from raids of other bands, thus setting themselves up as a sort of ‘Life and Property
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2.2.3. The Qiftlik Economy
The organisation of giftlik agriculture had certain built-in strengths and 
weaknesses. Most giftliks in the region were owned by local Muslim notables (e§rqf), 
influential government officials, prominent Christian and Jewish moneylenders and 
merchants.114 Landowners typically resided in towns and either left the administration 
of the giftliks to trusted bailiffs or sublet them to intermediaries in return for an annual 
rent.
The giftliks were heavily dependent on labour power.115 The most common form 
of labour procurement in the giftliks was sharecropping. Three forms of sharecropping 
prevailed in the region, namely ortakgilik, kesmecilik and the recruitment of agricultural 
workers (ter-oglans) on a yearly basis. In the first instance, the landlord provided the 
tenant (<ortakgi) and his family with land, a cottage for shelter, a stable for the livestock 
and a store room for the fodder. The landlord also supplied the seeds for sowing. In 
return, the tenant farmer provided the labour power, the farm tools and the draft 
animals. The produce was divided equally between the landlord and the tenant, after the 
deduction of the tithe and the seed share necessary for next year's sowing. The straw 
was usually kept by the tenants, but some close-fisted landlords chose to retain their 
share of the straw. The tenants were also responsible for conveying the landlord's share 
of the crop to his grain store, which usually was located in the town where he normally 
resided. In addition, the tenants provided the landlord with extra labour services. These 
services included carting firewood from the hills, helping the landlord harvest the crops 
in the fields spared for his subsistence needs and the maintenance and operation of the 
mill usually owned by the landlord. The labour dues could reach up to a few hours 
every week or about ten days a year. The tenants were not paid for this extra labour, but 
the landlord often gave them small garden plots, about 2-3 donums in size, for which 
they did not have to pay any rent. Landlords also allowed the tenants to graze their 
livestock over estate pastures and to use the woods within to the estate. Aside from their 
obligations to the giftlik owner, the tenants were also responsible for paying the same 
taxes and fiscal dues claimed from independent peasant proprietors, except for the
Insurance Company’. They are not only higher in their charges for insurance, but even more cheeky and 
energetic than die typical insurance agent” (PRO, F.O. 195/1553, 14.4.1886, Groschen to Blunt).
114 Adamr “The Macedonian Question”; McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Empire.
The following discussion of different forms of tenancy prevailing in the estates is based on 
the following sources: P.P.A.P., 1870, V. 27: 304; H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their
222
property tax (vergi), which was paid by the landlord. Ortakqilik constituted the most 
common form of sharecropping in the region during the period under consideration.
The second form of sharecropping was kesmecilik, which was quite similar to 
ortakqilik. The main difference between the two practices was that the kesmeci tenant 
stipulated a fixed quantity of the crop, irrespective of the actual yield. The amount of 
the fixed payment was agreed upon between the landlord and the kesmeci. The landlords 
rarely preferred this form of tenancy agreement. Although bountiful harvests could be 
advantageous for the landlord, bad harvest years were particularly detrimental and 
could, at times, compel the landlord to pay the tenants more than the yield of that year's 
harvest. Besides, many landlords found out many kesmeci tenants had little incentive to 
work hard in order to improve the quality and quantity of the harvest.
Finally, the landlords employed a third group of sharecroppers (ter-oglans) in 
their estates. The ter-oglans were often recruited from the lowest strata of the rural 
populace and typically included dispossessed peasants who, unlike the ortakqis or 
yaricis, had neither the oxen nor the farm implements they could bring into the 
partnership. The ter-oglans were often employed on an annual basis and received a 
combination of in-kind and cash payments in return for their services. The landlords 
also provided basic shelter, farm implements, draught animals and seeds.116
Under all these sharecropping practices, the tenancy agreements were verbal, 
although there is evidence to suggest that they became increasingly formalised towards 
the end of the century.117 The tenancy agreements were normally renewed on a yearly
Future, (London, 1906); Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms', Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire; Pamuk, 
Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimhlik; Adamr, “The Macedonian Question”; Baker, Turkey.
116 According to the report of the British consul Calvert to Manastir, the ter oglans were
employed under arrangements that varied considerably from one place to the other within the province.
For instance, in one district, the ter oglans were paid 68.5-77.5 bushels o f Indian com and rye in equal 
proportions, and about 165 in cash for the entire year in the late 1860s. In another district, they only 
received 73 bushels of wheat. In a third district they got 45.5 bushels of rye, barley and millet mixed, 33.5 
lbs. of salt, 140 lbs. of leek and cabbages, half a raw ox-hide to make footwear for the family and cash 
wages that varied from 95 to 135 6d (P.P.A.P., 1870, V. 27: 304; also see Pamuk (1994: 203)). James 
Baker, a British officer who held an estate near Salonica during the late 1870s, mentions similar forms of 
payment, which included £10 and extra allowances of grain and food amounting to £8 annually. Plus, the 
ter oglan and his family were given shelter. In another instance, the payment included two bushels of 
wheat, barley and rye each, plus a 15% share o f the crop after the deduction of the seed share and the tithe 
(Baker, Turkey, 400). Three decades later, the earnings of the ter oglans were still quite modest. 
According to Draganof, they received fixed annual wages that amounted to 80 to 100 bushels of grain 
(com, rye and maize mixed), 185 to 205 of cash, 5, to 8 pints of petroleum and 10 okes (1,300 grs.) of 
haricots.
117 For a sample of a written tenancy agreement, see Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, 45-46.
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basis, although some arrangements could extend up to three to six years. At the end of 
each term, usually in early March, a new agreement would be reached between the 
tenant and the landlord. Each party was entitled to terminate the agreement unilaterally 
at the end of the season. In that case, the tenants would leave the estate and the landlord 
would employ new sharecroppers for the following year. However, if  the tenants were 
indebted to the landlord, they could not terminate the tenancy agreement until they fully 
paid their debt. Most tenants were indebted heavily to the landlords, who willingly 
extend credits at times of economic distress (due to crop failures, death of draught 
animals and the like). Many peasant farmers often failed to pay their outstanding debt to 
the landlords. Therefore, they could not terminate the tenancy agreements and ended up 
working on the estates for extended periods of time, sometimes indefinitely. 
Indebtedness stands out as the main reason behind perpetual tenancy agreements.118
The landlords also employed seasonal wage labourers during peak harvest time. 
These seasonal workers, both men and women, were often recruited from amongst 
peasants coming from highlands in quest of extra cash earnings.119 The landlords 
normally hired these workers to assist the sharecropping tenants during harvest time.120 
Thus, sharecropping supported by seasonal wage-labour constituted the broad 
framework for the organisation of the labour process in giftliks.
The organisation of the production process in the giftliks was quite similar to that 
of the small peasant holdings. The tenant farmers mainly used the same technology and 
methods of production to cultivate the land and harvest the crops. However, the 
introduction of new labour saving technology, such as light iron ploughs, mechanised 
sieves and reapers, was relatively more common in the giftliks. Especially from the early 
1900s onwards, the introduction of new technology proceeded much faster on gifliks, 
owing mainly to growing labour shortages and the improvements in the technical and 
logistic facilities that were imperative for the effective introduction and diffusion of 
imported technologies.121
Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, 45-46.
Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 342.
1^0 Also see N. P. Mouzelis, Modem Greece, Facets o f  Underdevelopment, (London: 
MacMillan, 1978), 6.
121 See Chapter 3.
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The giftliks normally specialised in labour-saving agricultural produce. The 
scarcity of labour in the region probably encouraged landlords to concentrate on cereal 
production and especially on animal husbandry, which required relatively little labour 
input. The income generated through the marketing of the annual surplus produce 
probably constituted an important portion of the landlord's earnings accruing from the 
giftlik. However, many landlords occasionally leased out the grazing grounds of the 
giftlik and the fields left for fallow as winter pastures to flock-masters coming down 
from the highlands. Some landlords also invested considerably in animal husbandry and 
owned flocks of their own and kept these animals on their estates the year round. The 
meat and produce of these animals, nameiy dairy products, skins and wool, were 
marketed in the rapidly growing urban areas and brought considerable earnings to giftlik 
owners.
Labor dependency constituted the weakest point of the giftlik economy. 
Dependency on labour power meant that the giftlik economy remained highly exposed 
to the transformations taking place in regional labour markets. As we shall see, the 
labour market constraint put giftlik owners into a very difficult situation and compelled 
some of them to liquidate their estates and others to specialise in animal husbandry, 
particularly after the turn of the century.
3. Dynamics of Commercialisation, Rural Displacement and the Logic of 
Rent Seeking
3.1. Property Rights and Peasant Proprietors
Small peasant proprietors benefited from the consolidation of property rights. 
The inviolability and the exclusiveness of property rights and security of tenure 
provided by law underscored, ceteris paribus, the market responsiveness of small 
peasant farmers and contributed to the rapid growth of commercial agriculture in the 
region in important ways throughout the Hamidian era. During the late 1890s and the 
early 1900s, the growth of cash crop production in leading centres of commercial 
agriculture must be structurally associated with the consolidation of property rights and 
the security of tenure and property that was provided by the legal and institutional 
framework discussed above. It is doubtful that the cultivators would have otherwise 
responded to emergent market incentives with such vitality, because small peasant
225
proprietorship was still predominant in the region and this vulnerable segment of the 
agrarian society would feel reluctant to alter their means of livelihood without sufficient 
institutional and legal assurances.
The liberalisation of collaterals and mortgages had important implications for, 
the small peasant proprietors. On the one hand, this development enabled them to access 
credit markets on relatively easy terms. Although the peasants’ capacity to access public 
credit markets was circumscribed by the predominance of landlords and cumbersome 
application procedures, many farmers nevertheless received bank credits.122 This 
situation enabled some small peasant proprietors to escape the extortion of usurers. 
Therefore, in a broad sense, the liberalisation of collaterals and mortgages contributed to 
the stability of the peasant household economy and assured its predominance in the 
region at large during the period under consideration.
On the other hand, however, the liberalisation of collaterals and mortgages also 
increased the risks of dispossession for the small peasant proprietors. Indeed, many 
farmers were unable to pay their debt and eventually lost their property under 
distressing economic conditions and a growing cycle of indebtedness. Even farmers 
who had managed to receive credits from the Agricultural Bank could fail to fulfil their 
financial obligations and subsequently face sequestrations. Such processes of rural 
displacement can be observed best from the back page of the local daily, Asir, where 
land transactions taking place in the province were reported regularly. Among these 
pages, one comes across countless examples of the dispossession and sequestration of 
property following the debtors’ failure to meet financial obligations towards private 
parties or the Agricultural Bank. Likewise, the Council of State (§uroyi Devlet) 
documents in Istanbul archives contain hundreds of cases about farmers who failed to 
pay their debt to the bank and lost their property.
A number of factors and processes seem to have pushed peasant proprietors into 
indebtedness and subsequent dispossession during the period under consideration. The 
fiscal dues and fees collected from the rural population put peasant families under 
constant economic strain and often forced them into indebtedness under adverse 
economic conditions. In fact, contemporary sources often cite the (growing) fiscal
122 See Chapter 3.
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burden of the peasantry as an important, if  not the primary reason, for indebtedness and 
dispossession.123
Two factors appear to have increased the fiscal burden of the peasantry. First, 
the rise in the tithe rate by 20% in 1894 and by another 0.6% in 1900 increased 
considerably the real tax-burden of the rural population. The rise in the tithe rate 
reduced the cash income accruing to peasant families. Under the circumstances, families 
found it more difficult to disburse such fiscal dues as animal taxes, the road tax, 
property tax and the military exemption tax, which were to be paid in cash. Normally, 
peasant families could have made up for the loss of (cash) income by taking up by­
employment or seasonal work or by switching to the production of more lucrative crops. 
In fact, many peasants did take up by-employment and seasonal jobs in rural and urban 
areas during this period.124 Likewise, many took up the. production of more lucrative 
cash crops during this period. However, the crop failures that afflicted the countryside 
in the post-1895 period rendered the tax burden intolerable for small peasant 
proprietors. The periods of 1897-1902 and 1906-1910 were unusually poor harvest 
years for cereal producers. 1897-1898 and 1902-1904 were bad years for cotton 
producers; the opium and poppy yields of 1905 and 1909 were either poor or below 
average, and 1903-1904 and 1907-1911 were unusually disappointing for sesame 
producers. Despite the successful crisis management schemes put into effect by the 
Ottoman government, such persistent crop failures reduced the income of small peasant 
proprietors quite substantially and put them under considerable financial strain. Many 
farmers borrowed money from local usurers, as well as the Agricultural Bank in order to 
meet their fiscal obligations and other expenses. Apparently, such credit arrangements 
frequently ended in the sequestration of property and eventual dispossession.
In some instances, the dispossessed peasants simply could not break through the 
predicament of indebtedness, and they became tenants on lands they once owned. The 
clearest manifestation of this process was the emergence of “mixed villages”, where 
some fields were cultivated by peasant farmers and others were tilled by the tenants of 
one landlord or another.125 Clearly, the increasing commodification of land set the
*23 For complaints concerning the rising tax burden of rural populace see PRO, F.O. 94/17,
26.11.1892, Shipley to Blunt.
124 s ee Chapter 5 for a discussion of by-employment in silk reeling and woolen textile industry.
125 According to Draganof in the village of Novo-Selo located in the neighbouring province of 
Kosova, 300 doniims o f arable land were owned by ten peasant households and the remaining 400-
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institutional background for dispossession and the spread of such petty tenancy relations 
in the region during the period under consideration, particularly towards the end of the 
Hamidian era.
Other dispossessed peasants, who could somehow break away from the fetters of 
indebtedness and financial dependency, left the countryside and migrated either to urban 
areas or abroad. A number of push and pull factors underlined these processes of 
migration and emigration.
Extortions of tax farmers were another source of constant distress for the peasant 
farmers. Despite repeated attempts by the Ottoman government to impose tighter 
controls on tax fanning, the power of the tax farmer largely went unchecked during the 
period under consideration. The abuses and extortions of tax farmers were incisive. 
Through fraudulent practices and outright coercion, tax farmers could collect 
considerably higher fiscal dues than the official tax rates. For instance, tax farmers often 
overestimated the value and/or amount of the annual harvest in order to extract as much 
surplus as possible from the taxpayers.126 Also, tax farmers refrained from making bids 
forward before the realisation of the summer crops so as to secure a handsome margin 
of profit and to avoid the adverse effects of probable crop failures. This meant that the 
tax-farm auctions would take place only in August. Until then, the crops had to lie 
harvested in the fields, waiting for a tax farmer to arrive on the scene to collect the due 
tithe. Often, crops were left in the open, exposed to adverse weather conditions, attacks 
of animals, and theft.127 This situation not only undermined the producers’ bargaining 
power vis a vis the tax farmers, but it also reduced overall productivity and led to 
revenue losses for both the farmers and the government alike. Sometimes, the frustrated 
farmers harvested and marketed the crops before the arrival of the tax farmer. However,
doniims were owned by one landlord (Draganof, Macedonia and Reforms, 39). In the village of Isnefja, 
in Kosova, most of the land was owned by 30 Muslim families, but some fields were cultivated by tenants 
under sharecropping arrangements (PRO, F.O. 195/2453, 14.5.1913, Memorandum on the case of the 
village of Isnef?a in the nahiye of Rayanovo of the district of Kilki§, by Consul General Lamb). Likewise, 
in the central district of Uskiip, in 55 of 146 villages surveyed by the local authorities the land was, 
cultivated both by small peasant proprietors and sharecroppers (PRO, FO 195/2232, 29.1.1906, Satow to 
Graves).
126 For instance, many tax farmers tended to overestimate the value of certain crops, such as 
grapes and fruits, the tithes of which were paid in cash rather than in kind. In instances where the tithes 
were claimed in kind, such as cereals, the tax farmers often tried to overstate the amount of the crop in 
question. For extortions and fraudulent activities of tax farmers, see,, PRO, FO 195/1362, Extract from a 
letter from Mr. Consul General Blunt’s correspondent at Serres on August 23, 1881; PRO, F.O. 94/17,
26.11.1892, Shipley to Blunt; BA, TFR.l.SL., 16/1537-1, 12.Ca.1321 (6.8.1903).
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they were often caught upon the complaint of the irritated tax farmer and subsequently 
faced serious charges of tax evasion. The local courts appear to have systematically 
ruled against the tax evaders and sentenced them to pay the due amount as well as a 
substantial fine in order to discourage the farmers from resorting to similar action in the 
future and to set an “example” for the neighbouring villages.128 At any rate, the 
detrimental effects of the practice of tax farming, in general, and extortions of tax 
farmers, in particular, stand out as important factors that put peasant farmers under 
economic distress.
The local authorities made repeated attempts to improve the methods of tithe 
collection throughout the Hamidian era. In the early 1880s, the authorities abolished the 
practice of tax farming and appointed officers to collect the due taxes.129 These early 
efforts yielded little success. The appointed tax collectors faced insurmountable 
difficulties. First, the number of appointed officers was not sufficient for the prompt 
collection of the tithes in the province. This led to serious delays in the collection of the 
tithes and gave way to tax evasion and loss of revenue.130 Secondly, the officers were 
unable to market the in-kind tithe payments at favourable prices. The difficulty of 
finding purchasers in the regional markets that were dominated by prominent notables, 
landlords, merchants and usurers, who also had a substantial stake in tax farming, 
proved particularly prohibitive and led to grave revenue losses for the local 
government.131 The inadequacy of storage facilities and roads further exacerbated the 
problems faced by the officials.132 Finally, some opportunistic government officials 
abused their authority for personal gain. Some accepted bribes and turned a blind eye to 
those who evaded taxation. Others confiscated the produce in storehouses and some 
simply played with accounts to embezzle public revenue. After four years of this 
desperate trial, the authorities once again reverted to the practice of tax farming.
127 For complaints regarding this issue, see PRO, F.O. 195/1484, Report on the Trade of 
Monastir for 1883; Asir, 30.Ra.1320 (7.7.1902), N. 695: 2; Asir, 2.R.1321 (29.6.1903), N. 795: 2.
128 See BA, §D-Selanik, 2004/18,28.S.1289 (6.5.1872).
129 p r o , F.O. 195/1362, Extract from a letter from Mr. Consul General Blunt’s correspondent 
at Serres dated August 23, 1881.
130 p r o , F.O. 195/1362, Extract from a letter from Mr. Consul General Blunt’s correspondent 
at Serres dated August 23, 1881.
131 PRO, F.O. 195/1362, 7.9.1881, Blunt to Granville; D.T.O.G., 20.Za.1302 (31.8.1885), N.. 
201: 1; BA,M K  6/97, 30.Ra. 1303 (6.1.1886).
132 BA, M. V. 6/97, 30.Ra.1303 (6.1.1886).
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During the late 1880s and the 1890s, the local authorities tried to impose tighter 
controls on tax farmers, and took measures that would help improve the efficiency of 
tax collection in general. Attempts were made to improve the competitiveness of tax 
farming auctions and to assure the fairness of the bids made by potential tax farmers. 
Also, certain administrative and bureaucratic measures were taken to impose tighter 
control on government officials in charge of tax farming auctions, in particular, and the 
collection of taxes, in general. In addition, efforts were made to secure the prompt 
payment of revenues by the tax farmers.133 Although abuse of authority, extortions and 
other fraudulent practices could be seen during this later period as well,134 the efforts 
yielded some success, particularly towards the turn of the century. The authorities 
managed to enhance the competitiveness of auctions and to receive better prices for the 
tax-farms, especially in the late 1890s and the early 1900s.135 Thus, the government’s 
efforts helped consolidate state finances and bring some degree of order to fiscal 
processes during the late Hamidian period. However, the local authorities could do little 
to interfere in the redistributional relationship between the tax farmer and the taxpayer, 
which enabled the tax farmers to continue to exploit the cultivators.
The government was able to take more systematic measures that aimed at 
circumscribing the exploitative power of the tax farmers only after the turn of the 
century. In connection with the broader reorganisation of the administration of the 
Macedonian provinces, the central government again attempted to establish a more 
direct fiscal relationship with the taxpayer. This time the government did not attempt to 
collect the tithes directly from the taxpayers. Rather, it tried to introduce alternative 
methods that would give priority to villagers in tax farming auctions. Thus, ideally, the 
tax farmer could be eliminated and the taxes could be collected in cash in a way 
mutually beneficial to both the government and the taxpayer. However, some prominent
133 See BA, M. V. 66/39, 19.Z.1307 (26.7.1891); PRO, F.O. 195/2111, 2.1.1901, Ditzmourice to 
Burseu. Also, see the report presented to the vilayet by the governor of Nevrekop, Salih Vasfi Efendi, for 
the measures to be taken to improve die collection of tithes and to increase the fairness of tax-farm 
auctions (BA, §D-Selanik, 2028/17, 30.Ra.1316 (18.8.1898)). Also see Vefik, Tekdlif Kavaidi for a 
detailed discussion of the changes in the regulations governing the tithe farm auctions.
134 For an example of corrupt practices of government officers dealing with tax-farm auctions 
see the case involving the governor of Tikve§, who was accused of threatening certain bidders so as to 
help a number of prominent notables to dominate die auctions and to acquire the tax-farms at exorbitandy 
low prices. The governor probably took a handsome commission in return for his services. The 
investigations failed to prove the involvement of the governor in such practices, yet he was taken from his 
duty in Tikve§ and reappointed to a distant post (BA; §D-Selanik, 2034/4, 8.M.1317 (18.5.1899)). Also, 
see the case involving the manager of the public warehouse (ambar emini) of Kalkandelen, who sold the 
crops in store for personal gain (BA, §D-Selanik, 2041/6, 8.L.1304 (30.6.1887)).
135 p r o , F.O. 195/2111,2.1.1901, Ditzmourice to Burseu.
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landlords, who had a substantial interest in tax farming, responded swiftly against this 
decision and put considerable pressure on peasant villages to withdraw from the 
auctions.136 Soon, it became apparent that it would indeed be very difficult to by-pass 
the prominent landlords cum established tax farmers, as long as the practice of tax 
farming itself remained in effect. In response, the local authorities attempted to 
introduce a fixed land tax that would replace the proportional tithe. The scheme was 
initiated first in thirty selected villages of the neighbouring province of Kosova in 1904. 
The local authorities sent out officials to these villages in order to determine, together 
with the local village councils and agricultural inspectors, the productivity and the 
average annual yield of the land in the possession of each household. Thus, the 
contribution of each household to the total fiscal burden of the entire village commune 
was determined. After this point, the authorities took the average annual value of the 
tithe returns accruing from the tax-farm auctions of the previous five years and 
determined the annual tax burden of the village commune according to this average.137 
Each year, the appointed officers would make the necessary adjustments and register the 
changes in the composition and the amount of the produce in each village so as to 
prevent over or under taxation in subsequent years.138
The scheme was successful and satisfied both the villagers and the authorities 
alike. The villagers paid their taxes promptly and almost no payments were left in 
arrears. Encouraged by the success of the scheme, the authorities extended it further to 
include the respective central districts (kazas) of the Provinces of Manastir and Selanik 
the following year. Government officials carried out similar surveys in designated 
villages and set the fiscal liability of each village household.139 Again the scheme 
proved a success and the villagers paid the due taxes promptly without leaving much in 
arrears.140 However, the resistance of landlords and other prominent individuals 
undermined the expansion of the scheme to other districts in the province.141 In most 
districts of the province of Selanik, tax farming remained in effect until the end of the 
period under consideration.
136 See BA, M.V. 106/70,11.S.1321 (9.5.1903).
137 PRO, F.O. 294/37,25.2.1905, Monohan to Townley; Asir, 25.S.1323 (1.5.1905), N. 977: 2.
138 Asir, 24.C.1323 (24.8.1905), N. 1003: 2; Asir, 5.B.1323 (4.9.1905), N. 1006: 2.
139 Asir, 4.Z.1322 (6.2.1905), N. 954: 2.
140 Asir, 18.N.1323 (16.11.1905), N. 1027: 2.
141 For the resistance 'of landlords to the new scheme see PRO, F.O. 195/2232, 29.1.1906, 
Satow to Graves; PRO, F.O. 294/38, 8.4.1906, Monahan to Blunt; PRO, F.O. 195/2232, 8.4.1906, 
Monohan to O’Connor.
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Another important push factor that enticed peasants to migrate was the 
deteriorating political circumstances in the countryside, especially after the turn of the 
century. Mounting ethnic conflicts and the tension between armed Greek and Bulgarian 
bands, on the one hand, and the Ottoman security forces, on the other, posed a threat to 
the lives and property of peasant proprietors. Under the circumstances, many families 
left rural areas and sought refuge in the relative security of the proliferating urban areas. 
The relative lightness of urban taxes, which included a low revenue (temettu) tax on 
businesses and the usual property (emlak) taxes, was probably another important factor 
that encouraged farmers to migrate to urban areas. Others left the region for Greece and 
Bulgaria and started new lives as agriculturalists or urban workers. Thousands more 
emigrated to the United States in pursuit of new opportunities and handsome 
remittences.142
Overall, the consolidation of property rights and the liberalisation of land 
transactions had far reaching, if  contradictory, consequences for the peasant household 
economy and the agricultural sector. On the one hand, the consolidation of property 
rights and the liberalisation of land transactions worked well with the moment of 
commercialisation and the ongoing process of integration with the world capitalist 
economy. These legal measures helped create the appropriate incentive structure that 
encouraged proprietors to respond to market signals with vitality and facilitated the 
proprietors’ access to financial markets. On the other hand, the same legal process 
exposed peasants to market risks more directly and set the institutional background to 
their dispossession under unfavourable economic, fiscal and political conditions. Rural 
displacement had far reaching consequences. First, it underscored the persistence and 
spread of exploitative tenancy relations in the region. Secondly, displacement 
underlined the depopulation of rural areas, which ultimately brought the agrarian 
economy of Selanik to a halt and furthered its steady contraction from the early 1900s 
onwards. The very same process set the institutional background to processes of 
urbanisation and thus put its imprint on the ongoing modernisation process.
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3.2. Property Rights and the Crisis of the G iftlik  Economy
The consolidation of property rights and the increasing commodification of land 
had important implications for the estate owners as well. First, the new legal and 
institutional framework bestowed considerable power on the landlords and enabled 
them to appropriate the economic surplus generated within the giftlik economy on quite 
favourable terms, as indicated by the specific tenancy agreements discussed above. 
Ortakgilik constituted the most secure form of surplus appropriation for the estate 
owners. The practice not only guaranteed the proprietor the 50.0% share of the giftlik's 
annual produce, but it also provided him the necessary labour supply. In addition, the 
rent accruing from the lease of fallow lands and meadows as winter pastures provided 
an extra source of income for the giftlik owners. The new laws secured the economic 
advantages of the landlords. The law recognised the inviolability and exclusiveness of 
their ownership rights. The judiciary and the security forces enforced these rights. Thus, 
the legal and administrative reforms further empowered the landlords. Under the 
circumstances, the giftliks emerged as the ideal rent yielding property, provided that the 
giftlik owners were able to recruit the labour power they needed in their estates.
As we have seen, the indebtedness of tenant farmers served as an important, if 
not the primary, means of labour procurement in the giftliks. From the viewpoint of the 
landlord, the indebtedness of tenants was particularly advantageous, for it largely 
moderated the difficulty of recruiting agricultural workers in an economic setting where 
labour power constituted the scarce factor of production (see below). However, the debt 
bondage did not necessarily imply that the landlord had the capacity to squeeze the last 
farthing out of his tenants. Labour relations that prevailed in most giftliks were often 
quite balanced. Contemporary sources describe the relationship between the landlords 
and the tenants as “friendly” and based on “mutual interest”. The landlords were often 
careful not to upset the tenants, especially the ortakgis and the kesmecis, who, 
constituted the cream of rural workers in the region because they brought into the 
partnership their draught animals and farm implements. Acute labour scarcity and the 
keen competition among landlords for sharecroppers and other agricultural workers 
evidently played a significant role in securing the general well being of the tenants. 
Thus, the tenants were able to use the gardens and grazing grounds of the giftlik, which, 
as we have seen, provided the tenants with an important source of livelihood and
142 Gounaris, “Emigration from Macedonia”:
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subsistence. The giftlik owners also helped the tenants at times of need. The landlords 
provided seeds and allowances to the tenants at times of crop failures, so as to secure 
the continuation of agricultural production in their estates. Under the circumstances, the 
tenants often behaved dutifully and worked to the best of their ability. As we shall see, 
adverse political and economic circumstances began to disrupt these “friendly” 
relations. The bitter disputes that arose between some landlords and their tenants 
brought the giftlik economy to a halt from the early 1900s onwards. However, the 
landlords could control the labour process in their estates and appropriate the surplus 
without prohibitive problems and on quite favourable terms during the 1880s and the 
1890s. In this regard, the landlords clearly benefited from the legal empowerment 
provided by their ownership status and the institutional reforms that uphold this status. 
This empowerment and the landlords’ capacity to expropriate at economic surplus 
largely explain the strong desire to amass landed property, particularly in the relatively 
densely populated, commercially developed and rail-connected parts of the region.143
During the entire period, the real problem for the landlords was to recruit 
seasonal workers to assist the sharecroppers during peak harvest time. Selanik had an 
extremely low population density. The overall surface of the province was around 
36,700 square kilometres.144 This suggests that the population density of the region 
never really exceeded 33 people per square kilometre during the period under 
consideration. According to Palairet’s figures, this figure was well below that of many 
comparable Balkan economies at the time. For instance, the population density of Serbia 
was 60.5 person per square kilometres in 1910, while the same figure was 49.6 for 
Dalmatia, 45.6 for Bulgaria, 41.8 for Greece and 37.1 for Bosnia. The population 
density of Selanik exceeded only that of Montenegro, which had only 24.6 residents per 
square kilometre. Clearly, labour scarcity remained a serious structural problem for 
giftlik owners, regardless of the changes taking place in the level and composition of 
regional population.
Emigration and urban migration intensified the problem of labour scarcity in 
rural areas and the pressure on estate owners. For example, in the aftermath of the 
cessation of Thesally to Greece in 1885, mass emigration from the region gave way to
143 Baker, Turkey, 399-412.
144 y  Eldem, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nun Iktisadi §artlari gartlari Hakkinda bir Tetkik, 
[Research on the Economic Conditions of the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 
1994), 17.
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acute scarcity of labour in the countryside and compelled many estate owners to 
experiment with labour saving technology in their estates.145 However, labour scarcity 
intensified considerably after the turn of the century. The rapid growth of urban 
economies, the boom in the tobacco trade, and the intensification of political turmoil in 
the entire Macedonian countryside had serious dislocating effects for the giftlik 
economy.
First, rural depopulation caused by urban migration and emigration proved 
particularly distressing for the giftlik owners. As the agricultural workers coming from. 
the highlands and other regions increasingly sought their fortunes in the growing urban 
areas and abroad, the supply of labour that could be employed readily in the estates on a 
seasonal basis contracted quite notably.
Second, the growing attraction of cash crop production brought about certain 
dislocations in regional labour markets. More specifically, the spread of tobacco 
production in highland districts encouraged many agricultural workers to stay in their 
villages in order to contribute to the production of this highly labour intensive crop 
within the family unit. As opposed to seeking, employment in giftliks as they used to.
The mounting political instability throughout the region seriously upset the 
relations between the typically Christian tenants and Muslim landlords and rendered the 
recruitment of labour more problematic for the giftlik owners. In some instances, such as 
the above mentioned case of Akil Bey, political tensions gave way to the expulsion of 
tenants from the estates, despite the growing severity of labour shortages. Not 
surprisingly, some estate owners who faced problems similar to those of Akil Bey 
switched to land intensive.animal husbandry, while others simply chose to liquidate 
their estates. In short estate ownership became an increasingly problematic endeavour in 
the Selanik region.
Local peasants bought some or parts of these liquidated estates.146 It appears that 
the Ottoman state also showed some interest in these liquidated estates and purchased
See Chapter 3.
146 See Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 343.
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them to settle some of the immigrant Muslim families coming from Bulgaria.147 Strong 
motives to amass landed property persisted, particularly amongst the burgeoning 
commercial classes of the region. In some instances, purely speculative motives stirred 
the acquisition of landed property. Prominent notables, powerful merchants and bankers 
cum moneylenders competed keenly to acquire landed property in anticipation of future 
profits, particularly in the commercially developed parts of the region and along the 
railway lines.148
Other motives, for land acquisition were of a more subtle nature. First, land 
remained the most tangible guarantee for creditors in local credit markets. Notables, 
merchants, bankers and usurers dominated local credit markets, and extended credit to 
peasant farmers and needy landlords, who mortgaged their land or offered it as 
collateral in return for the money they borrowed. Subsequent failure to pay outstanding 
financial obligations ultimately gave way to the concentration of landed property in the 
hands of creditors, although this outcome was not necessarily advantageous for them. A 
stark example of disadvantageous acquisitions can be seen in the transactions of the 
Modiyano and Alatini families. During the 1890s and the early 1900s, these families 
extended credit to petty farmers, needy landlords and other individuals in possession of 
real property. In addition, both families guaranteed the contracts of some prominent tax 
farmers in return for collaterals.149 Most of the capital needed for such transactions was 
provided by Banque de Salonique, which the Modiyanos and the Alatinis controlled 
together with a consortium of French bankers. In addition, both families borrowed 
heavily in international capital markets and from other banks operating in the region. 
Thus, both families incurred heavy debts and placed considerable capital in speculative 
credit arrangements. This situation eventually led both families to bankruptcy. As land 
prices started collapsing in the aftermath of the Ottoman Italian War of 1911, the 
Modiyanos and Alatinis realised that they could not fulfill their outstanding financial 
obligations. Although the value of the assets (O.L. 700,000) owned by the two families
*47 for the settlement of immigrants into former $iftliks see BA, M.V. 140/33, 6.C.1328 
(14.6.1910).
148 For an example of such speculative land transactions, see the case of Tahir Umur Pa§a, who 
purchased an estate belonging to the Civil List in the district of Drama with a view to sell it in parcels to 
private parties. Tahir Umur Pa§a, travelled to Istanbul on numerous occasions and lobbied actively there 
to secure the sale of the estate to him. Eventually, the Pa§a acquired the estate for 700,000 kuru§es in 
total. However, subsequent investigations revealed that the real value of the estate was at least 2,000,000 
kuru$es (BA, B.E.O.-Ayniyat, 668/394). The available documentation does not reveal how the case was 
finally resolved. However, the document illustrates the speculative motives underlining certain real estate 
transactions.
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were sufficient to meet their liabilities (O.L. 400,000), the realisable value of their 
assets was much lower. Unable to pay their outstanding financial obligations, the 
leading members of both families hurriedly left for Paris by early morning train on 
December 1, 1911, without even declaring a moratorium on their business 
transactions.150
Secondly, real estate ownership provided the means necessary to enter into the 
lucrative business of tax collection. Tax farmers were required to show real estate in 
their possession as collateral, before they could make a bid to acquire the privileges 
associated with tax collection. These privileges came with a risk. If a tax farmer failed 
to pay the agreed-upon sum fully and promptly to the government, the authorities 
simply sequestrated the property shown as collateral and auctioned it to recover the 
difference in question. Thus, the government saw collateral as a security for the 
protection of the interests of the public treasury and the prompt payment of the revenues 
owed by the tax farmers. The authorities followed quite a strict policy in this regard and 
did not hesitate to sequester and auction the property of the tax farmers who failed to 
fulfil their obligations. Countless examples of such sequestrations appear in documents 
related to the Selanik province in the fiscal (maliye) section of the Supreme Council of 
State (§urayi Devlet) documents. The same documents and other sources, however, also 
indicate that tax farmers found ways of getting around the regulations. For example, 
many tax farmers acquired virtually useless landed property and showed it as collateral 
at a value well above its actual market value. In such instances, the tax farmers could 
easily default on their obligations. The government authorities would then encounter 
serious difficulties in recovering the revenue thus lost. Often no purchasers could be 
found, and if  the land was ever sold, the returns remained well below the amount owed 
by the tax farmer.151 Despite repeated attempts to prevent such fraudulent practices by 
an accurate assessment of the real estate shown as collateral, the problem was not 
solved entirely and it continued to entail revenue losses for the government. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the requirement of real property as collateral against tax- 
farms allowed only the individuals in possession of landed property to enter auctions 
and to benefit from the lucrative opportunity of appropriating and marketing the 
agrarian surplus. This opportunity enhanced the attraction of acquiring landed property.
149 BA, M.V. 110/24, 18.B.1322 (28.9.1904).
150 PRO, F.O. 195/2382,2.12.1911, Lamb to Lowther.
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Finally, certain political considerations apparently played an important role in 
the acquisition of landed property in the region. For instance, the Ottoman government 
showed some concern over the acquisition of extensive landed property by prominent 
Bulgarian, Greek and Jewish merchants and moneylenders, whereas it encouraged some 
Muslim notables to hold onto and expand their landed property regardless of the 
economic circumstances. Indeed, many Muslim notables continued to buy land in the 
region, despite the intensifying problem of labour scarcity and procurement.152
Thus, considerable capital was tied to unproductive ends. Speculative land 
transactions tied valuable capital to agricultural pursuits where productivity was low 
and the labour market constraint was almost prohibitive. Also the attraction of usury 
practices, especially of tax farming, enticed economic agents to invest considerable 
sums in land, for the ownership of this primary factor of production was a precondition 
to access credit markets. More specifically, debtors had to hold land to borrow in private 
and public markets and creditors had to hold land to become tax farmers. As 
considerable capital was tied to speculative transactions and usury practices, little 
capital could be channelled into productive investments. This situation, among other 
reasons, kept the “developmental” potential of the regional economy at bay during the 
period under consideration.
Conclusion
Overall, the consolidation of property rights over land emerges as an important 
dynamic underlying the structural changes in the regional economy. The consolidation 
of property rights facilitated the processes of commercialisation and the growth of 
commercial agriculture in the region. Simultaneously, it enhanced the processes of 
dispossession and rural displacement, which, in turn, culminated in urban migration and 
emigration amid growing ethnic tensions and rising tax burden. The destructive
151 Asir, 13.L.1319 (23.1.1902), N. 652: 1; BA, TFR.l.SL., 13/1271, 27.Ra.1321 (23.6.1319); 
BA, M. V., 109/83, 26.R.1322 (10.7.1904).
por the government’s concern over the acquisition of landed property by non-Muslims see, 
BA, M.V. 83/107, 22.§.1312 (17.2.1895). Also see Chapter 3 for the financial support to that the 
government provided the Muslim landlords through the Agricultural Bank.
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creativity of modernisation found its clear manifestation in the consolidation of property 
rights and subsequent processes of urbanisation and commercialisation.
The consolidation of property rights and the restructuring of the taxation 
processes had serious implications also for the pattern of capital accumulation and 
investment. First, consolidation of property rights and the associated liberalisation of 
collaterals and mortgages undergirded the emergence of a fluid land market in the 
region. This development had important, if  contradictory, implications for the 
transformation of the regional economy during the period under consideration. On the 
one hand, it facilitated proprietors’ access to credit markets, for they could now show 
their property as collateral against the credits they acquired. Despite all the problems 
involved in such credit arrangements, these credits contributed to the commercialisation 
and stability of the agricultural sector in a broadly structural sense. However, the 
emergence of a fluid land market also exacerbated speculative motives and encouraged 
many merchants, bankers and landlords to acquire massive amounts of property that 
yielded relatively little profits in both the short and medium term. This situation not 
only undermined productive investment, but it also seriously curtailed the broader 
process of the valorisation,of capital.
The taxation process had import dislocating effects on the agrarian economy. 
Excessive taxation and the extortions of tax farmers put an immense burden on the 
peasant household economy, and fed the processes of dispossession, urban migration 
and emigration. Perhaps more importantly, the practice of tax farming itself emerged as 
an economic domain within which rent-seeking motives were most manifest. The 
practice of tax farming was possibly the most lucrative means of income generation for 
those in possession of landed property and for those who had access to or control over 
financial resources. This situation exacerbated intense speculation over the sale and. 
purchase of real estate and tied usury and mercantile capital into fictitious transactions, 
which naturally increased the opportunity cost of investing in alternative, higher 
productivity pursuits in agriculture and manufacturing.
The transformation of the socio-economic domain occupied by property and 
redistribution had a dual impact on the transformation of the regional economy. 
Redistribution processes were in line with the broader commercialisation process and 
helped consolidate the integration of the regional economy with the expanding capitalist
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moment in world history. However, the same processes and structures exacerbated rent 
seeking motives and speculative transactions which seriously curtailed the valorisation 
of capital and thus undermined the development of primary sectors of the regional 
economy. Thus, there emerged in Selanik a highly commercialised economy marked by 
strong dynamics of dispossession, insecurity and exploitation, on the one hand, and the 
“black hole” of speculative motives and speculative transactions that absorbed the 
growth and modernisation potential of the regional economy, on the other.
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CHAPTER-V
FACETS OF MODERNISATION:
SERVICES, URBAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND
MANUFACTURING
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have concentrated mainly on the transformation of the 
rural economy. I have discussed the impact of world economic forces, the 
modernisation efforts of the Ottoman government, and property relations on the 
transformation of the agricultural sector. I have argued that these forces and processes 
had a combined, dual impact on agriculture. They enhanced commercialisation and 
contributed, in important ways, to the development and growth of certain sub-sectors of 
the agrarian economy, namely tobacco, silk and opium production. However, the same 
processes gave way to serious retardation in other sub-sectors. Enhanced integration 
with the international markets and the subsequent intensification of overseas 
competition put considerable pressure on cereal and cotton cultivators and eventually 
led to serious retardation in these primary sub-sectors of the agrarian economy. 
Likewise, the organisational and financial weakness o f the Ottoman government 
underlay retardation in agriculture. Although certain financial and organisational 
measures taken by the Ottoman government contributed to the commercialisation and 
overall stability of the agricultural sector, these modernisation efforts fell short of 
generating the desired break-through in the agricultural sector. Pressed hard under 
complex political, diplomatic and fiscal problems, the Ottoman government ultimately 
failed to provide sufficient technical, logistic and financial support to local farmers, and 
it could not provide them with an effective bulwark against the winds of foreign 
competition in domestic markets. Under the circumstances, the sub-sectors that were not
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favoured by the world economy remained seriously retarded. Finally, the relations of 
property and redistribution that prevailed in the region also contributed this twofold 
rural structure. The consolidation of property rights and the liberalisation of the land 
regime combined well with the moment of commercialisation and integration with 
capitalist world economy. However, certain rigidities inherent in the prevailing systems 
of land-tenure and the associated mechanisms of surplus appropriation and taxation 
deepened the retardation process. This complex set of developments generated a strong 
“push-factor” that led people away from agriculture and set the structural background 
for rapid emigration from and urbanisation within the region.
In this final chapter, I will discuss the development of the modem urban sector. I 
will concentrate mainly on the growth and development of the urban service sector, the 
construction industry, and the manufacturing sector. By concentrating on the 
development of the urban economy, I also hope to partially fill a persistent gap in the 
existing literature, a gap that has impaired our vision and understanding of nineteenth 
century Ottoman economy. Until the mid-1980s, scholars working on Ottoman 
economic history concentrated mainly on agriculture and paid relatively little attention 
to the transformation and development of urban sectors. Their focus on agriculture was 
both justifiable and necessary, since agriculture constituted the most important sector of 
the Ottoman economy and thus served as the key to understanding the broader trends of 
the Ottoman economy. There were also good conceptual reasons for concentrating on 
agriculture at the time. Theories of economic development that were in vogue during the 
1960s and 1970s, attributed considerable importance to the agricultural sector and 
considered it as the primary source of the capital and labour needed to reach the “take­
o ff’ stage in modem economic growth.1 Ottoman economic historians commonly 
subscribed to this liberal approach at the time and made a considerable effort to study 
the agricultural sector.2 Other sectors went largely under-studied, except a few 
pioneering studies.3
1 W. A. Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” Manchester 
School o f Economic and Social Sciences, 22, N. 2, (1954); G. Ranis, and G. Fei, “A Theory of Economic 
Development,” American Economic Review, 51, N. 4, (1961); and Rostow W. W. Rostow, The Stages o f  
Economic Growth, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1960).Also see D. Hunt, Economic 
Theories o f Development: An Analysis o f Competing Paradigms, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 
Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1989), for a discussion of the post-war theories of economic 
development.
2 C. Issawi, (ed.) The Economic History o f the Middle East, 1800-1914, (Chicago and London; 
Chicago University Press, 1966); C. Issawi, The Economic History o f Turkey, (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980); V. Eldem, Osmanli tmparatorlugu'nun Iktisadi §artlari Hakkinda bir
Tetkik, [Research on the Economic Conditions of the Ottoman Empire], 1. P. (1970), (Ankara: Turk Tarih
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In the mid-late 1980s, the World System Analysis (WSA) redefined the research 
agenda in Ottoman social and economic history and left a strong imprint that still 
prevails in the field. The proponents of the WSA concentrated on agriculture, but they 
also discussed the rapid development of the commercial economy in rich historical 
detail and paid considerable attention to networks of commodity circulation and credit.4. 
In addition, the WSA paid considerable attention to the transformation of the 
manufacturing industries throughout the empire5 and to the rapid development of towns, 
especially of port-cities, throughout the Eastern Mediterranean basin.6
Despite the contributions of the WSA, our knowledge of urban economic life 
and the development of urban sectors still remain relatively limited. For instance, there 
has been little research on the development of the urban service sector, except for a few
Kurumu Basimevi, 1994); Z. Y. Hershlag, Introduction to the Modem Economic History o f the Middle 
East, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964); 0 . L. Barkan, Turkiye’de Toprak Meselesi, [Land Issues in Turkey], 
Collected Works, V .l, (Istanbul: Gozlem Yayinlari, 1980); D.Avcioglu, Turkiye’nin Dtizeni, [The Order 
of Turkey], V. 1, (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1966); S.Yerasimos, Azgeli§mi§lik Surecinde Turkiye,
Tanzimattan 1. Dunya Sava§ina [Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment, From Tanzimat to the 
Great War], V. 2, (Istanbul: Gozlem Yayinlari, 1975).
3 The exceptions include the works of E. C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution,” 
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 5, (1974): 65-76; G. Baer, “Guilds in the Middle Eastern 
History,” in Cook (ed.) Studies in the Economic History o f  the Middle East, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), 11-30; G. Baer, “The Administrative Economic and Social Functions o f Turkish Guilds,” 
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 1, (1970): 28-50; Issawi, The Economic History o f  Turkey:; 
C. Issawi, “De-industrialization and Re-industrialization in the Middle East since 1800,” International 
Journal o f Middle East Studies, 12, (1980): 469-479; G.Okfiin, Osmanli sanayii 1913-1915 Istatistikleri, 
[The 1913-1915 Ottoman Industrial Statistics] 1. P. (1970), (Istanbul: Hil yayinlari, 1984); L. Erder, 
“Bursa ipek Sanayiinde Teknolojik Geli§meler (1835-1865) [Technological Developments in the Silk 
Industry of Bursa, 1835-1865] {METU Studies in Development, Special Issue on Turkish Economic 
History, 1978), 111-122, and O. Kurmu§, “Some Aspects of Handicrafts and Industrial Production in 
Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1915,” Asian and African Studies, 15, (1981): 85-101; O. Kurmu§, 
Emperyatizmin Turkiye ’ye Giri§i, [The Penetration of Imperialism into Turkey], 1. P. (1974), (Ankara: 
Sava§ Yayinlari, 1982).
4 R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, The Nineteenth Century, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1987); R. Kasaba, “Was there a Compradore Bourgeoisie in 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century Western Anatolia,” Review, 11, (1988): 215-288; R. Kasaba, “Open-Door 
Treaties: China and the Ottoman Empire Compared,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 7, (1992): 77-89; L. T. 
Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); §. Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade, Investment 
and Production, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); §. Pamuk, “Anatolia and Egypt During 
the Nineteenth Century: A Comparison of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment,” New Perspectives on 
Turkey, 1, (1992): 37-55; §. Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde Bagimlilik ve Buyiime, [Dependency and 
Growth in the Ottoman Economy] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 1994); E. Kiray, Osmanli’da 
Ekonomik Yapi ve Di§ Borglar, [Economic Structure and Foreign Debt in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: 
ileti§im, 1993).
5 §. Pamuk, “Osmanli Zanaatlerinin Yikilmasi,” [The Decline of Ottoman Manufactures] 
Toplum ve Bilim, 23, (1983): 75-99; Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisinde 
Bagimlilik; Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire.
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studies that focus primarily on Istanbul and to a lesser extent on Izmir and Salonica.7 
Likewise, the development of the urban construction sector received very little attention 
from economic historians, except for a few scholars who have undertaken pioneering 
research on the transformation of urban landscapes and architectural styles in the 
leading towns of the Empire.8 Finally, the economic history of the Ottoman 
manufacturing industry has yet to be written, building on Quataert’s pioneering work, 
which has enhanced our vision of nineteenth century Ottoman manufactures 
considerably.9
The current chapter is an attempt to begin to fill the gap in our knowledge of 
urban economies and their development during the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. The chapter relies on a broad range of primary sources and an 
extensive secondary literature in an effort to provide a comprehensive picture of urban 
development and economic transformation in the region. In the first section, I discuss 
the pull-factors underlying urbanisation, namely growing integration into the world 
economy along with arrival of railways and the rapid growth of commercial agriculture 
in the region. In the second section, I consider the development of the urban service 
sector in tandem with the proliferation of commerce and trade. In the third section, I 
discuss the physical development of the regional towns, with an emphasis on Salonica, 
which represented the urban experience par excellance at the time. Finally, I discuss the 
development of the manufacturing industries in the region, focusing on the growth of 
the factory system as well as developments in artisanal manufacturing. The chapter ends
6 See essays in Q. Keyder, Y. E. Ozveren and D. Quataert (eds.), Dogu Akdeniz’de Liman 
Kentleri, 1800-1914, [Port Cities of the Mediterranean] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1994), 121- 
157.
7 For Izmir see T. Baykara, (ed.) Son Yiizyillarda Izmir ve Bati Anadolu, Uluslararasi 
Sempozyumu Tebligleri, [Izmir, and Western Anatolia in the Last Centuries, International Conference 
Papers] (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1994). For Salonica see M. Anastassiadou, Salonique, 1830-1912, Une 
ville ottomane a I’age des Reformes, (Leiden, New York, Koln: Brill, 1997); G. Veinstein, (ed.) 
Salonique, 1850-1918, La “ville des Juifs” et le reveil des Balkans, (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1993).
8 M. M. Cerasi, Osmanli Kenti, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nda 18. ve 19. Yiizyillarda Kent 
Uygarligi ve Mimarisi [Ottoman City, Urban Civilisation and Architecture in 18th and 19th Century 
Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 1999); M. Qadirci, Tanzimat Doneminde Anadolu 
Kentleri 'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapilari [The Social and Economic Structure of Anatolian Towns in the 
Tanzimat Era] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); P.Dumont, and F. Georgeon (eds.) 
Modernle§me Surecinde Osmanli Kentleri [Ottoman Towns in the Modernization Process] (Istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1996); R. Kasaba, (ed.) Cities in the World System, (New York, Westport- 
Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1991).
9 D. Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age o f the Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); D. Quataert, Workers, Peasant and Economic Change in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1730-1914, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993).
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with some concluding remarks on the overall dynamics of modernisation and the 
associated proliferation of urban economies throughout the region.
1. The Dynamics of Urbanisation: Railways, Overseas Trade and 
Commercial Agriculture
The arrival of railways in the region had far reaching economic consequences. 
Despite all the problems encountered in the operation and pricing of railway services in 
the region, railways certainly enhanced the region’s integration with global markets and 
contributed to the expansion and deepening of the commercial economy.10 Railways 
integrated Salonica to its hinterland and the inland commercial centres of the Southern 
Balkans much more effectively than before. Salonica emerged as the primary 
commercial gateway that linked the region via the Mediterranean basin to global 
markets. The commercial dynamism that the railroads thus generated is directly related 
to the dynamics of urbanisation in the region during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In what follows, I discuss the impact of railways on commerce and 
urbanisation.
A consortium of French and Austrian bankers led by an energetic Belgian 
banker, Baron Maurice de Hirsch, built the first railway line in the region, connecting 
Salonica to the northern Macedonian town of Uskiip (Skopje). Its construction 
commenced in 1871, and the entire 219-mile network was opened to public traffic on 
December 29, 1874. In 1888, a new extension line connected the Salonica-Uskup line to 
the Serbian network. Thus, the port-town of Salonica was connected to continental 
Europe via the Serbian and Austria-Hungarian railway networks. Soon the Paris- 
Belgrade-Salonica route became the shortest and quickest connection that linked 
Northern Europe to Asia via Port Said.11 The British-Indian mail service began to run 
through Salonica and the bulk of almost the entire Serbian transit trade came to be 
conducted through the town.12
For the adverse impact of railway tariffs on agricultural development see Chapter 2.
11 B. C. Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the 
Railway Factor, (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 42-62; V. Engin, Rumeli Demiryollari, [Rumelian Railways] (Istanbul: Eren Yaymcilik ve 
Kitap<?ilik Ltd. §ti, 1993), 207-219.
12 PRO, F.O. 195/1619,10.8.1888, Blunt to White, Salonica.
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Chart 5.1.
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Source: Compiled from Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 174-175.
These developments naturally enhanced commercial activity in the region, 
especially in Salonica. Both the overseas trade and the volume of shipping conducted at 
the port of Salonica increased considerably during the 1880s and the early 1890s (See 
Charts 5.1 and 5.2).13 By the mid-1890s, Salonica had become one of the most 
important terminal points in communications and trade linking the southern Balkan 
Peninsula to Europe, thanks to Salonica’s railway and maritime connections. The 
construction of two more railway lines that connected Salonica to Manastir in the west 
and to Istanbul in the east, in 1894 and 1896, respectively, enhanced intra-regional trade 
among the Macedonian provinces and consolidated Salonica’s undisputed central 
position in the region.14
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Also see L. Berov, “The Course of Commodity Turnover at the Thessalonica Port and the
West European Economic Cycle, the Nineteenth Century up to 1912,” Etudes Balkaniques, N. 4, 1985, 
pp. 72-88.
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Source: F.O.A.S., Miscellaneous Volumes, 1883-1912. See Appendix 7.
The advent of the railways brought about important transformations in the 
regional economy. The most important transformation probably took place in the 
organisation of marketing networks throughout the region. Prior to the arrival of the 
railways, such leading towns as Salonica, Siroz, Drama, Vodine, Karaferye, and Kavala 
served as primary centres of distribution and marketing in the region.15 In addition, 
numerous fairs and market places facilitated commercial relations. However, 
transportation facilities and commercial connections remained relatively undeveloped. 
The bulk of the regional trade took place in small market places that were regularly set, 
up in towns once or twice each week.16 Local producers and petty merchants marketed 
their produce mainly in these local markets. Intermediary merchants and retailers 
working with import/export houses of Salonica also sold their merchandise and bought 
the local produce for export in local markets.17 A number of fairs served as important 
loci of commercial activity in the region at large. Although these fairs were much more 
important in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, they continued to serve 
important functions and provided producers and merchants with a regulated economic
14 PRO, F. O. 195/1768,14.4.1892, Blunt to Clareford, Salonica.
15 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 15-41.
16 0 . §en, Osmanli Panayirlari, 18.-19. Yiizyil [Ottoman Fairs, 18th and 19th Centuries] 
(Istanbul: Eren Yayinlari, 1996).
17 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 239-240.
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environment where products could be traded commonly in large quantities.18 According 
to one contemporary estimate, the trading volume of nine fairs still operating in the 
region amounted to O.L. 75,000 in the early 1890s.19
The arrival of the railways led to a reorganisation of marketing networks. 
Railways quickly became the main commercial arteries of the region, and caravan trade 
quickly lost its importance and became subsidiary to railway carriage, which provided 
merchants and producers with cheaper, faster and more secure means of transportation.20 
Subsequently, the rail-connected towns emerged as the primary loci of marketing and 
exchange in the region. The trading houses of Salonica set up offices and retail shops in 
these towns and from there reached the entire countryside through a well connected 
network of intermediary merchants, retailers and local representatives. An extensive 
chain of village-based small retail shops also supported this distribution network. Thus, 
marketing increasingly assumed a hierarchical structure in the region, as the trading 
houses of Salonica increasingly dominated local markets both as mass purchasers of 
local produce and as retailers of imported products. Spatially, commercial activity 
concentrated increasingly in rail-connected towns and extended in a web-like fashion 
down to the hamlets and villages. In due time, the local markets, and the once prolific 
fairs lost their importance and were pushed to the bottom of the newly established 
marketing hierarchies 21
A comprehensive credit system supported the entire marketing network, 
enabling the agents and intermediaries to run their petty businesses in cooperation with 
the prominent trading houses of Salonica. Prior to the 1880s, such businesses were 
conducted primarily through private credit arrangements between merchants and 
moneylenders 22 The Ottoman Bank was the only financial institution in the region and 
the bank’s commercial functions were limited. It mainly handled government accounts 
and extended credit to provincial administrations.23 With the arrival of railways and
For the foundation, operation and organisation of fairs see §en, Osmanli Panayirlari, 17-24.
19 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 239. This amount is quite significant. At around the same time, the 
commercial harbour of Salonica cost the government over O.L.290,000
20 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 58-62.
21 For the impact of railways on marketing networks see PRO, F.O. 195/1255, 27.6.1879, Blunt 
to Layard, Salonica. Also see Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 168-205.
22 See Chapters 3 and 4 for a discussion of regional credit markets and their broad organisation 
in the 1870s and the 1880s.
23 For the operations of the Ottoman Bank see A. Autheman, La Banque imperiale ottomane, 
Paris: Comite pour l’histoire economique et financiere Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances, 1996,
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growing tide of commercialisation in the region, however, the need for commercial 
banks became quite pressing for all parties involved in trade. In response to this need, a 
group of prominent merchants from Salonica established a new commercial bank in 
Salonica in cooperation with the Landerbank of Vienna and the Comptoir d ’Escompte 
of Paris in 1888. The new bank, Banque de Salonique, liberally extended credit to the 
mercantile community and provided financial support for agents and trading houses 
involved in overseas trade.24 In 1899, the Banque de Mytilini was established mainly to 
serve Greek commercial interests in the region. In 1905, the Bank o f  Industrial Credit o f 
Athens merged with the Bank o f  Athens within two years and it served similar ends. In 
1906, the German Orient Bank started its operations in Salonica. The Orient Bank was 
actually a branch of Deutsche Orient Bank, which was founded in the same year in 
Istanbul. In 1908, the Serbian Beogradska Zadruga was established in Salonica. Finally, 
the Bulgarian National Bank opened a branch in Salonica in December 1912. These 
credit institutions, especially Banque de Salonique and Banque de Mytilini, contributed 
to the development of the commercial economy and the expansion of overseas trade. 
Also, they provided capital for the establishment of new trading and manufacturing 
concerns in the region 25
The region’s enhanced integration into the world economy underlay the growth 
of port-cites and rail-connected towns as important centres of commerce, finance and 
manufacturing. Salonica grew by leaps and bounds as the leading port-town of the 
Southern Balkan Peninsula, and it served as an important commercial gateway between 
its vast hinterland and international markets. Likewise, rail-connected towns that had 
considerable agricultural potential grew rapidly during the period under consideration. 
Such important centres of commercial agriculture as Siroz, Drama, Istrumca, 
Tikve§/Kavadar, Avrethisan, Karaferye, Gevgeli, and Yenice emerged as leading 
centres of commerce upon the arrival of the railways and grew rapidly during the 1880s 
and the 1890s.26 The rapid growth of cash crop production in these districts during the 
same period also contributed to the expansion of trade and the concomitant growth of 
these towns. For instance, the growth of such railway towns as Istrumca, 
Tikve§/Kavadar and Gevgeli owed much to the proliferation of sericulture and opium
pp. 57-68; and, E. Eldem, Osmanli Bankasi Tarihi [The History of the Ottoman Bank] (Istanbul: Tarih 
Vakfi Yayinlari, 2000), 1-9.
24 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 169.
25 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 168-172.
26 1313 S.V.S., 1896, 315; Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 198.
production in these districts. Likewise, the rapid growth of Siroz, Drama and Yenice 
was associated with the impressive growth of cotton and especially tobacco cultivation 
in their immediate hinterlands.27 The propulsive impact of commercial agriculture on 
urban growth manifested particularly in Kavala’s impressive growth during the period 
under consideration. In the 1870s, Kavala was a trivial port-town with a population of 
only 5,000 residents. During the 1880s and especially the 1890s, the town grew as the 
primary centre of tobacco trade in the region. In this period, the expanding tobacco trade 
gradually shifted away from Salonica and concentrated in the port-town of Kavala, 
which was closer to the primary tobacco producing districts, Drama, Kavala, Provide, 
and San-§aban. Accordingly, the population of the town rose rapidly in the same 
period, to reach 24,000 in 1911. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, Kavala had become the 
third largest city in the region, after Salonica and Siroz 28
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27 See Chapter 2 for the development of commercial agriculture in these districts.
28 A. Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey Yunanistan’da §ehircilik ve Modemle§me,” 
[Urban Planning and Modernization in Northern Greece during the Tanzimat Period], in P. Dumont and 
F. Georgeon (eds.) Modernle§me Surecinde Osmanli Kentleri [Ottoman Towns in the Process of 
Modernization] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1996), 31-59.
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Overall, the arrival of railways strengthened the region’s commercial ties with 
overseas markets and undergirded the acceleration of urbanisation in the region. As. 
port-cities and rail-connected towns emerged as the primary loci of distribution and 
marketing, thousands of refugees, displaced peasant families and other agricultural 
workers migrated to urban areas, both on a permanent and seasonal basis, in a quest of 
jobs in the proliferating urban sectors. In this regard, the rapid development of the urban 
service sector was an important pull factor that attracted thousands into the urban areas.
2. The Development of the Urban Service Sector
The urban service sector constituted one of the most dynamic components of 
urban economic life in the region. The following discussion indicates that the sector 
expanded notably during the period under consideration and gradually became a leading 
field of economic activity in the region. This expansion was in tandem with the region’s . 
growing integration into the world economy. Below I concentrate on developments in 
three segments of the urban service sector, namely transport and commerce, catering 
and consumer services, and modem urban professions.
2.1. Commerce and Transportation Services
The intensification of commercial activity in port cities and rail-linked towns 
was the primary dynamic that underlay the rapid development of the urban service 
sector. The apparent dynamism of the transport sector was probably the clearest 
manifestation of this link between commercialisation and the development of the 
service sector. Thousands were employed as boatmen, porters and carriers at harbours, 
quays, railway stations, as well as at local markets, bazaars, and fairs. The porters and 
the boatmen of Salonica were an important component of the work force employed in 
transportation. The boatmen carried the merchandise between the ships anchored at the 
port and the quay line that stretched along the seashore. At the quay, the porters handled 
the merchandise and carried it over to the warehouses and depots, which were mostly 
situated at the west-end of the town. In addition, the porters carried goods between the 
quays and the railway terminus located at the Vardar Kapi Quarter located also in the 
west-end. In addition, many unskilled labourers worked as simple carriers, especially in 
the bazaars and the market places. The number of porters, boatmen and ordinary carriers
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working in Salonica is difficult to determine. However, some contemporary accounts 
suggest that their numbers could be measured in hundreds, if  not thousands.29 The same 
accounts and other evidence indicate that the number of workers employed in 
transportation increased steadily in tandem with the rapid growth of overseas trade and 
the expansion of railway services in the region.
The railways brought a similar dynamism to the transportation sector in interior 
towns as well. The railway companies hired hundreds of workers, including drivers, 
conductors, station workers, guards, technicians, engineers, porters, and other 
administrative employees, such as clerks, goods managers, weighers and loading clerks. 
The Oriental Railway Company employed a technical and administrative staff of about 
300 people in the early 1880s.30 Following the completion of the Manastir and Istanbul 
lines, the total number of employees working for the railway companies probably 
reached 1,000. Many more workers must have been employed as ordinary porters and 
carriers in the railway towns. We lack the data that would help us estimate long-term 
changes in the numbers of transportation workers. Logically speaking, however, we can 
maintain that employment opportunities in the transportation sector were very limited 
before the arrival of the railways and that they steadily increased thereafter.
The provision of transportation services for urban commuters was another 
important field of economic activity. The physical expansion of the towns brought about 
an acute problem of public transportation in urban centres. Especially in Salonica, 
thousands of workers and employees had to commute to and from work every day of the 
week, including Saturdays and Sundays. In the late 1880s, 20 omnibuses and about 200 
horse carriages constituted the primary means of public transport in Salonica. In 
addition, about 300 rowing boats ran along the quays carrying hundreds of passengers
29 D. Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” in Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993), 159-174; D. Quataert, “The Workers of 
Salonica,” in D. Quataert and E. Ziircher (eds.) Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire 
and the Turkish Republic, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers in Association with Institute of 
Social History, Amsterdam, 1995), 59-74; P. Dumont, “Une organisation socialiste ottomane: la 
federation ouvriere de Salonique (1908-1912),” Etudes Balkaniques, 11, N.2, (1975): 22-39; P. Dumont, 
“The Social Structure Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” 
Southeastern Europe/L’Europe du Sud-Est, 5, N. 2, (1979): 33-72; P. Dumont, “Naissance d’un 
socialisme ottoman,” in G. Veinstein (ed.), Salonique, 1850-1918, La ‘ville des Juifs’ et le reveil des 
Balkans, (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992): 195-208; P. Dumont, “A Jewish, Socialist and Ottoman 
Organization: the Workers’ Federation of Thessaloniki,” in M. Tun9ay and E. Ziircher (eds.) Socialism 
and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923, (London and New York: British Academic Press, 
An Imprint of I. B. Tauris Publishers in Association with the International Institute of Social History, 
Amsterdam, 1994), 49-76.
20 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 67.
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between the residential quarters of the east-end and the city centre every day.31 
However, these services were far from being sufficient to meet the needs of the growing 
urban population. Soon, commuting became a pressing problem that caused serious 
delays at work, particularly in the morning hours. The construction of a relatively 
comprehensive tram network in 1893 somewhat alleviated the congestion in the streets 
of Salonica.32 Yet, for all these improvements, the Tram Company was unable to keep 
up with the rapid growth of the town. Numerous extensions over the network and the 
improvement of services during the early 1900s did little to solve the problem of 
commuting and traffic congestion. The trams were often packed during the rush hours, 
and many residents still ended up taking omnibuses and carriages to commute to work. 
This situation led to frequent traffic jams in the city centre, particularly along the quays. 
In response, the town council considered alternative means of public transportation and 
proposed to run ferry services along the coastline in order to facilitate public 
transportation in Salonica.33 The proposal soon materialised, and the first ferry services 
started running along the shores of Salonica in 1907.34 Thus, public transportation 
became a “sector” on its own with the establishment of tram and ferry services in the 
town. The tram and ferry companies probably employed hundreds of workers. In 
addition, hundreds more earned a living from carriage and omnibus traffic and many 
more worked as boatmen carrying urban commuters along the quays. Salonica’s public 
transportation system was exceptionally well developed in comparison to other towns of 
the region. Nevertheless, public transportation was probably a growing field of 
economic activity also in the other towns that had a growing and sizeable population 
such as Siroz, Tikve§/KaVadar, Karaferye, Drama and Kavala. Unfortunately, we lack 
the information on the extent and growth of the public transportation sector in these 
towns.
2.2. Catering and Consumer Services
Urban growth brought about the need to provide basic as well as luxury services 
to the urban population. Above all, providing the foodstuffs and other basic consumer 
goods for the market dependent, wage-earning urban population acquired increasing 
economic significance in almost every town of the region. Hundreds of petty street.
31 1307 S.V.S., 1890,96.
3  ^For the construction of a comprehensive tram network in Salonica see below.
33 Asir, 28.C.1323 (28.8.1905), N. 1004:2.
3 4 F.O.A.S., 1907, N. 3867: 3.
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traders, shopkeepers, greengrocers, fruiters, bakers, butchers and fish, chicken, milk, 
cheese, butter and yogurt sellers provided basic foodstuffs for the urban residents. 
Likewise, other petty traders sold certain luxury goods, such as wines, spirits, sugar, 
candy, dried fruit and coffee to more prosperous residents, who were rapidly acquiring 
new tastes and lifestyles in the proliferating urban areas. Also, such artisans as public 
bath workers and barbers provided certain services that were essential for the well being 
of the urban population. Many other artisans, such as carpenters, glaziers, well makers 
and bricklayers, were employed to repair buildings and to maintain other fixtures in 
almost every town.
Table 5.1 provides a detailed list of such urban occupations and indicates the 
number of artisans employed in catering and consumer services in the late 1880s. Since 
these statistics incorporate only the number of registered, full-time artisans, the 
workforce employed in this important branch of the service sector appears smaller than 
we would normally expect. For instance, the official statistics cite 25 public baths but 
only nine public bath carers (hamamci) in the region. This simple observation attests to 
the probable underestimation inherent in the data set. Nevertheless, the statistics 
maintain the importance and diversity of the catering and consumer services in urban 
economic life.
The provision of comfort, entertainment, as well as regular catering to urban 
population also acquired increasing importance as new bourgeois lifestyles flourished in 
the rapidly growing towns. Traditional coffeehouses, modem cafes, restaurants and 
casinos provided entertainment for town residents and served as public spaces for 
socialisation and recreational activity.35 Hotels, motels and inns that could be found in 
almost every town provided shelter, comfort and food for visitors as well as for 
bohemian residents who chose to live in the relatively sterile and liberal atmosphere of 
the hotel rooms.36 Finally, cooks served food, pastry, and sometimes a shot of brandy or 
rah , or a warm cup of tea or coffee, for the townspeople in small comer-shops or 
mobile booths, particularly at lunchtime and in the “happy hour” after work. In other 
words, the service sector developed by serving the “relaxation” and convenience of a
35 For a general account of traditional coffee houses and cafes see M. Anastassiadou, “Son 
Osmanlilar Doneminde Selanik Kahvehaneleri,” [Salonica Coffee Houses in the Late Ottoman Era] in H. 
Desmet-Gregoire and F. Georgeon (eds.) Dogu ’da Kahve ve Kahvehaneler [Coffee and Coffee Houses in 
the East] (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 1998), 87-100.
3^ P. Dumont, “Le fran9ais d’abord” in G. Veinstein (ed.), Salonique, 1850-1918, La 'ville des 
Juifs ’ et le reveil des Balkans, (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992), 208-226.
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fast growing group of middle-class professionals, who were either self-employed or 
working for the government, commercial companies and factories (see below).37
Table 5.1.
Number o f Artisans Employed in the Urban Service Sector (Late 1880s)
Occupation Number of Artisans (Total)
Baker 2,150
Butcher 1,230
Yogurt M aker 920
Gardener 861
Vineyard Carer 566
Cheese Maker 460
Carriage Driver 328
Cotton Fluffer 286
G reengrocer 235
Coffee M aker 200
Goldsmith 155
M oney Lender 150
Suger and Candy Makers 81
Milk Seller 78
Dried Fruit Seller 69
Barber 60
Motel Keeper 47
Coal Seller 41
Chemist 40
Grocer 40
Petition W riter 31
Cook 21
Fruiterer 20
Butter M aker 17
Chicken Seller 16
Fishmonger 15
Salt Seller 10
Public Bath Carer 9
Glaizer 5
TOTAL 8,136
SHARE IN URBAN POPULATION 0
Source: 1303 S.V .S., 1886, Appendix; 1307 S .V .S., 1890, 223-226.
Thus, as urban centres grew, the demand for services increased proportionately, 
creating new job opportunities and attracting many others to urban areas. In this sense, 
the growth of catering and other urban consumer services appear as a self-perpetuating 
process that was tuned to the growth of urban population and the associated emergence
3 7 For Salonica’s glittering nightlife see Anastassiadou, “Son Osmanhlar D onem inde Selanik”; 
Anastassiadou, Salonique.
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of modem lifestyles. A work organisation process that revolved around in offices, 
factories and warehouses sustained the vitality of the urban consumer services.
2.3. Modern Urban Professions
One of the most important achievements of the Hamidian era was in the field of 
human resource development. Political centralisation and socio-economic 
modernisation were the two primary policy objectives of the Hamidian era. Sultan 
Abdulhamid II and his advisers understood the importance of mass education for both 
of their policy objectives and put considerable energy and resources into reforming the 
education system. New primary and secondary schools, military academies, vocational 
schools, and universities were founded both in the provinces and in Istanbul in order to 
train and educate new doctors, teachers, lawyers, judges, clerks, accountants, 
administrators, officers and bureaucrats.38 Thousands of well-trained professionals 
graduated from these institutions during the Hamidian era. This cadre of professionals 
worked in private and public institutions and contributed to the modernisation and 
centralisation drive in important ways.39 More significantly, they formed the backbone 
of the emerging bourgeois middle-classes that played leading political roles in two 
defining moments of Ottoman-Turkish history, namely the Young Turk revolution of 
1908, and the foundation of the Turkish Republic in the early 1920s.40
The growing commercial economy provided many opportunities for middle- 
class professionals in the Selanik region. The banks, commercial houses, insurance 
agencies, and factories employed hundreds, if  not thousands, of these educated 
professionals as clerks, accountants, administrative assistants, legal consultants and 
lawyers, and managers. We do not have detailed data on changes in the number of these 
employees. However, it is possible to establish a broad trend by looking at the changes
38 b. Kodaman, Abdulhamid Devri Egitim Sistemi [The Education System of the Hamidian Era], 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kuramu Basimevi, 1991); I Tekeli and S. Ilkin, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nda Egitim 
ve Bilgi Uretim Sisteminin Olu§umu ve Ddnii§umu [The Formation and Transformation of the Education 
and Systems of Information in the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Turk Dil Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1993).
39 c. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922,. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); C. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
40 §. Mardin, Jon Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908, (Istanbul: Ileti§im Yayinlari, 1989); Q. 
Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London: Verso, 1987); E. J. 
Ziircher, Turkey, A Modem History, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993); F. Ahmad, 
The Making o f  Modem Turkey, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).
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in the number of trading houses, banks, insurance agencies, the manufacturing concerns 
and schools operating in the region. The relevant data come from the provincial 
yearbooks. I have compiled this data in Table 5.2 for two benchmark years for which 
statistics were more comprehensive, that is for 1890 and 1907. The table points to a 
considerable increase in the number of commercial, financial and other professional 
institutions operating in the region during the period under consideration. Based on this 
indicative evidence, it is fair to suggest that the number of professionals employed in 
these establishments increased at least proportionately during the same period.
Table 5.2.
The Growth o f  Urban Professions in Selanik, 1890-1907
1890 1907
Banks 3 5
Bankers 11 15
Tarding Houses 22 60
Insurance Agencies 16 26
Factories 59 148
Lawyers 13 35
Public Schools 1,354 1,901
Hospitals n.a. 22
Doctors 14 45
Chemists n.a. 42
Dentists n.a. 7
Source: 1307 SV S (1890: 256-260); 1324 SVS (1907: 544-556).
Note: The Data pertaining to factory numbers are taken from Table 5.5. In fact, the 1907 
values pertain to the 1910 estimates presented in Table 5.5.
The centralisation and modernisation efforts of the Ottoman government, too, 
contributed to the growth of the urban service sector in important ways. The deepening 
of the government presence in the provinces and the associated improvements in local 
government services created new employment opportunities for middle-class 
professionals. Many high school and university graduates began their careers in 
provincial governments as clerks, translators, administrators, experts and technicians. 
Similar trends were at work also in Selanik. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the provincial 
government expanded notably in the Selanik region during the Hamidian period. The 
functions of the local government widened and new departments and government 
offices specialising in different administrative and judicial tasks were established, or 
expanded, at the sub-provincial and district levels. Accordingly, the number of officials
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employed by the local government increased steadily during the Hamidian era. By the 
late 1900s, provincial bureaucracy had become an integral component of the rapidly, 
growing urban service sector.
In addition, the modernisation attempts of the Ottoman government contributed 
to the rise of the urban middle classes in the region. For example, we observe a 
considerable increase in the number of professionals employed in health and 
educational services in the Selanik region. This development can be associated directly 
with the Ottoman government’s efforts to modernise health and education services 
throughout the empire. Although serious financial and institutional drawbacks continued 
to impair the efficiency of public health services until the end of the Hamidian era, the 
achievements in this field were nevertheless quite impressive. The provincial 
government established a number of public and military hospitals in the region during 
the 1880s and the 1890s. According to the official yearbooks, there were only three 
hospitals in the region in the late 1870s.41 By the early 1900s, there were a total of 16 
hospitals that provided basic health services to the general public and to the armed 
forces stationed in the province (See Table 5.2) 42 We do not know the number of 
doctors, nurses and other technical personnel employed in these hospitals, but their 
numbers probably increased along with the establishment o f new hospitals. In addition, 
private doctors, chemists and dentists provided health services to the local urban 
population. The number of these doctors, chemists and dentists increased during the 
1890s and the 1900s. According to the data presented in Table 5.2, the number of 
registered doctors working in the region increased from 14 to 45 between 1890-1907. 
The number of registered dentists and chemists rose to 7 and 42, respectively, by 1907.
We also see a notable improvement in education services in the region. The local 
authorities established new elementary schools not only in the leading urban centres but 
also in the villages during the period under consideration. In addition, new high schools 
and vocational academies were established in order to train technicians and 
administrators to be employed in local government offices and in the private sector. The 
number of public schools rose from 1,354 in 1890 to 1,901 in 1907 (See Table 5.2). 
Official statistics on the number of teachers employed in these schools are not available,
41 1293 S.V.S., 1876, 77-79.
4  ^There was at least one hospital in Salonica, Karaferye, Kesendire, Toyran, Istrumca, Katrin, 
Gevgeli, Drama, Kavala, Siroz, Demirhisar, Cuma-i Bala, Nevrekop and Razlik during the late 1900s. See 
1324S.V.S. (1907: 293-495).
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but it is possible that this number exceeded 4,000 in the late 1900s, whereas it probably 
was at most 3,000 in the 1890s, and much smaller in earlier decades.
3. The Construction Boom and the Growth of Salonica
The construction sector emerged as one of the primary fields of economic 
activity and investment, especially from the mid-1890s onwards, when urbanisation 
accelerated in the region. Thousands of residential, commercial and public buildings, as 
well as important urban infrastructures, were built to accommodate the ongoing process 
of urban growth.
3.1. Regional Trends and Patterns
The Ottoman authorities compiled rich data on the number of commercial and 
residential buildings existing in the leading towns of the region and regularly published 
these statistics in provincial yearbooks (salnames). The data resulted from the 
government’s efforts to clarify and consolidate its fiscal claims over the real estate 
owned by individuals residing in urban areas.43 The authorities carefully monitored the 
construction of residential and commercial buildings in order to secure the collection of. 
property taxes (emlak vergisi). They systematically registered the nature, estimated 
value, and the annual rent accruing from these buildings 44 The summary data published 
in the salnames were probably based on these fiscal registers. I use these statistics to 
demonstrate the dynamism-of the urban construction industry during the period under 
consideration. The available data are quite detailed, but there are gaps in the information 
provided. The provincial yearbooks for 1876 and 1882 contain ample data on the 
number of residential and commercial buildings. I rely mainly on these statistics in my 
estimations for 1880. However, these particular provincial yearbooks do not contain 
information on such important towns as Kavala, Gevgeli, Tikve§, Cuma-i Bala, Razlik, 
Menlik, Petri?, Longaza and Katrin. In order to by-pass this statistical constraint, I rely
43 H. Islamoglu-inan, “Administering Property: Law and Statistics,” Unpublished Paper 
Presented at Conference on Shared Histories o f Modernity: State Transformation in Chinese and Ottoman 
Contexts at Sabanci University in Istanbul on May 15,2000.
44 s. J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue Systems,” 
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 6, (1975): 421-459.
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on the yearbooks for 1895 and 1896 to determine roughly the number of buildings for 
any observation missing in the earlier yearbooks and thus in my estimates for 1880.45
The resulting estimates for 1880 are slight over-representations. Probably, there 
were fewer buildings in 1880 compared to the levels reached by the mid-1890s. 
Therefore, carrying some of the 1895 and 1896 values over to 1880, almost certainly 
inflates the earlier estimates, perhaps by as much as 10% for residential buildings, and 
by 5% for commercial buildings.46 This adjustment, however, maintains the relative 
comparability of the 1880 figures with the detailed statistics published in the 1907 
yearbook, which covers the number of buildings in all leading towns of the region. A 
comparative analysis of the 1880 estimates and the 1907 statistics enables me to observe, 
the broad trends in the sector in a more consistent empirical framework. Table 5.3 
presents the data set on which I base my observations.
Table 5.3 suggests .considerable dynamism in urban construction activity during 
the period under consideration. According to the data, the number of residential and 
commercial buildings increased by 55.9% and 54.5% respectively. These numbers 
slightly understate the actual dynamism of the construction industry during the 1880s, 
1890s, and the 1900s. First, the overestimation inherent in the 1880 estimate leads to a 
percentage figure that under-represents the expansion of the sector during the period 
under consideration. Secondly, our proxy variable is not sensitive to the transformation 
of architectural styles and reflects only changes in the actual number of buildings. As I 
shall discuss below, the construction of modem multi-story commercial and residential 
buildings became quite fashionable in Salonica and other leading towns in the last, 
quarter of the nineteenth century. In this sense, there was an actual “deepening” of 
construction activity, which our proxy variable does not represent. Finally, the proxy 
variable does not take into account the contribution of such important infrastructure 
investments as harbours, quays, paved streets and avenues, and water and gas works to 
the dynamism of the urban construction sector (see below). All the same, the evident
The data contained in the 1895 and 1896 yearbooks were not as comprehensive as the earlier 
ones, but these yearbooks included valuable data on missing observations in the earlier yearbook. 
Therefore, I did not use 1895 and 1896 yearbooks as benchmark, but simply used the data contained in 
them to improve the accuracy and comparability of my estimates for 1880.
46 The available figures for residential buildings in 1880 and 1895 suggest that the number of 
residential buildings grew by about 38% during the 1880s and the early 1890s. The data carried over from 
c.1895 to 1880 accounted for about a third of the estimate for 1880. If so the values could have been 
inflated by slightly more than 10% in total. Similar considerations suggest a 5% overestimation for 
commercial buildings.
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expansion in the number of urban dwellings and commercial buildings and the 
associated (physical) growth of towns points to the dynamism o f the region’s urban 
construction sector during the period under consideration.
Table 5.3 also reveals important clues about the forces underlying the apparent 
dynamism of the construction industry. As I discussed above, growing integration into 
the world economy, the construction of railways, and the simultaneous growth of the 
commercial economy were the primary factors that underlay the processes of urban 
growth in the Selanik region during the period under consideration.
Table 5.3 suggests that the same forces also fed into the physical expansion of 
the towns. In order to demonstrate the impact of these factors, I have grouped the 
leading towns of the region in accordance with their ideal type characteristics. I have 
used three categories, namely “port-towns”, “rail-connected towns and centres of 
commercial agriculture”, and “highland towns”. The pattern that emerges from the data 
presented in Table 5.3 is clear. The port cities and rail-linked towns grew most rapidly 
during the period under consideration, while the development of the commercially 
isolated highland towns remained more limited.
More specifically,, the number of residential and commercial buildings in 
Salonica and Kavala increased by 96.9% and 83.6%, respectively, from c. 1880-1907. 
Likewise, the physical growth of rail-connected towns and centres of commercial 
agriculture increased by 50.0% and 52.8%, respectively, during the same period. The 
expansion of highland towns was relatively modest, and the number of commercial and 
residential buildings in these towns increased only by 11.8% and 19.0%, respectively.
This should come as no surprise. The concentration of commercial activity and 
the subsequent growth of the service and manufacturing industries in port-cities, rail- 
linked towns and in important centres of commercial agriculture underlay their physical 
expansion. Hundreds of new shops, warehouses and other workshops were built to 
physically accommodate the growing urban economies. Thousands of residential 
buildings were erected to accommodate the growing urban population, and numerous 
hotels, inns, restaurants, casinos, pubs and coffee houses were built to cater to the needs 
of urban residents.
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Table 5.3.
The Physical Growth of'Interior' Towns, 1880-1907 
(Categorical Analysis o f the Changes in the Number o f Buildings)
Residential Buildings Commercial Buildings
Town 1880 1907 1880 1907
Port Cities
Salonica 5,215 9,694 3,144 5,633
Kavala * 1,627 3,775 252 602
TOTAL 6,842 13,469 3,396 6,235
% CHANGE 96.9% 83.6%
Rail-Connected Towns and Centres o f  Commercial Agriculture
Gevgeli * 646 865 288 515
Istrumca 939 1,460 485 515
Tikve§/Kavadar * 797 1,297 138 303
Vodine 1,102 1,291 350 623
Avrethisar 1,200 1,255 195 433
Yenice 1,016 1,616 539 570
Toy ran 870 1,000 189 358
Demirhisar 563 733 169 340
Siroz 3,035 4,416 1,581 2,192
Zihne 350 635 62 117
Drama 397 2,113 338 535
TOTAL 10,915 16,681 4,334 6,501
% CHANGE 52.8% 50.0%
Highland Towns
Nevrekop 706 1,434 482 619
Cuma-i Bala * 1,514 1,544 432 421
Razlik * 946 889 n.a. n.a.
Menlik * 532 700 190 205
Petri? * 1,149 1,149 279 287
Longaza * 409 464 198 203
Kesendire / Poliroz 460 420 18 59
Katrin * 989 1,378 261 285
TOTAL 6,705 7,978 1,860 2,079
% CHANGE 19.0% 11.8%
Overall Regional Trends
REGIONAL TOTAL 24,462 38,128 9,590 14,815
% CHANGE 55.9% 54.5%
Source: 1293 S.V.S., 1876; 1299 S.V.S.,1882; 1312 S.V.S., 1895; 1313 S.V.S., 1896; 1324 S.V.S.,1907.
Notes: 1) The c.1880 figures are based mainly on 1876 and 1882 yearbooks. The 1907 estimates are from 
the 1907 yearbook.
2) Towns with an asterisk are the ones for which no observation was available for c.1880. In order 
to compensate for this deficiency I used the data contained in 1895 and 1896 yearbooks to 
roughly determine the number of buildings for each missing category. Also see Text.
3) The ‘Commercial Buildings’ include: Shops, warehouses, hotels (han and otel), public baths, 
restaurants, bakeries, casinos, workshops and coffee houses.
Likewise, in leading towns of the region, local municipalities and other public 
and private bodies put considerable effort and resources into the modernisation of urban 
infrastructures, which further added to the dynamism of construction activity in these
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leading centres of commerce. In this respect, the physical expansion of urban centres 
and the growth of urban economies appears to have been mutually reinforcing.
This structural link between commercialisation and the physical expansion of 
towns becomes more important when we consider the relatively sluggish growth of 
highland towns in the same period. In general, highland districts participated in the 
commercial economy only in a very limited way. Their distance from railways and 
major roads underlay the relative isolation of these towns. The highland economies 
specialised mainly in animal husbandry, self-sufficient agricultural production, and 
small-scale textile manufacturing. Under the circumstances, the highland towns could 
not capitalise on the commercial opportunities that became readily available to the 
leading centres of commercial agriculture, rail-linked towns and the port cities. 
Consequently, the development of the urban construction sector also remained relatively 
limited in the highland towns.47 The only exception to this was the highland town of 
Nevrekop, which developed rapidly as an important centre of textile manufacturing and 
became one of the leading towns of the region by the late 1900s. Notwithstanding the 
example of Nevrekop, we can suggest that urban growth and the concomitant 
development of the construction sector took place mainly along the coast-line, in low­
land plains and along the valley systems, where commercial dynamism was more 
pronounced and penetrating. The commercial dynamic underlining the physical growth 
and development of towns shall become more clear when we consider the case of 
Selanik, which was the leading urban centre of the region by virtue of serving as a 
gateway between a vast hinterland and the world economy.
3.2. The Growth of Salonica
In the mid-1870s, Salonica was already quite a sizeable port-town with an 
estimated population of 80,000 residents. The town grew steadily throughout the 
following three decades and became one of the leading “metropoles” of the eastern 
Mediterranean basin, with a population of about 180,000 on the eve of the Balkan Wars.
47 However, note that the numbers of buildings in most of the highway towns were missing in 
the yearbooks of 1876 and 1882. Therefore, I had to use the 1895 and 1896 data for 1880. As I have noted 
above, this method has somewhat inflated the 1880 figures for highland towns and understated the 
respective growth rates for the period under consideration. Yet, considering that the margin o f error could 
have been by as much as 10%, we could still suggest that the expansion of highland towns was relatively 
modest in comparison to port-cities and rail-connected towns.
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The physical transformation of the town accompanied its demographic growth. 
First, the number of buildings increased considerably. In 1876, there were about 5,200 
residential and 3,144 commercial buildings in Salonica. By 1907, these numbers had 
risen to 9,694 and 5,633, respectively (See Table 5.3). Secondly, the entire face of the 
town was transformed within a matter of four decades. Modem impressions and eclectic 
interpretations of many different (European) architectural styles gradually replaced local 
ones. By 1910, the town also boasted quite extensive modem infrastructure outlets, such 
as a sizeable commercial harbour, extensive quays that stretched along the waterfront, 
wide avenues, paved streets, public gardens, railway and tram networks, as well as 
extensive water, gas and electricity works. With all these modem features and eclectic 
architectural decorum, Salonica inspired its residents and visitors to imagine it as a 
fledging Paris, or rather a Marseilles in the Levant.48 This outcome represented a 
relatively rapid process of urban growth and transformation, thanks to various agents 
and forces that I shall discuss below.
In the late 1860s, the city of Salonica was still circumscribed by the old city 
walls. Construction of residential and commercial buildings outside the old walls was 
prohibited by imperial decree. This legal constraint withheld the physical expansion of 
the city for decades and gave way to chronic overcrowding within the town.49 The 
centrally located Jewish Quarter of the town was especially cramped; narrow, disorderly 
and squalid streets barely separated the residential and commercial buildings.50 The city 
walls obstructed sea-borne trade and compelled ships to load and discharge their 
cargoes at a nearby location situated on the western side of the town.51
In 1870, the reformist governor general of Selanik, Sabri Pa§a, convinced 
Istanbul to consent to the demolition of the city walls and to the construction of new 
buildings beyond the confines of the old city quarters. This was an important 
development that changed the entire facade of the town and allowed its rapid
48 A. Yeralimpos, and V. Colonas, “Un urbanisme cosmopolite”, in G. Veinstein (ed.) 
Salonique, 1850-1918, La ‘ville des Juifs' et le reveil des (Balkans, Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992), 
158-176.
49 1307 S.V.S, 1890, 89;
50 For a report that discusses the state of the town and the problem of hygiene see Rumeli, 
1.Ra. 1290 (29.4.1873), N. 10: 1-2. Also see Anastassiadou, Salonique, 141.*
51 N. C. Moutsopoulos, “Une ville entre deux siecles”, in G. Veinstein (ed.) Salonique, 1850- 
1918, La ‘ville des Juifs ’ et le reveil des Balkans, (Paris: Editions, Autrement, 1992), 20-40.
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expansion.52 The old city walls along the waterfront were demolished in the early 
1870s.53 New houses, shops, bazaars, offices, hotels and warehouses were soon built 
along the seashore, as well as within the old commercial centre of the town, the Frenk 
Mahallesi.54 The town also rapidly expanded beyond the old city walls. The opening of 
the Salomca-Uskup railway line in 1872 quickly transformed the west-end of the town 
into an important commercial centre. Numerous commercial buildings and warehouses 
were constructed around the railway terminus situated in the Vardar Kapi Quarter.55 
This neighbourhood initially grew also as a promising residential centre and many 
houses were built between the old city walls and the railway terminal. Soon, however, it 
became apparent that the marshes of the Vardar River constituted a grave inconvenience 
for residents; the malicious attacks of mosquitoes, particularly at night, and the constant 
risk of malaria soon drove many residents away from the neighbourhood.56 Moreover, 
the establishment of a number of factories in this spacious part of the town created 
further distress among the residents of the Vardar Kapi Quarter. The noise and pollution 
caused by these factories ultimately forced many inhabitants to leave the neighbourhood 
for alternative residences in the northern and especially the eastern end of the town.57 
Eventually, residential development came to a halt and the entire west-end became one 
of the leading commercial centres of the town from the mid-1880s onwards.
Residential development took place mainly in the north and east ends of the 
town. Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1876, thousands of Muslim refugees 
poured into the empire.58 Some of these refugees settled in the northern Muslim quarters 
of the town.59 The Kalameriye Quarter in the north-east end of the town was another
52 Similar legislation enabled other port towns to expand rapidly beyond the old walls. The oft- 
cited cases in point are the port-towns of Kavala and Volos. See, Yeralimpos, ‘Tanzimat Doneminde 
Kuzey”.
5 3 P.P.A.P., 1871, V.29: 544.
54 P.P.A.P., 1874, V. 32: 670-672; P.P.A.P., 1874, V.33: 953.
55 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 6-7.
56 1307 S.V.S., 1890, 90.
52 it is interesting to note that the residents of the Vardar Kapi Quarters of Salonica resisted the 
establishment of the Torres spinning factory in the early 1880s. The residents were concerned about the 
residents was the pollution and noise that the factory would cause. However, the case was resolved in 
favour of the Torres family; the Chamber of Commerce and the municipality supported the entrepreneur 
families and the factory was eventually established in the Vardar Kapi quarter as initially planned. For 
details see BA, §D-Selanik, 2012/6, 5.R.1302 (22.1.1885).
58 K. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics, 
(Madison-Wisconsin and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); N. Ipek, Rumeli’den Anadolu 'ya 
Turk Goqleri, 1877-1890, [Turkish Immigration from Rumelia to Anatolia, 1877-1890] (Ankara: Turk 
Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1992). Also see Chapter-1.
59 BA, SD-Selanik, 2012/4, 17.R.1302 (29.1.1885).
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residential centre that grew rapidly in the 1880s. The old walls in this part of the city, 
too, were demolished, and the twelve hectare estate of a Muslim notable, §eyh 
Abdulkadir Efendi, was parceled out and sold to new settlers. In the early 1880s, a new 
development plan brought an additional 150 hectares into use in the north-eastern part 
of the town.60 Numerous villas and spacious residential dwellings mushroomed in 
Kalameriye, and the neighbourhood soon became one of the most fashionable parts of 
the town.61 In 1887, the south-eastern walls of the town were demolished and a new 
avenue, the Hamidiye Caddesi, was built,, connecting the neighbouring Hamidiye 
Quarter directly to the city of Salonica. Similar to the Kalameriye, the Hamidiye 
Quarter developed rapidly to accommodate handsome residential buildings. European 
residents and diplomatic envoys working in Salonica moved to this part of the town.62
Meanwhile, considerable infrastructure construction was taking place in 
Salonica. The construction of the quays along the waterfront was the largest and the 
most costly project. Raising the necessary capital to finance it initially posed a serious 
challenge for the local government and municipal authorities. To overcome the 
difficulty, the authorities soon came up with a brilliant idea. They auctioned the land 
that would be reclaimed from the sea upon the completion of the quay walls. Both 
European and local speculators showed immediate interest in the auctions and parceled 
out the most valuable land stretching along the coastline. Within a matter of few 
months, the local government had raised almost O.L. 100,000 from the auction.63 An 
Italian company took over the construction of the quay walls. The works commenced in 
1871 and were close to completion by the summer of 1874. However, later in the same 
year, the works came to an abrupt halt due to the exhaustion of funds. The full 
completion of this project had to wait until 1882.64
Other main avenues of the town, namely the Vardar, Kalameriye, Islahhane and 
Midhat Pa§a Avenues, were enlarged and repaired.65 In addition, the municipality
60 Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey,” 50.
61 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 6-7.
62 1312 S.V.S., 1895,186.
63 P.P.A.P., 1871, V.29: 544; PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 16.1.1875, Blunt to Elliot. Mr. Abbott, one 
of the leading British residents of the town, and the Alatini family were heavily involved in real estate 
development along the quay and purchased considerable land along the coast line in the 1870s (PRO, 
F.O. 195/2064, 8.4.1899, Blunt to O’Conor).
64 P.P.A.P., 1875, C.N. 17: 455-456; PRO, F.O. 195/1065, 16.1.1875, Blunt to Elliot; P.P.A.P., 
1883, N. 6: 102.
65 1312 S.V.S., 1895,191.
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opened numerous new streets and roads, and widened and improved the existing ones. 
By the end of the 1880s, at least a quarter of the streets in the town was paved with lava 
stone imported from Bandirma and Napoli.66 Masonry was of high quality and due 
attention was paid to “secure good drainage traps at the centre of cross streets, with a 
slight inclination for the water fall”.67 British Consul General Blunt reported in 1889, 
that “Salonica had the best paved streets in Turkey”.68
In 1890, a disastrous fire broke out in the Jewish and Frenk Quarters of the town 
and wiped out a third of the old city. 1,560 houses were burnt to ashes within a matter of 
few hours, leaving 10,000 people homeless.69 This was a crucial twist of fate that 
entirely changed the face of the town in the following years. The quarters destroyed by 
the fire were rebuilt. This time, however, the construction was carried out according to a 
plan drawn out by the local municipality. Wide avenues, orderly streets and new 
intersecting squares soon replaced the disorderly and enclosed public spaces of the old 
city.70 New multi-story residential buildings were built within the old Jewish Quarter. 
The entire neighbourhood was transformed into one of the most expansive areas of the 
town, accommodating the spacious mansions of the city’s rising bourgeoisie. A similar 
development took place in the Frenk Quarter. New passages and office buildings were 
erected in the quarter. The merchant families of the town built their own business 
centres. The most famous of these were the Alatini, Savol, Tiyano, Yildiz, Saias, 
Rongot and Lombardo business centres (harts). Thus, by the mid-1890 the Frenk 
Quarter once again became a leading business centre.71
The development of the town towards its western and eastern ends continued 
throughout the 1890s and the 1900s. In the Vardar Kapi end of the town, new factories 
and warehouses were built. In the east, residential development continued rapidly. After 
the fire, the local government and the representatives of the Jewish community helped 
resettle the displaced Jewish residents of the town in the Kalameriye Quarter and the
66 1312 S.V.S., 1895,192.
67 F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 6-7; 1307S. VS. (1890: 91-92).
6%F.O.A..S., 1889, N. 623:7.
69 PRO, F.O. 78/4288, 3.9.1890, Blunt to Manohan.
79 According to one estimate, the share of public spaces in the town area increased from 17% to 
29% following die fire of 1890 (Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey,” 50). Also, the construction 
of streets was impressive. The municipality built a total of 99,504 square meters o f pavements in the town 
in 1893 alone (1310 S.V.S., 1893, 208).
7  ^ 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 192; Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey,” 50-51.
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northern side of the Hamidiye Quarter.72 Also, the Hamidiye and the associated Yalilar 
neighbourhoods became increasingly popular among the prosperous families of the 
town. With their extensive public gardens, wide avenues and well-planned and orderly 
streets, the Hamidiye and Yalilar Quarters soon became the suburbs of the town.73 Not 
surprisingly, real estate speculators purchased sizeable parcels of land in the east-end of 
the town, forcing the land prices to increase exponentially. For instance, land prices rose 
from one kuru§ per ar§in in 1901 to 25 kuru§ts in 1905 in the most distant parts of the 
Yalilar Quarter.74
Real estate development continued also along the coastline. Two developments 
were particularly striking in this period. The first was the construction of the new 
commercial harbour. An imperial decree issued on November 31, 1887, granted to the 
Civil List the concession for the construction of a commercial port in Salonica. Despite 
the pressing need for the construction of a new harbour and a spacious customs house, 
no action was taken until the mid-1890s. The delay probably emanated from a lack of 
funds. The active resistance of the influential guild of porters, that had quite literally 
monopolised the handling of goods at the port of Salonica, also hampered the 
commencement of harbour works for quite a while.75 On July 20, 1896, the ministers of 
the Civil List finally signed a contract with a French entrepreneur, Edmond Bartissol, 
for the construction of a commercial harbour in Salonica. According to the contract, the 
harbour works were to be completed within the following five years. The entire project 
would cost £260,000. A fifth of the sum was to be advanced by the Civil List and the 
rest was to be financed by the contractor company, Societe ottomane de Construction du 
Port de Salonique. The company was granted the right to exploit the port for five 
years.76 Following a brief period of logistical and financial build up, the construction 
work commenced in 1897.77 A number of technical and financial difficulties caused 
delays in the actual construction process, but the harbour was finally completed in 
1903.78
72 1312 S.V.S., 1895: 192.
73 1307 S.V.S., 1890: 94-95.
74 Asir, 28.C.1323 (28.8.1905), N. 1004: 2.
7  ^D. Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 59.
76 PRO, F.O. 195/2064, 1899, Memo to the Ambassador O’Connor; Asir, 14.S.1314 (25.7.1896), 
N. 601: 2; Asir, 25.N.1314 (27.2.1897); Asir, 15.N.1319 (22.12.1901), N. 645: 2. For details of the 
contract see E. Pech, Manuel des Societes Anonymes fonctionnant en Turquie, (Paris, 1907) 168-171.
77 Asir, 25.N.1314 (27.2.1897), N. 155: 2; F.OA.S., 1898,N.2111: 9-10.
78 See F.OA.S., 1900, N. 2468: 5; Asir, 18.L.1318 (7.2.1901), N. 557: 2; Asir, 24.Za.1320 
(23.2.1903), N. 760: 1. Also see Anastassiadou, Salonique, 142-144;
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The second development in infrastructure was the enlargement of the quays. The 
rising volume of trade in Salonica and the increasing public traffic in the town were 
causing serious congestion along the quays. Goods discharged from the small boats lay 
along the quay walls and often occupied even the adjacent avenues, obstructing 
pedestrian and carriage traffic. After the arrival of tramways in 1893 (see below), the 
congestion along the quays became intolerable. The Civil List soon took steps to expand 
the quays in order to solve the problem. In 1899, the authorities approached the harbour 
construction company. The project on offer involved the widening of the quays from 12 
to 24 meters along the coastal strip that stretched between Olympos square and the 
White Tower. The harbour company welcomed the offer and estimated the cost of the 
project at O.L. 34,000.79 Following intense bargaining, the harbour company and the 
representatives of the Civil List finally agreed upon a substantially lower budget of O.L.
11,000.80 Necessary capital would be provided from the Privy Purse, and the Civil List 
would reserve all rights after the completion of the project. The works commenced in
1904.81 and the reconstruction of the entire quay line, was completed probably by
1908.82
Other important infrastructure developments took place throughout the 1890s 
and the 1900s. The most important projects were the construction of quite 
comprehensive water, gas and electricity networks and the foundation of a tram service 
that cut through the town from the west-end to the east.
Prior to the mid-1880s, the city did not possess a comprehensive water 
distribution scheme. The residents mainly relied on underground waters and used wells 
to meet their needs. In addition, two small streams passing through the town were the 
primary sources of fresh running water. However, the streams were far from sufficient 
for the needs of the town, and chronic water shortages affected the city, especially in
79 Asir, 14.M.1317 (24.5.1899), N. 382: 2.
80 Asir, 12.B.1318 (5.11.1900), N. 531: 2; Asir, 11.§.1318 (4.12.1900), N. 539; Asir, 24.§.1318 
(17.12.1900), N. 543: 2; Asir, 3.M.1319 (22.4.1901), N. 576: 2; Asir, 26.Ca.1319 (9.9.1901), N. 616: 2; 
Asir, 8.M.1321 (6.4.1903), N. 771: 2.
81 Asir, 12.?.1322 (31.10.1904), N. 926: 2; Asir, 22.§.1322 (31.10.1904); Asir, 12.L.1322 
(19.12.1322), N. 940: 2.
8 2 F.O.A.S., 1907, N. 3867: 3.
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dry summer seasons. The rapid growth of the town population aggravated the water 
supply bottlenecks from the 1870s onwards.83
In 1888, a prominent notable of Salonica, Nemlizade Hamdi Efendi, received the 
concession to carry water from the Vardar River to Salonica and to construct water 
wells in the hilly northern quarters of the town.84 Another notable from Karaferye, Talib 
Aga, was granted the concession to build a canal to bring fresh running water from the 
nearby Kel Baba and §eyh Suyu streams over to the Kalameriye end of the town. Talib 
Aga completed this project successfully in the late 1880s, and a regular 20-30 mesuro 
water supply for the town was thus guaranteed. Within this scheme, Talib Aga also built 
a public fountain in Kalameriye Quarters to serve the needs of local population.85 The 
commencement of the much larger Vardar project had to wait until 1891. In 1890, 
Hamdi Efendi ceded the concession to Ottomane des Eaux de Salonique, which was a 
joint stock company founded by a group of Belgian capitalists with an initial capital of
5,000,000 French francs. Subsequently, the Water Company and the Ottoman 
government signed a contract on January 12, 1891. The contract secured the 
management rights of the Water Company for fifty-one years in return for the 
construction of the project.86 Construction started in 1891 and the water canals were 
completed by 1893. The water was first brought from the Vardar plain to the 
waterworks situated near the Be§9inar public gardens in the west side of the city. The 
water was then pumped by, steam power to the reservoirs situated in the upper part of 
the city and from there distributed to the entire city. The contractor company built five 
hydrants and seven public fountains along with the main distributary channels.87
Extensions, improvements and repairs on the waterworks continued until the end 
of the period. The Water Company became the main supplier o f fresh drinking water to 
Salonica. Although complaints concerning the pricing policy of the Water Company 
were voiced in city circles, the new network made life easier for the Salonicans.88 The 
service also improved the sanitary conditions in a city where epidemics of cholera,
83 1312 S.V.S., 1895,182.
84 BA, Mukavelat, 3/174-183,21.§.1305 (2.5.1888).
85 1307S.V.S.(1890: 93).
86 BA, Mukavelat, 5/60-66,1 .C. 1308 (21.1.1891).
87 F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 21.
88 For complaints about the tariffs charged by the water company, see Asir, 6.Ca.l316
(22.9.1898), N. 314: 2-3; Asir, 20.Z.1316 (30.4.1899), N. 375: 2] Asir, 9.N.1323 (6.11.1905), N. 1024: 2.
typhus, and chronic diarrhoea, all emanating from contaminated water, had claimed the 
lives of many adults and infants in the past.89
The second important infrastructure project was the construction of gasworks in 
the town. In 1887, the imperial government granted a concession to a British subject, Sir 
Kirby, to build and manage gas works in Salonica for thirty-five years. Later that year, 
Sir Kirby sold the concession to a French company, Societe du Gas, which implemented 
the entire project in a short time.90 The company began to lay the first pipes along the 
streets of Salonica in 1889, and the actual gas distribution started in 1890. Construction 
proceeded rapidly in the following few years. By the mid-1890s, most streets of the 
town had been illuminated by gas lamps.91 The gas works continued to expand steadily 
throughout the following decade. In some years, the works had to be suspended due to 
lack of funds. Still, the expansion of the network continued well into the late 1900s, 
thanks to the timely credits that the local banks extended to the construction company.92
Another important infrastructure development of the 1890s was the construction 
of an extensive tram network in the town. We see, once again, a local Muslim notable, 
Hamdi Bey, behind the tram project. Hamdi Bey was granted a concession to build and 
run tram lines in the town of Salonica on 11 September, 1889.93 In 1892, a joint stock 
company, Compagnie ottomane des Tramways de Salonique, was established in 
Belgium to raise the necessary capital. Once Hamdi Bey and his Belgian associates 
secured a capital of 15,000,000 French francs, they launched the project. Under the 
direction of Monsieur Kaul, an engineer from Luxembourg, the construction proceeded 
quickly. By mid-1893, half of the projected network was completed. Within that year, 
tram services commenced. In the first six months, the trams carried 779,847 passengers, 
and the company earned about 4,000 French francs in profits. Next year, the entire 8.8 
km-long network was completed, connecting the east and west ends of the town. The
A. S. Unver “Les epidemies de cholera dans les terres Balkaniques aux XVIIIe et XIXe 
siecles”, Etudes Balkaniques, 4, (1973): 89-97.
90 F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 9-12.
91 1312 S.V.S., 1895,186.
92 F.O.A.S., 1910, N. 4579: 5-6.
93 BA, Mukavelat, 4/67-76, 21.Za.1306 (19.7.1889); F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 11); Pech, Manuel 
des Societes, 198. This Hamdi Bey was probably different from the Nemlizade Hamdi Bey who played 
the leading role in the Vardar waterworks project.
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company was a success from this point on. Passenger numbers reached 4,000,000 and 
the annual profits rose to 41,000 French francs in the late 1890s and the early 1900s.94
The development of the east-end, particularly of the Hamidiye Quarter, soon 
brought about the need to extend the tram services beyond the White Tower. The 
construction of a new four-kilometre line that connected the White Tower to the Depot 
located at the outskirts of the Hamidiye Quarter commenced in 1897. The Tram 
Company completed the project within three years, and new trams started running along 
the Hamidiye Boulevard in 1900.95 Meanwhile, services on existing lines improved. The 
number of carriages running through the town at rush hours increased.96 New late night 
and early morning trams were put into service. New seats were added to carriages to 
secure the privacy of Muslim women. Also, due care was taken to improve the 
punctuality of the services.97 In 1904, a new project was initiated to build a second tram. 
track along the quay with a view to increasing the flow of services between the railway 
terminus and the White Tower.98 This project proceeded rapidly and was probably 
completed in 1905.99 Yet, the trams could still not keep up with the rapid growth of the 
town population. Municipal authorities considered alternative measures that would help 
alleviate the problem of public transportation. In 1905, the growing need for new 
electric trams for the town was voiced for the first time in city circles.100 Later in that 
year, the Societe ottomane d ’Electricite de Salonique et Smyme was established in 
Istanbul to set up the first electricity works and to run the trams on electricity in Izmir 
and Salonica. This company, too, brought together a group of Belgian capitalists led by 
Mr. Barlett and influential Ottomans, including Ziya Pa§a, who successfully obtained 
the necessary concession from the central government and raised the due capital in 
Europe toward the realisation of the project.101
94 Pech, Manuel des Societes, 199; Anastassiadou, Salonique, 168.
95 Asir, 25.Ca.1315 (20.10.1897), N. 220: 2.
96 Asir, 29.§.1316 (12.1.1899), N. 346: 2. ,
97 Asir, 20.R.1319 (6.8.1901), N. 606: 2.
98 Asir, 12.L.1322 (19.12.1904), N. 940: 2.
99 Asir, 22.L.1322 (29.12.1904), N. 943: 2.
100/lsz/*, 5.N. 1323 (2.11.1906), N. 1023: 2;
101 Pech, Manuel des Societes, 193. The thirty-five year concession was granted by the imperial 
government to Mr. Barlett on July 30, 1899 (BA, Irade-Imtiyazat ve Mukavelat, 52/628, 22.Ra.1317
(30.7.1899)). Later in 1903, the concession was extended for another 35 years from its expiry date in 
1923 (BA, Irade-Ticaret ve Naifa, 327/837, 16.R.1321 (12.7.1321); PRO, F.O. 195/2182, 23.1.1904, 
Graves to O’Conor).
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In 1906, a group of engineers from Belgium arrived Salonica.102 Following 
preliminary investigations and planning, the engineers ordered the importation of the 
necessary equipment from Belgium. The engineers soon completed the project and the 
first electric tram started running along the streets of Salonica in June of 1907.103 The 
Tram Company also provided electricity for the town. In 1908, apart from several 
private consumers, three theatres and the Alatini Flour Mill were illuminated by 
electrical power. The next year, three main avenues as well as a few principal cafes 
situated around the Olympos Square and the seashore were lit by electricity.104
Table 5.4.
Comperative Returns over Alternative Investments (Late 1900s)
Investment Option Annual Returns
Average Annual Return over Real Estate Owned in Salonica 18%
Banque de Salonique 10%
Societe anonyme ottomane Industrielle et Commerciale de Salonique 10%
Banque Imperial Ottomane 7%
Interest Rate o f the Agricultural Bank 7%
Societe anonyme ottomane des Mines de Kassandra 6%
Commercial Company o f Salonica Limited 6%
Ottoman Government Bonds (Average Effective Interest Rate, 1876-1914) 5.50%
Societe ottomane d'Electricite de Salonique et Smyrne 5%
Compagnie ottomane de Eaux de Salonique 4%
Source: Pech, Manuel des Societes, 109, 128, 140, 186, 193, 205, 230); Kiray, Osmanh’da Ekonomik 
Yapi, 12; Giiran, 19. Yuzyil Osmanli Tarimi, 153.
All these projects reflect the prosperity, technical modernisation and the material 
improvements that affected the lives of Salonicans. Clearly, a considerable amount of 
wealth accumulated in Salonica during the period under consideration. As we have seen, 
the Ottoman government was partly responsible for the flow of wealth into the town. 
The Civil List and the local municipality played an important role in providing the 
necessary capital for some of the infrastructure projects. However, the bulk of the 
capital that poured into the city appears to have originated from local mercantile classes, 
notables and European capitalists.
In order to better demonstrate the interests of these agents in urban real estate 
development, I present a brief list of some of the prominent real estate owners in
102 Asir, 25.Z.1324 (19.2.1906), N. 1052: 2.
103 Asir, 25.Za.1325 (7.1.1907), N. 1144: 1-2; F.O.A.S., 1909, N. 4359: 7.
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Salonica around 1910 in Appendix 6. The data are extracted from an Ottoman tax ledger 
that contains information on the fiscal liabilities of the real estate in question. The 
ledger is far from being exhaustive, but it reveals useful information on the involvement 
of notables and mercantile classes in urban real estate development. For instance, the 
common presence of Muslim proprietors, who carry the prestigious titles of pa§a, aga 
and bey, point to the heavy involvement of wealthy notables and individuals in urban 
real estate development. The frequent appearance of Muslim women with the 
prestigious title of hamm in the list, likewise, confirms the preoccupation of wealthy 
Muslim families in real estate business. The frequent appearance of certain Jewish and, 
Greek family names on the list indicate that the town’s ethnically mixed elite shared the 
costs as well as the benefits of real estate development in Salonica.
Handsome returns appear to have been the main attraction of urban real estate 
development in Salonica. The above mentioned data also reveal some useful, and quite 
unique, information on the annual average yield of various types of real estate in 
Salonica. According to the data, the annual rent income that an average building 
generated in Salonica could reach 18.0% of the estimated value of the building. More 
specifically, residential buildings yielded an. annual rent income that equalled average 
15.0% of the actual estimated value of the property, while the same figure for 
commercial buildings was 19.0%. If this information is accurate, then real estate 
ownership emerges as a relatively profitable and secure investment option. For example, 
the leading firms and banks located in Salonica paid between 4-10.0% in dividends, 
every year in the late 1900s (See Table 5.4). Between 1886-1914, the average effective 
annual rate of interest on government bonds was 5.5%. The Agricultural Bank charged 
7.0% interest on loans extended to farmers. Money lending and tax farming were 
profitable investments that could yield as much as 30-40.0% of profit per annum.105 Yet, 
money lending and tax farming involved serious risks.106 These comparative figures 
indicate that real estate ownership in Salonica was probably one of the most lucrative 
and presumably the least risky of all investment options that were available to people of 
economic prominence in the region. This attractiveness of real estate development 
undergirded the physical growth of Salonica and other towns.
w  F.OA.S., 1908, N.4121: 7.
105 Asir, 9. B. 1313 (25.12.1895), No: 34: 1-2; J. Baker, Turkey, (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1877), 401.
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European capitalists showed considerable interest in real estate development. 
They were involved, to some extent, in the construction of commercial and residential 
buildings. Even more so, they participated in infrastructure projects, such as the 
construction of the commercial harbour, quays, gas and water works and trams. All the 
projects carried out by European capitalists, without exception, yielded handsome 
returns for the investors. These returns underlay European interest in infrastructure 
projects. Also, the constant struggle between the European powers to establish a strong 
foothold in the Balkans set the political and strategic backdrop against which these 
infrastructure outlets proceeded in the region. In this context, the predominance of 
French, Belgian and especially Austrian capital in infrastructure outlets illustrates the 
political and strategic nature of European presence in the region.107
The physical development of Salonica, then, can be associated with a number of 
interlocking structural processes at work. First, the moment of “peripherisation” 
encompassed the entire process of urban growth and the rapid development of the 
construction industry in Salonica. The concentration of commercial activity in this 
important port-city of the Levant constituted the broad historical backdrop against 
which the construction industry grew. The construction industry expanded rapidly to 
accommodate physically the town’s commercial and demographic growth. Secondly, 
the efforts to modernise the city fuelled the growth of the urban construction industry. 
The construction of wide avenues, paved streets, water, gas and electricity works, 
modem transport systems, as well as the emergence of new eclectic architectural styles 
in the town marked this development. Thirdly, the local elite seems to have responded 
swiftly to the emergent opportunities provided by the interlocking processes of 
“peripherisation” and “modernisation”. Local mercantile classes and prominent notables 
assumed active initiative in real estate development. They invested considerable sums of 
capital in the construction of both residential and commercial buildings. The primary 
motive behind this interest in real estate development was apparently the returns 
accruing from such investments. However, the prestige and power that came with 
ownership of real estate in urban areas too must have moved the elite. The proliferation 
of luxurious mansions, kiosks and other stylish buildings owned by prominent
106 s ee Chapter-5 for details.
107 M. Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the End o f the Ottoman Empire, (London: Frank Cass, 
1996); and, S. J. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, V. II, 
Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise o f Modem Turkey, 1808-1975, (Cambridge, New York, New 
Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988), for the details of inter-imperialist 
rivalries over the Ottoman Empire.
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individuals testify to this lavish interest in prestige and power. Probably similar 
economic and political concerns incited European capitalists to invest considerably in 
real estate development in Salonica, although the economic motives seem to have been 
more important in their case.
4. The Growth and Transformation of the Manufacturing Industry
In the early 1870s, the region’s manufacturing base included artisanal shops that 
specialised in the production of textiles, household utensils, furniture, basic iron goods 
and food processing.108 There were only a few “industrial” establishments in the region. 
These establishments included a number of silk filatures, a few tanneries, a steam- 
engined flourmill, and a soap factory.109 The products of these artisanal and “industrial” 
concerns were consumed largely within the region. The exceptions were the specialty 
textile products, specifically the famed heavy woollen cloth (§ayak), silken bath towels 
(pe§temal) and silken veils (<biiriimcuk), which were in demand also in the Ottoman and 
Levantine markets.110 The urban manufacturing industries of the region, then, were 
typically characterised by small scale artisanal production based on simple technology 
on the one hand, and a high degree of concentration on products sold in the immediate 
consumer markets, on the other. Mechanisation and production with a view to acquiring 
a larger share for the intra-regional and international markets remained limited. Intense 
European competition, technical difficulties encountered in the introduction, adaptation 
and maintenance of imported technology and, last but not the least, risk averse 
entrepreneurial behaviour undergirded relative isolation and the technological 
limitations of the urban manufacturing sector.111
108 Anastasiadou, Salonique', Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia', Dumont, “The Social 
Structure”.
109 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 134; D. Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 160- •
161.
HO 1299 S.V.S., 1883, 206-208; Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 134; Quataert, “Premieres 
fumees d’usines,” 160-161.
H I D. Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire, 1800-1914, 
(Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1992); D. Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in H. Inalcik and D. 
Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-946.
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The late nineteenth century, however, appears as a period of growth, deepening 
and diversification for the manufacturing industry.112 It is very difficult to measure the 
growth performance of the sector during these years. Available output figures provide 
only limited information on a few leading industries, mainly textiles, and are silent on 
many important branches of the sector.113 Besides, available data is often cross-sectional 
and do not allow a systematic long-term analysis.114 Thus, it is necessary to find an 
alternative proxy to help us establish the broad trends in sectoral performance.
Changes in the number of industrial establishments operating in the region can 
illustrate the development of the sector. This proxy can also enable us to surmise the 
changing composition of manufacturing production in time. The proxy in question, 
however, has certain drawbacks. First, it cannot fully account for the variations in the 
size of industrial establishments and therefore cannot fully account for the contribution 
of each establishment to the performance of the manufacturing sector at large. Second, 
it is not sensitive to changes taking place in the level of productivity in different 
branches of the manufacturing sector. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a critical 
distance to the implied results of the proxy variable. Yet, the exercise, as we shall see, is 
useful in reaching certain conclusions of a more general nature.
Table 5.5 presents the number of industrial establishments operating in the 
region in ten-year intervals between 1880 and 1910. The data pertaining to 1880 are 
based on the contributions of Gounaris, Quataert and Palairet and incorporate industrial 
establishments that existed in the region during the 1870s.115 As it is, the data set is 
somewhat incomplete, because it does not include a number of factories that actually
For the literature on the manufacturing industries on Salonica see Quataert, Ottoman 
Manufacturing; D. Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 159-174; Quataert, “The Age of Reforms”; 
Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 59-74; B. Gounaris, “Selanik”, in Q. Keyder, E. Ozveren and D. 
Quataert (eds.), Dogu Akdeniz’de Liman Kentleri, 1800-1914 [Port Cities o f the Eastern Mediterranean, 
1800-1914] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlan), 103-120. Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia; M. 
Palairet, The Balkan Economies’, 1. Tekeli and S. Ilkin “ittihat ve Terakki Hareketinin 01u§umunda 
Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapismm Belirleyiciligi” [The Determining Role of the Social Structure of 
Salonica in the Formation of the Committee of Union and Progress], in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.) 
Tukiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, 1071-1920 [Turkey’s Social and Economic History, 1071-1920], 
(Ankara: Metaksan Limited §irketi) 351-382; V. Kacarkova, and E. Nikova, “Thessaloniki and the 
Bulgarian-Greek Economic Relations in the Twentieth Century,” Etudes Balkaniques, N. 2, (1986): 3-16; 
Anastasiadou, Salonique’, and, Yeralimpos, “Tanzimat Doneminde Kuzey”.
H2 On cotton yam production in Macedonian provinces, see Palairet, The Balkan Economies,
351.
H 4 See below for a discussion of production trends in woolen textile manufacturing.
115 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines”; Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia’, Palairet The 
Balkan Economies.
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existed at the time but went unrecorded in available sources. An unknown number of 
silk filatures and iron works situated in Salonica, a few mechanised flour mills operating 
in Karaferye, Avrethisan, Vodine, Drama and Agustos are cases in point. Therefore, the 
1880 estimates do not fully represent the number of mills operating in the region and 
must be considered an under-representation by at least 20 establishments.116
The data set pertaining to 1890 is based on the provincial yearbook of that year, 
which provides a detailed list of the factories operating in the region.117 I have added to 
the numbers reported in the official yearbook an additional textile concern, one ice 
factory, four chair manufactures, a machinery repairs workshop and three macaroni 
factories, which are cited in British consular reports and also mentioned by Quataert, 
Gounaris and Palairet.118
The data for 1900 are based mainly on the relatively comprehensive 1890 
estimates. In estimating the number of establishments in 1900,1 simply controlled for 
the opening and closure of industrial establishments during the 1890s and adjusted the 
1890 numbers accordingly, by adding or subtracting, the respective observations. 
Otherwise, I assumed that' the industrial profile did not significantly change over time 
and carried the 1890 values over to 1900. I extracted the information about factory 
openings and closures from contemporary sources that reported such activity, namely, 
the provincial yearbooks, British consular reports, and the existing secondary literature. 
In addition, I referred to Ottoman archival sources, especially the State Council (§ura-yi 
Devlet) and the Imperial Decree (Irade) collections, the local newspaper Asir, and the 
journal of the French Chamber of Commerce of Istanbul, Revue Commerciale du 
Levant.
Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 136. For instance, we know that there were about 18 silk, 
filatures operating in Salonica in 1874 (E. Themopoulou, Salonique, 1800-1875: Conjoncture 
Economique et Mouvement Commercial, Unpublished Ph.D. diss., (Paris: Universite de Paris I, Pantheon- 
Sorbonne, 1994), 459). However, it is not exactly clear how many filatures existed in c.1880. Quataert 
maintains that there were only two filatures operating in Salonica and an additional six operating in the 
nearby villages in the late 1880s (Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 164). The 1890 Ottoman 
provincial yearbook cites only four silk concerns in Salonica (1307 S.V.S., 1890, 230-231). Therefore, it 
is difficult to exactly point out the number of filatures operating in the towns as o f 1880. Hence, I decided 
to keep silk filatures out of our data set for c.1880. Similarly, according to the 1890 yearbook, there were 
about 12 flour mills operating in numerous towns other than Salonica, i.e. two in Vodine, one in Drama, 
one in Sari-§aban, one in Kavala, one in Longaza, four in Karaferye, and two in Agustos, (1307 S.V.S.,
1890, 230-231). Their number in c.1880 is not exactly clear, so I left these establishments too out of my 
computations. Thus, including the iron workshops etc. in Salonica, I have possibly excluded a total of 20 
establishments for c.1880.
117 1307 S.V.S., 1890: 230-231.
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Finally, the 1910 estimates are based on a British consular report dated 1911. 
The report includes a list of industrial establishments operating in the leading urban 
centres of the region.1191 adjusted the British data to account for the new establishments 
and a number of closures that the consular report apparently overlooked. Thus, I. 
estimated the number of industrial establishments on a cross sectional basis for four 
benchmark years.
Another difficulty, encountered in the process of data compilation was to 
determine what an industrial establishment, or a “factory” proper, really entailed during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In both Ottoman and European 
sources, there was no clear indication as to the definition of a factory. Often, the 
identification of a workplace as a factory was not disputable. The food processing and 
textile mills that utilised steam power and employed tens and hundreds of workers could 
be legitimately termed as factories. Similarly, large workshops, such as the tobacco 
processing concerns that employed hundreds of workers, could be justifiably 
categorised as factories. However, there was also a grey zone of manufacturing 
concerns that stood very close to artisanal workshops. This grey zone included such, 
workplaces as oil presses, small tanneries, flour mills, smaller brick and tile works, 
numerous distilleries and small workshops producing iron goods. In order not to inflate 
the estimates, I excluded this latter group of workplaces in my “factory” category.120 In 
other words, I included only the sizeable and relatively mechanised establishments in 
my calculations.121 This methodological choice enhanced consistency within the data 
set.
F.O.A.S., 1886, N. 24: 6-7; Quataert “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 165; Gounaris Steam 
Over Macedonia, 135-138; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 346-352.
119 F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5017:4.
1^ ® The only exception to this were the large tanneries situated in Salonica, Vodine and Kavala, 
which are cited in the 1911 British consular report.
121 In the 1913-1915 industrial survey the definition of a ‘factory’ included flour mills capable, 
of grinding 100 quintals of grain within 24 hours, soap factories employing at least 10 workers, 
mechanised factories employing at least 10 workers, and non-mechanised factories employing more than 
20 workers. Our definition is not as clear-cut. Yet, by excluding the smaller workplaces, I have improved 
the comparability of the data set with the 1913-1915 survey. See Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanh 
Sanayii, 1913, 1915 Yillari Sanayi Istatistiki [Ottoman Industry, Industrial Census of 1913,1915], 
Prepared by G. Okfiin, (Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisii, Tarihi Istatistikler Dizisi, V.4, Ankara: Devlet 
Istatistik Enstitiisii Matbaasi, 1997).
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Table 5.5
Number o f Leading Industrial Establishments in Selanik, C.1880-C.1910
Consumer Goods
Sector c.1880 c.1890 c.1900 c.1910
Cottton Yarn 2 4 6 10
Cotton Cloth 0 0 2 3
Woolen Cloth 0 0 0 3
Fannel, Shirts and Underwear 0 0 1 13
Tanneries 0 0 0 4
TOTAL TEXTILES 2 4 9 33
Flour Mills 5 27 30 34
Macaroni 0 3 3 2
Rice 0 0 0 3
Distillery and Breweries 1 2 3 3
Ice 0 1 1 3
Soda Water 0 0 0 2
TOTAL FOOD PROCESSING 6 33 37 47
Soap 2 6 6 13
Paper 0 1 1 1
Shoe 0 0 0 1
TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS 2 7 7 15
Cutlery n.a. 0 0 2
Chairs 0 4 4 4
TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLES 0 4 4 6
TOTAL CONSUMER GOODS 10 48 57 101
Construction and Iron Works
Sector c.1880 c.1890 c.1900 c.1910
Tile and Brick Works 0 1 1 2
Iron Works n.a. 3 3 4
Nails 0 1 1 1
Machine Repairs 0 1 1 1
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION ETC. n.a. 6 6 8
Raw Material Processing
Sector c.1880 c.1890 c.1900 c.1910
Silk n.a. 4 23 32
Tobacco 0 1 4 6
Hempseed 0 0 0 1
TOTAL PROCESSING 0 5 27 39
Industrial Aggregate
c.1880 c.1890 c.1900 c.1910
TOTAL 10 59 90 148
Source: See Text.
Table 5.5 points to the dynamism of the region’s industrial manufacturing 
sector. First, the last row maintains the growth of the region’s urban industrial base 
between 1880 and 1910. More specifically, there was a minimum of ten, and possibly 
thirty, industrial establishments in the region in the 1880s. On the eve of the Balkan 
Wars, the estimated number of factories had increased to 148. This basic observation
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leaves little doubt about the growth of industrial production in the region during the 
period under consideration.
Secondly, the data indicate the growing diversification of industrial production 
in the Selanik region. In the early 1880s, the existing industrial establishments in 
Selanik included flourmills, cotton spinning mills, silk filatures, and a few other 
consumer goods industries. In contrast, the region’s industrial base included mechanised 
weaving concerns, flannel, underwear and shirting factories, and a number of 
establishments producing a variety of basic consumer goods, such as macaroni, 
beverages, ice, shoes, and tobacco products in the early 1910s. In addition, local 
entrepreneurs established numerous sweatshops producing iron goods, cutlery and 
furniture and a number of tobacco processing factories and silk reeling concerns.
In what follows, I will discuss the underlying dynamics of this growth process, 
focusing on a) demand side conditions, b) factor costs, and c) entrepreneurship.
4.1. Dynamics of Industrial Growth and the Rise of the Factory System
4.1.1. Demand Side Factors
Favourable demand side conditions underlay the growth of industrial production 
in Selanik. First, domestic demand for certain consumer goods and construction 
materials increased quite notably during the period. Two processes of structural, 
transformation underlay the expansion of the domestic demand. First, the growing tide 
of urbanisation generated fresh demand for basic consumer goods, processed foodstuffs, 
beverages and other items for immediate consumption. Likewise, the physical growth of 
cities and the proliferatipn of the urban construction industry generated additional 
demand for certain materials, such as nails, bricks, tiles, iron frames and fittings. 
Second, the growth of commercial agriculture, especially of tobacco production, led to a 
rise in disposable cash income of the farming communities, particularly after the turn of 
the century.122 Subsequently, the local demand for manufactured consumer goods 
expanded even further, as cash crop producers became detached from subsistence 
farming and increasingly involved in the broader circuit of commodity exchange.
122 See Chapter 2, the section on tobacco production.
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Imports from overseas probably absorbed a good portion of this fresh demand. 
As I have discussed above, imports grew steadily during the period under consideration. 
Such imported goods as textiles and certain foodstuffs captured a commanding position 
in the expanding domestic markets, owing much to the aggressive marketing strategy of 
foreign trading houses and the expansion of credit networks throughout the region. 
However, the rapid expansion of domestic demand worked also to the advantage of 
local manufacturing industries, especially in the low value added consumer goods and 
in commodities that directly appealed to local tastes. Indeed, the manufactured goods 
produced in local factories were consumed predominantly within the region. Take, for 
instance, the cotton spinning concerns of Salonica, Vodine, Karaferye and Agustos. 
Local artisanal and mechanised weaving concerns, as well as peasant women weaving 
cloth within the confines of the rural household economy, consumed the coarse yam 
spun in these cotton mills.123 Likewise, the cotton and woollen weaving manufacturers 
and the ready made cloth and footwear industries sold their products in both regional 
and in growing urban, markets. All foodstuffs and beverages were consumed locally.124 
Likewise, the soap factories catered exclusively to local demand.125 The industrial 
sectors linked to the booming construction industry also sold their products primarily in 
regional markets.126
Some consumer and construction goods industries, however, managed to expand 
their market reach beyond the region and sold their products in other Ottoman markets. 
For instance, the local cotton spinning concerns traded regularly with interior 
Macedonia, Albania, Anatolia, and the Aegean Islands.127 Similarly, the famous 
Olympos brewery in Salonica marketed its beer also in Istanbul and Izmir.128 The local
123 P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N. 6: 97; D.T.O.G., 12.B.1302 (27.4.1885), N. 9: 25; F.O.A.S., 1886, N. 
24: 7; D.T.O.G., 30.R.1304 (24.1.1887), N. 108: 25-16; F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 9; 1307 S. V.S. (1890: 
228); F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 21-22; 1312 S. V.S. (1895: 264); 1315 S. V.S. (1898: 578); R.C.L., 1907, N: 
238-243:991.
124 Alcoholic beverages, soft drinks and the ice as well as the flour milled in local industrial 
concerns were sold in domestic markets see F.O.A.S., 1893, N.1310: 21; Asir, 5.M.1324 (3.3.1906), N. 
1055: 2.
125 F.O.A.S.; 1903, N. 3100: 5; F.O.A.S., 1904, N. 3250: 5-6.
126 For iron works sqqF.O.A.S.; 1886, N. 24: 7; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 254: 4-5 and for brick and 
tile production see F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 6.
127 P.P.A.P., 1883, C.N. 6: 97; D.T.O.G., 12.B.1302 (27.4.1885), N. 9: ???; F.O.A.S., 1886, N. 
24: 7; D.T.O.G., 30.R.1304 (24.1.1887), N. 108: 25-16; 1307 S. V.S (1890: 228); F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 
1310: 21-22; 1312 S.V.S. (1895: 264); 1315 S.V.S. (1898: 578); F.O.A.S., 1902, N. 3100: 5; R.C.L., 1907, 
N: 238-243: 991.
128 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 166.
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tile and brick factories, especially the large concern owned by the Alatini family, sold 
their products in Izmir, Istanbul and Rhodes.129
The apparent expansion of intra-regional trade in these products can be 
associated with two processes. First, the demand dynamic generated by the rapid growth 
of such leading towns of the Levant as Izmir and Istanbul appears to have provided an 
important pull-factor that created ample opportunities for local industrialists. Second, 
the gradual abolition of internal customs duties during the late 1870s and the late 1880s 
was a crucial development that enabled local manufacturers to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the neighbouring consumer markets of the Levant.130
Another source of demand for manufactured goods, particularly for textiles and 
processed foodstuffs was the Ottoman state itself. From the 1840s onwards the 
Bulgarian textile industry was the primary supplier of woollen §ayak and aba cloths for 
the Ottoman army. However, following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1876 and Bulgaria’s 
subsequent autonomy, the Ottoman army withdrew its orders from Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarian woollen textile industry went into a period of crisis,131 but this situation 
created new opportunities for Ottoman woollen textile manufacturers. The weavers of 
Selanik, who had for centuries been manufacturing a variety of woollen cloths for both 
civil and military consumption, soon became an important supplier of woollen cloth for 
the Ottoman army. The bulk of woollen cloth production took place within the context 
of artisanal manufacturing.132 However, it is important to note here that the lucrative 
sale of woollen textiles to the army encouraged a number of entrepreneurs to establish 
mechanised weaving concerns in the region. In 1904, a §ayak factory was opened in 
Siroz. In 1906 an integrated woollen textile mill was established in Salonica and another 
concern was set up in Agustos next year. Finally, in 1911, a group of Jewish 
entrepreneurs established a large mill in Salonica, catering exclusively to army 
orders.133 Thus, the extra demand generated by the Ottoman army undergirded the
129 F.O.A.S., 1910, N. 4579: 12, F.O.A.S., 1911, N. 4797: 11.
130 F.O.A.S., 1889, N. 623: 9; Asir, 23.Ca.1314 (30.10.1896), N. 121: 1. Internal customs duties 
on goods to be transported overland within the Empire were abolished earlier in 1878. In 1889, the 
charges on goods to be transported over sea routes were abolished entirely. See §. Pamuk, Osmanli 
Ekonomisinde Bagimhhk ve Biiyume, [Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Economy], (Istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfi Yaymlan, 1994), 130-131.
131 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 70-73, 82,189-196.
132 See Section 4.2. below.
133 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 162, 169; Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 139- 
143; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 348.
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expansion of the mechanised woollen textile industry in the region, especially after the 
turn of the century.
The provision of flour and other foodstuffs for the local armies also created 
certain opportunities for industrialists. The third army corps stationed in the 
Macedonian provinces included about 75,000 soldiers.134 At the time, the average 
Ottoman soldier was given a daily ration of 960 grams of bread.135 This meant that each 
soldier consumed on the average 350 kilograms of bread annually. The total bread 
consumption of the entire third army corps, therefore, could reach up to 26,000 tons. 
This was a considerable amount and required the regular provision of about 20,000 tons 
of flour for the army annually. The leading cereal merchants of Salonica, the Alatini 
brothers, conducted the bulk of this lucrative business in army provisions. The Alatini 
brothers processed army provisions in their large flourmill in Salonica. Prominent 
notables also held a considerable stake in provisioning; some owned their own flour 
mills and processed and packed the produce before forwarding the flour over to the 
military barracks.136
Finally, the growth of cash crop production had a propulsive impact on 
industrialisation, as witnessed by the rapid growth of the silk reeling and tobacco 
processing industries. As it has been discussed in Chapter 2, the appearance of the 
malignant pebrine disease in Salonica and its environs led to an unprecedented decline 
in regional silk production from the mid-1850s onwards. The collapse of sericulture, in 
turn, forced numerous silk reeling concerns out of business in the 1860s and the 1870s. 
According to contemporary estimates, there were about 35 mechanised silk filatures in 
Salonica that employed a total of 2,000 workers in the mid-1840s. By the late 1860s, 
there were only 15 filatures employing about 1,000 workers.137 The contraction of the 
sector continued throughout the 1870s. In the early 1880s, there remained only two 
filatures operating in Salonica and another six filatures operating in nearby villages.138
134 G. Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu, Jon Turk Ihtilali’nin Kokenleri (1903-1908), [Macedonian 
Question and the Origins of the Young Turk Revolution, 1903-1908] (Istanbul: Afa Yaymlan, 1996), 
107.
135 R.C.L., 31.1.1909, No. 262: 133-135.
136 por example, the Ismail Pa§a, who was a leading contractor for the army, owned a large 
flour mill in the district of Ko?ana in the neighbouring province of Kosova (1318 K.V.S., 1901,484).
137 E. Themopoulou, Salonique, 459.
138 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 160-162.
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The silk reeling industry made a notable recovery following the successful 
containment of the pebrine disease and the subsequent recovery in sericulture from the 
1880s onwards.139 Gevgeli emerged as the primary centre of silk reeling. Ottoman 
provincial yearbooks report no silk concerns in Gevgeli in the late-1880s, but the 1895 
yearbook reports 18 filatures operating in the town.140 In 1907, there were a total of 28 
silk concerns in Gevgeli alone.141 By 1910, a total of 32 filatures were operating in the 
entire Selanik region.
Most of the silk concerns were privately owned. However, the Ottoman Public 
Debt Administration (PDA) set up at least three model filatures in the region during the 
1890s, one near Salonica, the other in Vodine, and the third in Gevgeli.142 The Gevgeli 
plant was the largest of these filatures. It was installed with the most up-to-date 
technology and boasted 60 reels capable of producing 8,000 kilograms of raw silk 
annually.143 Unfortunately, this factory closed down in 1899, due to prohibitive energy 
costs resulting from technical flaws and poor management.144 At any rate, these 
factories set an example and encouraged the establishment of new silk-reeling concerns 
throughout the region.
Likewise, the tobacco processing industry grew rapidly during the period under 
consideration. The growth of the tobacco trade from the mid-1880s onwards had a 
propulsive impact on tobacco processing. In 1888, the tobacco Regie set up a tobacco 
factory in Salonica to process tobacco and to produce cigarettes and other tobacco
139 See Chapter 2 for the recovery and growth of sericulture in Selanik.
140 1313 S.V.S., 1895, 290.
141 1324 S.V.S., 1907, 334.
142 BA, §D-Maliye, 368/51, 28.B.1314 (2.1.1897); BA, §D-Maliye, 378/42, 20.Ca.1316 
(6.10.1898).
143 Asir, 3.R.1314 (11.9.1896), N. 107: 2.
144 Asir, 2.Za.l319 (10.2.1902), N. 657: 1. Usually the closure of the PDA filature in Gevgeli is 
linked to rising wages (Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 164). However, contemporary Ottoman 
reports point to certain technical difficulties as the primary cause of the factory’s closure. The factory was 
initially designed for 120 reels and the machinery, especially the boilers, were installed accordingly. 
However, due to reasons unknown to us, only 60 reels were installed and had to be operated on boilers 
adjusted to the requirements of 120 reels. This technical mismatch inflated the energy costs and coal 
expenses averaged as high as 60 francs per day. In addition, excessive remuneration of the managers, 
clerks and engineers further inflated operational costs and ultimately forced the factory into closure in 
1899. A sum of O.L. 1,000 was necessary to undertake the technical adjustments that would render the 
factory economically feasible. However, neither the PDA nor any other private agent made an effort to 
reinvest in the mill. Probably, the downturn of global silk prices discouraged both the private 
entrepreneurs and the PDA from putting more money into the factory. Thus, possibly the largest reeling 
concern o f the region was abandoned to idleness.
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products.145 A few years later, the Regie set up another tobacco processing plant in 
Gevgeli.146 In the early 1900s, the leading tobacco concerns operating in the region, 
namely Commercial Co. and the Hertzog Co., established two more tobacco-processing 
factories in Salonica.147 The densest concentration of tobacco processing plants was 
probably in Kavala, Drama, Siroz and Yenice. We do not have detailed information on. 
the number of tobacco processing plants operating in these towns at the time, but we 
know that about 20,000 workers were employed regularly in tobacco processing. It is 
reasonable to assume on the basis of this figure that there were a significant number of 
small, medium and large-scale workshops in these leading centres of tobacco 
production.148
Overall, the opportunities that emerged in regional and intra-regional markets 
and the sustained demand generated by the Ottoman army, prepared the structural 
ground for the growth of industrial production in the region. However, the underlying 
dynamics of this growth process cannot be explained entirely with reference to demand 
side factors. Supply side dynamics, too, must be considered.
4.1.2. Factor Costs: Wages. Energy Costs and Raw Material Prices
Given the relatively liberal trade regime of the empire, the local manufacturing 
industries would not have been able to compete with their. European counterparts, unless 
they could maintain a competitive edge in pricing. In this regard, the region’s industrial 
establishments seem to have enjoyed, at varying degrees and in certain periods, three 
primary advantages, namely low wages, access to water streams and the availability of 
cheap raw materials.
In the existing literature, the availability of cheap labour is commonly 
considered one of the primary reasons underlying the growth of the sector in Selanik.
u s F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 10-11.
146 QUataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 164; Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 140.
147 Asir, 10.Z.1319 (20.3.1902), N. 668: 2.
148 Asir, 10.Z.1319 (20.3.1902), N. 668: 2; 1320 S.V.S. (1903: 560, 566). Consider for instance 
the tobacco workshop owned by a certain Alexander Efendi in Siroz, which employed about 100 workers 
in 1903. Similarly, a certain Na§ohik Efendi was running a sizeable tobacco processing plant near Siroz 
which was in excellent condition and earning good returns (Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N. 754: 2-3). No 
doubt there were similar cases in Drama, Kavala, and Yenice (R.C.£., 1907, N.238-243: 832-833, 991-
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However, there is also a tendency to suggest that the rise in urban wages, especially in 
the town of Salonica, somewhat arrested this dynamism, particularly after the turn of the 
century. It is argued that the rise in urban wages led to a notable reorganisation, or 
rather relocation, within regional manufacturing industries; that is to say that, industrial 
growth came to a halt in Salonica and shifted increasingly towards such interior towns 
as Agustos, Vodine, Karaferye and Gevgeli, where labour costs were relatively low.149
Indeed, labour costs were notably lower in the inland towns. No comprehensive 
wage data is available. However, the scattered evidence at hand does allow for a 
cautious analysis of wage differentials between Salonica and inland towns. For 
example, in the late 1880s, young girls working in cotton spinning manufactures in 
Yenice earned an average of 4.5d.150 Likewise, unskilled female domestic servants and 
cooks earned, on the average, 5.5d per day in the interior towns.151 Young girls working 
in the cotton mills of Salonica received an average wage of about 7.5d. The situation 
was slightly better for senior workers, but a notable wage gap between Salonica and the 
interior towns prevailed. For example, the relatively senior and skilled female spinners 
received Is Id  in Yenice and the most skilled, possibly senior, domestic servant 
received 7.5d in the interior. Skilled female workers employed at the Regie's tobacco 
factory in Salonica earned Is 4d, that is almost twice as much. Similar wage 
differentials seem to have prevailed for male workers as well. Unskilled male labourers 
earned 4.5d to 6.5d, or an average of 5.5d, in the interior towns around 1890.152 This 
wage rate was considerably lower than the wages received by young boys working in 
the cotton mills of Salonica, who received anything between Id  and lid , or an average 
of 9d. In the early 1900s, the wage gap between Salonica and the interior towns was still 
in place. For instance, in 1903, the unskilled workers employed in the tobacco 
processing plant owned by Alexander Efendi in Siroz received 6.5d to Is 3d.153 Their 
counterparts in Salonica got 1 Id  to Is 6d in 1906.
It is quite probable that this relative cost advantage, inter alia, constituted a 
strong incentive for setting up industrial concerns in interior towns. Yet, in my opinion,
995, 996-997). Unfortunately the sources do not reveal details about the number and size of these 
concerns.
149 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,”.
150 1303 S. VS., 1886: Appendix.
151 1303 S. VS., 1886: Appendix.
152 1303 S. VS., 1886: Appendix.
153 Asir, 3.Za.l320 (2.2.1903), N. 754: 2-3.
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low urban wages underlay the overall process of industrial development throughout the 
region, at least until the late 1900s. As I have noted above, since no comprehensive 
wage series are available, it is not possible to quantify trends in urban wages with 
accuracy. However, the scattered evidence at hand does suggest that local industrialists 
benefited from the availability of cheap, unskilled labour in the region at large.
In 1873, the young girls working in a silk factory in Salonica were earning daily 
wages between 10d and Is, or an average of l i t / .154 In 1893, the relatively skilled 
women employed in the tobacco Regie received Is to Is Ad, or an average of Is 2d, 
while the unskilled girls working in cotton mills received only Ad to 1 Id, or an average 
of 7.5t/.155 The wages of skilled female workers stood around an average of Is 5d, while 
the unskilled young girls received only an average of 6.5d  in 1906.156 If these 
observations are representative of broad trends in the region, then we can suggest that 
the nominal wages of skilled female labourers increased by as much as 20.0%. In 
contrast, however, the nominal earnings of unskilled girls declined consistently, by as 
much as 32% during 1873-1893, and another 13.3% during 1893-1906. It is more 
difficult to determine real trends in female wages, for we lack a comprehensive cost of 
living index for the Selanik' region. However, using Williamson’s cost of living indices 
for the Ottoman Empire, we can determine broad trends in real wages.157 According to 
Williamson’s estimates, the cost of living in the Ottoman Empire increased by 15.0% 
between 1893-1906. If so, the real wages received by skilled female workers probably 
increased only marginally by about 5.0%. In contrast, the earnings of the unskilled 
women declined by as much as 25.5% during the 1890s and the 1900s.158
The conditions were not any better for unskilled male workers. Although they 
received relatively higher wages in comparison to female workers, their nominal and 
real earnings also declined steadily between the mid-1890s and the mid-1900s. In the 
early 1890s, unskilled male labourers in cotton mills earned wages that ranged between 
l<y 6d to 2s, or an average of Is 9d, while young boys earned Id  to \\d .  In 1906,
154 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 261,
155 Gounaris Steam Over Macedonia, 267-268.
156 Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 71.
157 j, g . Williamson, “Real Wages and Relative Factor Prices in the Third World 1820-1940: 
The Mediterranean Basin,” (Discussion Paper N. 1842, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, 1998), Appendix, Table A2.2.
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unskilled male workers received somewhat lower wages at 1 Id  to Is 6d, or an average 
of Is 3d, per day.159 Based on these scattered observations, we could maintain that the 
nominal wages received by unskilled male workers, and possibly by young boys, 
dwindled by about 29.0% during this reflationary period. In real terms, the decline could 
well have been as much as 40.0%.160
The relatively privileged segment of the work force, namely skilled male 
workers, received considerably higher wages during the same period. In the mid-1870s, 
skilled male labourers were earning something around Is 3d per day.161 A decade later, 
their wages stood somewhere between Is 10d  and 2s 11J, or an average of 2s 4.5d.162 
After the mid-1890s, they started earning higher nominal wages. In 1905-6, for instance, 
a skilled male worker would receive an average daily wage of 3s 3d.163 If so, we can 
maintain that the wages of a skilled male worker increased by 37.0% in nominal terms 
between the mid-1880s and 1906. In real terms, the increase could well have been as 
much as 28.0%.164
Based on this evidence, we can suggest that the industrial sector of Salonica 
benefited from the low and declining wages, especially those received by unskilled 
labourers. As we have seen in the previous chapters, distressing economic and political 
conditions in the countryside forced many dispossessed peasant proprietors out of 
agricultural pursuits and compelled them to seek their fortunes in growing urban areas. 
Likewise, many refugee families coming from the Balkans settled in urban areas under 
the auspices of the Ottoman government. This downcast and unskilled labour force, 
together with the urban poor already residing in towns, constituted the backbone of the 
working classes employed in the manufacturing industries. Most of these workers were 
disorganised and had little bargaining power vis a vis the factory administrations. 
Young women, girls, boys, and other unskilled male workers in particular were
158 ^  estimating the changes in real wages, I assumed that maximum wages received by female 
workers represented skilled workers. I also took the average of the wages received by unskilled girls. 
Finally I simply deflated nominal values by the Williamson estimates.
159 Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 170.
160 Again, I used Williamson’s cost of living index to deflate nominal wages. Accordingly I 
assumed that the cost o f living increased by 15% during the same period.
161 P.P.A.P., 1975, V. 34: 383.
162 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 245.
163 Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 245; Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 170.
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vulnerable and could be disposed of and replaced by other unskilled workers at any 
time. Under the circumstances, these unskilled workers were often compelled to accept 
low wages, and were exploited to the extreme under highly distressing and unhygienic 
conditions that prevailed in most factories.165 The intense exploitation of the 
disorganised and downcast work force clearly bestowed industrialists with a 
considerable advantage in cost effectiveness, during the 1890s and the early 1900s.
The skilled labourers posed greater problems for the local industrialists during 
this period. As we have seen, this relatively privileged segment of the urban workforce, 
especially the skilled male workers, received higher and increasing wages during the 
period under consideration. This should not come as a surprise, because skilled 
labourers were scarce and difficult to recruit under modem “factory” conditions. Under 
the circumstances, the factory owners paid handsome wages to skilled workers to recruit 
and employ them as machine operators, foreman and supervisors. However, even the 
wages received by these skilled workers lagged behind their counterparts in Europe and 
the Mediterranean basin. According to Williamson, Ottoman wages lagged seriously 
behind their continental and many Mediterranean counterparts at least until the early 
1900s. 166 In this respect, it is fair to suggest that in general low wages and highly 
exploitative work conditions provided local industrialists with a cost advantage that 
enabled them to resist the tide of foreign competition in domestic markets.
After the mid-1900s, however, a series of organised strikes hit the 
manufacturing centres of the region, especially Salonica. The liberal political 
atmosphere generated 1908 revolution and the gradual erosion of real wages in the 
previous decades, triggered industrial action in most parts of the region in 1908.167 The 
strikes were successful in most instances. They managed to receive considerable wage
164 According to Williamson Ottoman cost o f living increased by a modest 6,8% between 1885 
and 1906 (Williamson, “Real Wages and Relative,” 10). I used these estimates to deflate the nominal 
values cited in the text, i.e. average of 2s 4.5d  for c.1885 and 35 3d  c. 1905.
165 For the condition of working classes in Salonica see Dumont, “The Social Structure,” 44-45; 
Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 168-173; Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 69-74; Gounaris, 
Steam Over Macedonia, 135-143. Also see, A. Makal, Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nda Qali§ma lli§kileri: 
1850-1920, Turkiye Qali$ma Ili^kileri Tarihi [Labour Relations in the Ottoman Empire: 1850-1920, A 
History of Labour Relations in Turkey] (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1997), 178-207.
166 According to Williamson the Ottoman real wage performance lagged considerably behind 
Europe and many Mediterranean economies. See, J. G. Williamson, “Real Wages and Relative Factor 
Prices around die Mediterranean, 1500-1940,” in Williamson, J. G. and §. Pamuk (eds.) The 
Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 62.
167 j) Quataert, “The Economic Climate of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,” in Workers, 
Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press) 49-62.
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increase and were able to negotiate better working conditions.168 According to one 
estimate, wages rose by about 60.0% in Salonica between 1905 and 1908.169 For 
instance, following a determined and well-organised strike, the workers of the Olympos 
brewery managed to increase their wages from an average of Is 4d  to 2s Id  in 1909. In 
the same year, following another determined strike action, workers in the Alatini flour 
mills managed to get a substantial wage increase from a previous average of 1 j  1 Id  to 
2s 8d. In the Alatini brick factory, average wages of senior workers increased by about 
60-70.0%, reaching a high of 2s 10d  the same year. Even the young female workers 
benefited from such determined strike action and their average earnings more than 
doubled to reach Is 3d in 1912.170 This substantial rise in wages curtailed the 
comparative cost advantage hitherto enjoyed by the industrialists. In fact, after 1908, 
industrial growth slowed down quite notably not only in Salonica, but also in leading 
centres of industrial production in the region. Investment activity came to a halt in many 
factories, and the capital stock was left to deteriorate and a number of plant closures 
took place during the late 1900s. Apparently, rising labour costs underlay industrial 
lethargy and factory closures.171
Another crucial supply side factor that affected the growth of industrial 
manufacturing in the region was the availability of water-power. In specific, the inland 
towns of Vodine, Karaferye, Agustos and Siroz were located ideally along streams and 
rivers, which enabled manufacturers direct access to virtually costless water power to 
generate energy. Not surprisingly, the machinery installed in all the flourmills and the 
cotton spinning factories located in the above mentioned towns were propelled by water 
power.172 Surely, this was an important cost cutting advantage. The region had very 
limited coal reserves and the bulk of coal that would be used in steam powered factories 
had to be imported from overseas, particularly from Cardiff.173 Imported coal was
168 Dumont, “Une organisation socialiste”; Dumont, “A Jewish, Socialist and Ottoman 
Organization”; Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines”; Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica”.
169 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 353.
170 Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica,” 70-72.
171 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 353-355.
172 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 263-264; 1313 S.V.S., 1896, 266, 289, 315-316, 341; 1324 S.V.S., 1907:
326-329.
172 At the time, there was only one lignite coal mine in Siroz, which produced about 100 tons of 
coal annually (1307 S.V.S., 1890, 64-65; 1320 S.V.S., 1903,490). This amount was not sufficient to meet 
the needs of local railways and factories, and about 15,000 to 40,000 tons had to be imported annually 
between the late 1880s and the 1910s.
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expensive and probably became even more so between the 1880s and the 1910s.174 
Besides, coal had to be transported to factories via railway, hence further inflating the 
energy costs. Not surprisingly, energy-costs, especially when combined with poor 
management or inadequate technical planning, could, and did, cause financial problems 
for manufacturers. For example, inflated energy costs were one of the major reasons for 
the closure of the famed Saias spinning mill.175 The closure of the PDA’s Gevgeli silk 
filature likewise was related to prohibitive energy costs.176 Thus, it can be argued that 
the growth of industrial production in leading industrial centres of the interior, such as 
Vodine, Karaferye and Agustos, would most likely have been limited without the 
availability of water power.}77
Local manufacturing industries also enjoyed certain cost advantages that enabled 
them to carve out a niche in local markets, despite intense overseas competition. For 
example, the cotton spinning industry benefited considerably from the availability of 
cheap cotton supplies coming from the Siroz and Zihne districts. As it has been 
discussed in Chapter 2, cotton prices declined by about 60.0% from the early 1870s to 
the late 1890s. This swift decline was beneficial for local spinning concerns and enabled 
them to maintain competitive prices throughout the 1890s. However, this trend was 
reversed after the turn of the century. The rapid growth of tobacco production at the 
expense of cotton production led to a swift rise in cotton prices from c.1900 onwards. 
This situation increased the costs incurred by local spinning mills and put them under 
considerable financial stress. Some local mills, including the spinning concern owned 
by the Sai'as family, could not resist the burden of rising input costs and eventually went
1^4 Comprehensive coal price series are not available for Salonica for this period. The available 
figures are extremely scattered (thirteen observations for forty years) and do not allow for a robust 
analysis o f cycles and trends. However, unpublished research data gathered by Pamuk suggest a secular 
increase in Istanbul coal prices, by as much as 15%, from 1885-1889 to 1905-1910. According to his data, 
there is also apparent trend acceleration after c.1900. It is very likely that similar trends in imported coal 
prices prevailed in Salonica. I would like thank Professor Pamuk for allowing me to use his data set.
175 it must be noted that the primary reason behind the closure of the Saias mill in 1901 was the 
financial difficulties faced by the Saias family. In 1896, the Saias family lost 1,000,000 francs upon the 
collapse of the Karamanos Bank in Marseilles, which administered the financial transactions of the family 
in Europe. Subsequently, the family started extracting capital from the cotton mill to meet its outstanding 
financial obligations and deliberately forced the management of the company into growing indebtedness. 
Under the circumstances, the factory management found it difficult to meet current expenses, about all the 
cost of the coal and cotton used in the mill. Eventually the firm went bankrupt, and a consortium of 
Jewish Bankers took the company over and started operations in 1907, under a new joint stock company 
named Nouvelle Filature (Asir, 2.B.1319 (14.10.1901), N. 625: 2; Asir, 5.B.1319 (17.10.1901), N. 626: 2; 
Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 142).
1?6 Asir, 2 Za.1319 (10.2.1902), N. 657: 1.
177 s ee Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 163; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 350.
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bankrupt.178 Nevertheless* -we can suggest that declining cotton prices proved quite 
advantageous for the development of the cotton industry in the region in the late 
nineteenth century. Similarly, the availability of locally produced animal skins, wool, 
barley, grapes and olive oil probably supported the growth of other important industrial 
sectors, such as skin processing, woollen textile manufacturing, beer and spirit making 
and soap manufacturing.
4.1.3 Entrepreneurship
Dynamic entreprenuership played a determining role in the growth of industrial 
production. Two socio-economic groups assumed active entrepreneurial initiative 
during the period under consideration. Prominent Jewish families constituted the first 
group of entrepreneurs that pioneered industrial development in the region. These 
families owned and managed almost all the leading industrial concerns in Salonica. For 
instance, the Alatinis owned the largest flourmill of the town, a large silk filature, a tile 
and brick factory, an ice factory and the Olympos brewery.179 The Saias, Modiano, 
Torres, Savol and Misrachi families owned all the cotton spinning concerns in Salonica, 
either in partnership or independently.180 The Modiano family also owned a large 
workshop producing shirts, underwear, veils and umbrellas.181 The Misrachi family had 
shares in the distilleries and the breweries of the town.182 The Torres family owned a 
hempseed factory.183 In addition, a number of smaller Jewish entrepreneurs had interests
1'28For instance, rising cotton prices constituted an extra burden for the Saias spinning mill and 
played a role in its closure (Asir, 2.B.1319 (14.10.1901), N. 625: 2; Asir, 5.B.1319 (17.10.1901), N. 626: 
2).
129 The available documents that reveal the details ,of Alatini interests in industrial 
establishments are as follows: A general account can be found in R.C.L., 1907, N. 238-243: 991-995. 
More specific information, especially concerning government permits and tariff exemptions over 
imported machinery, can be obtained from: for the ice factory and die brewery, BA $D-Ticaret, 1193/13, 
24.Ra.1309 (28.10.1891); BA, §D-Selanik, 2048/38, 22.C.1322 (3.9.1904); and, for the flour mill, BA, 
§D-Ticaret, 1191/34, 26.B.1308 (7.3.1891). Also see Gounaris Steam Over Macedonia, 134-143; 
Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 160-168; Anastassiadou, Salonique, 197-200.
180 For the cotton spinning interests o f the Saias family see D.T.O.G., 12.B.1302 (27.4.1885), 
N. 9: 37; D.T.O.G., 30.R.1304 (24.1.1887), N. 108: 25-26; P.P.A.P., 1883, V.72: 97; PRO, F.O. 
195/1196,26.10.1878, Barker to Layard. For the textile interests of Torres and Misrachi families see BA, 
$D-Selanik, 2012/6, 5.R.1302 (22.1.1885). For a general account see R.C.L., 1907, N. 238-243: 993. Also 
see Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 134-143; Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 160-168; 
Anastassiadou, Salonique, 197-200.
181 1324S.V.S. (1907: 555).
182 D.T.O.G., 17.M.1303 (26.10.1885), N. 22:11; D.T.O.G., 30.S.1303 (7.12.1885), N. 25:1-2. 
I82 BA, §D-Ticaret, 1225/59, 2.Za.l326 (26.11.1908); Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 140.
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in soap making,184 woollen textiles,185 and iron foundries.186 These Jewish families had 
important advantages that enabled them to assume entrepreneurial initiative. First, they 
had direct access to and control over regional capital markets. Almost all of these 
families acted as bankers and financial brokers and often worked in close contact, and at 
times in partnership, with European financial institutions.1.87 As we have seen, especially 
the Alatini family had considerable financial interests and, together with Fernandez and 
Misrachi families, controlled Banque de Salonique, which was the strongest private 
financial institution of the region at the time.188 Financial connections of the said Jewish 
families certainly enhanced their capacity to undertake industrial investments.
Secondly, these families had firm commercial contacts, which proved 
particularly useful in purchasing raw materials and in the distribution of manufactured 
products both within and beyond the region. For instance, the spinning concerns owned 
by Jewish families often entered the local cotton markets robustly and made mass 
purchases so as to secure low prices. Similarly, the yam produced in their mills could be 
mass marketed thanks to the well-established network of agents and intermediary 
merchants in which these families played a central role. Their commercial contacts in 
other parts of the empire, especially in Izmir and Istanbul, served as another important 
marketing convenience, which helped the local industrial concerns stretch their market 
reach beyond the region.
Finally, the Jewish industrial concerns benefited from the skills and expertise 
accumulating within the broader community. Jewish professionals educated in new 
local schools or in Europe worked in these establishments as lawyers, clerks, 
accountants and even as engineers.189 They worked actively in the establishment, 
operation and management of the industrial establishments. Besides, these professionals 
worked in close contact with European experts and technicians and played an important
184 Asir, 28.S.1314 (8.8.1896), N. 610: 2.
*8  ^ Kapanci, Jahiel, Benussan families owned the weaving concern established in 1911 
(Quataert, Premieres fumees d’usines,” 162,169.)
186 t w0 Jewish entrepreneurs, §alom and Benjamen, owned the nail factory in Salonica (BA, 
§D-Ticaret, 1179/10, 10.N.1302 (23.6.1885)). Also Minassian and Tiano families owned a number of 
iron foundries in the town (R.C.L., 1907, N. 238-243: 994).
187 For a list of bankers operating in Salonica see 1307 S.V.S. (1890: 256); 1324 S.V.S. (1907: 
549). See Chapter-1 for banking details.
188 pech, Manuel des Societes, 126-129.
18  ^Dumont, The Social Structure, 45.
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role in the importation of know-how and technology into the industrial 
establishments.190
Another social group that assumed active entrepreneurial initiative in the region 
was the Greek mercantile community. The Greek mercantile community had long 
established commercial interests and controlled a wide network of marketing and credit 
connections throughout the region and beyond.191 Similar to Jewish entrepreneurs, the 
Greek merchants capitalised on these commercial and financial contacts. They set up 
and managed manufacturing concerns in regular partnerships and marketed the produce 
through their connections.
These commercial and financial connections largely explain the proliferation of 
Greek-owned industrial concerns in the region, especially in inland towns of Vodine, 
Karaferye, Agustos and Siroz. All the cotton spinning mills located in these towns were 
owned and managed exclusively by Greek entrepreneurs.192 Also, Greek merchants
1^0 Especially the spinning mills owned by Jewish families imported machinery and technical 
and administrative expertise from England. For instance, the Saias mill imported machinery direct from 
England and it was managed by two British directors, Mr. J. Ashworth and Mr. Thomas Johnson 
(P.P.A.P., 1883, V.72: 97; PRO, F.O. 195/1196, 26.10.1878, Barker to Layard). The large mill owned by 
the Torres and Misrachi families imported all die machinery from England; the spinners were supplied by 
Howard and Bullough of Accrington, the openers and lap machines by Crighton of Manchester and the 
engines and boilers by the Galloways Ltd. of Manchester (BA, $D-Selanik, 2012/6, 5.R.1302 (22.1.1885); 
F.O.A.S., 1893, N. 1310: 21-22). Similarly the Alatini flour factory imported its machinery from Europe 
(BA, $D-Ticaret, 1191/34, 26.B.1308 (7.3.1891); BA, ?D-Ticaret, 1193/13, 24.Ra.1309 (28.10.1891); 
BA, §D-Ticaret, 1214/4, 7.Ca.l317 (13.9.1899)). Also, the brewery and the ice factory owned by the 
Alatinis operated on imported machinery (BA, §D-Selanik, 2048/38, 22.C.1322 (3.9.1904)). The 
machinery installed at the Torres hempseed factory was also imported (BA, §D-Ticaret, 1225/59, 
2.Za.l326 (26.11.1908)). Likewise the woollen cloth factory owned by §alom and Benjamen imported 
the weaving machines from Europe (BA, §D-Ticaret, 1179/10, 10.N.1302 (23.6.1885)).
191 x. Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” Journal o f Economic 
History, 20, (1960): 234-313; V.Kacarkova, and E. Nikova, “Thessaloniki and the Bulgarian-Greek 
Economic Relations in the Twentieth Century,” Etudes Balkaniques, 2, (1986): 3-16; G. Harlaftis, A 
History o f  Greek-Owned Shipping, The Making o f and International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present 
Day, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
192 xhe first spinning mill in the region was established in Agustos in 1876 by a group of Greek 
entrepreneurs led by Dimitri Longo (BA, BEO-Ayniyat, 668/205, 17.S.1392 (25.3.1875); BA, §D-Selanik, 
2006/10, 28.S.1292 (5.4.1875)). In 1884 a few Greek merchants established the first spinning mill in 
Vodine (1307 S.V.S., 1890: 230-231). In 1894 a new water powered spinning mill was founded in 
Agustos by a group of Greek entrepreneurs, Bili Tsitsi and Co. (R.C.L., 1907, N.238-243: 995). Next 
year, the owners of the first Agustos mill, Dimitri Longo and Co., opened another mill in Vodine (BA, 
§D-Ticaret, 1209/12, 16.B.1315 (10.12.1897); Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 139-140. In 1894, 
Goutzas and Karatzas established a third mill in Agustos (BA, §D-Ticaret, 1220/2, 3.Ra.l321 
(30.5.1903); Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 139). In 1902 a group of Greek and ‘Muslim’ 
entrepreneurs, Sossidis and Faik Hoca Nota, established the first water powered mill in Karaferye 
(Veroia) (Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 140; R.C.L., 1907, N.238-243: 995). In the early 1900s two 
additional mills, one in Karaferye and another in Vodine, were set up by Greek entrepreneurs, 
Hatzinikolaki and Lappas respectively. Thus, by 1910, Greek entrepreneurs owned seven out of ten 
spinning m ills in the region. According to Palairet these concerns accounted for 67% of the region’s 
spinning capacity (Palairet, The Balkan Economies> 351).
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owned numerous factories in these towns. These concerns included woollen textile 
mills, tobacco processing workshops, brick and tile factories, distilleries and ice 
factories.193 Greek industrial interests did not remain confined to interior towns. 
Following the establishment of a number of banks strongly affiliated with Greek 
financial interests. Greek capitalists were able to set up a number of factories in 
Salonica and interior towns in the late 1900s. These concerns included a few woollen 
textile concerns, macaroni factories, an ice factory and a number of tanneries.194 On the 
eve of the Balkan Wars, the Greek mercantile community controlled the majority of the 
industrial concerns in the region.
Similar to Jewish entrepreneurs, the Greek merchants played a crucial role in the 
importation and adaptation of technology, expertise and know-how. The difference 
between the two groups appears to be in the degree of the diffusion of their investments 
in the region. Whereas Greek interests spread throughout the hinterland, Jewish 
concerns remained largely concentrated in Salonica. This situation once again draws our 
attention to the importance of community links in the establishment of industrial and 
other major business concerns in the region.
Overall, industrial manufacturing grew steadily and assumed increasing 
importance within the regional economy during the late nineteenth century. More 
importantly, perhaps, Selanik became one of the leading industrial centres of the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin by 1912. With its 148 factories that produced a wide range of 
primary consumer goods the industrial base of Selanik compared well with that of 
Istanbul and surpassed Western Anatolia.195 However, Selanik was not, nor could it be, 
a Catalonia, or comparable to the industrial zones emerging in, say, northern Italy. First, 
intense overseas competition seriously circumscribed the export potential of the sector. 
Local entrepreneurs simply could not compete with their European counterparts who 
literally dominated global markets. Under the circumstances, the manufacturers of 
Salonica, as well as those in other parts of the empire, found a niche only in local and 
proximate intra-regional markets within the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen, they
R.C.L., 1907, N.238-243: 832-833, 991-997. Greek entrepreneurs owned a tile and brick 
factory in Siroz in 1911 (BA, §D-Ticaret, 1229/38, 5.S.1328 (6.2.1910)). Also see Gounaris, Steam Over 
Macedonia 1993, pp. 139-143; Quataert, “Premieres iumees d’usines,” 160-173.
194 R.C.L., 1907, N.238-243: 991-995. For the ice factory owned by Yorgiyadis and Co. see 
BA, §D-Ticaret, 1226/12, 14.M.1327 (6.2.1909). Also see Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 139-143; 
Quataert, “Premieres fumees d’usines,” 160-173.
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succeeded in finding that market niche. However, there was tight overseas competition 
even in domestic markets. This competition compelled many local manufacturers to 
specialise in the production of primary consumer goods that appealed directly to local 
tastes and needs. Although initially the lower end of the expanding local and intra- 
regional markets provided new opportunities for manufacturers, the market eventually 
became saturated, leaving little scope for further expansion. Besides, most of these 
consumer goods were low value added products that left a relatively small profit margin 
for industrialists. As factor costs rose in the manner discussed above, many industrial 
establishments naturally faced serious economic problems and the ones that were 
mismanaged simply went bankrupt in due course.
At this point, it is important to address the crucial question as to why the 
dynamic, experienced and relatively prosperous entrepreneurial class of the Selanik 
region did not respond to the overseas challenge by investing in productivity enhancing 
technology. It is probable that adverse political circumstances, growing labour 
discontent and rising factor costs kept some industrialists from investing in new 
technology, especially from the mid-1900s onwards. It is also likely that the 
attractiveness of alternative investment options, such as money lending, financial 
arbitrage and real estate development played a role in curtailing investment in 
manufacturing industry. As I noted earlier, money lending, tax farming and real estate 
speculation yielded much higher returns than any other investment option available to 
local entrepreneurs at the time.196 This situation increased the opportunity cost of 
productive investments and entrepreneurs felt reluctant to invest in manufacturing, 
where market risks were considerable, profit margins were narrow(er), and overseas 
competition was tight. When industrial ventures were not, or no longer, profitable, 
entrepreneurs opted to invest in these alternative and often lucrative ventures. These 
preferences contributed to the technological standstill in manufacturing industries and 
the subsequent failure to respond to the challenge of overseas competitors. In other 
words, the institutional and economic environment that rendered speculative real estate 
transactions, tax farming, financial arbitrage and other usury practices reinforced the 
lethargic conditions in the manufacturing sector. The absence of a strong and financially 
sound state apparatus left a regulatory and institutional vacuum that allowed speculative 
and usury activities to flourish. This institutional lacuna absorbed much of the available
195 The industrial survey of 1913-1915 reports a total of 148 factories in Istanbul and 125 in 
Izmir Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisii, Osmanli Sanayii, 1913, 1915 Yillari Sanayi Istatistiki, 13.
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capital, leaving little for productive investment elsewhere, thereby working as a major 
factor to hold the long-term developmental potential of the regional economy at bay in 
this period.
4.2. Artisanal Manufacturing
Probably the most prominent part of the artisanal manufacturing sector in 
Salonica was textiles. The region had a long history of being one of the most important 
centres of textile manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire. For example, Salonica was a 
leading centre of woollen cloth production. For centuries, the Jewish artisans of 
Salonica manufactured fine woollen cloth Qayak) for the Janissary corps.197 They also 
produced various kinds of coarse woollen cloth (aba, guha and kepe) that were regularly 
sold in Ottoman and European markets as well as in the region. Similarly, the cotton 
spinning manufacturers of Salonica and Siroz marketed their quality cotton yam in 
Ottoman and European markets throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries.198 The local cotton weaving manufactures also consumed a substantial amount 
of locally produced cotton. The cotton weavers of Salonica and Siroz produced 
headgear (turbans), tunics and underwear for the Janissary corps. Artisans in Salonica 
Vodine and Karaferye also produced a variety of popular cloth varieties such as alaca, 
and bath garments and towels (pe§temals and havlus).199
By the turn of the nineteenth century, textile manufacturers began to encounter 
certain problems. As in other parts of the empire, mounting European competition put 
the textile manufacturers under considerable economic distress from the 1820s onwards. 
After the 1830s, competition in international and domestic markets hurt the artisanal
196 See Chapter 4 and Section 3.2 above.
197 s. Faroqhi, “Labor Recruitment and Control in the Ottoman Empire (Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries),” in D. Quataert (ed.) Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1950, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 30-33.
198 s. D. Petmezas, “Patterns of Protoindustrialization in the Ottoman Empire. The Case of 
Eastern Thessaly, c. 1750-1860,” Journal o f European Economic History, 19, N. 3, (1990): 575-604.
199 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 76. For details of pre-nineteenth century textile 
manufacturing in Salonica see N. Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe siecle, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1956); Petmezas, “Patterns of Protoindustrialization”; Quataert, Ottoman 
Manufacturing", §. Pamuk, “The Silk Industry of Bursa, 1880-1914,” in H. islamoglu (ed.) The Ottoman 
Empire and the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 284-299; Quataert, 
“The Age of Reforms”; M. Gen?, “Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, 
Characteristics and Main Trends,” in D. Quataert (edj Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 
1500-1950, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 59-86; Themopoulou, Salonique..
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cotton spinning industry particularly badly. By the 1850s, the artisanal spinning industry 
had almost entirely collapsed in the region, and the sector had retreated to the confines 
of rural household economy.200
European competition adversely affected the weaving sector as well. Woollen 
textile production was forced to retreat in the overseas markets, as British woollen 
goods flooded European markets from the early 1800s onwards. Besides, the raw wool 
produced in the region became quite cheap for European merchants, following the 
debasement of the Ottoman silver currency during the early decades of the nineteenth 
century.201 This situation encouraged European merchants to make heavy purchases in 
the Salonica wool market, leaving little produce for local use.202 Local producers thus 
faced serious supply bottlenecks, especially in quality wool varieties. Pressed hard 
under unfavourable demand conditions and supply side bottlenecks, many Jewish 
manufacturers either abandoned weaving and became directly involved in the overseas 
wool trade, or specialised in the production of coarse woollen goods. In addition, the 
abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826 entailed a notable contraction in demand for 
woollen as well as cotton products, because of the collapse of the military demand for 
turban headgear.203 These developments put considerable pressure on local woollen and 
cotton textile manufacturers and eventually forced some o f them to abandon the trade.
By the 1870s, the artisanal cotton and woollen textile industries had contracted 
notably. However, both cotton and woollen weaving manufacturers managed to survive 
the onslaught of overseas competition, the collapse of military demand and the adverse 
effects of currency devaluation. Many artisans responded to these crises by 
concentrating on the production of either “authentic” or low-value added, coarse textile 
goods that appealed directly to the tastes and the needs of the Ottoman people. For 
example, in the early 1880s the woollen cloth manufacturers of Salonica, Karaferye, 
Vodine, Siroz, Drama and especially of Nevrekop were still weaving coarse woollen
200 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing.
201 For the debasement of the Ottoman silver currency, see §. Pamuk, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu’nda Paranin Tarihi [The History of Money in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi 
Yurt Yayinlari, 1999), 210-217..'
202 Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 55-56. According to Pamuk, the Ottoman kuru§ lost 50% 
of its silver content between the late 1760s and 1808. See §. Pamuk, “Appendix: Money in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1326-1914”, in H. tnalcik and D. Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History o f the Ottoman 
Empire, 1300-1914, (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press), 970.
203 Palairet The Balkan Economies, 55-56.
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cloth {aba, kepe), horse cloth (gul), mgs {kilim) and carpets (halt).204 These products 
were consumed predominantly within the region, although the famed abas were still 
sent regularly to other Macedonian provinces, to Greece and to Istanbul.205 The cotton 
cloth weavers of Salonica, Siroz, Nevrekop and Provide continued to manufacture a 
range of popular cotton cloth varieties, such as kirbast and alaca206 The artisans of 
Salonica, Karaferye, Yenice and Siroz produced cotton bath garments and fancy silken, 
towels {pe§temal, ipekli hamam takimi and ipekli havlu) for local people, who habitually 
paid regular visits to the public baths.207 The former turban weavers in Salonica 
increasingly specialised in the production of conventional veils {burumcuk and 
pegekari) worn commonly- by Muslim women. The cloth weavers in Salonica and 
Kavala also manufactured other types of coarse cotton cloth varieties, such as bed sheets 
(yataklik bezi), regular white cloths {beyaz bez and pamuk bezi), curtains (perde) and 
sofa throws {dd§eme)2m In Yenice, artisans continued to produce linen and silken cloth 
varieties {keten and ipekli bez).209
According to official statistics, artisanal textile manufacturing still employed 
about 10,900 full-time workers in Selanik during the mid-1880s. Most of these workers 
clustered in the weaving sector (See Table 5.6). At the time, the urban population of the 
region probably stood around 150,000. Thus, full-time artisans engaged in textile 
production accounted for about 7.3% of the urban population. If these estimates are 
accurate, then we can suggest that the sector still constituted an important component of 
urban economic life in the region. Besides, these numbers do not include an 
indeterminate number of part-time workers engaged or employed in textile 
manufacturing. Therefore, normally we would expect that the sector had a greater 
degree of importance than that indicated by the percentage mentioned above.
This brief account should indicate that artisanal manufacturing went through a 
period of reorganisation, as well as relative decline, and adopted itself to emergent 
economic conditions by focusing on domestic markets. Through a combined strategy of 
specialisation in the production of popular goods and of moving towards the lower end
204 1299 S.V.S., 1883: 206-208; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 56.
205 1299 S.V.S., 1883: 206-208; Palairet, The Balkan Economies, 76.
206 1299 S.V.S., 1883,206-208.
207 1299 S.V.S., 1883,206-208.
208 1299 S.V.S., 1883: 206-208.
209 1299 S.V.S., 1883: 206-208.
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of the domestic markets, artisanal textile manufacturing survived well into the 1880s 
and continued to fulfil important economic functions. The only exception to this, as we 
have noted, was cotton spinning, which collapsed almost totally.
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Table 5.6
Number o f  Workers Employed in Leading Artisanal Manufacturing Industries (Late-I880s)
Occupation 1886/1890
I) Textiles
Textile Weavers (Woolen and Cotton) 7,470
Tailors 1,900
Mat Makers 715
Horse-Cloth Makers (M uytab) 620
Cotton Spinners 124
Cotton Sac Makers 45
Fez Makers 28
TOTAL 10,902
II) Leather-Works
Cobblers and Shoe Makers 2,225
Saddle and Harness Makers 395
Fur Processors 145
Tanners 140
TOTAL 2,905
III) Household Durables and Consumer Goods
Millers 4,820
Potters 814
Candle Makers 146
Basket Weavers 75
Quilt Makers 55
Chair Makers 30
Knife Makers 29
Coopers 27
Chest Makers 20
Umbrella Makers 7
Lamp Makers 6
Soap Makers 6
TOTAL 6,035
IV) Metal-Works
Shoeing-smiths 448
Tin Polishers 270
Tinsmiths . 240
Coppersmiths 180
Gun Makers 175
Clock Makers and Repairers 79
Hand-Loom Makers 34
TOTAL 1,426
V) Manufactures Related to Urban Construction Industry
Ironsmiths 1,880
Masons 1,055
Carpenters 381
Painters 254
Brick and Tile Makers 231
Stone Cutters 227
Pavers 215
Plasterers 175
Joiners 101
Sawyers 48
Beam Makers 40
Graters 6
TOTAL 4.607
TOTAL ARTISANAL MANUFACTURING 25j875
REGIONAL URBAN POPULATION 150.000
TOTAL SHARE IN URBAN POPULATION 17%
% of Textiles in Total
Factory Employment 2500
Tobacco Processing 5000
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 17388
Source: 1303 S.V.S., 1886: Appendix; 1307 S.V.S., 1890: 223-226.
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Unfortunately, the available quantitative data do not allow a comprehensive 
analysis of the performance of artisanal textile manufacturing industries in the region in 
the post-1880 period. However, qualitative sources and the limited quantitative evidence 
at hand reveal the dynamism of certain branches of textile manufacturing. In this 
respect, we are relatively better informed about woollen textile manufactures and carpet 
and rug making. There is also evidence to assess the scope of cotton cloth 
manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, of mat and fur production. In what follows, I shall 
take stock of the existing sources to outline the dynamism of textile manufacturing 
industries in the post-1880 period.
As it has already .been noted, the formation of an autonomous Bulgarian 
principality created new opportunities for local woollen textile manufactures, and 
injected a new dynamism into the sector. In the late 1880s, there were 2,125 looms 
weaving §ayak and aba cloth in Gevgeli, Nevrekop and Tikve§. In the entire province, 
woollen cloth manufacturers produced a total of 543,000 square meters of aba and 
§ctyak. This output level was considerable and compared reasonably well with the 
Bulgarian woollen cloth output at its peak in c.1870, which stood somewhere between 
1,400,000-1,650,000 square meters. 210
However, the real growth of woollen cloth production took place later in the 
1890s. For instance, in the mid-1890s, artisans were producing an estimated 800,000 
square meters of aba cloth in Gevgeli alone.211 The weavers of Karaferye produced 
another 15,000 square meters of §ayak and an additional 67,000 square meters of aba, 
§ayak, and other miscellaneous woollen cloth varieties Were produced in the highland 
towns of Razlik and Nevrekop.212 These gayaks and abas were sold primarily to the 
military units stationed in the area, and the balance was consumed either locally or sent 
to Manastir, Kosova, Istanbul and even Bulgaria.213 Besides, an unknown amount of 
woollen cloth was produced and consumed locally in a number of locations such as 
Avrethisan, Katrin, Kesendire, Demirhisar, Cuma-i Bala, Menlik, Provide and Zihne.214 
Taking the above figures into account, it is possible to suggest, somewhat 
conservatively, that the production of coarse woollen cloth reached at least 1,000,000
210 1307 S.V.S., 1890,227.
211 1313 S.V.S., 1896,290.
212 1312 S.V.S., 1895,263,430,446.
213 1312 S.V.S., 1895,263,430; 1315 S.V.S., 1898, 576-577.
214 1312 S.V.S., 1895,246-247, 257, 309,397,410,433; 1313 S.V.S., 1896: 361, 373,393.
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square meters by the late 1890s.215 If  so, regional woollen cloth output could well have 
grown by more than 80.0% within a decade. When we take into account the carpets, 
rugs and woollen stockings manufactured in the province the overall dynamism of the 
sector becomes even more apparent.216 This observation is also supported by consul 
Blunt’s commercial reports, which regularly point to the growth of local woollen 
industries in response to growing military, local civilian and intra-regional demand for 
§ayak and aba cloths.217
Assessing the performance of the other branches of artisanal textile 
manufacturing is more difficult, due to a lack of output statistics. Nevertheless, the 
limited evidence at hand indicates that the production of a number of textiles continued 
to be important throughout the period. Cotton and cotton silk mix cloth manufacturing 
is a case in point. In the early 1890s, cotton cloth manufacturers in Nevrekop, Kdpriilu, 
Avrethisar, Zihne, and Yenice operated a total of 1,650 looms, generating an estimated 
annual revenue of O.L. 25,000.218 Nevrekop was the leading centre of cotton weaving, 
and boasted some 500 looms that produced 10,000 rolls o f cotton cloth (bez) 
annually.219 In Yenice, there were 52 looms producing bennurk cloth.220 The production 
of bath towels and garments continued in Salonica and Karaferye. In addition, there 
were 50 looms producing bath garments (hamam takimi) in Ak?a Mescid.221 The 
production of the alaca cloth, shirtings, tunics, sail cloth, towels and bath garments 
continued in Avrethisan, where the sector employed about 100 artisans in the mid to 
late 1890s.222 Cotton weaving also retained its importance in Siroz and became 
prominent in Provide in the late 1890s.223 The 1907 provincial yearbook indicates that
215 This output level compares well with Bulgarian figures. Palairet (1997: 192) maintains that
woollen output of entire eastern Rumelia was, including factory production, 423,000 m2. Unfortunately 
no output figures are available for northern Bulgaria to make comparisons. Nevertheless the comparisons 
must be handled carefully due to lack of data pertaining to the weight of the woollen produce as well as 
the area.
216 For instance in Provi§te there were 141 looms weaving 25,000 pieces of coarse gul cloth and 
rugs in c.1890. At the same date, in the entire province about 300,000 pairs o f woollen stockings were
produced and sold by Vlach tribes (1307 S.V.S., 189Q, 228).
217 F.O.A.S., 1886, N 24: 6; F.O.A.S., 1887, N. 75: 3; F.O.A.S., 1888, N. 394: 3; F.O.A.S., 1893, 
N. 1310: 8; F.O.A.S., 1896, N. 1663:7.
218 1307 S.V.S., 1890,227.
219 1312 S.V.S., 1895,446.
220 1313 s.V.S., 1896,325.
221 1307 S.V.S., 1890,228.
222 1312 S.V.S., 1895, 246-247; 1313 S.V.S., 1896, 242; 1315 S.V.S., 1898, 355.
223 1 3 1 3  s.V .S., 1896, 575,434; 1315 S.V.S., 1898, 552.
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cotton weaving industries were still operating in the above mentioned locations, with no 
visible decline or contraction.224
The manufacturing of ready-made clothing constituted another important 
component of the artisanal textile sector. The data presented in Table 5.6 suggest that 
there were about 1,900 active tailors operating in the region in the late 1880s. This 
should not come as a surprise. Although ready made European outfit varieties had 
become very popular among certain sections of the urban populace, many relatively 
modest urban residents still regularly asked the local tailors to cut out frocks, suits, 
winter coats, shirts and skirtings for occasional use.225 Urban middle classes and 
government officers constituted the regular customers of the local tailors.226
It is also important to note that a specialised textile manufacturing industry 
developed around the booming tobacco trade from the mid-1890s onwards. The 
production of sacks and mats to be used in the processing and packing of tobacco grew 
notably from c.1890 onwards. At the time, 715 mat makers (hasirci), 620 woollen and 
goat’s hair sac weavers (muytab) and 45 cotton sac (kirpas penbesi) producers were 
operating in the region (See Table 5.6).227 By the late 1890s, the sector had expanded 
notably, particularly in the tobacco growing districts.228 For example, more than
100,000 sacs made of goaf's hair were produced annually in Provide in the late 1890s. 
In addition, between 50,000 to 100,000 straw mats were manufactured. These mats were 
used primarily in the processing of tobacco, especially in the separation, lining and the 
withering of the produce.229 In Provide alone, the industry employed 250 sac weavers 
and 800 mat makers.230 Perhaps more than a thousand workers were employed in sac
224 1324 S.V.S., 1907, 221.
22  ^ The following example is illustrative of the growing popularity o f ready made clothing 
imported from Europe, especially among die more ‘modem’ and prosperous components of Salonica’s 
populace. In the early 1900s the Karamursel woollen cloth factory opened a branch in Salonica. One of 
the journalists working for Asir was apparently ‘struck’ by the quality and attractive prices of the cloths 
sold at the Karamursel shop. He bought a couple of ar§ms of the finest quality §ayak cloth and gave it to a 
local tailor, Ismail Hakki Efendi, to cut out one coat and a suit for him. The result was outstanding. The 
reporter then goes on to criticise the ones who chose to buy fancy, yet lower quality and less durable, 
European dresses just for the ‘fashion’ and ‘trademark’. No doubt the new urban consumer culture was in 
full swing among the middle income classes of the town (Asir, 9.Ca.l317 (15.9.1899), N. 414: 1; Asir, 
22.Z.1318 (11.4.1901), N. 574: 2).
22  ^Dumont, “The Social Structure,” 43.
227 1307 S.V.S., 189oj 223-228.
228 1312 S.V.S., 1895,467.
229 1313 S.V.S., 1896,434.
230 1315 S.V.S., 1898, 552.
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weaving and mat making in Kavala and Drama.231 Apparently, together with woollen 
textiles and possibly cotton cloth making, the manufacturing of sacs and mats for the 
tobacco industry was one of the leading textile manufacturing activities in the region. It 
is fair to suggest that the sector grew in tune with the booming tobacco trade, especially 
after the turn of the century.
Table 5.7.
Manufacturing Artisans Working in the Town o f  Salonica, 1883 and 1898
Occupation 1883 1898
Tinsmiths 15 290
Tin Polishers 20 35
Ironsmiths 15 142
Coppersmiths 10 28
Cobblers and Shoe Makers 22 446
Coopers 27 27
Saddle and Harness Makers 11 11
Chest Makers 5 46
Clock Makers 17 47
TOTAL 142 1,072
Source: 1303 S.V.S., 1883, Appendix; Dumont, “The Social Structure,” 42.
The region also possessed a diverse urban manufacturing base that went well 
beyond the confines of the textile industry. In all cities throughout the region, there were 
artisans working to produce various goods exclusively for the local population. The 
production of primary consumer goods and household utensils was of great importance. 
For instance, flour milling was possibly the most basic artisanal occupation that was 
almost universal throughout the region. In every urban centre, there were a number of 
small water powered mills producing flour for the local population.232 As Table 5.6 
indicates, flour milling was one of the largest of all artisanal industries. The sector 
employed 4,820 full time artisans in the late 1880s. Similarly, thousands of artisans 
laboured to produce shoes and footwear, pots, tin cups, copper cutlery, candles, baskets, 
quilts, household furniture, guns and clocks along with a number of other essential 
consumer goods. Another group of artisans manufactured key iron products, bricks, tiles 
and timber, all of which were basic inputs for the booming urban construction industry. 
These full-time artisans employed in non-textile manufacturing industries totalled
231 1315 S.V.S, 1898, 571.
232 1307 S.V.S, 1890, 234-235.
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15,000 souls and constituted another 10.0% of the region’s urban population in the late 
1880s.
Lack of conclusive quantitative evidence precludes definitive statements about 
the growth performance of these diverse artisanal manufacturing sectors. However, the 
existing secondary literature firmly holds the view that artisanal manufacturing rose in 
importance in tune with growing urbanisation in the region. For example, Paul Dumont, 
who studied the Jewish artisans of Salonica, suggests that artisanal production grew 
rapidly, mainly in response to growing urbanisation and the rapid ‘modernisation’ of 
lifestyles in the town.233 Recently, Meropi Anastassiadou has confirmed Dumont’s 
findings and pointed to the rapid proliferation of artisanal manufacturing in response to 
growing tide of urbanisation and modernisation in Salonica.234
This view is confirmed by Table 5.7, which indicates the growth of the number 
of artisans registered in the town of Salonica between 1883 and 1898. The increase in 
the number of full-time artisans employed in the making of household goods, cutlery, 
furniture and footwear is particularly striking. Among other reasons, the development of 
the sector can be attributed to the growth in urban demand for the goods that it 
produced. Comparable data were not available for other artisanal sectors.235 
Nevertheless, considering the relatively limited nature of European competition in such 
consumer goods as pots, tin cups, copper cutlery, candles, baskets, quilts and household 
furniture, we would expect a similar expansion in other artisanal occupations. By the 
same token, we could somewhat speculatively expect a similar expansion in artisanal 
sectors in other, interior, towns of the region, especially in rail-connected centres of 
commercial agriculture where urban growth was more prominent.
Overall, a number of demand side factors seem to have created certain 
opportunities that enabled local artisanal manufacturers to survive, and even to expand
233 Dumont “The Social Structure,” 38-44.
234 Anastassiadou, Salonique, 337.
235 The data presented in Table 5.7 reveals only a partial picture o f the growth process. For 
1883 I used the relatively comprehensive 1886 provincial yearbook. For 1898 I mainly extracted the data 
for 1898 mainly from Dumont and Anastassiadou. I could only incorporate the coinciding artisanal 
sectors included in both data set to maintain consistency between two observations. Nevertheless, it might 
be also illustrative to note that the 1886 yearbook reports 1,856 full time artisans working in both 
manufacturing and service sectors. Dumont/Anastassiadou estimate a total o f 2,272 artisans in 1898. 
However, it must be noted that many crafts cited in the 1886 yearbook are not included in the 
Dumont/Anastassiadou series. See Dumont, “The Social Structure,” 42; Anastassiadou, Salonique, 337.
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their activities during the period. The growth of local urban, military and intra-regional 
demand for textiles, processed foodstuffs and other primary consumer goods was 
particularly important in this respect. Also the rapid growth of cash crop production, 
especially of tobacco production, had a propulsive impact on certain branches of 
artisanal manufacturing. It is important to note that these were exactly the same demand 
side factors that underlay the growth of mechanised manufacturing sectors in the region. 
However, the advantage of,small scale artisans was that they produced a wide range of 
high and low value added manufactured goods and thus catered to the needs of the local 
(urban) population from the richest to the poorest segments. It is precisely this wide, yet 
specialised, market spread that enabled artisanal manufacturing to resist the tide of 
overseas competition and flourish during the period under consideration.
Conclusion
The arrival of the railways in the region and the growing tide of 
commercialisation were the primary factors that underlay urbanisation in the Selanik 
region. The development of the service sector and a frenzy of construction activity 
accompanied urban growth. Commercial, transportation and catering services grew 
rapidly in accord with the proliferation of urban areas, especially of port cities and 
railway towns, which served as the nexus of marketing and distribution in the region. In 
addition, new urban professions emerged and expanded in response to the growth of the 
commercial economy and the ongoing process of modernisation. New commercial and 
residential buildings, as well as extensive infrastructures, were built to physically 
accommodate the urban masses and the growing commercial economy. Local 
mercantile classes, notables and European capitalists played an important role in the 
growth of this leading urban sector and invested considerable sums into commerce, 
catering, transportation, and urban real estate development.
The proliferation of the urban economies and the emergence of new urban 
lifestyles also created fresh demand for consumer goods and construction materials. The 
bulk of new urban demand, appears to have been, was absorbed by imports from 
overseas. However, these developments, also created new opportunities for the 
manufacturing sector. In addition, the rapid growth of cash crop production created 
fresh demand for new processing and manufacturing products in the region. The
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dynamic entrepreneurial classes that had direct access to financial sources and assumed 
a strong presence in local and intra-regional marketing networks soon responded to 
emerging opportunities and established new factories in leading urban centres of the 
region. In due course, they benefited considerably from the availability of cheap labour 
power, raw material inputs and abundant water power and found a stable, if narrow, 
market niche in the region, despite intense foreign competition. However, local markets 
soon saturated and many industrial concerns encountered demand side problems. Also, 
the notable rise in factor costs, especially in wages, put considerable pressure on local 
capitalists and brought industrial expansion to a halt in most parts of the region. Many 
industrialists failed to respond to the challenge by upgrading their technology and 
adopting more aggressive marketing strategies that would expand their business 
horizons beyond the immediate markets. In this process, a complex set of political and 
economic factors helps explain the reluctance of the local capitalists. For one, 
worsening political conditions and growing uncertainties in the region probably 
withheld them from investing into industrial projects. More importantly, the attraction 
of usury practices, real estate speculation, tax-farming, and financial arbitrage increased 
the opportunity cost of productive investments, making manufacturers reluctant to 
invest in risky industrial projects.
The artisanal manufacturing sector, on the other hand, benefited from the 
expansion of urban demand. Self-employed artisans who relied on simple technology 
and low capital outlays and specialised in the production of goods that appealed directly 
to local tastes or on high value added products, were able to respond well to emerging 
opportunities in urban areas. Also, the textile sector benefited considerably from robust 
government demand for woollen textiles and from the proliferation of the tobacco 
processing industry. Thus, small-sized artisanal establishments survived and even grew 
in importance despite an initial period of adaptation and re-organisation during the 
earlier decades of the nineteenth century.
The richness and diversity of the urban experience marks the complexity and 
contradictions of the modernisation process in the Selanik region. First, the apparent 
growth and proliferation of urban economies stand in contrast with the processes of 
retardation and backwardness that affected agriculture. The different impact of the 
world economic forces on agriculture and modem sectors appears to have undergirded 
the apparent contrast. While capitalist integration brought riches to mercantile classes,
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notables, moneylenders, and other agents of capitalist integration, the excluded 
segments and compartments of the agrarian economy paid a heavy price and fell into 
severe crisis and retardation, Also, the political and institutional environment seems to 
have fed into the widening contrast by allowing the persistence of speculative and rent- 
seeking motives. Surplus capital simply did not find its way into disadvantaged 
agricultural sectors. Instead, it went into urban areas and projects, which yielded higher 
returns and provided a more amenable lifestyle for men of prominence and power.
Second, the contrasts and tensions that gradually emerged within the urban 
process itself underlines the complexity of the modernisation pattern that we encounter 
in the Selanik region. The coexistence of modem factories, sweatshops and dynamic 
small-scale artisanal manufactures, which utilised different levels of technology, 
adopted different forms of labor procurement, and specialised in the production of 
different types of goods underlined not only the richness of the urban experience but 
also its transitional nature. In this transition, facets of “modernity” mesh with those of 
“tradition”. Likewise, mounting political tensions and emergence of urban forms of 
resistance and discontent underline the explosive nature of this transitionary process. It 
can not be a coincidence that the 1908 Young Turk revolution empted in Salonica. I 
interpret this movement as the historical outcome o f the political and economic tensions 
that had been building up in the region along with its gradual transformation and 
urbanisation. Intensifying economic inequalities, political tensions, and shifts in cultural 
and ethnic identities accompanied these developments ultimately metamorphosing into 
irreconcilable revolutionary movements and wars that concluded the Ottoman period of 
the region’s history.
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AFTERWORD
Selanik became one of most modernised and dynamic regions of the Ottoman 
Empire during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. With its tightly knit 
marketing networks and extensive railway systems, relatively well-developed financial 
markets, fluid land market, modem factories, burgeoning urban areas and port-cities, 
Selanik had clearly become one of the leading commercial regions of the entire eastern 
Mediterranean basin by the turn of the twentieth century.
Two primary forces underlay the process of economic modernisation in the 
region, namely the capitalist world economy and the reform efforts of the Ottoman 
government. Enhanced integration with the world economy brought new opportunities 
and helped bolster economic modernisation in the region. For instance, certain sub­
sectors of the agrarian economy, namely tobacco, opium and to a lesser extent silk 
cocoon production benefited from robust overseas demand, and the institutional and 
financial support provided by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA) and the 
European and American trading houses operating in the region. Likewise, European 
capitalists played an important role in the development of marketing and financial 
networks, economic infrastructure (railways, harbours and urban utilities), urban real 
estate development, and the emergence of modem manufacturing concerns in the 
region. In this regard, the capitalist world economy appears to have been the prime 
driver of economic modernisation and growth in the region.
The Ottoman state also contributed to the moment of commercialisation and 
overall economic development. Legal reforms that largely liberalised the land-regime of 
the empire and the consolidation of property rights over land, the establishment of the 
Agricultural Bank, the foundation of agricultural schools, model farms and agricultural 
machinery depots were all important steps that helped enhance commercialisation and 
economic modernisation in the region. Likewise, the infrastructure investments carried 
out by the Ottoman government contributed significantly to the commercialisation and 
urbanisation of the regional economy during the period. In addition, timely and well- 
executed crisis management schemes undertaken by the government enhanced the
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stability of the agrarian economy at large and increased its capacity to resist crop 
failures and other dislocating factors.
However, processes of economic growth and modernisation proceeded hand in 
hand with those of serious economic retardation and dislocation in the region. 
Ironically, the very same forces that fostered processes of economic growth and 
modernisation also undermined its long-term potential for economic development.
Enhanced integration with the world economy retarded certain key 
compartments of the regional economy. Intense European competition in overseas 
markets and, more importantly, in the under-protected domestic market posed serious 
demand-side problems for manufacturers and agriculturalists alike.
Foreign competition in domestic markets, for instance, circumscribed the growth 
potential of manufacturing industry and forced it to specialise in the production of low- 
value-added goods that appealed directly to the tastes and needs of the local population. 
This situation left the manufacturing industry, especially modem manufacturing 
concerns, extremely vulnerable to changes in factor prices. Rising labour costs, raw 
material and energy prices quickly ate into the already narrow profit margins and put 
local manufacturing concerns, especially textile producers, under acute economic 
distress, forcing some into bankruptcy towards the end of the period.
Likewise, the radical reduction in global freight rates and transportation costs, 
combined with the ensuing price depression in global markets left local cereal and 
cotton producers exposed to intense foreign competition in both overseas and domestic 
markets. Subsequently, the sub-sectors went into a period of serious and long-lasting 
recession and within a matter of two decades agricultural production declined by about 
30%. More importantly, the ensuing recession created serious socio-economic 
dislocations in the sector. Pressed hard under distressing mortgages and debt incurred at 
usury interest rates during the crisis, many farmers ultimately lost their lands and 
became tenants over the property they once owned. Subsequently, dispossessed farmers 
were forced to accept the exacting terms of unfavourable tenancy agreements. Others 
increasingly turned to non-agricultural pursuits, especially to seasonal migration and to 
by-employment, whenever these options were available. Many more chose to migrate to 
cities, and still others emigrated overseas in quest of new opportunities and remittances.
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Clearly, such dislocations constitute the destructive creativity of modernisation 
and mark the beginnings of what we can call a “Great Transformation” (after Polanyi) 
in Ottoman lands. However, these socio-economic dislocations prepared the structural 
background to the political and ethnic tensions that seriously disrupted economic 
development in the Selanik region later from mid-1900s onwards.
The fiscal, political and diplomatic weakness of the Ottoman government gave 
way to economic retardation and arrested the ongoing process of economic development 
in the region. In this context, three processes/linkages appear particularly important to 
note.
First, the diplomatic weakness of the Ottoman government was a serious 
problem. Bound by the trade treaties signed with European powers, the Ottoman 
government could do little to shelter domestic markets from overseas competition. This 
circumscribed the growth potential of the manufacturing sector at large and gave way to 
serious retardation in agriculture. Likewise, the government could not effectively 
control or mediate the tariff policies of the railway companies who charged exorbitant 
fares. Inflated transaction costs, in turn, undermined the development of the agricultural 
sector, especially of cereal production, which had for centuries been the primary axis of 
agricultural production in the region.
Secondly, the fiscal feebleness of the government had a retarding effect on the 
agricultural sector at large. The mammoth fiscal needs of the government put a heavy, 
burden on the rural economy and put farmers under acute economic distress. Under 
adverse price and/or harvest conditions, many farmers failed to meet their fiscal and or 
financial obligations and eventually lost their property. Their distress accelerated the 
processes of agrarian retardation and socio-economic dislocation.
Third, the fiscal weakness of the government also circumscribed its capacity to 
institute far-reaching economic reforms. Pressed hard under serious political and 
financial problems, the government was compelled to concentrate its reform efforts in 
such crucial areas as provincial administration, justice, and security. Under the 
circumstances, financial resources available for economic reform remained limited. The
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government failed to provide sufficient and/or regular logistic and technical support to 
the farmers in the region. Thus, agriculture remained at a technological standstill, which 
circumscribed the competitiveness of the sector, especially in overseas markets. When 
combined with inflated transaction costs, unfavourable price conditions and rural 
depopulation, technological stagnation circumscribed the growth potential of the 
agrarian economy.
Finally, the fiscal feebleness and the organisational inadequacies of the Ottoman 
government left a massive regulatory vacuum within which speculative and rent-seeking 
motives could be liberally manifested. The fiscal weakness of the central government 
undermined its organisational capacity and prevented it from consolidating its power 
over the provinces. Notwithstanding the relative centralisation drive of the Hamidian 
era, the lack of direct government control in the provinces allowed for, and indeed 
necessitated, the maintenance of alternative, more indirect forms of governance in the 
provinces, whereby local agents held key positions of power and controlled processes of 
economic redistribution. Under the circumstances, such rent-seeking practices as tax- 
farming, usury, concession hunting, and real estate speculation emerged as lucrative 
means of income generation and power consolidation. Thus, considerable capital was 
tied to speculative ends. Although such practices contributed to capital accumulation, 
they ultimately undermined the valorisation of capital in its broad sense. To put it 
briefly, the weakness of the state left ample space for speculation and rent seeking, 
which effectively hindered productive investments and thus arrested economic 
development, especially in agriculture.
Thus, a dual economic structure emerged in the region towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, whereby facets of “modernity” meshed with those of economic 
retardation. Clearly, this duality reflects the transitionary nature of the regional 
economy at large and points to the dynamic interaction of local structures with the 
encompassing moment of incorporation into the capitalist world economy. The tensions 
and contractions of this transformation process ultimately fed into the ethic and political 
tensions and pulled and pushed the region towards mass uprisings, revolution and 
ultimately to war. The catastrophes of the two Balkan Wars and the Great War marked 
the end of a unique era of striking contrasts; contrasts that were manifest in the 
coexistence of processes of growth and retardation, of modernisation and tradition, and 
of transformation and standstill. Ironically, these contrasts did not evolve in
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contradiction, but metamorphosed in a process of dialectic interaction and unity. It 
appears that the mould, or the driver, of this evolution process was the sweeping power 
of European capitalism.
The case of Selanik also reveals important clues about the problematic nature of 
economic growth and modernisation in the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire at 
large. Enhanced integration with European capitalism certainly brought new 
opportunities for economic growth in other parts of the empire. Western Anatolia, Trace 
and Istanbul, Adana and certain parts of central Anatolia benefited considerably from 
enhanced integration with the world economy and became leading centres of 
commercial agriculture and economic growth, especially after the arrival of the railways 
from the 1870s onwards. In this process, rail served towns and port cities emerged as 
centres of commerce, finance and manufacturing.
However, processes of economic growth remained circumscribed and came in 
sporadic fits when conditions were most appropriate. First, growth surfaced in sectors 
that meshed well with the moment of capitalist incorporation; ‘excluded’ sectors 
remained largely retarded, due mainly to serious demand side constraints and 
prohibitive transaction costs. Besides, growth processes could not be sustained 
indefinitely, for the feebleness of the technological base, particularly in agriculture, left 
the production process highly exposed to the unexpected shifts in demand side 
conditions (typically manifest in prolonged price depressions) and or supply side 
shocks. Under the circumstances, it proved extremely difficult to sustain enclaved 
growth processes.
The fiscal, organisational and diplomatic feebleness of the Ottoman state 
apparatus also exacerbated the problems of the Ottoman economy and circumscribed its 
developmental potential at large. An excessively liberal trade regime, a heavy and rising 
fiscal burden, insufficient market regulation, inadequate promotion and diffusion of new 
technology, and the resilience of endemic rent-seeking motives were the manifestations 
of a weak(ening) state apparatus that could do little to counterbalance the dislocating 
and retarding effects of enhanced integration with European capitalism.
Thus, the Ottoman economy emerged as a troubled, yet dynamic, one, which 
was overburdened with serious institutional inadequacies, prohibitive transaction costs,
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erratic demand conditions, and dislocating political, economic and financial effects of 
enhanced integration with capitalist world economy. Under the circumstances, the 
response to the challenge, of ever aggressive expansion of capitalism could not 
materialise in Ottoman lands, not at least until the later years of the Unionist, or perhaps 
more appropriately later in the Republican, era. Seen from a comparative perspective, 
the late nineteenth century was a period of falling behind, of widening divergence, and 
of deepening relative backwardness for the Ottoman economy.
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APPENDIX 1
Tax Revenues and the Estimation of the Real Tax Base
1. Tithe Revenues:
For the compilation of tithe revenues I used two sprimary sources. First, I used 
the regular fiscal data published by the Ottoman government. This data was available on 
a provincial basis only for the period 1888-1895. Secondly, I used the fiscal data 
published in provincial yearbooks to complete the series until 1905. Thus, it was 
possible to compile a comprehensive tithe data series for the entire period, 1888-1905. 
The data is presented in Table-1 below.
T able-1:
Accruing Tithe Revenues for Selanik (1888-1905)
Year Tax Revenues
1888 21,917,681
1889 25,186,456
1890 19,592,817
1891 21,561,813
1892 27,926,619
1893 24,773,471
1894 19,584,497
1895 21,176,812
1896 20,438,247
1897 20,187,636
1898 19,312,164
1899 21,810,000
1900 27,027,000
1901 22,098,869
1902 19,590,693
1903 23,851,969
1904 23,507,821
1905 22,439,400
Source: Devleti Aliyeyi Osmaniyenin Varidat ve Masarifati Umumiyesinin 
Sal Muhasebesidir, 1305-1312, Dersaadet, 1888-1895; 1299-1324 
S.V.S., 1882-1905.
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2. Compilation of the Tax Deflator:
I gathered the price data necessary to deflate tax revenues from two sources. I 
mainly used Gounaris’s data on cereal prices in Selanik. However, Gounaris’s serious 
had gaps for certain years, namely 1887, 1901, 1902 and 1904. To overcome this 
deficiency, I used the price data regularly published in the local daily Asir. I mainly 
took the first observation pertaining to the first week of each month of the lunar 
calendar and then averaged the monthly estimates to reach annual figures. This effort 
enabled me to compile a comprehensive price series for 1883-1909. The data is 
presented in Table-2 below.
Table 2:
Cereal Prices in Selanik, 1883-1909 (Pence)
Year Wheat Barley Maize Oats Rye Total 3MA
1883 93 62 67 63 84 100.08
1884 85 65 65 65 85 96.78 94.2
1885 80 57 54 64 71 85.69 90.2
1886 84 63 57 63 59 88.20 87.1
1887 83 57 59 54 63 87.38 88.8
1888 87 60 63 54 59 90.92 84.3
1889 70 48 50 58 55 74.73 84.7
1890 80 59 60 67 67 88.33 89.9
1891 104 68 65 66 92 106.70 99.5
1892 92 88 63 68 78 103.39 93.2
1893 63 48 48 54 48 69.58 78.7
1894 55 37 50 41 43 62.98 65.5
1895 56 38 51 41 43 64.08 64.7
1896 59 43 51 42 45 66.91 67.1
1897 67 44 47 51 51 70.20 77.1
1898 98 58 58 54 67 94.16 78.4
1899 68 48 48 43 46 70.80 79.0
1900 70 48 48 43 49 72.12 70.9
1901 63 46 50 45 50 69.82 72.2
1902 65 53 52 64 53 74.68 73.0
1903 70 51 53 46 45 74.56 75.7
1904 69 49 59 47 55 77.92 79.9
1905 74 65 61 64 66 87.33 83.3
1906 80 60 54 59 61 84.57 90.6
1907 90 76 60 69 88 100.00 99.2
1908 118 69 67 67 87 113.03 106.8
1909 108 69 69 57 75 107.26
ource: B.C. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the Railway
Factor (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 92-93. Data for 1887, 1901, 1902, 1904, compiled from miscellenous issues of the 
local daily Asir. See text for details.
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Based on the 1907 statistics, I then determined the weight of each crop in the 
commodity basket (see Table-3) and then compiled a standard Laspeyres price index for 
the period 1883-1909, taking 1907 as the base year. Then I compiled a 3-year moving 
average, which served as proxy for a tax-deflator due to reasons discussed in Chapter-1. 
By deflating the indexed nominal tithe revenues I could reach a ‘real’ tithe index, which 
I used as proxy to determine production trends in cereal production.
Table-3:
Cereal Production and Weights (Kuru§es)
Crop Value %
Wheat 73,451,664 32.4
Barley 41,092,464 18.1
Oats 9,207,300 4.1
Rye 27,084,540 11.9
Maize 76,121,961 33.5
TOTAL 226,957,929 100.0
Source: Orman ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti Istatistik Idaresi, 1323 Ziraat Istatistigi, 1907, 11-33.
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APPENDIX 2
Provincial Population and Number of Households in Selanik
Population and Residential Building Statistics Pertaining to the Province of Selanik, 1876-1912
Population Residential Buildings
Town 1876 1894 1906 1912 1876 1894 1906 1912
Salonica 80000 88000 98930 157900 5215 8321 9694 n.a.
istrumca n.a. n.a. 9320 n.a. 939 1360 1460 n.a.
Tikve? / Kavadar n.a. - 4557 11022 21000 797 n.a. 1297 n.a.
Toyran n.a. 4819 n.a. n.a. 870 n.a. 1000 n.a.
Avrethisar n.a. 5376 8000 n.a. 1200 1255 1255 n.a.
Katrin n.a. 2869 2093 n.a. n.a. 989 1378 n.a.
Karaferye n.a. 8891 14000 14000 1914 1120 2232 n.a.
Gevgeli n.a. 2000 4000 5000 n.a. 646 865 n.a.
Kesendire / Poliroz n.a. 2134 1700 n.a. 460 403 420 n.a.
Longaza n.a. 1716 2000 n.a. n.a. 409 464 n.a.
Vodine n.a. 7449 n.a. 13000 1102 1185 1291 n.a.
Yenice n.a. 8281 8500 n.a. 1016 1616 1616 n.a.
Siroz n.a. 21602 n.a. 32000 3035 4416 4416 n.a.
Petrif n.a. 4651 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1149 1149 n.a.
Demirhisar n.a. 3425 n.a. n.a. 563 733 733 n.a.
Cuma-i Bala n.a. 5592 5250 n.a. n.a. 1514 1544 n.a.
Zihne n.a. 2424 n.a. n.a. 350 535 635 n.a.
Razlik n.a. 4728 n.a. n.a. n.a. 946 889 n.a.
Menlik n.a. n.a. 3000 n.a. n.a. 685 700 n.a.
Nevrekop n.a. 5755 n.a. n.a. 706 1434 1434 n.a.
Drama n.a. 6933 12700 13000 n.a. 1287 2113 n.a.
Kavala n.a. - 5357 21000 24000 n.a. 1627 3775 n.a.
Provi$te n.a. n.a. 2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 560 n.a.
Source: 1293 S.V.S., 1876; 1312 S.V.S., 1896; 1324 S.V.S., 1906; F.O.A.S., 1912, N. 5234: 3-4.
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APPENDIX 3
Cereal Exports from Salonica
Cereal Exports from Macedonia, c.1870-1912 (Tons)
Year Wheat Barley Maize Oats Rye Millet Total
1872 9,161 2,210 4,018 1,340 889 n.a. 17,618
1873 39,643 10,714 15,000 10,781 19,286 n.a. 95,424
1874 10,286 4,821 4,286 n.a. 1,286 n.a. 20,679
1875 19,582 n.a. n.a. 11,316 n.a. n.a. 56,580
1876 50,184 n.a.- n.a. 17,712 n.a. n.a. 188,928
1877 162,360 n.a. n.a. 29,520 n.a. n.a. 450,672
1878 27,552 n.a. n.a. 17,220 n.a. n.a. 114,636
1879 2,571 1,786 n.a. 6,786 n.a. n.a. 14,956
1880 0 n.a. n.a. 8,143 1,286 n.a. 14,071
1881 13,929 16,071 19,714 10,179 18,857 n.a. 78,750
1882 18,075 16,863 12,011 9,345 9,377 n.a. 65,671
1883 31,527 17,734 24,633 8,867 13,793 n.a. 96,554
1884 13,695 16,256 29,063 7,926 19,212 n.a. 86,152
1885 6,630 6,995 10,123 8,669 11,133 n.a. 43,550
1886 787 5,806 1,692 5,215 1,210 n.a. 14,710
1887 5,904 1,786 n.a. 4,428 n.a. n.a. 14,563
1888 11,571 10,714 17,357 4,457 643 n.a. 44,742
1889 26,500 15,000 8,591 18,133 10,389 n.a. 78,613
1890 45,835 8,492 5,341 6,126 10,630 202 76,626
1891 56,000 25,000 6,800 5,775 40,827 974 135,376
1892 35,800 18,600 26,650 14,434 27,758 1,201 124,443
1893 5,900 7,900 12,800 7,900 15,750 1,750 52,000
1894 8,200 12,800 25,000 8,850 13,800 500 69,150
1895 10,976 15,680 28,420 13,720 13,720 588 83,692
1896 36,750 16,660 10,780 15,092 9,800 735 89,817
1897 30,382 16,170 6,860 10,780 12,740 490 77,422
1898 11,910 14,700 3,430 10,486 2,744 69 43,339
1899 19,173 11,281 3,676 12,809 3,580 349 50,868
1900 15,584 14,216 14,519 8,088 5,463 233 58,103
1901 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1902 0 15,000 36,000 12,000 3,500 n.a. 66,500
1903 3,800 22,500 20,000 23,400 6,800 n.a. 76,500
1904 0 28,200 11,500 26,000 15,300 n.a. 81,000
1905 5,400 17,000 20,400 15,500 13,500 n.a. 71,800
1906 2,100 19,400 21,930 23,680 7,390 1,400 75,900
1907 700 8,035 1,730 7,628 6,170 700 24,963
1908 645 1,386 463 925 51 432 3,902
1909 0 4,000 2,000 4,500 500 160 11,160
1910 0 0 11,500 9,900 1,000 200 22,600
1911 0 8,800 6,100 8,300 1,600 418 25,218
1912 0 7,474 29,751 3,250 3,661 637 44,773
Source: B. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change and the Railway
Factor, (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 92-93.
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APPENDIX 4
Cash Crop Prices in Salonica
Cash Crop Prices in Salonica, 1880-1912
Year Tobacco Cocoons Opium Cotton
1880-1884 40 52 144 650
1885 43 n.a. 120 612
1886 39 61 107 n.a.
1887 32 52 204 528
1888 29 37 121 536
1889 37 53 144 584
1890 29 48 156 588
1891 n.a. n.a. n.a. 396
1892 31 57 108 380
1893 26 49 126 366
1894 26 37 138 392
1895 37 38 98 417
1896 38 36 120 399
1897 38 36 102 410
1898 34 39 157 406
1899 28 n.a. 114 427
1900 30 40 142 537
1901 n.a. 31 171 492
1902 67 44 94 518
1903 66 44 102 581
1904 54 41 63 631
1905 43 39 91 527
1906 47 39 117 620
1907 53 •* 46 208 610
1908 58 n.a. 192 n.a.
1909 70 n.a. 199 n.a.
1910 80 n.a. 158 n.a.
1911 78 58 336 784
1912 72 n.a. 269 n.a.
Source: B. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912, Socio-Economic Change 
and the Railway Factor, (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 
Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1993), 96-97, 114-115.
Notes: 1) Tobacco prices are based on the arithmetic average of the prices of three 
different tobacco varieties, namely Giilibek, Kir and Prosotsani.
2) Data for 1887, 1901, 1902, 1904 were compiled from miscellenous issues 
of the local daily Asir.
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APPENDIX 5
AGRICULTURAL BANK CREDITS
Table 1
Loans Given by the Agricultural Bank in the Province o f  Selanik, 1889-1908 (Kuru$es)
Year Total Value o f Loans Number o f Debtors Loan Per Debtor
1889 1,281,808 877 1,462
1890 3,950,024 3,225 1,225
1891 4,748,409 4,832 634
1892 5,128,635 3,440 1,491
1893 6,274,374 3,810 1,647
1894 4,770,692 3,197 1,492
1895 4,602,762 3,326 1,384
1896-1897 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1898 4,923,219 6,111 806
1899 3,226,776 3,868 834
1900 3,340,177 3,690 905
1901 3,770,354 5,133 735
1902 3,502,665 5,708 614
1903 2,675,095 2,446 1,094
1904-1907 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1908 7,001,340 7,492 935
Annual Averages 4,228,309 4,083 1,090
Source: Ziraat Bankasmin ikrazatim Miibeyyin Istatistik Defteridir, 1305-1324, 1889-1908, Dersaadet: Matbayi
Osmaniye.
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Table 2
Distribution o f  Agricultural Bank Credits between Districts, 1889-1908 (Kuru ?es)
. . .  . 1 8 8 9 % 1890 % 1891 % 1892 % 1893 % 1 8 9 4 % 1 8 9 5 %
D istr ic ts  w ith  H igh C ift lik  C o n c e n tr a tio n  (A lso  th e  L ea d in g C e n te rs  o f  C e re a l P ro d u c tio n )
S e la n ik 135 ,293 1 0 .6 3 6 5 ,9 9 8 9 .3 194 ,137 4.1 2 0 7 ,6 0 0 4 .0 3 8 3 ,1 0 0 6.1 3 6 4 ,3 8 3 7 .6 5 1 2 ,9 8 2 11.1
K a ra fe ry e 2 ,0 0 0 0 .2 18 ,700 0 .5 3 7 ,5 0 0 0 .8 6 3 ,3 5 0 1.2 122 ,750 2 .0 1 7 7 ,6 1 0 3 .7 164 ,125 3 .6
Y e n ic e 4 7 ,5 4 0 3 .7 130 ,025 3 .3 158 ,705 3 .3 2 9 8 ,0 5 0 5 .8 2 8 7 ,7 5 0 4 .6 2 5 0 ,9 0 0 5 .3 2 9 3 ,9 1 7 6 .4
V o d in e 3 1 ,5 6 0 2 .5 109 ,3 5 0 2 .8 170 ,0 5 0 3 .6 174 ,650 3 .4 2 7 9 ,3 5 0 4.5 13 9 ,8 0 0 2 .9 130 ,7 0 0 2 .8
K a tr in - - 6 1 ,2 0 0 1.5 6 6 ,3 5 0 1.4 145 ,700 2 .8 141 ,800 2 .3 5 7 ,9 5 0 1.2 5 0 ,5 0 0 1.1
A v r e th isa r 77 ,421 6 .0 2 4 2 ,9 2 2 6.1 123 ,3 0 0 2 .6 2 8 2 ,0 7 5 5 .5 3 0 9 ,4 0 0 4 .9 6 9 ,5 3 0 1.5 109 ,865 2 .4
G ev g e li 5 ,0 0 0 0 .4 1 4 9 ,1 0 0 5 .8 6 2 ,8 0 0 1.3 7 6 ,2 5 0 1.5 2 3 2 ,8 0 0 3.7 , 199 ,5 7 5 4 .2 135 ,925 3 .0
P etr i? 2 5 ,9 0 0 2 .0 7 8 ,7 5 0 2 .0 8 1 ,9 5 0 1.7 2 3 6 ,8 2 5 4 .6 2 4 1 ,8 0 0 3 .9 9 9 ,9 0 0 2.1 8 4 ,5 0 5 1.8
T O T A L 3 2 4 .7 1 4 2 5 .3 1 .1 5 6 .0 4 5 2 9 .3 8 9 4 .7 9 2 18 .8 1 ,484 .500 2 8 .9 1 .9 9 8 .7 5 0 3 1 .9 1 .3 5 9 .6 4 8 2 8 .5 1 .4 8 2 .5 1 9 3 2 .2
D istr ic ts  w h er e  S m a ll-S c a le  P e a s a n t  P ro p r ie to rsh ip  w a s  P re d o m in a n t (A lso  P r im a ry  C e n te rs  o f  T o b a c c o  P ro d iic t io n  a n d  o f  JSericulf u re)
D ra m a 1 9 5 ,7 0 0 15 .3 2 8 6 ,5 1 7 7 .3 3 7 7 ,1 3 9 7 .9 86 ,1 1 7 1.7 3 4 2 ,2 5 0 5 .5 2 4 3 ,6 9 8 5.1 2 8 7 ,6 5 0 6 .2
K a v a la 2 9 ,6 9 0 2 .3 6 3 ,0 1 8 1.6 3 6 ,4 0 0 0 .8 6 2 ,4 5 0 1.2 100 ,875 1 .6 4 8 ,0 7 5 1.0 7 6 ,0 0 0 1.7
S a n  § a b a n 1 9 ,300 1.5 3 0 5 ,8 3 9 7 .7 192 ,6 0 0 4.1 2 6 4 ,2 4 2 5 .2 2 7 3 ,9 0 4 4 .4 143 ,375 3 .0 125 ,675 2 .7
C u m a -i B a la 1 4 ,500 1.1 7 7 ,0 0 0 1.9 5 2 ,2 5 0 1.1 6 0 ,0 5 0 1.2 105 ,400 1.7 106 ,6 2 5 2 .2 140 ,2 0 0 3 .0
P ro v i§ te - - - - - - 158 ,650 3.1 2 2 1 ,8 0 0 3 .5 15 6 ,8 7 9 3 .3 151 ,775 3 .3
K esen d ire 85 ,601 6 .7 1 1 5 ,7 5 0 2 .9 190 ,4 4 6 4 .0 151 ,150 2 .9 152,941 2 .4 2 4 1 ,4 0 9 5.1 2 0 8 ,8 5 0 4 .5
T O T A L 344 .7 9 1 2 6 .9 8 4 8 .1 2 4 2 1 .5 8 4 8 .8 3 5 17.9 7 8 2 .6 5 9 15 .3 1 .1 9 7 .1 7 0 19.1 9 4 0 .0 6 1 19.7 9 9 0 .1 5 0 2 1 .5
D istr ic ts  w h e r e  S m a ll S c a le  P e a sa n t  P r o p r ie to r sh ip  w a s P re d o m in a n t, a lth o u g h  th e  C>ftliks w e r e  co m m o n
(A lso  L e a d in g  C e n te rs o f  O p iu m  and  C o tto n  P ro d u c tio n )
S iro z 2 1 3 ,3 0 0 16 .6 5 2 9 ,7 7 8 13 .4 4 4 7 ,5 4 2 9 .4 5 6 2 ,9 0 7 11.0 4 9 4 ,0 5 0 7 .9 5 4 6 ,6 0 9 11 .5 4 2 2 ,5 5 8 9 .2
Z ih n e 6 5 ,9 6 8 5.1 2 7 6 ,1 4 2 7 .0 153 ,653 3 .2 358 ,531 7 .0 3 5 2 ,8 3 4 5 .6 170 ,7 5 0 3 .6 179 ,525 3 .9
K tiprtilti 6 4 ,7 0 0 5 .0 2 3 5 ,7 5 0 6 .0 2 6 2 ,8 5 0 5 .5 2 7 9 ,5 0 0 5 .4 3 9 6 ,2 5 0 6 .3 2 7 1 ,9 0 0 5 .7 2 1 4 ,4 0 0 4 .7
T ikve$ - - 1 8 1 ,7 2 2 4 .6 157 ,6 0 0 3 .3 3 1 8 ,0 5 0 6 .2 2 7 1 ,4 5 0 4 .3 2 0 1 ,8 0 0 4 .2 158 ,475 3 .4
Istru m ca 134 ,585 1 0 .5 190 ,525 4 .8 3 3 8 ,0 2 5 7.1 3 1 1 ,3 0 0 6.1 3 7 9 ,6 2 5 6.1 2 4 5 ,9 0 0 5.2 2 5 8 ,1 5 5 5 .6
T O T A L 4 7 8 .5 5 3 3 7 .3 1 .4 1 3 .9 1 7 3 5 .8 1 .3 5 9 .6 7 0 28 .6 1 .8 3 0 .2 8 8 3 5 .7 1 ,8 9 4 .2 0 9 3 0 .2 1 .4 3 6 .9 5 9 30.1 1 .2 3 3 .1 1 3 2 6 .8
C a te g o r ic a l a nd P ro v in c ia l A g g res a tes
S U B -T O T A L 1 ,1 4 8 ,0 5 8 90 3 ,4 1 8 ,0 8 6 87 3 ,1 0 3 ,2 9 7 65 4 ,0 9 7 .4 4 7 80 5 ,0 9 0 .1 2 9 81 3 ,7 3 6 ,6 6 8 78 3 ,7 0 5 ,7 8 2 81
O T H E R  D IS T R IC T S 1 3 3 ,7 5 0 10 5 3 1 ,9 3 8 13 1 ,6 4 5 ,1 1 2 35 1 ,0 3 1 ,1 8 8 20 1 ,1 8 4 ,2 4 5 19 1 ,0 3 4 ,0 2 4 22 8 9 6 ,9 8 0 19
P R O V IN C E 1 ,2 8 1 ,8 0 8 100 3 ,9 5 0 ,0 2 4 100 4 ,7 4 8 ,4 0 9 100 5 ,1 2 8 ,6 3 5 100 6 ,2 7 4 ,3 7 4 100 4 ,7 7 0 ,6 9 2 100 4 ,6 0 2 ,7 6 2 100
Source: Ziraat Bankasmin ikrazatim Mubeyyin Istatistik Defteridir, 1305-1324, 1889-1908, Dersaadet: Matbayi Osmaniye.
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Table 2 (Cont.)
Distribution o f  Agricultural Bank Credits between Districts, 1889-1908 (Kuru$es) (Cont.)
189 8  | %  | 1 899 %  I 1 900  | %  | 1901 | %  | 1902  | %  | 1 9 0 3  | %  | 1 9 0 9  I %
D istr ic ts  w ith  H ig h  C^lftlik C o n c e n tr a tio n  (A lso  th e  L ea d in g  C e n te rs  o f  C erea l P ro d u c tio n )
S e la n ik 6 5 5 ,3 9 1 13.3 182 ,230 5 .6 3 9 7 ,8 2 0 11 .9 3 9 9 ,9 7 0 10.6 2 8 5 ,4 2 5 8.1 13 9 ,1 5 0 5 .2 5 4 8 ,6 7 5 7 .8
K a ra fe ry e 2 6 9 ,3 0 0 5.5 1 94 ,330 5 .9 122 ,325 3 .7 122 ,350 3 .2 116 ,830 3 .3 2 2 6 ,9 0 5 8 .5 9 9 8 ,9 3 0 14.3
Y en ice 2 2 6 ,2 2 2 4 .6 134 ,518 4.1 2 1 3 ,3 0 5 6 .4 2 0 9 ,9 7 5 5 .6 198 ,200 5.7 11 0 ,6 5 0 4.1 4 2 7 ,6 0 0 6.1
V o d in e 2 1 0 ,4 7 5 4 .3 8 4 ,6 5 0 2 .6 3 1 8 ,1 2 5 9 .5 2 1 1 ,4 0 0 5 .6 139 ,675 4 .0 8 6 ,3 2 5 3 .2 2 6 6 ,4 7 5 3 .8
K a tr in 6 9 ,3 7 5 1 .4 7 1 ,3 6 0 2 .2 128 ,725 3 .9 2 1 1 ,0 1 8 5 .6 142 ,855 4.1 9 4 ,0 0 0 3 .5 2 8 5 ,4 5 6 4.1
A v r e th isa r 1 1 9 ,0 0 0 2 .4 5 4 ,3 8 0 1.7 193 ,525 5 .8 3 2 1 ,2 0 0 8 .5 4 9 3 ,5 0 0 14.1 8 2 ,6 0 0 3.1 4 9 5 ,0 7 5 7.1
G ev g e li 1 05 ,3 2 5 2.1 6 9 ,0 5 0 2.1 159 ,275 4 .8 197 ,325 5.2 192 ,035 5 .5 8 9 ,0 7 5 3 .3 5 6 8 ,4 4 0 8.1
P etr i? 9 1 ,4 8 5 1 .9 107 ,325 3 .3 4 5 ,6 6 0 1.4 3 1 ,8 0 5 0 .8 6 6 ,0 9 5 1.9 8 7 ,5 0 0 3 .3 1 1 0 ,0 0 0 1.6
T O T A L 1.7 4 6 .5 7 3 3 5 .5 8 97 .8 4 3 2 7 .4 1 .5 7 8 .7 6 0 47 .3 1 .705 .043 4 5 .2 1 .634 .615 4 6 .7 9 1 6 .2 0 5 3 4 .2 3 .7 0 0 .6 5 1 5 2 .9
D istr ic ts  w h e r e  S m a ll-S c a le  P ea sa n t P r o p r ie to r sh ip  w a s  P re d o m in a n t (A lso  P r im a ry  C e n te rs  o f  T o b a c c o  P ro d u c tio n  a n d  o f  S e r ic u ltu r e )
D ram a 3 6 1 ,2 5 4 7 .3 1 00 ,850 3 .1 172 ,465 5 .2 6 8 ,0 4 7 1.8 7 1 ,8 6 5 2.1 7 8 ,7 9 5 2 .9 3 5 1 ,3 0 0 5 .0
K a v a la 5 1 ,5 7 5 1 .0 2 2 ,7 5 0 0 .7 2 8 ,8 5 0 0 .9 13 ,600 0 .4 3 2 ,2 5 0 0 .9 1 6 ,500 0 .6 6 3 ,8 2 5 0 .9
S a n  $ a b a n 7 1 ,2 7 0 1 .4 6 8 ,2 5 0 2.1 6 2 ,7 7 5 1.9 5 7 ,0 5 0 1.5 2 0 ,6 7 5 0 .6 4 7 ,8 3 5 1.8 3 3 ,8 5 0 0 .5
C u m a -i B a la 121 ,9 0 0 2 .5 139 ,825 4 .3 88 ,9 2 5 2.7 9 7 ,1 0 0 2 .6 5 0 ,4 5 0 1.4 8 5 ,8 5 0 3 .2 2 1 8 ,8 7 5 3.1
P rov i$ te 164 ,563 3 .3 3 6 ,1 1 5 1.1 124 ,8 6 7 3 .7 102 ,625 2 .7 9 9 ,2 4 0 2 .8 8 0 ,2 2 5 3 .0 162 ,875 2 .3
K esen d ire 1 3 3 ,6 5 0 2 .7 106,921 3 .3 6 0 ,0 8 3 1.8 108 ,9 5 0 2 .9 5 7 ,3 0 0 1.6 5 8 ,7 9 0 2.2 1 2 6 ,6 0 0 1.8
T O T A L 9 0 4 .2 1 2 18 .4 474 .7 1 1 14 .5 5 3 7 .9 6 5 16.1 4 4 7 .3 7 2 11 .9 3 3 1 .7 8 0 9 .5 5 8 .7 9 0 13 .8 1 2 6 .6 0 0 13.7
D istr ic ts  w h e r e  S m a ll S ca le  P e a sa n t  P r o p r ie to r sh ip  w a s  P re d o m in a n t, a lth o u g h  th e  C iftlik s  w e r e  co m m o n  
(A lso  L e a d in g  C e n te rs  o f  O p iu m  and  C o tto n  P ro d u c tio n )
S iro z 2 4 6 ,3 4 7 5 .0 132 ,880 4.1 2 1 6 ,2 9 7 6 .5 181 ,565 4 .8 2 8 0 ,7 0 0 8 .0 2 0 3 ,6 0 2 7 .6 1 5 5 ,6 8 9 2 .2
Z ih n e 9 8 ,9 5 0 2 .0 6 1 ,5 0 0 1.9 5 9 ,8 0 0 1.8 6 5 ,6 0 0 1.7 7 5 ,0 3 0 2.1 9 3 ,5 0 4 3 .5 6 9 ,7 7 0 1.0
K o p r iilii 147 ,365 3 .0 5 0 0 ,1 5 0 15.3 165 ,7 0 0 5 .0 2 4 0 ,7 0 0 6 .4 191 ,925 5 .5 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 4 .5 1 7 8 ,0 5 0 2 .5
T ikve§ 2 8 0 ,6 7 5 5 .7 136 ,750 4 .2 1 0 5 ,0 5 0 3.1 7 0 ,2 2 5 1.9 82 ,875 2 .4 2 0 4 ,4 7 5 7.6 19 5 ,7 7 0 2 .8
Istru m ca 4 1 6 ,0 5 0 8 .5 134 ,039 4.1 148 ,4 0 0 4.4 2 2 4 ,7 7 5 6 .0 6 4 ,6 7 5 1.8 189 ,175 7.1 6 0 0 ,9 5 0 8 .6
T O T A L 1 .1 8 9 .3 8 7 2 4 .2 9 6 5 .3 1 9 2 9 .5 6 9 5 .2 4 7 2 0 .8 7 8 2 .8 6 5 2 0 .8 69 5 .2 0 5 19.8 8 1 0 .7 5 6 3 0 .3 1 .2 0 0 .2 2 9 17.1
C a te g o r ic a l an d  P ro v in c ia l A g gres;ates
S U B -T O T A L 3 ,8 4 0 ,1 7 2 78 2 .3 3 7 .8 7 3 71 2 ,8 1 1 ,9 7 2 84 2 ,9 3 5 ,2 8 0 78 2 ,6 6 1 .6 0 0 76 1 .7 8 5 .7 5 1 78 5 ,0 2 7 .4 8 0 84
O T H E R  D IS T R IC T S 1 ,0 8 3 ,0 4 7 22 8 8 8 ,9 0 3 2 9 5 2 8 ,2 0 5 16 8 3 5 ,0 7 4 22 8 4 1 ,0 6 5 2 4 8 8 9 .3 4 4 22 1 .9 7 3 .8 6 0 16
P R O V IN C E 4 ,9 2 3 ,2 1 9 100 3 ,2 2 6 ,7 7 6 100 3 ,3 4 0 ,1 7 7 100 3 ,7 7 0 ,3 5 4 100 3 ,5 0 2 ,6 6 5 100 2 ,6 7 5 ,0 9 5 100 7 ,0 0 1 ,3 4 0 100
Source: Ziraat Bankasinin Ikrazatim Miibeyyin istatistik Defteridir, 1305-1324, 1889-1908, Dersaadet: Matbayi Osmaniye.
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APPENDIX 6
Real Estate Ownership in Salonica
L e a d i n g  R e a I  E s t a t e  O w n e r s  i n  S a l o n i c a  a n d  A n n u a l  R e t u r n s  o v e r  R e a l  E s t a t e  O w n e d  i n  S a l o n i c a ,  c . 1 9 1 0  ( K u  r u s e s )
N a m e  o f  t h e  P e r s o n T y p e  o f  E s t a t e L o c a t i o n V a l u e  ( 1 ) A n n u a l  R e n t  ( 2 ) ( 2 V ( 1 )
Ism ail Pasa Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 70 ,000 13,000 19%
S alih  P asazade K am il Bey R esidential H am idiye Q uartiers 40 ,000 7,500 19%
N uriye H am m Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 105,000 22,500 21%
M essiuer S ifald ir (?) R esidential H am idiye Q uartiers 27 ,000 27,000 100%
M essiuer Levi M odiyano R esidential H am idiye Q uartiers 420,000 40,000 10%
M ekteb-i Sanayi R esidential H am idiye Q uartiers 200,000 48,000 24%
R em osin  A nkelaki (?) Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 50 ,000 5,000 10%
Y orgi Isteryadi Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 20 ,000 3,100 16%
M arpu lgo  K ostandi R esidential H am idiye Q uartiers 50,000 4,500 9%
A y?e H am m Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 50,000 5,000 10%
M ekteb-i Sanayi C ofee H ouse H am idiye Q uartiers 22,000 6,000 27%
M ekteb-i Sanayi Shop H am idiye Q uartiers 16,000 3,500 22%
M ahm ud Efendi B akery V ardar A venue 30,000 6,000 20%
M anm ud K am il Efendi Restaurant V ardar A venue 42,000 4,500 11%
??? Efendi Shop M anastir A venue 15,000 1,600 11%
E sre f Bey C offee Shop V ardar A venue 13,000 13,500 104%
A vram  (??? ) Large Large S tore M anastir A venue 30,000 4,500 15%
S aias Fam ily T obacco  P lant K olom bo Q uartiers 200,000 120,000 60%
H erzog  Co. T obacco  Plant K olom bo Q uartiers 450,000 81,800 18%
M arori C offee Shop Rihtim  (Q uay) 155,000 9,120 6%
???? Bakery Idare-i A skeri S treet 15,000 1,800 12%
A hm ed K apanci H otel and C offee Shop O lim pos Square 550,000 80,000 15%
A hm ed K apanci Residential and Large Store O lim pos Square 100,000 19,500 20%
H risto  A dam o R esidential and Restaurant R ihtim  (Q uay) 40,000 7,250 18%
A hm ed K apanci Shop O lim pos Square 49,500 6,650 13%
K erem  E fend izade (???) Bey Shop K alam erye A venue 21,000 2,200 10%
A hm ed C avus - Shop U nkapam  Q uartiers 25 ,000 1,400 6%
M orpurgo  Fam ily Shop K azgancilar Q uartiers 25 ,000 1,500 6%
Sofia K onst and in Bakery Carsi Ba$i Q uartiers 40,000 4,500 11%
M irtaki Efendi Large Store U nkapam  Q uartiers 30,000 3,400 11%
Sim on M ano Shop C arsi Ba§i Q uartiers 27 ,000 1,500 6%
S alm on B ija (??? ) Shop K azgancilar Q uartiers 35,000 1,000 3%
A tiye H am m Bakery Sabri Pa$a A venue 30,000 3,600 12%
Rukiye H am m Shop Sabri P asa A venue 23,000 3,000 13%
M ehm et and M ustafa Efendis C offee Shop H iikum et Square 87,000 12,000 14%
T orres  Z adeler Shop Sabri P asa A venue 30,000 4,000 13%
Sevki Efendi Large Store Sabri Pasa A venue 30,000 7,500 25%
B ekir S ad ik  Efendi Shop O rtu lu  £ ars i 17,500 5,400 31%
B ekir S ad ik  Efendi Large Store O rtu lu  Qar$i 37 ,500 4,200 11%
B ekir S ad ik  Efendi T hree Large S tores O rtu lu  C ars' 75 ,000 8,400 11%
Suha Bey Large Store O rtu lu  C ars ' 110,000 12,000 11%
N iko la  P aparisi (??) Pub K esisler Q uartiers 90 ,000 11,500 13%
A hm ed K apanci Efendi Large Store Istanbul Carsisi 55,000 4,200 8%
M iyaz A sin  Efendi (??? ) Shop Y ah K apusu Q uartiers 40 ,000 3,450 9%
M ustafa Efendi Shop Y ah K apusu Q uartiers 18,000 1,600 9%
N uri Efendi Large Store Parm ak K apu Q uartiers 20 ,000 7,000 35%
M osyo Isak  Salom Large Store l$tira Q uartiers 20 ,000 7,000 35%
H aci H am id  Efendi Large Store istira  Q uartiers 25 ,000 8,000 32%
S uha Bey Large S tore and Land P lot I$tira Q uartiers 45 ,000 4,750 11%
O ttom an and Salon ica Banks T hree Large S tores S iseciler Q uartiers 76 ,000 10,000 13%
Y u su f B ozuncu Tw enty tw o Large S tores Frenk Q uartiers 160,000 22,000 14%
(????) Shop Biiyiik Pazar 15,000 2,500 17%
A s above Shop Buyiik Pazar 9,000 2,100 23%
H aci H useyin  Efendi R esidential Lom bardo Street 200,000 20,500 10%
M urad F ikri E fendi Shop K arrlar Pazari 22 ,000 2,400 11%
M i$on A rgaz Large Store K arilar Pazari 15,000 1,200 8%
D im itri Boyaci Large Store SCipiirgeciler Q uartiers 65 ,000 5,000 8%
H asan  Efendi R esidential B elediye A venue 80,000 8,800 11%
H usnu Efendi R esidential islahane Q uartiers 45 ,000 5,200 12%
H afiz  K erim  Efendi R esidential Sozsiizsu Q uartiers 30 ,000 2,700 9%
§eyh E §ref Bey x '  Shop V ardar A venue 45,000 8,400 19%
T on iez  Sason (?) B ezirhane F renk Q uartiers 60 ,000 5,000 8%
Salim e H am m Residential Islahane Q uartiers 35 ,000 4,400 13%
H aci Selim  A ga L arge Store K antar Street 45 ,000 4,000 9%
??? Pandali Residential H am idiye Q uartiers 40 ,000 4,000 10%
Y ako and Levi M odiyano Site Sabri P asa  A venue 550,000 180,000 33%
Levi M odiyano L arge Store S iseciler Q uartiers 650 ,000 110,000 17%
T O T A L 5.857 .500 1.062.620 18%
R E S ID E N T IA L  T O T A L 1.462.000 221,200 15%
C O M M E R C IA L  T O T A L 4.395 .500 841.420 19%
Source: BA, TFR.l.M., 20/1919, 19.2.1326 (22.1.1885).
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APPENDIX 7 
Shipping in Selanik
Tonnage o f  Ships Clearing from the Ports o f Salonica and Kavala, 1883-1912
Year Salonica Kavala
1883 500,434 n.a
1884 574,215 n.a
1885 578,088 n.a
1886 725,043 n.a
1887 632,917 169,788
1888 733,755 169,976
1889 726,916 191,453
1890 813,122 123,509
1891 871,468 n.a
1892 943,153 171,829
1893 813,488 n.a
1894 858,161 n.a
1895 838,433 205,489
1896 772,854 241,115
1897 725,156 207,332
1898 824,953
1899 741,447 246,525
1900 703,744 191,269
1901 795,135 n.a
1902 910,673 n.a
1903 842,167 228,006
1904 919,430 219,576
1905 922,073 237,656
1906 927,132 247,067
1907 n.a. n.a
1908 1,037,460 286,285
1909 1,090,825 293,478
1910 1,173,643 328,327
1911 1,096,168 381,256
1912 874,788 344,053
Source: F.O.A.S., Miscellaneous Volumes, 1883-1912.
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